


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


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POLITICAL ELOQUENCE IN GREECE:

DEMOSTHENES.

WITH EXTRACTS FROM HIS ORATIONS, AND A CRITICAL
DISCUSSION OF THE "TRIAL ON THE CROWN."

BY

L. BRÉDIF,

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TRANSLATED BY

M. J. MAC MAHON, A.M.

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TO
HON. GEORGE H. PAUL,

OF MILWAUKEE, WIS.,

PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF WISCONSIN
UNIVERSITY,

AS A TRIBUTE OF RESPECT FOR EMINENT ABILITY AND OF
GRATITUDE FOR VALUABLE SERVICE IN BEHALF
OF PUBLIC EDUCATION,

THIS VOLUME IS
RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

THE author of this work has devoted twenty-two years to the study and teaching of Ancient Letters, and has particularly studied Demosthenes and his contemporary orators. If this were the only recommendation for the appearance of "Political Eloquence in Greece" in the English language, it would not, we think, be a slight one; but from the author's comparative study of ancient and modern eloquence, from his exposition of the passions, incentives and convictions underlying those remarkable outbursts of eloquence which culminated in a Demosthenes and an Æschines, in a Cicero and a Cæsar, in a Mirabeau and a Bossuet, the student of history, oratory and philosophy will find this volume instructive.

"To animate a people renowned for justice, humanity and valor, yet in many instances degenerate and corrupted; to warn them of the dangers of luxury, treachery and bribery; of the ambition and perfidy of a powerful foreign enemy; to recall the glory of their ancestors to their thoughts, and to inspire them with resolution, vigor and unanimity; to correct abuses, to restore discipline, to revive and enforce the generous sentiments of patriotism and public spirit,"—these were the purposes for which Demosthenes labored, and they may possibly recommend themselves to the orator, the statesman, and the citizen of the nineteenth century.

To the classical student who has read or is to read the *Oration on the Crown* and the *Oration Against Ctesiphon*,

Chapter XI will possess a particular interest. In it Professor Brédif has drawn, with a masterly and impartial pen, a picture of the two great adversaries, of their times and their acts, their abilities and their failings, their rise and their fall.

A love for the Greek language and literature, and a strong admiration for the scholarly manner in which the author has treated the king of the ancient tribune, might also be mentioned as incentives which induced the translator to undertake this task. That the work is free from errors and worthy of the admirable original, we can by no means vouchsafe. So vast is the field of ancient literature from which the author has gathered his rich material, that it has been difficult at all times to consult the original texts. Of the numerous extracts from the classical writers of antiquity, we have translated some from the original Greek and Latin, others we have taken directly from the author's faithful version, and in the orations of Demosthenes and Æschines we have availed ourselves of the excellent translations made by Dr. Leland and Mr. Kennedy.

The special thanks of the translator are due: first to the author himself, then to Major Geo. M. McConnel, of Chicago, for valuable critical assistance, to Alfred Flinch, Ph.D., for advice on the last chapters, to the publishers and printers for their pains to issue the volume in its present form, and to many friends for their interest in the progress of the work and for their appreciated criticisms and suggestions.

M. J. MACMAHON.

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, March 1881.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

“**T**HAT which distinguishes man from the lower animals, and the Greek from the Barbarian, is his superiority of intelligence and utterance.” Isocrates might have added that the best use to which speech can be put is the examination and defense of civic interests. Political eloquence was one of the essential elements and one of the least disputed glories of Athenian democracy. We cannot attempt to study in detail its various developments.

The political eloquence of Greece, during the Persian invasions and the Peloponnesian war, left no original monument of itself. It has been necessary to trace it through second-hand productions,—sometimes rendered faithfully enough (as in Thucydides), but all rare and insufficient. On the other hand, during the forty years which elapse between the capture of Athens by Lysander and the appearance of Philip on the borders of Greece (404–359 B.C.), Attic eloquence is especially judicial,—political eloquence merely incidental. Hence, while profiting by the writers whose recollections of early ages illuminate, in a general manner, the history of political eloquence, we have particularly sketched the image of that eloquence which rendered the Macedonian epoch so illustrious. Demosthenes and his contemporaries do not constitute the entire eloquence of Greece, but they represent it with the greatest éclat at one of the most impressive moments in the life of the Greek world.

Two great personages eclipse all others in the middle of the fourth century of Hellenic history (362–336 B.C.): Philip and Demosthenes. They and the Athenians are the three

actors in the national drama unfolded in Greece. We have drawn a picture of the Macedonian king and the city against which he contended.

In regard to Demosthenes, his achievements as a statesman and as an orator fill and animate this entire work. At every moment he appears upon the scene as an actor or witness. Happy would it be if the reader found as much delight in listening to his eloquent testimonies as the heliasts experienced in hearing those of Homer and Solon, Sophocles and Euripides, read by the court clerk. We have thought it possible to dwell upon the judicial eloquence of Athens without inconformity to the title of this work. The functions of advocate and political orator were so closely interlaced among the ancients that it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate them. Private interests and political tendencies incessantly commingled in the cities where the retired and private man was but little separated from the active citizen.

Thus the bar was converted into a political arena. The passions which agitated the assembled people might also move the tribunal. The debates presented a doubly interesting spectacle of opponents defending their life or their honor, while at the same time they took sides on affairs of state,—a public deliberation grafted upon a duel. Under such conditions, it is not surprising to hear an ex-consul, the prince of the political rostrum at Rome, assert the priority of judicial eloquence,—the most difficult, perhaps, of human accomplishments, but also the grandest.* A political trial was the origin of Cicero's masterpiece in oratory, *Oratio pro Milone*.

One particular cause consolidated the union of deliberative and judicial functions at Athens: public administration was extended to the entire people. The accorded right, not to say the duty, imposed upon every citizen of investigating

* In causarum contentionibus magnum est quoddam opus, atque haud scio an de humanis operibus longe maximum. (*De Oratore*, ii, 17.)

political crimes and misdemeanors, favored the perpetual confusion of the tribune and the bar by inciting accusations in which private pique was too often armed under the guise of public interests.

The only three orations of Æschines which remain to us are three political speeches. With the exception of the *Philippics* and the *Olynthiacs*, the finest harangues of Demosthenes* are composed in about an equal measure of the deliberative and judicial element. Add to this that the Athenians did not have special judges for special cases. When there was a question of civil claims or a political debate, the tribunal was always a part, more or less respectable, of the Athenian multitude,—a popular audience, whose minds the orator ruled and whose passions he swayed by appropriate arts. Whence among the Attics the affinity of oratorical customs at the tribune and bar, and the necessity, in order to thoroughly comprehend the political orators of Athens, of seeing her advocates at work.

A witness, to be proof against suspicion, should neither be a partisan nor a dependent of the litigant. To these conditions the tribunal of Letters might add another, that of not being his translator or his critic. There is a common inclination to become over-zealous in our admiration of a writer whom long and sympathetic communion has apparently made our own; the exact truth sometimes suffers from this excess of good will. Great names add to this interested affection a prestige which favors illusion. Undoubtedly, one should not speak lightly of such eminent personages; but if respect is due to their glory, the whole truth is due to the reader. We believe that we have studied the king of the ancient tribune with a veneration that is free from partiality. The citizen, the statesman, and the orator are sufficiently strong in him to sustain the re-

* *Contra Leptinem, In Midiam, In Aristocratem, On the Affairs of the Chersonese, On the Embassy, and On the Crown.*

proaches which the man and the polemic did not always escape.

Brébœuf has been reproached for being more Lucian than Lucian himself (*Lucano Lucanior*). Many an interpreter of Demosthenes, undoubtedly dissatisfied with his original eloquence, contributes to it what pleases his own taste. Unfortunately the Attics were not eloquent in the Gallic view; to adorn Demosthenes amounts to parodying him; to make him bombastic, does not render him more recognizable. When he recounts *wrongs*, the translator, with the best intention imaginable, denounces *crimes*. "Rest in repose, confident and armed," becomes "Await without noise, confidence in your hearts, and your sword in hand." "I will speak with frankness," is cold; a substitute is made: "Nothing will enchain my tongue." These scruples are given with good intention, but they miss the mark. For want of stones, an indiscreet tenderness throws flowers and metaphors at this colossus. The greatest service which Demosthenes' friends can render him is to refrain from obliging him with this affectation. Do you wish that his beauty should enrapture? Then display him simply as he is. You will thus spare him the "calumnies" of which Addison* complained, and you will avert from yourself the application of the adage, *Traduttore, traditore*. The translator should be the prime auxiliary of the critic; an ancient orator well translated has his commentaries half written.

During long years devoted to secondary and higher instruction, we have collected from the study of ancient literature rich materials, which is to-day distributed into fourteen different courses. We offer the most recent of these courses to the public; it is also one of the most modern. May it be hoped that this conscientious study in which moral

* I have been *traduced* in French. (The French word meaning translated is *traduit*.)

philosophy, politics and literary criticism naturally lend their aid, will prepare the way for its seniors by meriting the indulgent approbation of its readers.

Demetrius, the Phalerian, said of eloquence that in free states it is like the sword in combat. Well organized republics should know no other civil battle-field than that of the tribune—a peaceful and fruitful arena where the issue is joined between intelligence and intelligence on a common ground of national devotion.

When recalling the oratorical and sanguinary conflicts of the patricians and plebeians, at periods reputed the most flourishing of the Roman Republic, the author of the *Dialogue of Orators* charges eloquence with living upon seditions. Free and united France nurtures eloquence with better aliments. The era of social seditions will never again interrupt her, and, thanks to the Constitution which has made her her own sovereign, she will avoid errors which might cause her to launch words of iron, as did Athens and Demosthenes, against foreign enemies.

Far more fortunate in our day is the mission of the French forum. In profound peace its sole impulse is for good; it exhibits with pride the dearest interests of the country to all eyes. Assisted by its powerful ally the press, it has become, by wise considerations, the political preceptor of the people; and by the dignity of its sentiments it nobly maintains the proud soul of France.



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POLITICAL ELOQUENCE IN GREECE.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

IN the seventeenth century, when public speaking was restricted principally to the pulpit and bar, Fénelon restored the omnipotence of Grecian eloquence. To-day our assemblies are manifestly uncereemonious; they exhibit great examples of the efficiency of eloquence, but still they are far from those triumphs familiar to Greek antiquity. And so we can share even in these days the admiration of the author of *The Letter to the Academy*.

Eloquence will never exercise over us the sovereignty which it enjoyed at Athens. This is attributable to the different conditions of public life among the ancients and moderns. From her cradle Greece grew up and waxed strong in the warm light of liberty. As long as her independence lasted she breathed the public life of the Pnyx and the Agora. In the popular assemblies, where the nation met for deliberation, eloquence was naturally called upon to play an important rôle. Political discussions took place in the open air; each deliberation was like a drama played by a thousand actors, whose passions and votes depended on the master of the tribune. In the midst of democratic cities, justly jealous of governing themselves and examining care-

fully their own affairs, "all could do everything."* The majority decided without appeal most important questions: the choice of alliances, peace or war, the life or death of the vanquished. "*In a democratic state*," says Æschines, "*the private individual is a king by right of law and suffrage.*"† Sometimes a great citizen appears to be king of a city; but this fragile royalty depends upon the favor of the people: the people have instituted it, and the people at their will overthrow it, according to the impulse of the moment. What ally will aid the statesman in preserving the confidence of the city whose will he must obey?—Eloquence. In former times, says Aristotle,‡ the usurpers to whom the citizens submitted were generals. For then the sword was more skillfully handled, and was more powerful than speech; "but in our days, thanks to the progress of eloquence, the faculty of speaking well will suffice to place a man at the head of the people. Orators are not usurpers on account of their ignorance of military art, or at least such an occurrence is very rare." Thus among the Greeks the multitude was master of everything, and oratory was master of the multitude.

This power of eloquence produced surprising effects. The Athenian army falls into the hands of the victorious Sicilians. Diocles, a favorite orator, advises the Sicilians to kill the generals, to sell or throw the soldiers into prison. The Sicilians applaud these vigorous measures. A citizen, Nicolaus (although the war has deprived him of his two sons) exhorts the victors to

* Tacitus, *Dialogue of Orators*, 40.

† Ἐν πύλει δημοκρατουμένη ἀρχὴ ἰδιώτης νόμῳ καὶ ψήφῳ βασιλεύει. (*Against Ctesiphon*).

‡ *Politics*, viii, 4.

clemency. The people are touched, and are about to pardon them. Gylippus, a Spartan general, alarmed at this impolitic weakness, speaks in his turn: the multitude is exasperated, and votes the punishment.*

Once, at Athens, the Mityleneans, having revolted, were condemned to death in mass by the advice of Cleon. The next day Diodotus made the people blush at such thoughtless barbarity, and the Mityleneans were spared.† Eloquence also reigned in the Amphictyonic assemblies: a council of the states general of Greece, in which the interests, as well as the political and religious debates of the Hellenic family were discussed. Thus public speaking was the main-spring of Greek society.

From its origin eloquence flourished in Greece without effort or study, as if on a soil best adapted to it. This spontaneity sprang from qualities indigenous to the Hellenic race: customs and institutions nourished and bore it into full maturity. Sensibility, lively imagination, flexible and delicate organs, electric sympathies,—nothing prevented the Hellenes from acquiring the gift of speech without seeking it. The Grecian was born an orator (ὁρίζωρ), and the social center in which he lived, since the heroic age, compelled him to provide himself with convincing and persuasive power. In his *Théâtre des rhéteurs* Father Cressolins, of the Society of Jesus, quotes a verse of the Odyssey (xix, 179) to trace the art of oratory, not to the deluge of Deucalion, but anterior to it: to Deucalion's father, Minos, who was converted into a profound sage and consummate reasoner by lessons drawn from conversations with Jupiter. Without tracing it so far back, the

* Diodorus Siculus, xiii, 19 et seq.

† Thucydides, iii, 35 et seq.

ingenious scholar might have been satisfied with the story of Peleus confiding Achilles to Phœnix that he might learn how "to speak and to act"; or with those verses of the *Iliad* which describe the oratorical contests with which the Achaean youth diverted the assemblies.* This twofold influence of natural gifts and customs appears manifest in Homer. Heroic feudalism discloses democratic inclinations in which the future institutions of popular government are foreshadowed. The counsel-bearing (*βουληφόροι*) orators are but harbingers of the ordinary counsellors and ministers of Athens; even then we behold in Thersites the dawn of demagogism. The council of chiefs (*βασιλεις*) deliberating upon public interests, and the assembly of the people (*λαός*), open to eloquence a vaster field on which glories equal to those of the battle-field are acquired; the whole is but a representation of the assemblies of the gods on Olympus, when they harangue one another in the hope of effecting a better understanding. Achilles is the first hero of the *Iliad*; Ulysses is the next in rank. The lance of Thetis' son is most effective in combat; the oratory of Sisyphus' son is most effective in council.† An irresistible orator, his voice is powerful, his concise and weighty sentences demolish and sweep all before them like a torrent. He has well shown how eloquence, like Achilles' javelin, can cure the evils which it has inflicted.‡ Outside of political life what a part eloquence is made to play in the drama

* *Iliad*, ix, 443; xv, 283.

† *Iliad*, ix, 441; iii, 221; *Odyssey*, xiii, 297; ix, 441.

‡ The second book of the *Iliad* affords a memorable example of this (verse 144 et seq.) Agamemnon wishes to test the army; he advises it to return home. His discourse, more persuasive than even the orator himself had anticipated, is too effective; the Achæans rush

of the Iliad, teeming with sudden passion to be exhaled, with impetuosities to be governed, resistances to be overcome! If the immortals laugh to their hearts' content, the kings below rival them in cursing each other. With great difficulty Nestor calms the tumults of this stormy parliament. At one moment the stubborn wrath of Achilles draws forth the most eloquent supplications; at another old Priam's tears moisten the crimsoned hands of his last son; in still another place the tenderness of Andromache would disarm the rash valor of her husband: all pathetic inspirations which tragedy and eloquence have never surpassed.

The power of public speaking and its important office in Homeric times explain the care with which the poet has drawn the characters and even the attitudes of his orators.* It also bears witness to these significant verses:

“With partial hands the gods their gifts dispense;
Some greatly think, some speak with manly sense;
Here Heaven an elegance of form denies,
But wisdom the defect of form supplies:
This man with energy of thought controls,
And steals with modest violence our souls;
He speaks reserv'dly, but he speaks with force,
Nor can one word be changed but for a worse;
In public more than mortal he appears,
And, as he moves, the gazing crowd reveres.”†

to their boats with joyful shouts. Ulysses intervenes opportunely, and prevents the execution of Agamemnon's test, which proved too successful.

“He said. The shores with loud applauses sound,
The hollow ships each deafning shout rebound.”

* Iliad, iii, 209.

† Odyssey, viii, 167. This apotheosis of eloquence is found in *De Oratore*, iii, 14. The eulogy of oratory was natural to a poet of whom

The power and necessity of eloquence increased in proportion as the spirit of aristocratic feudalism in the early ages gave place to democratic institutions, and consequently, that Greek race which became the most warmly attached to free government was destined to behold the art of eloquence flourishing most vigorously in it.

This was the peculiar privilege of the Ionic family established in Attica, and became the treasure of Athens.

The ancients were unanimous in rendering to her this testimony: "The taste for eloquence was not common to all Greece, but it was the exclusive attribute of Athens. In verity, who knows any orator of Argos, of Corinth, or of Thebes, during this epoch? As to Lacedæmon, I have never heard it stated that up to our days she produced a single one."*

A Lacedæmonian system of rhetoric, like that of the Stoics, would have taught the art of silence. Could this singular faculty be peculiar to the very atmosphere of Attica, and an omen of some mysterious link between the nature of the soil and the genius of its people? "Scarcely issued from the Piræus, eloquence sped over all the Grecian isles and spread throughout Asia; but, adulterated by foreign customs, it lost the pure and wholesome diction it brought from Attica,

Quintilian could say: "Rivers and fountains find their source in the ocean, thus Homer is the father and model of all kinds of eloquence."

* Brutus, 13. Brasidas, however, was not deficient in eloquence, "for a Lacedæmonian." Thucydides iv, 84. The Spartans generally mention Menelaus. Iliad, iii, 213.

"When Atreus' son harangued the listening train,
Just was his sense, and his expression plain,
His words succinct, yet full, without a fault;
He spoke no more than just the thing he ought."

and nearly forgot its mother idiom." Eloquence in the East, even at Rhodes, divested itself of those qualities drawn from its natal soil, and Athens remained the privileged abode, the classical ground of oratorical talent.

This predilection on the part of eloquence for the city of Minerva is explained by the nature of Athenian institutions. In Rome the patricians were not satisfied with having laid hands upon history which had been converted from the first into a pontifical code and partial guardian of the renown and privileges of their order, but they reserved to themselves the monopoly of legal knowledge and the forms of court procedure; so that when prosecuted, a plebeian client was at the mercy of his patron. At Athens there existed nothing like this pernicious guardianship. The law of Solon willed that every citizen should be as competent to defend his rights by speech as by arms on the field of battle. The law enjoined upon him that he should create, by the practice of public speaking, a new guarantee of his independence,—a pledge and warrant of his dignity. "If incapacity to defend one's person is shameful, it would be strange if the inability to defend one's self with speech were not equally so, for speech is befitting a man much more than corporal qualities."*

Imbued with this spirit of democratic liberty and strong personality, the constitution of Solon gave to political life and open speech an impulse which the authority of the Pisistratidæ might weaken but could not arrest. The four qualified classes established by the legislator constituted the assembly of the people, and furnished the tribunals with judges or *heliasts*. Thus all citizens, rich and poor, were admitted with

* Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, i, 1.

the archons and areopagus to share the sovereignty and to scrutinize public affairs. Persons of importance were obliged to give their logical advice in these assemblies. On opening the sessions a herald demanded, in a loud voice, "Who of the citizens above the age of fifty years will address the assembly?" The "most virtuous and sage" obligation of fifty years, regretted by Æschines,* soon fell into disuse, and the right of all to mingle in public matters before the tribunal was developed every day along with the progress of liberty and the aggrandisement of the state.†

The democratic‡ reforms introduced into the constitution of Solon by Clisthenes, chief of the Alcmeonidæ, after the final expulsion of the Pisistratidæ, impressed upon the political activity of Athens a decided impulse, which exalted the conceptions of her citizens and the mission of eloquence. From that time freedom rendered Athens capable of conceiving and of executing great things, as well as of transmitting them

* *Against Ctesiphon.*

† "The laws instruct the *orator* and the *strategus*, who wish to be held in good repute with the people, to have children conformably to the law, to possess real estate in the territory, and to merely direct the people after having given all legitimate pledges." (Dinarchus, *Against Demosthenes*.) Plutarch (*On the Love of Children*) attributes to Lysurgus and Solon a law against bachelors, which was in force at Sparta, but the Attic orators have not left in their works a trace of its application at Athens. This obligation of being married, father and proprietor, conditions formerly exacted by the theorists of a civilized country, but poorly conforms to the spirit of tolerant liberty in Athens, and the indulgent ease of its manners. Bachelors might there be of little importance, even ridiculed. Upon their tomb was placed a particular figure,—that of the *λειτουργός*; but the law respected toward them the fundamental principle of the equal rights of all citizens.

‡ Aristotle, *Politics*, iii, 1; viii, 2.

to posterity in standard literature.* Fame and honor were more than ever assured; not to the most noble and opulent, but to those most capable of persuasive appeals. The magistrates became responsible to the people, and appeared before their tribunal. Their rendition of accounts initiated the people in the administration of government and jurisprudence, and familiarized them with contradictory debates. The Athenians from that moment knew no other school than the Pnyx. It was indeed the best school, and by far the best.

The Median wars, in this respect as in many others, aroused Athens to action. The evils of foreign invasions are sometimes compensated by the benefits which an enemy unconsciously brings with the invasion. To the passion of the Persian kings for conquest Athens (not to mention the immediate union of nearly the entire Hellenic family) owed the subsidence of its domestic rivalries, and a maritime supremacy destined to remain its characteristic and dominant power. Henceforward she could intone her *Rule Britannia, Britannia rules the waves*;† her maritime vocation was fixed; the democratic movement springing suddenly from the mixture of all classes on the ships, a last and fragile hope of the commonwealth; the recurrent outgrowth of that sentiment of equality so active at all times among the Athenians, and still more quickened by common trials and victories; the expansion of the authority of Athens, now at the head of the hegemony by right of moral conquest, and the political and intellectual focus of the Hellenic world; this meritorious exaltation of the

* Herodotus, v, 78, 91. Grote's *History of Greece*, iv, 107; v, 358.

† This is the *ζώπας ἀνάσσειν* (the royalty of the oar) of Euripides; Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, iii, 2. *Le trident de Neptune est le sceptre du monde*.

land of Miltiades, Themistocles, Cimon, and their competitors, communicated animation to the genius of Athens, and prepared her for the age of Pericles.

Thereafter the constitution of Clisthenes, which had been in vogue for nearly thirty years, had to be enlarged. Of the four classes established by Solon, and recognized by Clisthenes, the first three alone had access to the magistracies. The force of the democratic current was such, after the expulsion of the barbarians, that Aristides, a man little suspected of demagogism, was the first to propose extending the eligibility to all citizens. This recognition of equal rights was consecrated by the adoption of the custom of drawing lots for all posts save that of strategus. All Athenians, after honorably passing the examination of the *dokimasia*, a preliminary inquiry into their morality and capacity, could be summoned by the impartial bean to the highest dignities: to the archonship and senatorship.*

* The drawing of lots, ridiculed by Socrates (*Memorabilia*, i, 2), is, in Aristotle's eyes, the essential character of popular government. In a democratic state "all citizens ought to be electors and eligible to every office; all ought to command each, and each all in turn. All offices ought to be assigned by lot, or at least all that require neither experience nor special talent." (*Politics*, viii, 1.) Montesquieu is also favorable to this method of appointment. "Suffrage by lot is natural to democracy; suffrage by choice is characteristic of aristocracy. The lot is a mode of election which affects no one; it leaves a reasonable expectation to every citizen." (*Esprit des Loix*, ii, 2.) This equalizing procedure cuts out more than one abuse by the roots; it simplifies in a wonderful manner the electoral law. Republican Rome, armed for all emergencies and weak against intrigue; imperial Rome, with her official candidates, might often envy Athens her candidates of chance. "At Heræum the usual way of election was abandoned for that of the lot; election had placed in power only intriguers." (*Politics*, viii, 2). Perfection is ignorant of human things; even in Athens fraud found place. Euxitheus, a client of Demosthenes complains of the electoral operation, which excluded him from

This reform, so favorable to the extension of popular government, was equally so to eloquence. It enforced the practice of public speaking by all classes of citizens, even that mob of sailors (according to a rather scornful phrase of Aristotle) which had saved the state at Salamis, and had placed the democracy on foundations indestructible by any power except democracy itself.*

One of the most important public functions in Athens, although without any administrative character or special power, was that of orator. The orators of Athens were ministers, without governmental departments. Now these ministers, neither elected nor

his canton. "We were in the darkness; Eubulides supplied each of his accomplices with two or three ballots. * * * There were not more than thirty voters, and the number of votes in the urn exceeded sixty. Judge of our astonishment!" (*Against Eubulides*.)

* This democratic expansion, according to Aristotle, was not exempt from dangers. It destroyed the wise equilibrium of Solon's institutions. Hitherto the people had "neither been slavish nor hostile." Salamis gave them a pride which they abused. The sailors of the Piræus, warmer democrats than the inhabitants of the city, were undisciplined, and rebelled against the police of a well organized state. (*Politics*, ii, 9; iv, 5; viii, 3.) According to Montesquieu (*Esprit des Loix*, viii, 4), "Salamis corrupted the Athenian republic"; a disputable estimation, but at all events more acceptable than Plato's paradox. This philosopher (*Laws*, book iv) has only virtue in view, and he declares that the battles of Marathon and Plataea alone saved Greece; Salamis and Artemisium were injurious to her. "The most important point for men is not, as the majority imagine, to save their lives and simply exist, but to become as virtuous as possible, and remain so as long as they live." The practical sense of Aristotle warranted him in these extreme speculations. Plato places a low estimate on the pilots, captains, and oarsmen themselves; crowds gathered together from one place or another who are of little importance. But was this a sufficient reason to regret victories which preserved the life if not the ancient valor of the Hellenic world?

Primo vivere, deinde philosophari.

drawn by lot, but indebted for their investitures to themselves, and constituting themselves counsellors of the people by dint of their ambition or talent, were far from descending as a whole from families of the Eupatridæ. Cleon was a currier, Hyperbolus a lamp-maker, Cleophon a lyre-maker, Eucrates a junk-seller, Lysicles a cattle-drover, Isocrates was the son of a lute-maker, Demosthenes of an armorer, Iphicrates of a shoe-maker, Pytheas of a miller, Æschines a school-master's assistant; Demades, the son of a common sailor, was at first a sailor himself. The participation by the most modest artisans in the government of Athens should inspire neither surprise nor distrust. The offices do not seem to have been the worse filled for all this. "In despotic governments, where they abuse equally honor, position and rank, a prince becomes a blackguard, and a blackguard a prince, indifferently."* There were no blackguards nor fools at Athens. The level of intellectual culture was more uniform in Grecian cities than it is to-day in our modern communities; and the Athenians especially, gifted with most various aptitudes, were fitted for everything.† No one was astonished at seeing a courier (Diodorus) charged with an embassy, a comedian (Aristophanes) a diplomat, a shoemaker a publicist, (Simon, Socrates' friend‡). Let us leave historians and comic poets to become the echoes of aristocratic malice, and to rail at

* *Esprit des Loix*, v, 19.

† Their liveliness, *εὐπραγία*, permitted them to do everything "with grace," *μετὰ χαρίτων*, without even being obliged to exert their talent. (Thucydides, ii, 41.) The sophist Hippias is a curious type in this respect (Plato, *Second Hippias*). Cf. Juvenal, satire iii, 74.

‡ Simon composed a political treatise *On the Law*; another *On Demagogism*.

these orators and statesmen "who were brought up on the public market." The constitution which permitted the various strata of society to unite in a single one, and gave the humblest the right to raise himself to the head of the government by the ascendency of his merit or eloquence, was certainly most favorable, not only to the cultivation of eloquence, but to the expansion of individual energies,—the real strength of a state. "In war a narrow ditch will break a phalanx; in the state the least line of demarkation (contrary to the fusion of classes) may breed discord."* Athens leveled the political ground, and filled up the pits into which peace sometimes stumbles.

Pericles and Ephialtes completed the work of Solon, Clisthenes and Salamines. They reorganized the courts of justice (*dicasteria*) upon an enlarged basis, and, as Amyot says, "they arranged themselves in line with the popular mass, preferring a multitude of poor commoners to a small number of the noble and opulent." The archons and the areopagus, formerly vested with judicial power, both civil and criminal, were almost entirely deprived of it in favor of the popular tribunals, where jurors drawn by lot were impaneled to the number of six thousand per annum. The assiduous discharge of political duties demands rest and relaxation. The judges receive a daily stipend of two oboles, afterward increased by Cleon† to three. This was a means of attracting the poorer classes to the tribunals, and of making democratic influences prevail there. The *dicastes* not only had to decide on questions of fact, like modern jurors, but to settle questions of law. And

* Aristotle, *Politics*, viii, 3.

† For the political consideration of three oboles (about nine cents). Cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, ii, 9; vi, 10.

we can easily imagine how numerous these questions were in a city, chosen, ever since Mycale, director of the confederation of Delos, and abundantly provided with the manifold interests of her subjects and allies. Is it surprising that Athens, thus transformed into a court of justice for Ionic Greece and the islands, should become the radiating point of eloquence, and as it were an immense bazaar richly stocked with ideas and expressions? *

In this respect natural dispositions had singularly aided the institutions. Pericles extols the Athenians for not believing, as did the Spartans, that public discussions enfeeble action.† In a panegyric on Athens before the tombs of warriors who had fallen for their country, the grave orator could not use the license of Cleon. This favorite of the people reproves them unsparingly. He does not call his auditors *gobe-mouches* (gawks), with the recklessness of Aristophanes, but he advances the strong reprimands of the *Philippics*. The Athenians, subtle wranglers, voluntarily exhibited their adroitness in oratorical jousts: "governed by whatever tickles your ears, you resemble spectators seated to hear sophists rather than citizens deliberating on state interests."‡ Cleon points out the superabundance of their gifts, but he gives us a glimpse at the cost of these very qualities. The Athenians, vivacious and impressive, are naturally fluent and very sensitive to oratorical beauties. They are born for oratory, and they permit themselves to be carried away by it.

We have followed the correlative progress of the constitution and the eloquence of Athens; then described the resources that were found in the native

* *Ἐμπορία λόγων.* † Thucydides, ii, 40. ‡ Ibid, iii, 37, 38.

institutions and dispositions. The time has come to determine the transformation of spoken eloquence, not as yet a literature, into written and scholarly eloquence, and the developments which the art of rhetoricians and logographers effected.

During several centuries after the Homeric age prose was merely used as an instrument in the social relations of the Greeks, but did not succeed in supplanting poetry as a literary language. On this account eloquence is first and solely found in the poets. At the time of the first historians of the fifth century (Hecatæus of Miletus), prose in turn rose to the dignity of a scientific and literary element. In like manner eloquence was at first employed artlessly and without oratorical devices, as a natural instrument of defense and attack amid the various occurrences of civil and political life in Greece; then as an art, wisely practised with a just conception of its elements, its rules, and its effects. Undoubtedly eloquence had representatives previous to the beginning of the fifth century, but it awaited its masters until the age of Pericles. Although practiced for a long time before that epoch, it was cultivated and taught only then. After the Median wars, and during the Peloponnesian war, rhetoric became allied to eloquence; sophistry aided and sometimes corrupted it. In the Macedonian period, provided expressly for passion and action with the arms accumulated in her arsenal for past ages, she sent forth her most magnificent masterpieces.

Thus three principal ages are unfolded. The first is that of ancient political eloquence with Aristides, Themistocles, and Pericles; the second shows us this art for awhile in the hands of Pericles' successors, not, it is true, irreproachable statesmen, but still gen-

erally faithful to ancient traditions. Again, we detect it professed and practiced by artists, tradesmen, sophists, and scribes, who enrich themselves by their knowledge and sagacity.* The third age is that of its consummated maturity and its most resplendent triumphs under Demades, Lycurgus, Hyperides, Æschines, and Demosthenes. Eloquence appears to have then laid aside the pen for the sword, and to have thrown all its science, all its energies, into the tumult of the time.

Cultivated eloquence was backward in Greece. Cicero was struck with the slowness of its advent. Greece, says he,† is infatuated with eloquence. She has long excelled in it, nevertheless other arts are more ancient than it; she brought them to perfection long before her study of this splendid art of speech. The author of *Brutus* explains this tardy flight of eloquence by the exceptional difficulties with which it was hampered, *rem unam omnium difficillimam*. To this reason he might have added another. In Greece fine arts appeared each in its turn by an order of natural succession, as in the history of man the phenomena peculiar to different periods of his life introduce themselves. At first eloquence saw the sacred hymn unfold, and the epic poem, which for more than a century reigned supreme over the Hellenic world; then didactic and lyric poetry in their various forms, and finally the drama. When the poetic inspiration which had animated the seventh and sixth centuries began to wane, prose was born, and with it history, eloquence, and philosophy.

* Without mentioning the price realized from his lessons, Isocrates received, we are told, from Nicoles, the son of Evagoras, twenty talents (\$21,666.60) for one discourse.

Brutus, 7.

Thus Greek genius pursued, and with what splendor, the circle of its intellectual creations by a natural succession of regular births, and with a logical connection: the manifest proof of spontaneous generation.

At Rome, on the contrary, where Greece sometimes presented her masterpieces in every branch at the same time to the unpolished sons of Latium for imitation, the production of literary works during the early centuries was tarnished by a strange confusion and pell-mell.* In the presence of such fair fruits which were borne at different seasons from Greek genius, the Roman translator, embarrassed by the choice, and astonished at their wealth, seized with avidity the treasures spread before him, according to the fancy of his appetite. Then appeared reproductions, sometimes artificial, capricious grafts attempted on original plants at each one's fancy, but indebted for one part of their sap to that law of progressive beings so well illustrated by Aristotle,† and which human genius, left to its own creative power, follows with the fidelity of nature.

When its hour came (which was the advent of prose), the eloquence of Greece followed, in its developments, the successive evolutions of the city. It had no other alternative. The arts of the Greeks were always intimately connected with practical life: their works adapted to a certain end.‡ This adaptation was, in their eyes, an essential quality. Occasionally they converted it

* Ennius, for example, borrowed from Greece tragedies, comedies, a philosophical poem (*Epicharma*), a treatise in prose (*Euhemera*), and a poem on didactic gastronomy (*Phagctica*). The whole of his work is a true *satura*.

† *History of Animals*.

‡ E. Boutmy, *Philosophy of Architecture in Greece*.

into an element of beauty, confounding the beautiful and the useful. And so, said Socrates, a body, an edifice, an armor, any object whatever, is only beautiful so far as it conforms to its purpose, to its proper use.* This merit of fitness exacted of the plastic arts should be, for a stronger reason, imposed upon eloquence, an indispensable agent in the civic and political life of the Greeks, and constantly exercised as an object of primary necessity, and for this very reason modified according to the characters and wants of the times: at first the plain weapon in which weight and edge are alone important, then a "fencing-foil,"† a dress-sword, adorned with art for display, and adroitly adjusted by logographers in the hand of whosoever had bespoken it; finally a falchion, at once splendid and murderous, its plain ornaments not blunting its edge, it darts in the face of Philip incomparable flashes.

* *Memorabilia*, iii, 8, 10; iv, 6. A narrow theory, refuted by Plato in his *First Hippias*. Let us also observe the half utilitarian definition which Aristotle gives of beauty in a young man, a perfect man, and an old man. (He says nothing of woman's beauty.) "Beauty is of a particular kind for each age. A youth's beauty consists in having a body capable of enduring the fatigues of the race, and every exercise requiring strength; his limbs should be so symmetrical and attractive as to charm the eye. Consequently the athletes who carry away the prize of the *pentathlon* are the most beautiful, inasmuch as they unite the advantages of strength and agility. With the grown man, beauty consists in being able to endure the fatigue of war, to please the sight, and to inspire fear. The beauty of old men consists in enduring the necessary toils of life, and not being chagrined at any of the infirmities which accompany old age." (*Rhetoric*, i, 5.)

† A saying attributed to Philip in comparing the eloquence of Isocrates and Demosthenes. (Cf. Cicero, *On the Best Kind of Eloquence*.)

First Period.—Let us now cite the principal characters and most illustrious representatives of the three ages of Greek eloquence. Themistocles, the greatest man of Athens before Pericles, was also a great orator. He established the greatness of his country by obtaining, through his heroism, the sacrifice of Athens, which was abandoned as a prey to the barbarians that the Athenians might boldly sail out upon an unknown future. Such a victory, won over the natural resistances of private interests, excels that of the Roman orator who compelled the tribes to renounce the agrarian law instituted to support them, and more than justifies the eulogy of Lysias: “Themistocles was very capable of speaking, conceiving and acting.” What were the characteristics of his eloquence? Undoubtedly those which Cicero recognized in the ancient school,—precision and simplicity, penetrating acuteness, rapidity and a fertility of thought, rather than abundant expressions.

Pericles is the most finished type of this school,—an orator “almost perfect,” says the author of *Brutus*. This eulogy is confirmed by three productions which Thucydides* puts in his mouth, an admirable trilogy, full of the soul of a great citizen who was worthy of having governed for forty years a people most sceptical of merit and most jealous of their liberties. Pericles would not have been such if he had been the pupil of those rhetoricians who “instructed how to bark (*latrare*) to the elepsydra.” He had other instructors. At first Pericles called science to his aid, but the science of things, not of words. Two philosophers moulded him: Zeno of Elea, a consummate dialectician, and, above all, Anaxagoras of Clazomenæ,

* J. Girard, *Study on Thucydides*.

whom his contemporaries called "Intelligence," because he was the first who recognized it in the universe and adopted it as the first element of the Cosmos, which was regulated and embellished by it. These two minds, eminent by their elevation and searching acumen, were the Chiron foster-fathers of this Achilles,* rather than the learned musician Damon. This is apparent in the essence, the marrow of his speeches. His mode of arguing, strong and simple, is that of truth made conspicuous by lofty, sententious thoughts, by picturesque vivacity, or by a logical network of expressions. His dignified familiarity is combined with daring contrasts, which from time to time burst into flashes of eloquence like the radiance of lightning. With him logical strength was bound to that concentrated emotion which was born of high conceptions and magnanimous sentiments, a serious eloquence, whose irresistible weight made all wills succumb. Full of imposing grandeur in its gravity, it left the impression of a Doric temple. When expedient, Pericles could use playful figures,† sometimes witty ones, but those were fugitive smiles, for he was a stranger to

* Plutarch, *Life of Pericles*. Isocrates, who has his reasons for exalting the art of speech, complacently confounds it with philosophy, and divides the honor of having molded Pericles between Anaxagoras and Damon, "the wisest man of that epoch" (*εφορμηώτατος*).

† He said of Ægina, a rival island situated in the face of the Piræus, "We must remove that blot from the eye of the Piræus (literally, that blearedness). The oaks break themselves to pieces by striking against one another; the Bœotians do likewise by fighting one another." He compared the Samians undergoing the Athenian yoke against their will to "little children who, while weeping, eat their soup." One of his funeral orations contains this graceful and touching passage: "The republic, deprived of its youth, who have been cut down in war, is like the year deprived of its spring-time." Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, iii, 4, 10.

Roman urbanity. Everything in him breathed austerity. His aspect was as staid as his oratory. His walk was easy, the sound of his voice always the same; in his gestures and address he preserved a moderation that the most vehement animation never shook. Pericles in this aspect is a faithful image of Greek art, always self-possessed, even in his most energetic intentions. No rival could have said of him, "Ah, what would you have thought had you heard the lion himself roar?" As motionless as Homer* describes Ulysses holding his sceptre, by the sole might of language and without gesticulation he inspired respect, even terror.† These testimonies received from the ancients should prevent all misconceptions of the real meaning of characteristics often cited by Eupolis and Aristophanes. When these two writers of comedy speak of the lightnings, the thunders of Pericles at the tribune, they wish to express, not a clamorous vehemence nor oratorical bursts of startling impetuosity, but the timid admiration which a dignified eloquence inspires in the multitude, and in which the dreadful majesty of the Olympian ruler seems to shine forth.

Pericles, who was a statesman, and not a professional orator, never wrote his orations. Like Aristides, Themistocles, and the ancient orators, he improvised after a laborious meditation. The impression produced was immediate and lasting; "he left the goad in the minds of his hearers." But powerful as was his voice, antiquity has scarcely transmitted a feeble echo. Neither Pericles nor his contemporaries thought of preserving such touching harangues. Only a few specimens of these masterpieces have been saved from oblivion. They are like detached fragments of the eloquent mar-

* Iliad, iii, 219. † *Vim dicendi terroremque timuerunt.* (Brutus, xi, 9.)

ble which Pericles fashioned by inspiration and without forethought. But where is the statue itself? Where is the Minerva of Phidias? Contemporaries saw it appear in a day. Its majesty touched them; they obeyed its orders and permitted it to vanish. Why have the authors or witnesses of the Attic masterpieces deprived us of contemplating their works? In their eyes the sole object of such works was practical use. Political eloquence seemed to them created for action alone, not for the admiration of future readers. Stenography was, perhaps, known about this epoch; no one, however, deigned to make use of it. Pericles spoke for the dignity or safety of the city. He disregarded the established rule that all speeches should be written; and yet, what must that eloquence have been which is still so forcible and grand, half concealed under the veil of his historian and interpreter?

Second Period.— This disinterestedness, regretted by the learned, lasted until the time of Antiphon, the author of the first written discourse, which proved an innovation favorable to the perfection of eloquence.

The age of Pericles ignored rich developments or the effects of style in the structure of composition. On the day when orators aspired to the glory of writers eloquence became enriched with precious gifts. The pen, says Cicero, is an excellent master of eloquence. *Stylus optimus dicendi magister et effector*. After leaving Antiphon, it becomes necessary to distinguish the orator of action from the orator who merely composes. The first is a political personage, who speaks at the *ecclesia* when circumstances invite him. The second does not appear, or rarely appears, before the people; he is an advocate of a new character,—an

advocate who does not speak; but he writes. In his cabinet he composes treatises on rhetoric (*τέχνη*), or orations on fancy subjects. He becomes in turn the accuser and defender in the same cause. Sometimes even to these two pleadings, which were already a sufficient proof of the extent of his talent, he joins the instance and reply, all in the same suit. Such are the *tetralogies* of Antiphon.

Very often these school exercises served to train him for the occupation of *logographer*, or *dicographer*,—that is, a writer of pleas for the use of another. The Athenian law required the parties in civil and criminal cases to appear in person. For a long time the simplicity of manners rendered the observation of the law easy. But when speech became an art, and eloquence an obligatory requisite, the majority of those interested in the proceedings freed themselves from their dangers. They had recourse to advocates whose talent increased their chances of gaining their causes. Thus the banker, Phormio, not desirous to amuse his audience with his “solecisms,” esteemed it safer to be an able speaker by proxy. The client paid for his harangue as one pays for a consultation, and he went to the tribunal to deliver it with all possible naturalness, feigning an improvisation, as if he were speaking extempore, and not from memory.

The rhetorician did not write solely for the school or tribunal. Sometimes extracts for display, in which he was wont to exhibit the fruits of his art, were destined for assemblies,* or read in the solemn reunions at the great games. Such was the *Olympiac* of Lysias, the *Olympic* of Gorgias, and the *Panegyrics*, so named

* Isocrates contended for the prize which Artemisia offered for a eulogy on her husband, Mausolus.

from the general assembly (*παρόλιτος*) before which they were pronounced.

Sophists. — The logographic rhetoricians were, in different degrees, the students of the sophists, whose instruction, during the thirty years which intervened between the death of Pericles and Socrates, provoked a great explosion of ideas, of new methods in science, and, unfortunately, of new methods in morals. The sophists were vigorously attacked and admired by the ancients. We have seen them in turn outlawed (Protagoras) and honored (Gorgias) with a gilded statue at Delphi, in the very temple of Apollo. Let us briefly mention what was pernicious and useful in their innovations. Their influence was, in a certain measure, beneficial to science. The systems previous to the age of the sophists were vast conceptions *à priori*, sometimes tainted with theogonic prejudices. The aim of the new spirit was to free science from these shackles, and to restore it to the observation of nature. This demand for truth provoked then, as always, passionate resistances. Omitting the rivals in Plato's *Euthyphron*, Aristophanes, the conservative poet of *The Clouds*, in hatred toward the new spirit, became the patron of popular prejudices against the natural philosophers.* He pronounced the sophists impious for daring to teach that it was not Jupiter who thundered. He saw a crime against the state precisely in one of their best titles. He ridiculed them in an ill-

* Plutarch, *Life of Nicias*. Strong minds of the time secretly discussed the books which explained the eclipses of the moon humanly. The study of physics caused Protagoras to be banished, Anaxagoras to be thrown into prison, and Socrates to be poisoned. In modern times astronomy has not been more clement. *Vide* J. Bertrand, *Les fondateurs de l'Astronomie moderne*.

judged scene, and in spite of his rapture, and against his custom, the laugh was not at Athens, and is still less in our day on his side.

With this work of scientific renovation was combined another of the greatest interest,—the minute study of thought and language. Formerly natural talent alone had inspired political eloquence, but, thanks to the sophists, it found a useful auxiliary in art. About the middle of the fifth century Sicily* produced renowned masters of sophistry. Corax, Tisias, and Gorgias promulgated a method of instruction unknown or neglected until that time. The Athenian pupils surpassed their masters. The most illustrious was Isocrates, whose school was a laboratory of eloquence open to all Greece. Like the Trojan horse, it gave birth to heroes: the rivals of Demosthenes, and Demosthenes himself.†

This is a glowing eulogy on the rhetorical sophists in the person of their most famous pupil. No doubt it is exaggerated: neither Brutus, the friend of Cicero, nor Aristotle indorsed it. Nevertheless, that the prince of Roman orators believed he could confer it upon them, even with an indulgence tainted with partiality, they must undoubtedly have rendered unquestionable services to eloquence.

In fact, eloquence owed to them new qualities. Before their time it had not escaped a degree of stiffness: its conciseness sometimes verged on obscurity. After the rhetoricians it acquired flexibility, transparency, and copiousness. Its muscles, somewhat exposed and projecting, became indued with graceful curvatures, which did not exclude strength. It was like the style

* Syracuse was the Athens of Sicily. Brutus, 12; Thucydides, viii, 96. † Brutus, 8, 12; *Orator*, 13; *De Oratore*, ii, 22.

of Raphael's *Virgin Gardener* compared to his *Holy Family* and *Transfiguration*. It acquired from them a metrical taste; it learned to round its periods, and at the same time to arrive, by fine analysis, at the most delicate shades of language. The sophists, like the stoics of Rome at a later time, were fond of etymological and philological researches. Protagoras wrote a treatise on the correction of language (*ὀρθοέπεια*); Prodicus, on the exact signification of words and synonyms; Evenus of Paros composed a poem on the formation of words. The sophists were very skillful in decomposing thought into its elements in order to compare and contrast them. Language must have felt these inquisitive studies: ingenious or bold antitheses gave delicateness or energy to the style. This exercise in penetration and artistic adjustment (*concininitas*) was pleasing to the subtle mind of the Greeks.

But these fascinating qualities were accompanied by grave defects; they led to subtilty, to artificiality and "false lights," to all the refinements of symmetrically balanced periods, of consonances and assonances, "adorable" cadences like that of the sonnet of Orontes, learned puerilities honored by the gravest rhetoricians who were skilled in minute precepts.* In the hands of these word-spinners† what was delicate became finical, color turned into vermilion; by inuring the taste to the flexibilities of dialectics they fell into quibbles on syllogisms. In its zeal to polish the idea the file reduced it to nothing; in their care to adorn

* Aristotle does not deign to speak of them. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Memoirs on the Ancient Orators*, Isocrates, ch. 14) made a just criticism of a page of Isocrates, full of these affectations of language. (Cf. *On the Elocution of Demosthenes*, ch. 19, 20).

† *Λογοδαίδαλος* (Plato), *Orator*, 12.

the thought it became suffocated with dregs; they desired to balance the idea with grace, to give to it the most advantageous appearance and dress: it was transformed into a manikin, irreproachable as to adjustment and posture; blooming in smiling colors it aims at figures (*σχήματα*), it even makes miens; but it is empty and inanimate, an object of vain-glory to its frivolous author, of passing curiosity to the spectator, and of contempt in the eyes of good taste and sense. Such was the artificial eloquence pictured by Balzac, such Pascal's *Village Queen*, and such was that affectation of thought and language known under the name of *préciosité*. The opening of the seventeenth century in France was acquainted with the harmonious magniloquence of Gorgias in the grandiloquence of the Spaniards, Gongora and Antonio Perez; the affected subtilty of Polus of Agrigentum and of Hippias of Elis in the vivacity of mind (*vivezze d'ingegno*) of Guarini, and of the cavalier Marino. The *Précieuses*, or affected ladies, like the sophists certainly aided in perfecting the language; but, like them, they kept the office of wit; they pursued the end of the end,—the end of things,—and they caught it in company with affectation. The sophist called the sea “the blue tinged floor of Amphritrite,” the great king the “Jupiter of the Persians”; vultures he denominated “living tombs.” With him an object has “pale colors, is *anémique*.”* In the same strain the Saturday fre-

* Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, iii, *passim*. Aristotle censures as “cold” or “ridiculous” certain expressions and figures which we would not have the severity to condemn in him. Gorgias gave to flatterers the epithet of *πρωχόμενος* (who begs with art). Alcidas called the Odyssey “a true mirror of human life.” Several peculiar expressions of the sophists deserve to pass into language. Strange analogy with the *Précieuses*.

quenters of Mlle. Scudéry “imprint their shoes in snow,” and call a court promenade “an empire of glances,” and violins “the souls of the feet.”*

This perversion of taste in France, an ephemeral imitation of the false *bel esprit* of Spain and Italy, did not coincide with a prostration of beliefs and manners. The *hôtel de Rambouillet* aspired to “unbrutalize” the manners as well as the language. It refined the sentiments without corrupting them. In Greece it was not so, and the sophists, wretched masters of rhetoric as they were, were still worse logicians and moralists. It was well to protest against the ambitious systems of philosophers who pretended to draw from their heads alone an explanation of the universe, but to deny all science because it had wandered away was an absurdity worse than the evil justly criticised. Believing in the senses alone is a prejudice quite as perilous as believing alone in one’s mind; and the idealistic philosopher (Anaxagoras), declaring snow black because the water of which it is formed is of a dark color,† did not have reproaches to receive from the empiric who, like Epicurus, gave the sun and moon the volume they appeared to have, namely, that of a Bæotian cheese. It is praiseworthy to free philosophy from sacerdotal bonds; but is it reasonable, if religious tradition is not the highest authority in science, to constitute man the sole arbiter of all truth and the measure of all things?‡ To deny virtue and absolute good; to admit only the probable, the agreeable, and the useful; to teach how to uphold with an equal likelihood either a thesis or its antithesis; to make a weak

* *Dictionnaire de Somaïse.*

† Cicero, *Academica*, ii. 23, 31, and *Lucretius*, v. 565.

‡ *Ἀπάντων μέτρον ἀνθρώπου* “Protagoras.”

(ἡττων) argument overthrow a stronger (χρειέτων λόγος) argument;—such was the foundation of the sophists' doctrine. Philosophic scepticism was born in Greece from an excess of metaphysical speculation, just as the idealistic exaggerations of the Cartesians elicited the scepticism of the eighteenth century. But, if excesses are explained by reaction, they are never justifiable, especially when they step from the domain of pure ideas into that of morality in order to destroy it. The scepticism of the eighteenth century produced Helvetius, d'Holbach, and Lamettrie;* the sophists of Greece did not hesitate, on their part, to draw from their doctrine its lurking poisons. Is the law of conscience indefeasible? or is the law of nature the only true law? Is divine justice aught but an oratorical supposition? Does a successful crime cease to be criminal? That is according to circumstances. Yes, if the thing suits you; no, if you find the contrary more advantageous. Thus Greece, by subtilizing, amused

* "The sentiment of self-love is the only basis upon which a useful morality can be founded." (Helvetius, *De l'Esprit*.) "It would be useless, and perhaps unjust, to require man to be virtuous if he were not so without rendering himself unhappy: when vice renders man happy he is to love vice." (D'Holbach, *Systeme de la Nature*.) Lamettrie, *Passim*: "Remorse arises from the prejudices of education. * * * It is permitted, according to the law of nature and Puffendorf, to take by force a little of that which another has in excess." Lamettrie considers innocent "those philosophical demolitions of vices and virtues. That will not prevent the people, a vile herd of imbeciles, from continuing their course, from respecting the lives and purses of others, and from believing in the most ridiculous prejudices." Such is the philosophy which he calls "our amiable queen," and Voltaire "execrable." According to this philosophical physician, man is a "machine." The whole machine gets out of order if its springs are forced to overwork. The author of *L'Art de Jouir* died of indigestion. His landlord, it is true, Fredrick, "the Solomon of the North," wrote his funeral oration.

herself as if fencing with demonstrations or refutations of the most necessary moral truths.

Protagoras commenced one of his works with this peremptory declaration: "Are there gods, or are there no gods? Two reasons prevent me from devoting myself to the examination of this question: the uncertainty of the thing, and the brevity of human life." Antiphon, although a man of grave character and weighty eloquence (he was surnamed Nestor), laughs at the prejudicial and religious beliefs of his contemporaries. "Certain men do not live the present life, but prepare themselves with great trouble, as if they had to live another life, and not the present life; in the meantime the hours escape them, and their time has past."* This present life, the sole object of the sophists, was precisely what Socrates disregarded for the life to come,—Socrates, a novice like the sophists as to scientific methods, but as hostile to their religious and moral scepticism as to their filigreed language. Sophistry, "a school of impudence," had instructed the great statesman of the *Gorgias*. Callicles threw away the preconceptions of small minds as litter. The strongest reason is always the best. Might conquers right,—a theory upheld in our day by important personages, with the annexation of provinces to support them; a theory formerly taught in certain schools of Greece, and put into practice by her statesmen.† By losing the sense of the true, the sophists and the Athenians, their subservient disciples, lost the sentiment of divine existence, of goodness and justice, which are identified with it. That which the experi-

* *Orat. Attici*, Didot, p. 238, § 125; G. Perrot, *L'Eloquence Judiciaire et Politique à Athenes*.

† Thucydides, i, 76; iii, 37, 40; v, 89 et seq.

ence of antiquity, with Hesiod and Æsop, had only considered as a brutal fact,* the sophists had set up as a principle, and this principle they applied with a cruel logic worthy of Machiavel's *Prince*. These poisoned maxims sooner or later destroyed those who fostered them.† Athens profited by the apology for tyranny and usurpation. Under the grasp of Philip she bitterly expiated her sophisms.

The moral influence of the sophists was therefore very pernicious, but their influence on eloquence was not altogether bad. The Attic orators profited by their researches without sacrificing to their errors. The justness and stability of the Attic temperament had reacted against the allurements of Sicilian vices. In the hands of Lysias, Isæus, and their school, prose, judiciously elaborated, learned to adorn itself without coquetry, to blend simplicity and grace, vigor and ease. No longer were there evidences of effort or laborious meditation, but an easy and fluent style, less solicitous to induce reflection than to instruct by its precision and clearness. No longer do we behold in it the glittering prisms of sophistry, with irredescent colors and flattering illusions. It is a transparent crystal, in which objects appear in their natural tints and proportions. Nor need the eye disentangle their real contours under artificial reflections and undulating movements. It beholds them clearly drawn in mellow re-

* Æsop, *The Earthen Kettle and the Iron Kettle*; Hesiod, *The Nightingale and the Hawk*.

† "Whoever plays the tyrant inevitably falls into the evils of tyranny, and suffers what he caused others to suffer. Athens has testified to this. She placed garrisons in the citadels of other cities, and, as a result of this, saw the enemy (the Lacedæmonians) master of her own." Isocrates, *Discourse on Peace*, p. 113, § 91; Didot.

lief, like the tracery of cordage on a Piræan ship under the fading rays of the setting sun.

Third Period.—The Attics bequeathed to their successors an exquisite instrument,—a clear, expressive, and sufficiently picturesque prose. Their eloquence was at all times a little wanting in action and heat.* This placidity, which, according to our taste, verges upon coldness, was imposed upon the orators by law. The Athenians knew themselves too well to trust themselves to eloquence. Ulysses closed the ears of his companions to the song of the sirens; the Athenians captivated the mouths of the sirens† in the agora. The law of the tribunals interdicted pathetic appeals. If the advocate attempted to use the pathetic, an officer recalled him to his duty. The Areopagus observed this rule with jealous respect; however, it was eluded on the day when Hyperides pleaded for Phryne. The mute eloquence of unveiled beauty touched the grave assemblage,—an overwhelming peroration not foreseen by the laws. The mild eloquence of the genuine Attics was unequal to the agitations of the Macedonian period. Political orators then kindled the fire which Atticism had preferred to leave smouldering. The “clear fountain” became an impetuous torrent; the “gentle zephyr” a “tempest accompanied with thunder-bolts.”‡ This eloquence was not only artistic, but militant in the midst of impassioned contests between the adversaries and partisans of Philip. One side,

* We may mention, as an exception, the pathetic peroration of Andocide's discourse *On the Mysteries*; *Oratores Attici*. Didot, p. 72, Sec. 144.

† On Isocrates' tomb a column thirty cubits high was erected, upon which was surmounted a siren seven cubits in height.

‡ Quintilian, vi, 1; x, 1.

through venality or good faith, advised the Macedonian alliance. They saw in the father of Alexander, not an ambitious man, meditating, by craft and force, to strike the heaviest blow that the Greek world could suffer,—the destruction of Athenian liberty; but they looked upon him as the pacifactory arbiter of dangerous dissensions,—the future leader of Europe against Asia. The other party spurned this savior as the violator of Athenian dignity by his past life and destined course. They marshaled themselves against him with all the force of their genins, with the recollection of their ancient valor, which they laid before the eyes of those Athenians who were indifferent about the invader. At their head appeared Demosthenes, the voice of his mother country and the savior of Hellenic liberty, if it were possible to save it. But if Phocion was the “chopper”* of Demosthenes’ arguments, Demosthenes could not likewise be the “chopper” of Philip’s actions, and as might triumphed over right, arms triumphed over eloquence. We will study this period, the most beautiful and last of Greek eloquence. After a sublime effort, and a burst of genius worthy of the patriotism which inspired it, eloquence fell and perished with everything else; it exhaled its last breath at Calauria, on that day when, in the presence of the satellites of Antipater, the author of the *Oration on the Crown* expired.

Let us here repeat a fact worthy of notice, and contradictory to the common ground of the joint responsibility of morals and eloquence. Messala (*Dialogue of Orators*) labors to find the causes of the decline of eloquence. He imagines he finds the principal one in

* ἡ τῶν ξμῶν λόγων κοπὴ ἀνίσταται, a saying of Demosthenes, according to Plutarch.

the decline of morals. Seneca* also affirms that morals are the regulators of eloquence. "As is life, so is the language; moreover, wherever you see a corrupt language, you can be assured that the morals are corrupted." This estimate is not altogether true. Style may undoubtedly be the mirror of character. Mecænas and the Spartan Sthenelaidas, Nicias and Alcibiades, had not the same soul; they did not speak with the same air. Eloquence often savors of a baseness of the heart, or reflects its nobility. But does it follow from this possible correlation that the decline of morals necessarily draws with it that of art and speech? Literary and political history deny this assertion; for the heart may remain pure when the taste becomes depraved, and not unfrequently taste has been purified at an instant when the soul had lost its virtuous energy. Moral sentiment ennobles eloquence as well as the works of art in general, but it is not indispensable to them. And so the palmiest days of heroism in Greece were not the days of her eloquence. The soldiers of Marathon and Salamis were citizens rather than orators: Themistocles must be excepted, for he was eminently both the one and the other. But even his example confirms the natural independence of genius and virtue. Aristides, morally his superior, stood far below him in political genius and oratorical talent.

During the period intervening between the close of the Peloponnesian war and the Macedonian intervention,† the sentiment of moral grandeur appeared to be banished from Hellenic society. And yet this was the epoch during which eloquence prepared itself for the

* *Ad Lucilium*, 114.

† Ot. Muller cited the fact without stopping to explain it, t. ii, p. 573, of the translation by M. K. Hillebrand.

flight which was destined to carry it to perfection in the immortal productions of Demosthenes and Æschines. This phenomenon is not at all surprising. Already eloquence had presented a striking contrast with morals during the struggle between Athens and the Dorian race. Who is not struck in Thucydides* with the somber picture of Greek profligacy, in the midst of the fearful commotions of the Peloponnesian war, and of rampant passions of the most detestable dye? Eloquence had then lost much of its moral excellence, but it retained its artistic worth. Alcibiades and Cleon, statesmen infested with the vices of their time, and worthy of the felicitations of Timon, the Misanthrope, were, to the misfortune of Athens, very powerful orators. This proves that moral conscience and taste (a kind of æsthetic conscience, applicable to the estimate of the beautiful), do not necessarily follow a parallel development. On the contrary, perfect eloquence, the master of all its resources, presumes culture and an advanced state of civilization, rarely the consorts of austere morals.† “Grand eloquence, like fire, requires aliments to nourish it, action to excite it; it is in burning that it displays its brilliancy.”‡ Now the most combustible substances are not always the purest. The scourge of war raises up great captains; eloquence lives on storms, on guilty angers or holy wraths. Demosthenes hated the invader with a zeal

* iii, 82, 84.

† Bautru's calumnious sally is well known, “An honest man and good morals do not harmonize”; and this saying, which is surprising in a man of good taste, “The society of women corrupts morals and forms the taste.” (*Esprit des Lois*, xix, 8.) These sentiments, if well founded, would justify J. J. Rousseau's paradox on the pernicious influence of civilization and society.

‡ *Dialogue of the Orators*, 36.

that did him as much honor as his eloquence. Nevertheless it must be conceded that the patriotic dislikes which were at the bottom of his heart were (to omit other weak points which it would be puerile to deny) allied to rancorous personal feuds: a source of action far from generous, albeit his eloquence was still admirable. His oration on the prevarications of the embassy equals, in an artistic point of view, his finest *Philippics*.

The ideal definition of an orator given by Cato* is rather a wish than the statement of a general fact. How many men among the ancients and moderns have failed to maintain their integrity on the same elevation of their talents! *Satis eloquentiæ, sapientiæ parum*. Sallust applies this phrase to Catiline. It could be as appropriately applied to his historian and to other personages. Thus it appears that bad taste and good morals are sometimes found together. In France the theorists of the charming, of the sensational, have often been a very estimable and extremely serious class of people. For instance, Father Bouhours and Montesquien (*Essai sur le goût*). "A magistrate rose by his merit to the highest dignity. He published a moral work in which the sarcasm is unique" (Labruyère). Taste, before the time of Boileau, was generally detestable, but can it be said that the first half of the seventeenth century was inferior in its morals to the last half?

Let us return to Greek eloquence. If, in the midst of the decline of private and public morals, when a Philocrates and a Timarchus were possible, in the bosom of triumphant egotism and venality, Greece, always proud of her past history, but incapable of sustaining it, produced her most famous orators, she owed it to circumstances

* *Vir bonus dicendi peritus.*

especially favorable which made such orators contemporary with the merciless duel between Athens and Philip, and the inheritors of the progress made in the art of speaking during the age of Pericles and the Attic school. A master of these treasures of experience and art, Æschines lavishly resorted to them, and used them with a talent difficult to excel. Demosthenes, like his adversary, sometimes took advantage of them under the goad of disordered passions. But in him the citizen fortunately governed the individual. His soul was purged of its impurity by the bitter toils of patriotism, he rose above his rival with all the superiority that the heart has over the mind.

More firmly bound to the laws of honor than Pythia herself, and the faithful interpreter of Athens, enslaved, but proud in the midst of her defeat, when, after seven years of servitude, she at last, with the author of the *Oration on the Crown*, received her revenge of Chæroneia, Demosthenes, the orator of duty, united in one finished work artistic and moral beauty.

The galaxy of Grecian orators terminates in him as a theological system carries in triumph the statue of an immortal. Homer is the poet of all poets. Demosthenes is eloquence personified. Men desirous of serving their country at the tribune should study him and become imbued with his eloquence, ever ancient, yet ever new.

Demosthenes will therefore forever breathe his spirit and influence upon citizens burning to repel a public enemy with the sword of speech. He will ever be the law of eloquence,* the herald of national dignity and liberty.

* Quintilian, x, 1, *Lex Orandi*.

CHAPTER II.

PHILIP—THE ATHENIANS.

AFTER the lapse of twenty centuries the harangues of Demosthenes again delight the learned and instruct the philosophic historian. They remind him how the states went to ruin. The orator's counsels and reproaches to the Athenians should always be an object of meditation among people who desire to escape the failings which destroyed Greece forever. To thoroughly appreciate the power of Demosthenes' eloquence, and the difficulty of the task which he confronted, it is necessary to have present in our mind the obstacles which accumulated before him; to be well acquainted with the public enemy, Philip, who had also become the orator's private enemy, and with his domestic adversary, the Athenian people, whose vices became the Macedonian's allies. We will afterward see what resources Demosthenes could draw from his soul and genius to struggle against two antagonists equally formidable.

I.

Philip, detained several years at Thebes as a hostage, profited by his disgrace, and studied, in the heart of Greece, that military art which he afterward used so skillfully against her. At the school of the victor of Leuctra, Epaminondas, he conceived the idea of the Macedonian phalanx, formed on the model of Thebes' sacred army, and destined to play so important a rôle in history. Thus Thebes educated the soldier who was

to crush the liberties of Greece at Chæronea. At the head of his phalanx, Philip routed the cohorts of the presumptuous Lysicles, and joined the victorious wing of his son Alexander. This powerful machine required careful management, otherwise it was but poorly adapted to all kinds of action. Philip reserved it for decisive conflicts. He ordinarily avoided pitched battles. That he might more surely surprise his enemy, instead of heavy cohorts, he advanced and retreated at the head of a flying camp, composed of archers and light cavalry.

Alert and always ready—for he made no distinction between winter and summer—he changed his position at will and unexpectedly fell upon cities. The Athenians were not so active; they consulted the aspects of the moon; they followed old national customs which were disregarded by this barbarian king; they only waged war willingly during four or five months of fine weather. “Our century does not at all resemble preceding centuries, and this is especially true in the art of war, because it appears to have had action and progress.”* The Athenian strategy of the good old times was disconcerted, scandalized by these innovations contrary to all rules which had hitherto been respected. Likewise, the thundering marches of Bonaparte were incongruous to the sentiment of the old German generals who had been habituated to exact and methodical evolutions and to the patient combinations practiced during the thirty-seven years’ war. Philip, like Cæsar at a later day, believed he had done nothing if anything remained for him to do. He well knew how to prosecute everything with obstinate activity, to prepare everything timely, and to foresee everything; action, movement, was his sole life. As a general, he was diligent and inevitable,

* *Third Philippic.*

and at all times displayed dauntless bravery. Demosthenes paid him this homage:

“I saw Philip, our adversary, braving all dangers that he might command and become master; I saw him deprived of an eye, his shoulder broken, his hand and legs maimed; I saw him freely and cheerfully resigning any part of his body which fortune pleased to take, so that he might enjoy the rest with renown and glory.”*

This passion for glory, which rendered Philip regardless of his body and life, made him at a later period respect his vanquished enemy. He was urged to destroy Athens. “May it never please God,” he responded, “that I should destroy the theatre of glory; my sole work is for it.”

He also labored to satisfy an insatiable ambition; he himself confessed it: “I am at peace only with those who are willing to obey me.” This thirst for rule led him to carry his arms into most opposite countries, from Phocis to the Danube, from the Hemus (the Balkans) to Eubœa, from the Peloponnesus to Byzantium, and even into Scythia.

Master of Illyricum, of Chalcidice, of the Chersonesus, of Thermopylæ, of all the avenues of central Greece north and south, no aggrandisement could satisfy him. “Greece and the barbarian countries were all too narrow for the ambition of this wretched mortal.” In his eyes no conquest was small. Compelled to withdraw for a moment from Athens, his most coveted prey, he throws his army upon the “poor villages of Thrace, willing to brave toils, cold and hunger and extreme dangers for such conquests. * * * That he may plunder the Thracian vaults of their rye and mil-

* *Pro Corona*, § 67.

let, he faces the stormy deep in the midst of winter.
* * * A miserable Macedonian, born in a country where it is impossible to purchase even a good slave." He is raised over Greece, and appointed to preside at the Pythian games, the most august of her national solemnities. He receives the privilege of consulting the oracle first. Admitted with reverence into the amphictyonic council, the sovereign arbiter of Hellenic differences, the instrument of the gods' vengeance on their profaners, nothing satiates him. The undisputed ruler of all Greece, invested since Chæronea with the hegemony which was formerly an object of emulation among the great cities of Greece, he will not yet be at ease. Proclaimed generalissimo of the eastern forces against Asia, he will dream of the conquests reserved for his son, and at the moment of entering upon this new career a murderer's dagger will consign him, at the age of forty-seven, to his first, his last repose. (336 B.C.)

Philip's first entrance into the government revealed in him qualities characteristic of a great politician: he became a master of intrigues, and his intrigues were successful. At first, regent of Macedonia in the name of his nephew, Amyntas, he supplanted him. At the age of twenty-four, by virtue of his address and energy, sometimes criminal, he succeeded in maintaining himself against his enemies at home and abroad. Of this number were the Athenians from the origin. They were the partisans of Argæus, the foremost one of his competitors for the crown. The Greeks had long wished to interfere in his affairs. He paid them well for it. Their covetousness and traditional jealousies furnished arms against them, and the artful Macedonian used them with success. He besieged Amphipo-

lis, a position long disputed by Athens and Macedonia. The Athenians wished to aid it. Philip checked them by promising that he would surrender it to them when once captured. He took it and guarded it. (358 B.C.) A year afterward he deprived them of Potidæa, and gave it to the Olynthians, who were then hostile to Athens. Later, Olynthus was seized in its turn (348 B.C.). His device was to take advantage of divisions and conquer them. He saw that the Thessalians, the Thebans, the Phocidians, had become suspicious of one another. He duped them in their turn, and subjugated them all, one with the assistance of another. Against Sparta (for his ambitious activity embraced all Greece) he used the interested intervention of Argos and Messene, or the antipathy of the Arcadians. He gave to one city what he plundered from another. In this way he was assured of accomplices. He fomented intestine hatreds; he baffled in advance all attempts at coalition. The cities, blinded by cupidity or municipal enmities, did not see that, in exchange for trivial advantages, — guarantees only as real as the rays of the sun given to the brothers of Perdiceas by the king of Sabæa, — the common enemy robbed them of their honor and their arms. Philip, in order to enjoy the right of contending for the crowns at the Olympic games, proclaimed himself a descendant of Hercules. He was neither a Greek, nor allied to the Greeks, but worthy of being such. He had many qualities in common with Homer's Ulysses. He was not only patient, inured to fatigue, but also sagacious, fertile in resources, and skillful in strategy. He could metamorphose* himself and impersonate different characters. He was a man competent to do everything (*πανοῦργος*), to feign everything.

* Πολύτλας, ποικιλόμητις, πολυμήχανος, πολύτροπος.

According to the state of his affairs, he alternately caressed or intimidated. His speeches were spirited or reserved, even humble (especially after the alliance of Athens and Thebes). He advanced or retreated, resisted or yielded, at the proper moment.

Philip was a prudent politician, and practiced the diplomatic maxim of always giving the appearance of right to his own side; his clemency never despaired: "Notwithstanding so many provoking iniquities, I have respected your city, your temples, and your territory. I could, however, have taken much, even captured all. I have persisted in my desire to submit our mutual complaints to a court of arbitration." The duplicity of his actions is especially apparent in his contest (always disavowed) against Athens. He has sworn to take it, and, as far as he is able, from the moment he steps on Hellenic ground he proclaims his friendship for the city of Minerva. On all occasions he treats her with respect, and flatters her. He sends the Athenian prisoners, loaded with presents, back to the camp of Argæus; he treats the Athenian garrison of Potidæa with civility; later he will promise to liberate the captives of Olynthus: "See how far my good will for you goes. I have given to you this island (Halonnesus); your orators have not permitted you to receive it." After such pledges who would dare distrust him? His designs are innocent; his intentions equitable and peaceable. "Let us have peace," is his cry. His partisans publish it; he himself declares it in writing: and therefore we doubt the sincerity of his desire! The Athenians are impressed by his peaceful measures, and observe the truce; Philip profits by it, and advances his schemes. Athens is at peace with Philip, but Philip is not at peace with Athens. While his

abused enemy is disarmed, the invader pursues his hostilities; he scales the ramparts without striking a blow. What need has he of violence when stratagem suffices? There will always be time enough to draw the sword when the adversary, driven to desperation, revolts.

Convicted, taken in the very act, he still denies his intentions. When necessary he affects a hypocritical devotion to the victims whom he has already baffled; to the unfortunate Oretians he answers:

"I have sent my soldiers to visit you; it is out of love for you, for I have learned that you are suffering from factions; the duty of an ally, of a true friend, is to present himself at such a crisis."

Philip excelled in secret manœuvres; in the face of hostilities he concealed his designs and retreated; in the meantime he strengthened himself little by little, and advanced. As soon as his knavery made him master he threw off the mask. No longer did he offer promises of friendship and protestations of innocence, but menacing reproaches. Here are a few extracts from a letter of this friend of Athens.

"Notwithstanding my frequent embassies for the maintenance of our oaths and agreements, you have never turned your attention to this side of the question. I believe, then, I ought to acquaint you with those points in respect of which I consider myself slighted. Be not at all astonished at the length of this letter: my grievances are numerous, and it is indispensable that I should explain myself clearly upon all of them."

The enumeration of the iniquities of Athens follows. The most grievous wrong on the part of the city is to have at last opened her eyes, and to have rendered war in return for war against this honest neighbor.

“Such are my grievances. You are the aggressors, and my moderation renders you bolder, and makes you more eager to do me all the injury within your power. It to-day becomes my duty to repulse you; I will call the gods to witness, and I will settle the difficulty.”

Philip declared war against the Athenians in this message. For twelve years he had been preparing for war. Athens was his sole object. The alarms of Athens increased in proportion as his oblique measures, his winding marches, dissimulated by pretense and decisions of every kind, progressed; but the Macedonian's oaths and machinations increased also, and the city, not seeing the danger, remained inactive. When once the adversary is at his mercy, Philip openly prepares for decisive action; a single blow remains to be given, and he feels himself the stronger; the key of the house, the house itself, is within his reach; what need has he to play the rôle of hypocrite any longer?

Philip knows where the nerve of Athenian power is located: in the preponderance of her naval forces, he endeavors to cause the maritime arsenals of the Piræus to be burned: in the tributes accruing from her allied islands, he makes an effort to exhaust this source of her revenues. The Athenian piracy does great injury to Philip; it impedes importation and exportation from Macedonia: against a pirate a pirate and a half. The Macedonian piratical boats proceed to enrich themselves by plundering the allies of Athens; they fall upon Lemnos, Imbros, Gerestos, and Marathon, from which they take away the sacred trireme. Philip, the corsair, aspires to the guardianship of the sea. The pirates infest the Archipelago and the coasts of Asia Minor. Philip is to intervene and assist the Greeks; this will give him an opportunity to inspect the coasts,

to practice intrigue among the islands, sometimes to take possession of them (thus he takes the island of Halonnesus from the pirate Sostratus); to favor the development of his marine, the most cherished of his aspirations; and, under the disguise of friendly coöperation, he will corrupt the allies of Athens. He follows his adversary over all lands; like a vigilant sentinel he watches, and attacks him on all sides; he knows that whenever he assails he cannot fail to injure and finally to conquer.

Philip is not only a friend of the Greeks, but also of their gods. Their religious quarrels during the Sacred War offer him many an opportunity to become obtrusive. The pillage of the temple at Delphi (about 355 B.C.), and, later, the impiety of Cirrha in cultivating a consecrated field, place a devout army in the hands of this protector of religion. Invested by the Amphictyons with an absolute military command (*στρατηγὸν ἀντοράτορα*), he marches at the head of his soldiers, and, like them, encircles his head with Apollo's laurel. He is the minister of the vengeance of the god who leads him. He writes to the Peloponnesians: "With you I wish to aid the god and punish those who transgress things held sacred among men," and piously he keeps his word. Sacrilegious Phocis is delivered to conflagration, and its inhabitants to slaughter. The Cirrhæans, contemners of religious decrees, are chastised. All labor deserves its recompense. His first intervention opens to him without a struggle the pass of Thermopylæ (346 B.C.); the second, by the capture of Elatea (339 B.C.), the road to Attica. These two thunderbolts produced consternation in Athens; but did she not know that the gods protect the defenders of their outraged rights?

Notwithstanding this protection, Philip sometimes founders. Checked the first time at Thermopylæ, he postpones this blow. He knows how to await. He could not strike his enemy there; he hastens to meet him in his colonies of the Chersonesus, and marks all vulnerable points. Beaten in Thessaly by Onomarchus of Phocis, he displays in his defeat a new energy and destroys his adversary. Repulsed from Perinthus, from Byzantium, driven from the Hellespont, he is not discouraged. Obstinate, tenacious, his eye fixed upon his object, he changes his means of attack, but not the end. He spies the shores of Greece as a wolf prowls around a sheep-fold; he explores Megara, Ambracia, and Eubœa. He always appears at the post from which he can best hold his enemy in check. He varies his line of march that he may baffle the suspicion of wise prophets. If a fortress is impregnable to engines of war, he causes its gates to fall before "an ass laden with gold." Affable, eloquent, captivating by his very person, he can use bribery at a longer range than his catapults. The gold mines of the Pangæa, without mentioning those of Thessaly and Thrace, give him a thousand talents per annum. He employs them in purchasing Greece, with her generals, her orators, and her oracles. Among those who draw salaries are skillful flatterers who lull the Athenian people to sleep by their deceptive promises, and who extol their indolence. Others surrender to him their troops or the strongholds which they have promised to defend. In this manner he takes possession of Pydna, Amphipolis, and Olynthus. He does not, it is true, always allow the traitors to enjoy the fruits of their treason. His object once accomplished, he discards them. He fears to share the glory of success

with them; and he is assured, notwithstanding these bitter returns, that he will never be in want of them. He declares the man contemptible who sells himself, and he does not count on his fidelity. Who had sacrificed the Hellenic cause for the profits of a Macedonian alliance more eagerly than the Thebans? Nevertheless the Thebans one day betrayed him; nor did the victor of Chæronea (338 B.C.) spare these deserters. He put them to the sword or sold them. Athens, on the contrary, alone of the Greek cities, always resisted his offers and encroachments. He hated and esteemed her; he pursued her furiously, yet admired her; he returned her prisoners and spared her the dishonor of yielding to a Macedonian garrison. Was it not as great a disgrace to her to be deprived of her liberty?

Philip, in his eagerness to rule, appealed to the bad instincts of human nature: jealousy, cupidity, in short all the infirmities of egotism. He excelled in corruption, and, by his corruption, in conquering. Violent and perfidious, mild and merciless, pious and cruel,* according to the views of his policy, disdaining mankind as all ambitious men have done, he himself had his vices, but instead of allowing them to obstruct his designs, he turned them into allies as efficacious as his good qualities: activity, indefatigable perseverance, heroic valor, military talent, profoundness and versatility, passion for glory, and finally that factitious grandeur accompanying stupendous projects which were executed at the cost of an admirable unfolding of intelligence and

* He cast three thousand prisoners of Phœcis into the sea out of pity. In less than three years he destroyed thirty-two cities of Chalcidice. At Olynthus, he gave liberty to some friends of a Greek comedian, and killed his two brothers; he had previously caused a third to perish. (*Justin*, viii, 3; ix, 8; *Diodorus Siculus*, xvi, 54, 95.)

energy, but without scruple and regardless of the means. Such was Philip, an enemy formidable in himself and strengthened still more by the blunders of his adversaries.

II.

After Mantinea (361 B.C.), confusion and trouble reigned in all Greece more than ever. Never did the Hellenic cities, not even in the time of the Persian invasions, form a body of general confederation, capable of uniting all the forces of the country against the public enemy. "I do not see the Greeks united by a common friendship. There are those who place more confidence in the enemy than in certain of their own body." The envious rivalries which divided Lacedæmon, Athens and Thebes, omitting the cities which remained strangers to the practice or even covetousness of the hegemony, broke the union which it had been so necessary to form; and, if patriotism is the sympathy of all with all in a common order of ideas and sentiments, the object of which is the good of the common country, Greece never knew patriotism. Fear of the invader, the strongest bond of harmony, never made her entirely united around a common hearth, as was the Roman republic in the face of the Gauls or of Hannibal. That altar of Vesta—a symbol of a country one and indivisible; those public penates; that temple of Jupiter Capitolinus—the unique seat of the Roman empire; and finally that strong cohesion of the whole people united in their convictions and faith in common destinies;—where could these be found in Greece, with her diversities or antipathies of race, and her parceling out of little personalities, active and vigorous in themselves, but weak as a whole on account of a distrustful and

jealous isolation? At Marathon, Athens was alone in line; Sparta waited, before marching, until the moon was full. At Salamis, Athens with her allies was the rampart of Greece. At Plataea, the struggle was sustained by the Athenians, the Lacedæmonians, the Tegeatans and Megarians, against the Persians and their Greek auxiliaries, among others the Thebans. At Charonea, the last battle-field of liberty, Athens and Thebes alone met the enemy. Lacedæmon did not even appear too late then as she had done at Marathon. There was an intellectual Pan-Hellenism (*παιδεία Ἑλληνική*); there was no political, and even less a patriotic Pan-Hellenism. Greece was an aggregation of egotistical individualities incapable of disinterested sacrifices. In the oration *On the Navy Boards*, the orator speaks of the design, ascribed to the great king, of attacking Greece: "He will give gold, he will offer his friendship to some, while they, wishing to repair their individual losses, will sacrifice the common safety. Many might, without the charge of inconsistency, neglect the rest of Greece, while engaged in the pursuit of private interests"; and further: "the Hellenes might wish to place themselves on his pay-roll, not so much to procure any conquests for him, as to escape their poverty and acquire a little personal ease." Such are the dispositions of the Greeks in respect to this monarch, "wealthier himself than all the Greeks together, and whose gold loads two hundred camels." They will be the same toward Philip, who is less opulent but more dexterous. He will know how to entice their cupidity and dupe them. Some will not entertain the design of giving him arms against the Hellenes, but the crafty statesman will know how to turn their passions to his profit, even against their will. Never did

the Athenians consent to these shameful bargains, even by deceit; but what other advantages they allowed Philip to take against them!* They dread Philip as the enemy, not of their liberty, but of their repose. Careless, buoyant, a mere trifle distracts them from their duty. In the midst of the most important deliberation, if a child's story had been narrated to them they would have received extreme pleasure from it. And in fact a short tale was sometimes necessary to compel the frivolous multitude to listen. Without being devoted to laughter perpetually, like the Tiryntians, the happy subjects of Amphitryon, who was the king beloved of Jupiter, the Athenians acquitted the greatest criminals, even when convicted, "in return for one or two witty remarks." Instead of delighting in the reasoning of the orator, they are carried away by nicknames and jokes of which he is the object before the tribune; they turn everything to pleasantry. A rhetorician at Olympia pledges them to union. "This man exhorts us to concord," remarks an auditor, "and in this he cannot persuade the three persons who compose his household, his wife, himself and his servant." Such is the fruit which they draw from his harangue. It is necessary to divert them in order to win them. Leo of Byzantium is deputed to Athens; he appears; a general laughter welcomes his small stature. "Ah! what would you think," says the clever ambassador to them, "if you should see my wife; she scarcely reaches to

* The author intended here to portray only the traits of Athenian character which pertain to this part of his subject. A complete portrait would be more favorable, and would recall the canvass on which Parrhasius essayed to picture the contradictory qualities of a fantastic and unequable people. (Pliny, *Natural History*, xxxv, ch. 36, § 5. Cf. Thucydides, i, 70; Plato, *Laus*, books i and ii.)

my knee"? The laughter and cheers redouble. "And yet, as small as we are, when we have a dispute between us, Byzantium is not large enough to contain us." Athenian gayety respects nothing, not even the venerable Areopagus. A member of that convention, when it was assembled before the people, used, in regard to a decree of Timarchus, and without thinking of any evil, terms implying double meanings, in which the malignity of his audience saw an allusion to the questionable houses which that personage used to frequent. Several times the hilarity of the public underlined certain expressions of the honorable and candid orator; but behold, when, with a deep tone, he entered into details, the assembly no longer governed itself, it burst out in laughter. The crier interceded: "Do you not blush for laughing thus before the Areopagus?" What could he do? The wanton laughter was like a panic, irresistible; and it was not at Athens that the people thought of subduing it.*

The Athenians were amused at the disputes of their orators as they would be at cock-fights. Demosthenes ill understands how to amuse them on every occasion. He is a water-drinker. He constantly entertains a people entirely devoted to pleasure with their troublesome duties. Loving leisure, they passed their time pleasantly chatting in the barber's or in the perfumer's shop. Fond of news, they went to and from the agora asking one another, What news? For want of news they forged it. "The sublimity of the newsmonger is chimerical reasoning on politics" (Labruyère). The Athenians reasoned, conjectured, interpreted Philip's designs. They described what he had never done, and refused to believe what he was seen to do every

* Æschines, *Against Timarchus*, § 81.

day. Each one forged his own fable, scrutinized the future; no one thought of his present duty. After magnificent decrees they laid down their arms on a slight rumor, just at the time when the report announcing Philip's death or illness should have aroused them to immediate action more than ever before.* Always with humor to give in excess, they passed from extreme discouragement to extreme confidence; from presumption to despair. Credulous to whosoever flattered them, they closed their ears to the admonitions of Demosthenes; they opened them with complaisance to the pacific counsels of Phocion, to the naïve illusions of Isocrates, and to the cleverness of those counsellors of injustice, the detestable authors of belligerent motives. Obstinate blind, the Athenians found it more convenient to turn their eyes from danger than to meet it.

Philip has seized Thermopylæ. At this news there is great agitation in the agora. The subject is discussed, accusations are made, the people are excited; then, with the aid of their egotism, they come to tranquillizing reflections. It is still far from Thermopylæ to the Piræus. No danger in delaying. However, if Philip has overleaped the rampart of Greece, it is for the sole object,—he himself has given his word for it,—of concluding the Sacred War, which has stained Greece with blood for more than ten years (357–346 B.C.). Athens does not oppose these charitable measures. With a light heart she assists in the destruction of the accursed Phocidians. Philip, master of Phocis, descends toward the south. The Athenians are dis-

* In an analogous circumstance, Phocion will tell them at a later time: "Do nothing hastily. If Alexander is dead to-day, he will be dead to-morrow and the following days."

turbed only in a moderate degree. Philip has not yet attacked the Theban power. Now, Athens has conquered the Thebans. Thebes is threatened,—Athens' consolation: since Mantinea, Theban arrogance has humiliated Athens. Did not Epaminondas dare to say to the multitude that "it was necessary to transfer the Propylæa of the Acropolis to the vestibule of the Cadmea?" And then these Bœotians are as stupid and heavy as the air that nourishes them. Why should any one at Athens be interested in people who have no spirit and character? Bœotia is subjugated, the Thebans destroyed, and the invader has reached a new halting place. Athens begins to take the hint. The great justiciary of the sacrileges of Phocis and of Theban insolence always advances. He is about to touch the point. In vain Demosthenes has given the alarm: To arms, Athenians! Those machines erected against Thebes are going to demolish your own walls. If Bœotia perishes, you will perish, for you are the particular men whom the Macedonian fears and wishes to annihilate. Wealthy men, give your gold; wealthy and poor, mount your galleys, seize the oar and spear! * * * Demosthenes, a disagreeable prophet, an inexorable patriot, is not listened to; for Æschines tranquillizes them. His brow is serene. He pronounces the suspicions of this morose orator falsehoods injurious to Philip. He advises the Athenians to spare their money, their lives, and to continue in the enjoyment of their rest. This agreeable language is a feast for them; and while treason and violence pursue their work, unfortunate Athens does not stir. At the most, she is only agitated, but she does not act.

Too often her movements are as fruitless for her as is her repose. She is generous, and adopts resolutions

worthy of her in favor of the oppressed, but she does not adhere to them. An orator proposes an expedition. *Act to-day*, cries the assembly; and neither on this day nor on the next is anything accomplished. She votes forty triremes and sixty talents. She sends ten empty boats with five talents of silver, and at another time “a general without troops, a decree without force, and the boastings of her tribune.” She wages against Philip a clamorous war of decrees. What fruit does she derive from it? Long ago had the Macedonian been chastised, if the decrees had that virtue; but in spite of their zealous speeches he always progresses. The Athenians carry off the palm for orations, Philip the palm for action. “That Philip, a general and soldier, putting himself in the foreground, animating all with his presence, losing no opportunity, not even an instant, triumphs over men given to delays, to decrees, and to conjectures, I am not astonished.” Harangues, even those of Demosthenes, are not sufficient to conquer in war. “Without action all eloquence is powerless, especially the eloquence of Athens; for we pass for the cleverest speakers of Greece.” Quick to understand themselves and to comprehend the ideas of another, they adopt resolutions, but make no effort. That people who formerly aroused all Greece to defend the rights of the Hellenes, at the very moment when the people themselves are plundered, slumbers, and allows the despoiler to go unpunished; and yet she loves glory, she admires the glory of her ancestors, and rejoices in hearing it celebrated. But she contents herself with applauding her ancestors, the saviors of Greece, without having the courage to imitate them. At one moment aroused (what apathy would not be aroused?) by

the eloquence of Demosthenes, she votes war by acclamation, but she leaves the care of waging it to others. Instead of serving in person, the Athenians hire mercenaries; good citizens as to desire and intention, patriotic warriors by proxy.

The time was not long past when, before a Spartan assembly, their enemies rendered this homage to the Athenians: "They are prompt to imagine and to execute what they have conceived. * * * For their country they risk their lives and expose their bodies as if they were of least importance to them. * * * They know no other pleasure than the accomplishment of their duty."* What a contrast between the Athenian of Pericles' (432) day and the Athenian of Demosthenes' (360) time! The latter before all things looks to his own well-being. It is repugnant to him to quit a laughing sky, the chats of the Porticos and the Agora, the thousand artistic and literary amusements constantly renewed in a city not only the *school* but the *rendezvous* of pleasure for all Greece, and to go in the midst of winter into a barbarous climate to meet rude soldiers accustomed to dare everything and to suffer everything. The enjoyments of body and mind to which he has habituated himself have rendered him unfit for the severe toils of war. The poor man is devoted above all to the three obols of the tribunals which enable him to live; to the two obols which assure him an entrance to the theater. He repairs to the assembly "as to a feast at which the scraps are to be divided." The wealthy man "measures happiness by the capacity of his stomach† and by the most shameful pleasures,"

* Thucydides, i, 70.

† "What nonsense are you relating to us here? You are talking for pleasure: Lyceum, Academy, Odeum, Thermopylæ, the nonsense of

without any regard for the happiness of serving no master, "an advantage once esteemed in Greece the greatest and highest degree of felicity." It is sufficient to say that the wealthy and poor are ill-disposed to expose their bodies to that monstrous beast, all bristling with iron, which is called the Macedonian phalanx. They reserve themselves for more agreeable contests. Instead of fighting Philip, they fight their counsellors and generals.

"Is it the author of your misfortunes that you hate? No, it is the citizen who has spoken to you of them last," when he was about to offer a remedy for an evil of which he himself was innocent. A military enterprise has failed. A speaker attributes its failure to Diopithes, Chares and Aristophon. The crowd exclaim "he is right!" and the general is summoned to trial. "Brave to condemn, cowards to act," they hold him responsible for their own faults; or, if he himself has committed any, they punish him with a severity which they could use to a better purpose against the great criminal, Philip. • What is the result of these injustices or excessive severities? The generals desert Athens. Each one of them in all security goes to wage war where his interests call him.* Thus the Athenians do the work of their enemy, not their own.

sophists. I see nothing in these worth our attention. Let us drink, Scion, let us drink to excess and make life happy as long as opportunity and means permit. Join in the uproar, Manes; nothing is dearer than the stomach. The stomach is your father, the stomach is your mother. Virtues, embassies, commands, vain glory, vain turmoil of the land of dreams. Death will strike you on the day marked by destiny. There will remain to you only what you shall have drunk and eaten. The rest is dust. Dust is Pericles, Codrus, Cimon." (Alexis, *The Lord of Debauchery*, frag. of the *Comic Poets*. Cf. Plutarch, *Moralia*.)

* Thus Timotheus and Chabrias sold their services to Persia against Egypt; Chares became a lieutenant to Artabazus; Iphicrates con-

What shall we say concerning the election of magistrates? Socrates and his followers in general were not very sympathetic with Athenian democracy. Socrates dared to ridicule "the fullers, shoemakers, masons, coppersmiths, petty tradesmen and peddlers,—all important personages of whom the assembly of the people was composed." Politics was, in his eyes, a complicated science, as virtue itself was an art. Was the ignorant multitude capable of arriving at the one or the other?

Montesquieu is more indulgent.

"The people are admirable to choose those to whom they are to entrust any authority. They have only to determine from the nature of things which they cannot be ignorant of, and from facts which fall under their knowledge. They know very well that a man has often been in war; that he has had such or such success. They are then very capable of choosing a general. They know that a judge is assiduous; that many classes go away from his tribunal satisfied with him; that he has not been convicted of corruption. This is enough to choose a pretor. They have been struck with the magnificence or wealth of a citizen; this is sufficient to choose an ædile. All these things are facts of which they can better inform themselves in public places than can a monarch in his palace."*

The Athenians, if Demosthenes is to be credited, ill justify the good opinion which Montesquieu has in this respect. They give offices to the wealthiest, not to the most worthy.† They name their political or military

ducted twenty thousand Greek mercenaries to Artaxerxes; the old pirate Charidemus gained possession of small cities on the coasts of Asia, and reigned there.

* *Esprit des Lois*, ii, 2.

† Demosthenes, *In Midiam*, passim.

leaders with as much levity as their priests. It should be required, for example, that a cavalry general could hold himself in his saddle. Now Midias, promoted to this dignity, cannot, even in the solemn processions, becomingly cross the public place on a horse. With such aptitudes for positions due to intrigue, what wonder if, on the day of action, these incapable aspirants use every evasion to escape the obligations of their duty? They have coveted dignity. They no longer wish office if it threatens to become effective. If they decree to send out cavalry, the cavalry general suddenly becomes enamored of the sea and runs to the triremes. If a naval expedition is decided upon, they must wait until the sailors rejoin their squadron.

“How does it happen (Isocrates, after a severe criticism of the political customs of the Athenians, puts this objection into the mouth of a contradictor) that with a similar conduct we are not destroyed, not even inferior in power to any city?” It is because the enemies of Athens, the Thebans and Lacedæmonians, are no longer discreet. Athens has for a long time owed the maintenance of her prosperity to the faults of her adversaries. With Philip it must be otherwise. The king of Macedonia was not a man who would be apt to become an instrument of success for the Athenians.

“To such circumstances are you reduced by your supineness, that I fear (shocking as it is to say it) that, had we all agreed to propose, and you to embrace, such measures as would most effectually ruin our affairs, they could not have been more distressed than at present. At present your conduct must expose you to derision. Nay, I call the powers to witness that you are acting as if Philip’s wishes were to direct you. Opportunities escape you; your treasures are

wasted; you shift the weight of public business upon others; break into passion; criminate each other.”*

Instead of adopting measures most agreeable to the enemy, why do they not hasten to do what he would not fail to do were he in their place? But their characters are very different. Philip deliberates upon the future; the Athenians quarrel over the past. Philip anticipates emergencies; the Athenians follow him as if towed.

“Just as barbarians engage at boxing, so you make war with Philip; for, when one of these receives a blow, that blow engages him; if struck in another part, to that part his hands are shifted; but to ward off the blow, or to watch his antagonist, for this he hath neither skill nor spirit. Even so, if you hear that Philip is in the Chersonesus, you resolve to send forces thither; if in Thermopylæ, thither; if in any other place, you hurry up and down; you follow his standard. But no useful scheme for carrying on the war, no wise provisions, are ever thought of, until you hear of some enterprise in execution, or already crowned with success. This might formerly have been pardonable, but now is the very critical moment when it can by no means be admitted.”†

The Athenians are absolutely wanting in the justly appreciated quality of the Greeks,—opportuneness (*εὐκαιρία*); they do everything at the wrong time, too late or too early. “The people always have too much or too little to do. Sometimes, with one hundred thousand arms, they overthrow everything; sometimes, with a hundred thousand feet, they only go like insects.”‡

“And now, Athenians! what is the reason (think ye) that the public festivals in honor of Minerva and of Bacchus are

* *Third and Fourth Philippics*, §§ 1, 20.

† *First Philippic*, § 40.

‡ *Esprit des Lois*, ii, 2.

always celebrated at the appointed time, whether the direction of them falls to the lot of men of eminence or of persons less distinguished (festivals which cost more treasure than is usually expended upon a whole navy, and more numbers and greater preparations than any one perhaps ever cost); while your expeditions have been all too late. The reason is this: everything relating to the former is ascertained by law, and every one of you knows long before who is to conduct the several entertainments in each tribe, what he is to receive, when and from whom, and what to perform. Not one of these things is left uncertain, not one undetermined. But in affairs of war and warlike preparations there is no order, no certainty, no regulation. So that when any accident alarms us, first we appoint our trierarchs; then we allow them the exchange;* then the supplies are considered. These points once settled, we resolve to man our fleet with strangers and foreigners, then find it necessary to supply their places ourselves. In the midst of these delays, what we are sailing to defend the enemy is already master of; for the time of action we spend in preparing, and the junctures of affairs will not wait our slow and irresolute measures. These forces, too, which we think may be depended on until the new levies are raised, when put to the proof, plainly discover their insufficiency." †

Omitting the vices of the military and financial organization, the Athenian always depends upon his neighbor.‡ He would like to apply the law to his

* *Ἀντίδοσις*. Every citizen who believed himself taxed unduly or to excess had the right of demanding that a wealthier man should be charged with his *liturgy*. If the latter refused under pretext that his resources did not permit him to do it, the law compelled him to exchange his goods for those of the demander,—a law equitable in principle, but a source of delay and of debates very prejudicial to the harmony of the city and to the promptitude of military operations.

† *First Philippic*, § 35.

‡ Cf. Aristophanes, *The Assembly of the Women*, the law of communism in theory and practice.

neighbor and be exempt from it himself. He indifferently comes to the place of action at the latest possible moment, in the hope, secretly caressed, of escaping from a painful duty. We see how at Pydna, Potidæa, Methone, Pagasæ, they arrive just in time to witness Philip's triumphs and their own confusion. "Can the people conduct an undertaking, know the places, opportunities, moments, and profit by them? No, they cannot,"* and the Athenians less than all others. All at Athens is capricious, tumultuous; no decided impulsions, no regular counsels, no unique authority. All is done by intermittent passion, by jerks and twitches. How different it is with the despotic invader! His finances are in a sound condition, his veteran soldiers always under arms. What he judges proper to do he does immediately, without public deliberation or a proclamation of decrees. He is neither calumniated before the tribunals, nor accused as a transgressor of laws, nor amenable in person; but everywhere a universal arbiter and an absolute master. In the face of such an adversary what do we see? A people aggravating by the disorder of the time, one of the vices connected with the democratic constitution, a multitude "blinded, as it seems, by an evil spirit," an "old man in delirium tremens," as Æschines expresses it.

In Aristophanes the favored orators of the people cajole and dupe them; in the time of Philip they flatter and betray them. The spirit of vengeance forced

* *Esprit des Lois*, ii, 2; cf. v, 10, *De la Promptitude de l'Execution dans la Monarchie*: "Cardinal Richelieu wishes the people to shun the thorns of societies in monarchies, societies which form difficulties for everything. Although the cardinal could not have had despotism in his heart, he might have had it in his head."

Alcibiades to desert his country. The ambitious fugitive wished to punish her for her intended ingratitude, and employed against her the talents for which he deemed himself poorly paid. Then, when the chastisement was consummated, he returned to her and was loved, inasmuch as he had caused her to feel the value of his favors. The return of the victor was a triumph. "The Athenians lauded what he had done for the city, and did not admire less what he had done against her." During the Macedonian epoch duties toward the country were no better known, and forfeitures arose from a source more impure than from the wounds of pride,—from venality. "A contagion, a terrible and cruel pest, came and spread over Greece." Magistrates and private citizens emulously called for the Macedonian's gold and servitude. The epidemic at first reached Thessaly, penetrated the Peloponnesus, "provoked the massacres of Elis, and became intoxicated with a furious madness of the pitiable classes who, in order to elevate themselves one over another, while extending their hands to Philip became covered with the blood of their relatives and citizens." Far from resting here, the scourge gained Arcadia and Argolis, and finally crept into Athens. "Whilst it has not yet spread, watch over yourselves. Athenians, stigmatize those who have imported it. Else fear lest you may recognize the utility of my counsels when a remedy shall have become impossible."* The disease, pointed out in vain in 342 B.C., continued to spread; the orator of the *Oration on the Crown* (330 B.C.) should have recalled the sad effects of it. In this respect the Athenians might have received lessons from the Spartans. Pausanias sacrificed the interests of

* Demosthenes *On the Embassy*, § 259.

Lacedæmon to the favor of Xerxes. Convicted by the ephors he fled into the temple of Minerva. His mother was the first to place a stone at the door and shut him in. Athens did not consider things so seriously. Are Philip's friends really traitors? Some call them promoters of peace, saviors and champions of the true interests of the state, as were Fouché and the auxiliaries of the allies in 1815. The Athenians forgot to distinguish between the sincere citizen who was deceived and the egotist who thought more of himself than of the republic. Formerly Arthmius of Zelia, an Asiatic city, brought gold from the Persians into the Peloponnesus. The ancestors of those Athenians who were fighting Philip declared him an enemy, himself and his race infamous, and considered him an outlaw. At another time the Athenians, jealous guardians of the dignity and safety of Greece, engraved upon bronze the infamy of corrupters. How times have changed! "Envy toward him whom gold has seduced; jests and laughter if he confesses it; pardon if he is convicted; hatred against his accuser."* Such were the sentiments awakened by the traffic of the country. Is it astonishing after this that the Macedonians in the Piræus multiplied, and, shielded from contempt, exhibited for sale a shameless simony? Votes, decrees, administration, war, finances,—they sold everything in full market, and preached peace for ready cash. They vied in their emulation to become purchasers.

"Philip was not satisfied with hearing the traitors' propositions, and he did not know what prey to seize first. He took, in one day, five hundred horsemen with their arms, delivered up to him by the leaders themselves, a capture hitherto unequalled. The light of day, the soil beneath their

* *Third Philippic*, § 39.

feet, temples, tombs,— the guilty traitors regarded nothing, not even the reputation which was to shed infamy upon such acts. Such great venality, Athenians, strikes men with derangement and madness!”

Philip, it is true, neglected no opportunity, as he did at Diium after the capture of Olynthus, to display a liberal magnificence by which the greedy poverty of the Greeks was dazzled and enticed. Athenæus* has transmitted to us the description of a feast at a Macedonian wedding, so sumptuous and splendid that it might render Trimalcion jealous. Caranus' guests return from the banquet not only deliciously feasted, but loaded with gold and silver plate, enriched for life. Let an Athenian now come and talk to them of the meager fare of his feasts; they will send him back ridiculed to his rockets and onions. We do not know the bill of fare of the banquets offered by Philip to his hosts from Athens, but his liberalities are known to us. One brings back from Macedonia timber to cover his house, another sheep and horses; for the most skillful artisans the highest salary. Philocrates, the principal author of the fatal peace, which took its name from him (347 B.C.), received lands whose revenue was a talent, besides the grain and gold with which he openly carried on commerce on the bankers' tables in the Agora. He brought back from Olynthus freed women, captives to gratify his pleasures, and besides this he was seen going the rounds of the market, and, a fine connoisseur, “purchasing women and fish.” Demosthenes has named several of these traffickers of the Hellenic family whose eloquence had a fixed tariff. “The day would fail me if I should recount their names.” He paints the least shameless of those who realized

* *Banquet of the Sophists*, iv, 2.

their fortunes of real estate and retired into Macedonia. He also represents those traitors in Macedonia who betrayed their country, seated at Philip's table with cup in hand, drinking the public liberty. Such characters justified the insulting contempt of the princely purchaser of Greece. See in what a strain he speaks of the few orators who remained faithful. "It would be easy for me, by throwing a little gold before them, to check their censures and convert them into eulogies; but I would blush to be seen purchasing the friendship of such men."* They likewise justify this cry of Demosthenes: "We have inured a formidable enemy against ourselves. Let whoever denies it appear before me and say where Philip derived his power if it was not in the heart of Athens." In fact, did not Athens send him deputies who were emulous to deprecate their country before him? "The people, a restless multitude, are the least stable, the most vacillating, of all things. They are like the waves of the sea which a slight breeze agitates: one comes, another goes away; no one cares nor studies public affairs. It therefore behooves you to have friends at Athens who will do and regulate all according to your will. Take care of this support and among the Athenians you will make all yield to your pleasure.† Philip was careful not to allow these charitable encouragements to pass gratuitously. It was far less expensive for him to hire a few men than to conciliate the entire city by honorable means. In this way he succeeded well.

The same tongues calumniated Athens in Philip's presence and exalted Philip himself before the Athenians. No, never was man seen "so gracious, so

* *On the Embassy*, passim.

† Demosthenes, *On the Embassy*, § 136.

amiable"; he was gallant, he was eloquent, he was the "most Grecian" of those who were not Greeks, and what a drinker! They did not add that this accomplished prince was an excellent payer, but the Athenians, when advised, discovered it. Thanks to the connivance of these allies, he deferred the oaths which were at some time to bind his hands, for three whole months. In the mean time, he pilfered and appropriated on all sides; he esteemed as a good capture whatever he could possess before signing the peace.

It was still in the heart of Athens that he found accomplices always ready to become the echo of his fallacious promises, sometimes even to exceed them. This was apparent after the treaty and peace of 347 B.C., from which Philocrates, Æschines and their associates perfidiously allowed the Phocians to be excluded, against the will of Athens. How could the people escape becoming the laughing-stock of their machinations? Sent to Philip in order to treat with him directly, and to examine on the spot the true state of things, they were the sole official authority to decide; their falsehoods were dexterously colored, and enforced belief. Contemporary history has presented certain examples of these deceptions of a nation by ministers employed to enlighten it, and throwing it into fatal adventures when misguided by forged declarations. "Yes," said Æschines, "Philip has passed Thermopylæ. What signifies? Do not be alarmed, all will go according to our wishes; in two or three days you will learn that he has become the enemy of those whose friend he appeared, and the friend of those whose enemy he proclaimed himself." Athens was often deceived by these phantasmagorias of her orators, but she was also often the victim of her own illusions, and of faults attributable to herself.

She had a right to cry out treason; but did not the entire people betray themselves by their weakness and follies?

“Oh, gods! we have suffered all these plunders; we have, if I dare say it, coöperated with him in them, and now we will seek the authors of our misfortunes! for I know too well we will take care not to confess ourselves guilty. In the perils of war no fugitive accuses himself, but always his general, his comrade; he accuses all rather than himself; nevertheless all the fugitives cause the rout. This accuser of another could have held his ground firmly, and if each had held firmly, they would not have been vanquished.”*

Never, indeed, did Athens accuse Demosthenes: this was justice. No man was more passionately devoted to the difficult work of the common safety. In Philip's time, Athens numbered as many citizens (about twenty thousand) as in the days when she repulsed the barbarians, and disputed the empire with Lacedæmon; she had preserved her numerical forces, but not her valor. Let us now see what resources Demosthenes, the citizen, the statesman and the orator, used in his endeavor to restore her valor and thus save her liberty.

* *Third Olynthiac*, § 17.

CHAPTER III.

DEMOSTHENES — THE MAN — THE CITIZEN.

“Τούτ' γε καὶ ἀντὶν ῥήτορα (ἔξω δὲ λόγου τίθεται Φωκίων)
καὶ τῶ βίῳ παρῆλθε: “He was the most upright of the orators of
his time, excepting Phocion.” (Plutarch, *Life of Demosthenes*.)

“My character has never been compromised. I was never known
to prefer the favor of the great to the rights of the people. And, in
the affairs of Greece, the bribes and flattering assurances of friend-
ship which Philip lavished never were so dear to me as the interests
of the Hellenes.” (*Oration on the Crown*.)

IN Demosthenes, the citizen, the statesman, and the
orator, were equal to the task which he volun-
tarily imposed upon himself. Before entering upon
his political career, the young son of a sword-cutler
was in danger of being deprived of his inheritance,
and said to the judges: “You have not yet put me
to trial, and do not know what I can do for the state;
but, may I hope, I will not be of less service to it than
my father was.”* This modest prevision of the young
man of nineteen years was more than justified. Forty
years later the patriotic exile could write to his citizens,
in demanding of them a re-examination of his trial: “I
yield to no one in affection for the people. Not one
of my contemporaries has done more for you, none
given more proofs of his devotion.”†

* *Second Pleading against Aphobus*, § 22.

† Second letter of Demosthenes, fin. Some moderns have dis-
puted the authenticity of these letters recognized by Cicero. We
accept them as a faithful proof of the sentiments of ancient Greece
toward their patriotic orator.

I. The Man.—Demosthenes had from his youth given proof of a character fitted for strife. The athlete, who was destined some day to bear up against Philip with all his strength, had first tested his powers on himself. Less fortunately endowed than some of his rivals in eloquence, he resolved to repair nature's work and to remake himself. His obstinacy remained ruler. This tenacious firmness, perpetuated in legend like all that strikes man's imagination, permitted Valerius Maximus to say: "If his mother brought one Demosthenes to light, art begat another with toil."* Æschines several times rebuked Demosthenes with the title of Scythian. "Demosthenes is neither of our soil nor of our race. * * * On his mother's side he is a Scythian, a barbarian, a Greek only in language, his heart is too perverse to be an Athenian." His grandmother, in fact, was a woman from the Bosphorus. The stiffness of his character, wanting in Athenian flexibility and playfulness, was due, perhaps, to the influence of his maternal blood. At all events, his youth was not in every respect similar to that of the sons of Athenian families, but more worthy, in certain respects, of the young Anacharsis. His midnight studies remain celebrated. Who is ignorant of them? Says the author of the *Tusculanæ Disputationes*: "He was grieved if it happened that an artisan began work earlier than himself."† According to his own testimony he became an orator by using more oil than wine. It was not the oil of the palestra. Æschines reproached him for not having cared for the well-being

* Valerius Maximus, viii, 7; Demosthenes, born in 384 or 385, died in 322.

† *Tusculanæ Disputationes*, iv, 19: "Qui dolere se aiebat si quando opificum antelucana victus esset industria."

of his body in the gymnasium. Neither had the chase any charms for him. He disdained the amusements enjoyed by companions of his age. Athenian orators more than once drew unfavorable inferences from the indifference of their adversaries for the accustomed amusements of the Greeks. To pass the time pleasantly chatting before the bankers' counters, in the perfumer's shop, or in the barber's shop, was one of their favorite pleasures. Aristogiton did not engage in these pastimes. He lived a stranger to the pleasures of society. His accuser did not forget to charge him of this crime. Demosthenes likewise sought isolation for himself. To what end? To accustom himself to the chicanery and to the artifices of a rhetorician greedy of the goods of another. Thus speaks the accuser of Ctesiphon. Plutarch gives curious, if not authentic, details of the studious practices of the stubborn wrestler. His half-shaven head, his cave, his great mirror before which he was wont to declaim, his sword suspended over his shoulder to check its disagreeable shrugs, the pebbles in his mouth, and, finally, the different painful or whimsical exercises to correct the imperfections of his voice, are at least proofs of the impression left upon the ancients by a will power which has become traditional.

Plutarch means that the youths should go to the gymnasium and to the chase, exercises more ennobling than fishing.* The latter has, however, one advantage: it does not cause fatigue, which is, according to Plato, the enemy of knowledge. Of these Demosthe-

* *On the Education of Children.* Cf. *Animals of Land and Sea.* Apollo and Diana received their surnames from destroying wolves and conquering stags. No god was ever named from exterminating congres and surmullets.

nes enjoyed neither the one nor the other. He cared not to run in the forests like Hippolyte, and he devoted his leisure hours to pleasures which the chaste friend of Diana would have despised. Before his severity in prosecuting his guardians had given him the surname of Argas (a kind of serpent) his youth had received, not from his nurse, but from fame, according to Æschines, the name of *Batalus*.^{*} The customs of his manly age were not without reproach. Demosthenes' different speeches cut the characters of the gilded youth of Athens to the quick. Perhaps the accuser of Conon and Neæra has exaggerated these traits a little.

The eulogies conferred upon the family life of the Athenians by Aristogiton's adversary cannot be suspected of exaggeration.

"Naturally kind and indulgent toward one another, you conduct yourselves in this city as do families in their homes. One house contains a father, his sons, who have grown to manhood, and perhaps their children. In these three generations there are necessarily numerous and essential differences of taste: the young neither speak nor act like the old. And yet, if the young people are observed, they desire in whatever they do to escape notice, or at least they clearly show their intention to conceal themselves. If the old men, on their part, notice that the young are given too much to expenditure, to wine, and to the pleasures of their age, they see it without the appearance of seeing it. Thus each follows his own tastes, and all goes well."[†]

^{*} Demosthenes' busts have the lower lip raised against the gum, a customary habit with stammerers. For a long time he was unable to pronounce the letter R. His nurse might have designated by this nick-name an effeminate stammering like that of the *Incoyables*. Battos (whence βατταλος), king of Cyrene, was famous for his stammering. Æschines naturally adopted an interpretation less innocent.

[†] This is an exaggeration of the Athenian quality praised by Thu-

Timarchus is an incorrigible debauchee. How can it be helped? Leave him to his evil propensities, with this simple restriction: "With respect to those who give chase to the young,—a prey always easy to capture,—compel them to turn themselves toward foreigners and alien settlers. They will thus be able to satisfy their passion without injuring you."* Timarchus would be a very bad citizen if he did not profit by so conciliating a concession. Æschines endeavors to associate the names of Demosthenes and Timarchus. We know what to think of these calumnies, but of calumny something always remains. "If these fine garments, these soft underclothes in which you are dressed when you write orations against your friends, and which cause them to pass into the hands of the judges, were taken away from you, no one would know, I believe, unless informed, whether these garments belonged to a man or to a woman."† Demosthenes, like Hyperides and others, had easy manners, and participated in recreations before which the old men of Athens closed their eyes. However, he excepted wine from these pleasures. Did he abstain from it out of taste or calculation, and ought this proscription of wine to be added to the voluntary ordeals which his desire to attain eloquence imposed on him? Unlike Horace, water was perhaps his Hippocrene. *Cleon*: "Do you wish that I should tell you what has happened to you? You have, like so many others, gained a small case against a foreigner. Did you mutter it sufficiently all night, declaim it in the streets, recite it to every comer? Did you drink enough of *water* to inspire

cydides (ii, 37): a fine condition of social relations and indulgence of good taste among a people who know how to live.

* *Against Timarchus*, § 195. † *Against Timarchus*, § 285.

you?" *The Butcher*: "And what do you drink then in order to be capable of astounding the stupefied city with your clamors?"* Cleon follows Philocrates' regime. "He waters a fresh fish with a large jar of pure wine." Demosthenes' method is different. He needs more to calm than to animate himself. Eratosthenes speaks of his bacchic (παράβαλλον) frenzy; Demetrius the Phalerean, of his "enthusiasm" at the bar. What would all this have been if he had loved his wine? Pythagoras proscribed the bean as contrary to the serenity of philosophic meditation. Our orator likewise distrusts the exciting liquor of Bacchus, and his good intention is turned against him. Water drinkers are abominable. Demosthenes often heard this epithet applied in connection with that of morose and coarse. Solon, even in his old age, enjoyed the sweet gifts of the gods. Demosthenes seemed never to unbend his stern and imposing brow. A similar contrast marked his whole life. His career gave proof that he possessed a sensibility accessible to human weakness, and an austere firmness in mastering himself as soon as a higher interest of his own choice imposed upon him its duty.

This man, unsparing of himself, was always so toward the enemies of his country. The bitter humor aroused by his political foes was not at all surprising in a citizen moved by the dangers of Athens, and by the animosities of the unequal contest which he sustained for her. The sad thoughts of his mind darkened the traits of his character. This orator, with careworn visage and evil predictions, will be treated with *curses* after Chæronea. Before the disaster Æschines was contented to abuse his morose character

* Aristophanes, *Knights*.

and his gross manners. What differences between these two counsellors of the people! The one sportive, amiable, has the smiles and indulgence of Philinte. He has had the good taste never to trouble any accountable person; he never banishes any person into exile. He is easy, accommodating; he views things on the agreeable side, and adapts himself to the times. He loves Athens, the liberty of Athens, as Philinte loves truth and virtue; a little less than his comforts, and on condition that it will cost him nothing. Demosthenes is not, like him, a gallant man. He injures the Macedonians in order to convince them that he is their enemy; he insults Philip at the risk of implicating the city; he is brutal, ill-advised; he does not know how to live. He has no heart; it is scarcely seven days since his daughter, who first gave him the sweet name of father, expired. Demosthenes, crowned with flowers, dressed in a white robe, celebrates Philip's death in a public sacrifice! He violates the most sacred laws of nature and religion. He dares to say in public that he believes himself bound more by the duties of patriotism than by the rights of hospitality. He causes to be put to torture an Oritian who was suspected of high treason, and whom he had formerly welcomed under his roof. He accuses his colleagues in the embassy of prevarication, even after having participated with them in the repast of the Prytanem. A blind enemy of Alexander, he persuades, even while in exile, the Athenians to revolt. His obstinate resistance is like that of a madman. * * * These traits depicted by Æschines were intended to dishonor Demosthenes, but in fact they honor him.

Æschines further calumniates him when he insinuates that he was sold to the enemies of the republic.

In Demosthenes the citizen was irreproachable, if the man was not. Like Mirabeau, Demosthenes loved money, and for the same reasons. Plutarch reproaches him for having increased his wealth on board of merchantmen, which was then considered the greatest usury.* On this point modern men are justly less rigorous than the ancients were. Money is a commodity as well as anything else. Commerce with money is therefore legitimate on land and sea. Plutarch accuses Demosthenes of another charge, equally trivial. The Athenian orator was never intrusted with an important commission or command like Cicero. Does the biographer wish us to understand that perhaps he would have enriched himself like Verres' accuser, or that at the head of an army he would not have been more scrupulous or sparing of others' property than Diopithes or Timotheus?† These insinuations should be withdrawn: opportunities are rarely wanting to him who would offend. Æschines and Philip's well-paid friends have clearly proven it. Demosthenes was fond of luxury and its accompanying pleasures; no one has ever convicted him of having betrayed his duties as a citizen in order to gratify his inclinations.‡ The stenographer's eloquence sufficed to delight him. Often has he himself in his speeches stigmatized, in the name of his litigant, the greedy venality of those who deal in orations. Æschines has a right to censure him for deserving that his own invectives against covetous orators should be applied to himself; but is this gain, whatever may be thought of

* *Comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero*, chap. 3.

† *Oration on the Chersonesus*, and *Against Timotheus*, passim.

‡ Æschines insists upon the Eubœan affairs, but without proving anything.

it, comparable to that of Philocrates? The author of *The Lives of Illustrious Men* expressed regret, and all share it, that Demosthenes was not sufficiently daring in war, nor “sufficiently guarded and fortified against presents.” These two qualities would certainly have crowned his glory; but what his defects have left to him is still grand; and as Plutarch has said of him, if Demosthenes in some respects did not escape the common vices of Athens, he was the most honorable orator of his time with the exception of Phocion. It was no small merit during the Macedonian period to be, we will not say perfect, but even moderately virtuous,—the only assumption Demosthenes ever entertained.*

Eloquence was the great power at Athens, but too often gold actuated it. Without mentioning the corruption of magistrates and judges (thus Chares through his immense wealth escaped death which his colleague Lysicles had already suffered), the orators of Athens sold their eloquence and their silence in turn. Those whose heads Alexander demanded owed their safety to five talents which Demades accepted for shielding them, by a skillful expedient, from the vengeance of his friend, the Macedonian prince. In the case of Harpalus,† this same Demades laughed at the *money-cold* ascribed to Demosthenes. It is well known how Philip paid his partisans for speaking or remaining silent. He became so accustomed to success over these venal souls that he was filled with hatred toward the upright counsellors of Athens. “I would blush to

* *Φύσσει μέτριοι πολίτην.* (*Pro Corona.*)

† Harpalus fled from Asia to Athens (327) in the hope of escaping Alexander's wrath and enjoying the fruits of his extortions in peace. He succeeded in bribing several orators, but not the city's protection, and had to flee to Crete.

purchase the friendship of such men." We have little faith in a scruple of delicacy on the part of Philip. If he did not seduce Demosthenes it was not because of his disdain, but because he was unable. To bribe Demosthenes was to terminate the war at once; but if the zealous patriot accepted gold from the Medes to procure arms against the Macedonians, as the European powers unscrupulously received gold from England with which to defeat Napoleon, never did he stain his hands with presents from his enemies. In an oration * in which he succeeded, by force of reason and elevated sentiments, in calming the Athenians who were enraged against him, in the midst of the double scourge of the plague and of the war, Pericles recalls his principal claims to their confidence, and especially his integrity,—superior to riches,—a rare quality, which the historian insists is one of the causes of his long power over the Athenians. "Pericles, as eminent by his intelligence as by the respect shown him, manifestly invincible to the seduction of presents, governed the multitude. He did not allow himself to be led by it, but he led and guided it." Demosthenes' political integrity was in like manner one of the secrets of his strength against Philip and his influence over Athens.

"If on all these occasions it is evident that I have foreseen the future more clearly than others, I do not assume vanity, nor do I flatter myself with the belief that I am possessed of a remarkable sagacity. To two causes, Athenians, I will attribute all the honor of my intelligence and presentiments: the first is fortune: * * * the second the disinterestedness with which I judge and reason on all things. No; no man can show a single present attached to my actions, to my words and speeches in the administration of duty." †

* Thucydides, ii, 60-65.

† *Oration on the Peace*, § 11.

Money is the offensive arm of the ambitious. All usurpers establish their power on corruption. While Philip was buying Greece rather than conquering her, our orator's integrity remained impenetrable to seduction. By that means he again acquired the right of comparing himself to Pericles and claiming honor like him.

"If it is asked by what means Philip succeeded in all his enterprises, everybody will answer, By his army, by his presents, by the corruption of those who were at the head of affairs. * * * In refusing his gold, I have conquered Philip; for if the purchaser triumphs over the traitor who sells himself, that man who remains incorruptible has triumphed over the seducer. Athens, therefore, has been unconquered on the part of Demosthenes."*

Demosthenes several times made allusion to the reproach of timidity which was imputed to him. "He is weak and without courage. He counsels war and dares not propose it by decree!" In fact, he objects to it in the fourth Philippic (341), and explains his objection by motives of prudence. The fierce reply of Hegesippus on this occasion is well known: "But it is war that you propose! Yes, war, and with it mournings, public burials, funeral eulogies,—everything that ought to make us free and save our necks from the Macedonian yoke." Demosthenes does not view it in this light. He does not conceal his apprehension of being treated, in case of failure, as traitors more justly would be dealt with. During the previous year (342) he extricated his cause from that of Æschines, a prevaricating deputy, and disavowed the criminal manœuvres, in the expiation of which he feared that he would see, in days of anger, his innocence entan-

* *Pro Corona*, § 247.

gled. In the third *Philippic* he calls to mind Euphræus, the Oritian: "Rather die a thousand times than complain like a coward to Philip and deliver up any of your faithful orators." Demosthenes did not flatter himself in saying that he foresaw the future. Æschines was to accuse him of ruining Greece, and Alexander was to demand his head. From 352, in the first *Philippic*, he declares himself resigned to suffer everything if success deceives his expectation, and at the same time he would wish to be assured, he said, that it would be as advantageous to himself to give good counsels as to the Athenians to receive them. Notwithstanding his uncertainty he gives his counsels, for he knows them to be useful. "Audacity is often the child of ignorance, and hesitation that of deliberate consideration. The truly great mind is that which clearly perceives wherein is pleasure and pain, and which, in the meantime, never turns away from dangers."* Demosthenes saw the danger. Without fear or boasting he felt it approaching and boldly faced it. In these conditions the cautious prudence of certain apparent timidities exalts, if it can be said, the courage of principles and general conduct.

According to Æschines, Demosthenes was wanting in assurance before the multitudes (*δειλὸν πρὸς τοὺς ὄχλους*).

"As regards his courage I have only a word to say: If he did not acknowledge his cowardice and you were not convinced of it as he is, I would stop for a moment to prove it to you. But since he himself recognized it in our assemblies, and since you do not in the least doubt it, it only remains for me to remind you of the laws directed against cowards."†

Thus an enemy could describe him. Some lines of

* Thucydides, ii, 40.

† *Against Ctesiphon*, § 175.

the oration *In Midiam* imply a discreet acknowledgment of the facility with which he faltered.

Midias endeavored to obtain from him a nonsuit at the cost of gold. At the sight of the banker Blepæus approaching Demosthenes, the fear of seeing him accept a settlement provoked the people to such clamors that the terrified orator left his mantle and hastened his flight, "almost naked, in his shirt," before the pursuing financier. To fly before gold and shouts is indeed characteristic of a man very easily influenced. Demosthenes was impressible to an extraordinary degree. He did not always possess that firmness which permits one, without stumbling, to look in the face the situations in which coolness is necessary to escape from all danger. Demosthenes had a nervous and sensitive nature. Æschines compares him to a woman on account of the vivacity of his sentiments, and reproaches him for weeping more easily than others laugh. He was, as often happens, very firm, very decided, in his ideas, but timid in his actions. A little was sufficient to throw him off his balance. The *nil admirari*, which constitutes the virtue and happiness of Horace's sage, was not his lot. He was a man astonished at the most trifling things. How much he suffered from this weakness! Sent on an embassy to Alexander, then encamped under the walls of Thebes, he was seized with fear and returned with the precipitation of a "fugitive." Appalled at the march of Alexander on Thebes after its revolt, the Athenians instructed deputies to announce to Philip's son that they recognized his hegemony and that they decreed him divine honors. The author of the *Philippics* had not the courage to cross the Cithæron and to place at the feet of the prince whom he had mocked the proof

of his country's and his own humiliation. Dare we blame him for it? If the sentiment which inspired Demosthenes' retreat was such as we believe it was, Æschines' raillery is rather a praise than a reproach to him. But why so freely accept a mission if his courage to accomplish the task was not assured? Demosthenes feared, perhaps, that he would falter before the young conqueror, as he had done before Philip. In the presence of the Macedonian's court, and without the excuse of the military apparel which was destined one day to paralyze the flowing eloquence of the defender of Milo, the deputy from Athens lost his memory and stammered, a disgrace obvious to an orator who was Æschines' colleague. That nature which Demosthenes subdued at the tribune of the Pnyx was predominant at Pella. Others before him and less timid than he had experienced similar failures. Alcibiades was wanting in self-confidence at the tribune, and often broke down. One day, while haranguing the people, he let a quail escape. The Athenians ran after it, caught it, and returned it to him. Did Alcibiades, who was fond of diversions, premeditate this very thing in order to conceal the treachery of his memory and to give himself time to think? An idol of the Athenians, he well knew that he was not speaking before hostile hearers. Demosthenes, in the presence of Philip, lost his self-possession as if he were before an enemy.

His timidity was too manifest to think of concealing it; he could only essay to apologize for it.

"Hardy, shameless, impudent, I am not, and do not desire to become so. Nevertheless, I esteem myself much more courageous than these intrepid statesmen without shame. To judge, to confiscate, to distribute the property of others, to

accuse, without regard to the interests of the country, does not demand any courage. When one has for a pledge of his own safety the faculty of speaking and of governing to please you, boldness is without danger. But, for your good, to resist your wishes, to give you advice not agreeable, but always the most useful to you, to follow a policy in which fortune rules more often than sound calculation, and nevertheless to declare myself responsible both for fortune and calculation,— this, I say, proves a man of courage.”*

Æschines taunts him for his cowardice. And didst thou not, replies Demosthenes, during the prosperous days of our country “live the life of a hare? Fearful, trembling, thou hast constantly expected to be struck and chastised for the crimes with which thy conscience has reproached thee. At the hour of our misfortunes thy assurance has struck every eye.”† Demosthenes’ timorous humor discloses the character of the citizen, resolved to brave the dangers connected with the political rôle which honor had commanded him to choose. Was that orator cowardly who, assailed by sarcasms, by cries, by menaces, and at the risk of being “torn into pieces,” repulsed with his inflexible views and patriotic zeal the assaults of beasts (*θηρία*) which had been let loose on him? Sometimes he seemed to hesitate to commit himself. What is the use of incurring enmities which do not profit the commonwealth? But when solemn circumstances demanded it, as on the day after Elatea, and on the eve of the Theban alliance, far from sparing himself, he devoted himself entirely to the common interest. Civil courage is valuable at a time when the country is in danger and summons us, and when the sentiment of duty binds a citizen to bear alone, or more than all

* *Oration on the Chersonesus*, § 68.

† *Pro Corona*, § 263.

others, the hazards and responsibilities of the future. Cicero, consoled by Cato, displayed this courage against Catiline; Demosthenes displayed it against Philip with no other ally or inspirer than the genius of the Athens of the past. The comic poet Timocles pictures Demosthenes as a warrior in battle array, a "Briareus, an eater of lances and catapults."* The irony is keen when we consider that this warrior had fled at Chæroneæ. Here it would be pleasing to use the eraser and draw the curtain. Nevertheless, if Bourdaloue marked the six circumstances in extenuation of "the eclipse" of Louis of Bourbon at the head of the Spanish army, it is equitable, not to palliate Demosthenes' fault, but to show why his compatriots pardoned him. On this point Æschines, a brave soldier, had fine play against the warlike orator who deserted his post. The law of Solon condemns to civil degradation the coward who throws away his buckler; and he,—he claims a crown! In vain Demosthenes, in order to escape his adversary's blows, intrenches himself behind his oratorical ability: at the tribune, in the embassies, in the public councils, I have served the state better than any other man. The minister of Athens has always done his duty; let the statesman acquit the soldier. This apology is more adroit than solid, and his answer to Æschines' sarcasm in this proverbial verse, which Aulus Gellius puts in his mouth, is truly characteristic,—

"He who fights and runs away,
Will live to fight another day,"—

a verse which the poet Horace, without doubt, agreed to on his return from Philippi. "Yes, my friends, I fled, but with you." Thus Xenocrates, not merely a

* *Fragments of Comic Poets.*

soldier but a general, without further troubling himself, replied to his companions in the rout. In like manner Demosthenes followed the general rout; he fled from the battle-field, but in fact he returned to his duty. While he was stealing away conquered from the arrows of the Macedonians, what was Æschines doing? Æschines has neglected to tell us. Was he behind Philip's army, awaiting the issue of the combat, hoping, perhaps, for the defeat which must necessarily strengthen his party? He himself took care to give us in detail an account of his services in the campaigns previous to the year 350. Nowhere has the glorious soldier of Thamines, crowned for his bravery against the Eubœans,* made allusion to his participation in the battle of Chæronea. It would have been very difficult to repulse with his arms an enemy whose complaisant policy had prepared the road. Demosthenes is worthy of blame, but we are not willing that Æschines should address him on this subject. Æschines did nothing to avert the disaster, nothing to repair it. Even after Chæronea, Demosthenes was a better and more useful citizen than Æschines. Demosthenes' safety served Athens better than if he had suffered a courageous death. It was he, with Hyperides, who organized the resistance and forced Philip, by the city's resolute attitude, to treat her with care and respect. Viewing things in a certain light, all the works of genius combined are not worth one good action. And yet, if one of these works is fitted to inspire us with virtuous acts, can we not show some indulgence to the weakness which made it possible? The author of the *Oration on the Crown* did not fight like a hero, but that oration inspires heroism. It

* Æschines, *Embassy*, § 167.

would have been a great loss to Athens if the trial on the crown had not occurred. For if she saved the honor of the Hellenes by fighting at Chæronea, she consecrated her own by justifying Ctesiphon's decree. There are fortunate mistakes against which posterity has not always the courage to protest. Let us pardon this confession. We are very well satisfied that Demosthenes ill sustained his maxims of war to the knife on the field of battle. His death would have confirmed his orations, but how dearly would this confirmation have been bought! The Athenians themselves, if consulted, would not have wished it at that price; they owed gratitude to the counsellor of the city for the generous words which had awakened their zeal. Like the Thebans, they were touched with this magnanimous trait. "Thebans, you refuse to give us your alliance; very well, we will fight alone. Only permit us to pass over your land to go to Philip!"* How many times did they applaud his manly counsels without having the fortitude to follow them? Demosthenes, in his turn, forgot what he had said concerning the duty of dying for his country, and his fellow citizens had the generosity not to remember it. The orator of the *Philippics* conceived courage without realizing it. He magnificently traced the idea of it, as J. J. Rousseau adored virtue, with a Platonic passion. Human weak-

* Æschines (*Against Ctesiphon*) has the unskillfulness to find fault with this eloquence, worthy of the sublime apostrophe of Ajax to Jupiter:

"Oh, King! oh, Father! hear my humble prayer:
 Dispel this cloud, the light of heaven restore;
 Give me to see, and Ajax asks no more!
 If Greece must perish, we thy will obey,
 But let us perish in the light of day." (*Iliad*, xvii, 645 et seq.)

ness will always justify Montaigne's saying: "We must consider the sermon and preacher separately."

Never would Demosthenes have made a public confession of his timidity if he had not known that he could do it with impunity. Athens even gave him remarkable proofs of pardon. It would not have been surprising, immediately after the disaster, if the people persecuted him with their resentments as the author of the public distress. On the contrary, the whole city turned toward him. It adopted his decrees, it spurned the accusers who wished to profit by the public misfortunes and overwhelm him,—a conduct equally honorable to Athens and to the orator. Very soon the city confirmed its esteem for him by a testimony still more striking. Let Demosthenes himself speak. To quote him here offers him an opportune chance to avenge himself:

"When the people came to elect a person to make the funeral oration over the slain immediately after the battle, they would not elect you, although you were proposed, although you are so eminent in speaking; they would not elect Demades, who had just concluded the peace, nor Hegemon, no, nor any other of your faction. They elected me. And when you and Pythocles rose up (let Heaven bear witness with what abandoned impudence!), when you charged me with the same crimes as now, when you pursued me with the same virulence and scurrility; all this served but to confirm the people in their resolution of electing me. You know too well the reason of this preference; yet hear it from me. They were perfectly convinced both of that faithful zeal and alacrity with which I had conducted their affairs, and of that iniquity which you and your party had discovered, by publicly avowing, at a time when your country was unfortunate, what you had denied with solemn oaths while her interests

flourished. And it was a natural conclusion that the men whom our public calamities emboldened to disclose their sentiments, had ever been our enemies, and now were our declared enemies. Besides, they rightly judged that he who was to speak in praise of the deceased, to grace their noble actions, could not, in decency, be the man who had lived and conversed in strict connection with those who had fought against them; that they who, at Macedon, had shared in the feast and joined in the triumph over the misfortunes of Greece with those by whose hands the slaughter had been committed, should not receive a mark of honor on their return to Athens. Nor did our fellow citizens look for men who could act the part of mourners, but for one deeply and sincerely affected. And such sincerity they found in themselves and me; not the least degree of it in you. I was then appointed; you and your associates were rejected. Nor was this the determination of the people only; those parents also and brethren of the deceased who were appointed to attend the funeral rites expressed the same sentiments. For as they were to give the banquet, which, agreeably to ancient usage, was to be held at his house who had been most strictly connected with the deceased, they gave it at my house, and with reason, for in point of kindred each had his connections with some among the slain much nearer than mine; but with the whole body none was more intimately connected; for he who was most concerned in their safety and success must surely feel the deepest sorrow at their unhappy and unmerited misfortune."

Bdelycleon, an advocate of Labes, excuses a thievish dog in these terms: He is a poor ignorant brute. "Pardon me, he cannot play on the lyre." The remark is comic and profound. Vice has often other roots than ignorance, but it is also often born of ignorance. The followers of Plato only erred by exaggeration when they confounded science and wisdom,

in other respects a less dangerous prejudice than that of the Cartesians attributing errors to the will. Ignorance is not alone the origin of culpability. One is born a fool, another becomes one; the latter is culpable, since he has perverted his nature. The former is innocent because he is from birth what he is. The gods made him so. Antiquity was very indulgent toward moral infirmities attributable to nature. Want of courage was of this number, and this consideration sometimes tempered the severity of punishment. Isocrates never dared to mount the rostrum, and he spent ten years in composing one oration. He was evidently interested in placing eloquence above all things. He also declared that it gave a man more honor than wealth, *courage*, and the other gifts of fortune and nature. The author of the panegyric on Athens has chiseled out gems. He is a goldsmith who pleads for his art. He may be right, but this disdain for courage, a pure gift of nature, is remarkable, for it implies indulgence to him who does not possess it. This disposition of the ancients to condemn the weaknesses of nature gave to Demosthenes a distinction at which the moderns are at first astonished. Midias, said he, will become humble in order to disarm your justice; be so much the more inexorable to him.

“For if incapable of curbing his pride,—he had been so haughty and violent all his life by the power of nature and fate,—it would be just to moderate your rigor; but if, capable to adapt himself, whenever he wishes, to moderation, he has adopted a contrary plan of life, it is very evident that after having deluded you to-day he will become to-morrow the same man you know him to be.”

This is saying: “Strike Midias without pity, he is not incorrigible”; and if he were manifestly in-

corrigible, would it be necessary to save him from punishment? Well authenticated incorrigibility is an argument which, among modern nations, the advocates of capital punishment endeavor to establish. On the contrary, it forced the ancients in certain cases to use clemency. "There are passions which emanate from nature. Thus a son, appearing before the tribunal for having struck his father, defended himself by saying: 'But he also struck his father!' and he was acquitted; for it appeared to the judges that it was a natural failing which was in the blood, *φυσικὴν ἀμαρτίαν*."

"Intemperance seems to be more voluntary than *cowardice*; it also makes us the object of more legitimate reproaches. * * * Cowardice does not seem to be voluntary in all cases, when they are examined in detail. It is not itself grievous, but the circumstances under which it is produced (the fear of servitude and death) cause pain which places man beyond his control; it compels him to lay down his arms or to commit other acts as unbecoming (*ἀσχημονεῖν*). This is why it appears to be real violence,"*

like the act of striking his parents by virtue of a hereditary disposition. It would be easy for us to multiply these citations. They all prove that, in the opinion of the Stagirite, man is not responsible for the physical emotions that actuate him, nor for acts provoked by those emotions. There are many forces which habitually triumph over human nature, and consequently the motives or intemperances to which we yield, shrink from the judgment of morality and human justice. A madman tears out his hair and gnaws it,—is he to be blamed for yielding to the pleasure of this phantasy? No, no more than he should be praised

* *Nicomachean Ethics*, iii, 13.

for controlling it, or at least victory or defeat are of very little importance here; for they depend almost entirely upon the intensity, more or less great, of the physical impression. Now, natural passions are as excusable as unhealthy intemperances.

Here, then, is a formal consecration of the body's triumph over the soul, of destiny over will. All is reduced to the knowledge of knowing with what complexion each is born. Gall had predecessors among the ancients.* Metoscopy and physiognomy were the legitimate children of a belief in fatality; this prejudice was so strong that it inspired Æschines with scruples against reproaching Demosthenes for his cowardice,—a trait for which nature alone was responsible. “It will perhaps be surprising,” said he, “that we should prosecute a man for a vice attributable to nature (*φύσεως γράφαί*).” And in fact if natural dispositions are sovereign in this respect, is it logical to bring men controlled by them before the courts? Was Isocrates, then, justified in stigmatizing the innate baseness of the Barbarians, or Demosthenes in doing honor to the Athenians for having obeyed the generous impulses of their natural character? The ancients, in general, under the weight of dogmas and fatality, ill-knew and ill-defined human liberty. Aristotle attributed it to original inclinations; his theory opens the door to the convenient excuse of necessity.†

* See Aristotle, *History of Animals* i, 9, and the Elder Pliny (Book xi, 114), here a compiler of the Stagirite and of Trogus Pompeius.

† “I think that there does not exist, that there never has existed, any art capable of making men who are born depraved conform to justice and virtue.” (Isocrates.) Seneca's maxim, *Ars est bonum fieri*, is nearer the truth. “With necessity all is well”; this is the conclusion of grave Pindar celebrating the *ex-voto* of a happy lover, and an hundred young courtesans brought by Xenophon to the sacred grove of

We cannot absolutely say with Socrates that courage, no more than virtue, is a science. For courage, in a great measure, depends on temperament; but are flesh and blood the ruling power in man? The sovereignty of instinct prevents perfectness in animals. Never will the hare of the fabulist be a thunderbolt of war, whatever he may think of it, even by comparison. But liberty gives to man the power of ruling his physical complexion. Socrates, by his confessions, justified Zopyrus, the Lavater of his times; but the vigor of his mind surmounted nature. Whoever is born without courage ought to acquire it. Turenne felt his *carcass* agitated on the battle-field; he ruled it by throwing it into the greatest danger.* The man of courage conducts his body where he pleases, and moulds it to his liking. Did not Demosthenes conquer rebellious organs? Did he not resist, at his will, the allurements of pleasure and acquire his eloquence by the power of his will? So strongly organized a mind was in all respects worthy of repairing nature's work. In a city where the poets (Æschylus and Sophocles) skillfully handled the lyre

Cypris. Pindar here speaks like an oracle: "There is in Phocis a temple to Hercules Misogynes, and its priest is bound to be chaste during the year of his ministry. Thus old men are ordinarily chosen as priests. In later times, a young man of noble birth and mild temper secured the priesthood. He was at the time in love with a young lady whom he took great care to shun. One day she came to surprise him at the hour of repose, after the dance and festival. He was unfortunate enough to forget himself. Seized with trouble and fear he ran toward the oracle, and inquired if there was any means by which he could expiate his crime. He received the following answer: *The god pardons all that is necessary.*" (Plutarch, *Why Pythia no longer gives her oracles in verse.*)

* "Thou tremblest, carcass! Thou wouldst tremble much more if thou knewest where I am about to conduct thee."

and sword in their turn, he could have united the two qualities necessary to a Grecian statesman.* He ought to have done it; he was competent to do it. His entire life, save Chæroneia, and his death prove it. Isocrates, according to tradition, punished himself for his great illusions by permitting himself to perish of starvation. Euphræus, a clear-sighted patriot, a ridiculed prophet, "cut his throat," and thereby proved his sincerity. Demosthenes preferred a bitter struggle to a fortunate submission. This timid man braved Philip and Alexander; he provoked Antipater's deadly wrath. Was this the conduct of a man without courage?† In the silence of moral deliberation, face to face with honesty, his soul, inaccessible to fear, yielded to the calls of duty.‡ In the midst of the unaccustomed clash of arms, his body regained its empire, and the great emotion of combat, which sometimes makes cowards forget their fear, deprived him of his firmness. The Athenians pardoned this surprise of the senses; let us regret it without branding him with injurious reproaches which his enemies lavished upon him. Let us rather reflect on the grief by which the patriot's soul was certainly penetrated at that moment when, deceived in his dearest hopes, he quitted the battle-field on which the liberty of the Hellenes was entombed forever.

* Μόθωντες ῥητῆρ' ἔμεναι περηκτῆρά τε ἔργων. Iliad, ix, 443; *Oratorem verborum actoremque rerum.* (Cicero.)

† When the Macedonian's assassins, at the threshold of Neptune's temple, were about to kill him and he asked of them a few moments' respite, they insulted him; they were ignorant of what he was about to do. (Plutarch, *Life of Demosthenes*, chap. 29.)

‡ Τοῦ τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν ὁρμήν.

Thirteen years later (325) Demosthenes withdrew from his native soil, vanquished this time by his enemies' hatred. Condemned at the trial of Harpalus to pay a fine of fifty talents, then thrown into prison as insolvent, he succeeded in escaping from it and departing from Attica. He could undoubtedly have found relief from the chagrin of exile in the consciousness of his devotion to the Athenians and in the thought of their ingratitude. Nevertheless his eyes could not turn toward Attica without shedding tears. Plutarch blames him for having shown such manifestations of weakness during his exile, ill according with the fiery energy of his administration. This tenderness was not at all surprising in so sensitive a soul. Dishonored and separated from Athens, Demosthenes did not conceal his affliction, but his grief remained dignified. He submitted to the unjust arrest by his country with a filial respect which recalls the *Crito*.

"Do not think that these orations have inspired me with anger. I do not wish to be irritated against you, but complaint offers a kind of solace to the victims of injustice, as weeping does to the sick. I have affection for you, which I might wish you had for me. Such has been, such ever will be, my maxim. From the beginning I thought that every man connected with public affairs, if he was a good citizen, ought to hold in respect to all members of the city, the feelings of a son toward his parents. He will hope to find them as equitable as possible, but he will bear with them, such as they are, with a benevolent resignation. Defeat in such a case is a grand and honorable victory in the eyes of the wise. Be happy."*

Demosthenes' piety toward his country was naturally associated with piety toward the gods. At first a

* *Third Letter*, § 10.

fugitive at Troezen, he leaves this place for a safer asylum, Neptune's temple at Calauria. "Respect toward the god will, I hope, furnish me a safeguard. And yet how do I know? When we are at the mercy of another, we live from day to day without ever being assured of the morrow." These presentiments were justified. At the moment when Antipater's soldiers, conducted by an old comedian, Archias, surnamed the *exile-hunter* (εὐραδοθήρας), invested the sanctuary where Demosthenes had fled, the great man at first thought that he ought not to desecrate the god's threshold. He then sucked the poison from his pen, which was to assure him a franchise more certain than that of Neptune's temple. After this he arose.

"Now," said he, "you may act the part of Creon* in the play as soon as you please, and cast out this carcass of mine unburied. For my part, O gracious Neptune! I quit thy temple with my breath within me, but Antipater and the Macedonians would not have scrupled to profane it with murder."

Demosthenes succumbed under the enemies of Greece, and he fell in protecting his country's religion.

The foresight of this unworthy end of a generous life sometimes inspired him with bitter feelings. Young men frequently visited him in his exile and sought his counsels, but he dissuaded them from public life.

"If at the outset two roads had been proposed to me, the one leading to the tribune and assemblies, and the other direct to death, and that I could have foreseen the evils, fears, jealousies, calumnies, and struggles inseparable from public life, I would have chosen the road to death."

* Alluding to that passage in the *Antigone* of Sophocles where Creon forbids the body of Polynices to be buried.

If devotion to one's country was always recompensed, no man could have deserved a happier death. Cicero, himself a victim to the patriotic ardor of his *Philippics*, sketched from Plato the outlines of a good citizen.* Disinterested devotion, which is the principal characteristic of the good citizen, was Demosthenes' eminent virtue. "I am passing my life in giving you counsels, which place me lower in your estimation than many others, but which would make you great if you would follow them. I can undoubtedly speak thus without exciting envy. No, I cannot reconcile the character of the true patriot with a policy which would readily place me in the first rank among you and you in the last rank in Greece; but by the administration of faithful orators the country ought to prosper, and their duty to all is at all times to propose, not the easiest measure, but the best. Common instinct will suffice to propose the first, the wise advice of a good citizen ought to conduct us toward the second."†

II. The Citizen.—Power is the test of character (a saying of Bias). Demosthenes sustained this test with honor. The man of the people, as he calls himself in an exordium, was the most useful servant of the people whom he wished to save. Faithful to a promise made to the judges of Aphobus, "scarcely had he grown from infancy" when he contributed and supported the public charges. When a man, he aided the state not only by his counsels, but also by his funds. He equipped three galleys for the expeditions to Eubœa, to the Hellespont, and to Byzantium; he turned eight talents into the public treasury; he ransomed

* *De Officiis*, i, 25. † *Oration on the Chersonesus*, § 72.

Athenian prisoners in Macedonia; he gave doweries to poor daughters, and went bail for insolvent citizens. After Chæronea Demosthenes alone furnished three of the ten talents appropriated for repairing the walls. He wasted his fortune on private individuals and on the state to such an extent that he was unable in his turn to pay the fine imposed upon him by the Areopagus. But these were not the claims which he believed he ought to plead with his fellow citizens: he did not imitate the selfish orators who preferred their own interest with the people and with Philip to the safety of the state. It is in the following that he gloried:—he always contended with them and refuted them with boldness,—among others Python of Byzantium, the Macedonians' regular ambassador, and Pytheas of Arcadia, a treacherous democrat in the pay of Philip. While these mercenaries were stirring up hatreds, cementing discord among the cities, Demosthenes was laboring to efface hostilities, to foment coalitions, and to conclude alliances. Greece was still less united against the Macedonians than she had been against the Barbarians; the motto, *each one in his own house, each one for himself*, had then become general. And so, instead of all contending together and at the same time, she exhausted herself in isolated and successive efforts. Athens fought at Chæronea in 338, Thebes revolted in 335, Sparta with Agis struck for deliverance in 330. Each of the capital cities contended alone and at its own time; no powerful movement in unison.

These practices of individual efforts, so fatal to Hellenic interests, were instinctive among the Greeks. The cities, in their turn leaders of the hegemony, contributed to establish them. "It is of importance to

our city that Thebes and Lacedæmon do not become too powerful; that the first should have to contend against Phocis, the second against other enemies. These are the conditions of our security and of our greatness." Demosthenes, in 352, had not yet seen that these maxims, favorable to the preëminence of his own city, were preparing the overthrow of Greece; later he strove to reunite what political selfishness had studied to sever. What Athens had done for her own aggrandizement Philip used against her. His aim was to divide; Demosthenes', to reconcile. The Hellenic family, a privileged race, endowed with the national qualities of Europe and Asia, might have been able, if united into one state, to rule the universe.* Demosthenes did not dream of universal rule for her; fortunate if she found power to sever herself from Philip's embrace. On the ground of reconciliation the orator succeeded once in conquering; he triumphed over the mutual antipathy of Athens and Thebes, and united them against the invader. This alliance had for a long time been the dream of far-sighted citizens. Æschines names six political persons who, before Demosthenes, had endeavored to bring it about, but none succeeded. "The occasion, fear, and want" compelled the Thebans to accept it: they saw war at their gates. Demosthenes, said Æschines, cannot therefore claim the honor. He did, however, claim it; to him alone was due an unhoped for success which caused Philip's star to grow pale for a moment, and which the orator considered the grandest triumph of his life.

Demosthenes' indefatigable activity embraced all divisions of the state: marine, land forces, finances, and the administration. He is always in the breach;

* Aristotle, *Politics*, iv, 6.

at the least attempt of Philip he proposes either embassies or expeditions. If Philip sends envoys, Demosthenes refutes them. If Philip hires negotiators at Athens, Demosthenes unmasks them. When Philip sends an emissary, Antiphon, to burn the arsenals of the Piræus, Demosthenes, ever on the watch, seizes him and has him condemned to death. A watchful patriot, he anticipates Philip, and reveals his plans. He can anticipate and foresee all. He is not one of those experts who, while serving the commonwealth, guard their retreats and fortify themselves beforehand against the accidents of the future. He gives himself up to his task without consideration or after-thought; he has no other care than his duty and his country's safety. He alone provides for all. He proposes a resolution, draws up the decree, and charges himself with its execution.* He follows the Macedonian step by step; he throws himself in the way of all his designs; he arrests his course at Ambracia, and again at

* The spirit of the Athenian democracy was equality of rights and duties, whence the distribution of public functions by lot, the obligation of not filling important offices several times in succession, and finally the distribution of public authority: several citizens share the different parts of the same political action. One proposes, a second has it decreed, a third executes. The duties assigned in certain modern constitutions to the cabinet, to parliament, and to the executive power, are divided among three citizens or three groups of citizens. The Athenians found a double advantage in this distribution of rôles. The honor of the enterprise, in case of success, did not fall to one alone: in case of failure the responsibilities were shared by several. Demosthenes sometimes recoiled from the responsibility of a decree, and his enemies attributed this prudence to his timidity. Sometimes, also, in pressing dangers, when no one dared to share it with him, he took all upon himself. He took into his own hand all powers, as he did at the time of the Theban alliance: *τὸν συλλήβδην ἀπάσας τὰς Ἀθηναίων ἄρχας ἄρχοντα*. (*Against Ctesiphon*.)

Byzantium. It is he who organizes Phocion's victory in Eubœa. "Philip has been driven from Eubœa by your arms, and also (certain envious aspirants ought to choke with anger) by my policy and decrees." It is he who, at the greatest crisis, is the inspirer and soul of all Greece. "Who will save the Hellespont from the rule of a foreigner? You will, men of Athens! When I say you, I mean the commonwealth. Now who consecrated his orations, his counsels, his labors to the commonwealth? Who devoted himself entirely to it? I!" After the fall of Elatea (339-338), in the midst of the city's agonies, the herald, the voice of the country in distress, calls the good citizens to the tribune. No one dares to mount it. Who courageously seized the helm at the approach of the storm? "It was I!" It is Demosthenes, always Demosthenes. He is everywhere.* Why this ardor to place himself foremost at the post of danger? It is from his conviction that his devotion is necessary to the state. "I have persuaded myself, perhaps it was foolish, but in short I have persuaded myself that no man could propose anything better than what I proposed; that none could do anything better than what I did." Was this presumption on his part? No! The very defeat at Chæroneia justified him in it. He always spoke to the Athenians in the name of honor; it was due to him that her honor at least was saved.

At Philip's death, Demosthenes, an irreconcilable enemy of the Macedonians, endeavors to arouse Greece against them. Alexander, "the youth," reveals his intentions by the sack of Thebes. Greece has only changed her master: she receives a new one, and a more terrible one. At Alexander's death,

* *Pro Corona*, passim.

Demosthenes, then in exile, hastens to Greece and manifests all the ardor of his youth against the conquerors of his country. He encourages the ambassadors at Athens to form a new league, and he visits the cities in person, summoning them to liberty. Everywhere he searches for enemies against Macedonia, as Hannibal traversed the earth to arouse enemies against the Romans. Even the time of his banishment was not lost to the contest which had become his life. At the Olympic games, Isocrates, a childish old man, preached the crusade against the Persians and peace with the Macedonians.* Demosthenes made better use of his eloquence. Lamachus, of Myrrhenus, was reciting before the assembled Greeks a panegyric on Philip and Alexander, in which Thebes and Olynthus were vilified. Demosthenes arose: by facts and reasoning he proved, on that great day, the claims of the two cities to the respect of the Hellenes, and the calamities due to the flatterers of the Macedonians. The auditors turned around and cheered Demosthenes with enthusiasm. The sophist, frightened by the tumult, escaped from the assembly; Demosthenes thus avenged himself on the ingratitude of his fellow-citizens. Cicero passed the whole time

* Philip has kidnapped Amphipolis; Isocrates excuses him for having taken his precautions against Athens: "If we change our conduct toward him and give him a better opinion of us, he will not only not touch our territory, but he will be the first to yield us some of his own, in order to gain the useful friendship of Athens." (*On the Peace*.) Farther on: "Let us renounce the hegemony; influenced by this disinterestedness, the people of their own accord will offer it to us." Are we to believe that an Athenian, a rhetorician, can be so innocent? Manifestations of aged simplicity are not rare in Isocrates. He himself felt that he was the least fitted of all the Athenians for public life. "I have not sufficient voice or hardiness." There was still another quality wanting in him. (*Address to Philip*.)

of his exile in Macedonia, and in the greatest idleness; Demosthenes' exile was a continuation of his public administration: "he went to several cities of Greece, strengthened the common interest, and defeated the designs of the Macedonian ambassadors; in which respect he manifested a much greater regard for his country than did Themistocles and Alcibiades, when suffering the same misfortune. After his return, he pursued his former plan of government, and continued the war with Antipater and the Macedonians.* An adversary of this character was not one of those who could be bought. Philip could not silence him with his gold. Alexander meant to put an end to the seditious and incorrigible orator, and demanded his head. Phocion had the shameless courage to vote that he should be delivered up; a cunning evasion on the part of Demades spared the Athenians this crime. Later, Antipater wrested from their impotency the proscription of the orator who was ever dreaded, even when the Hellenes were held in bondage. Demosthenes escaped the sword of the soldiers sent in his pursuit, as he had often before been obliged to ward off the blows with which the Macedonians of Athens had attempted to crush him. Many a time summoned to justice before Chæronea, he was assailed on all sides after the disaster. This was a dreadful exasperation. "I was accused nearly every day," † and with what hatred, the invectives of Dinar-

* Plutarch, *Comparison between Demosthenes and Cicero*, ch. 4.

† Where there were so many laws and decrees, often contradictory, passed by the people in moments of excitement, it was difficult for an author of a new law to avoid stumbling against the dangers of a previous law. Whence that accusation, so frequent, of infringement upon laws, *παράνομον*. Give me two lines of an Athenian decree, and I will hang its author. The general Aristophon, of Azenia,

thus and Æschines can give some idea. Notwithstanding the odious address of these imputations, which were the fermentations of unhealthy passions and selfish resentments, Athens, which had not the courage to follow Demosthenes' counsels in time, had not the cowardice, at least, to abandon him to his enemies. She respected in him the virtues which she did not possess herself; she remembered the crowns which she had decreed him in return for the successes to which he had led her.

boasted that he had undergone sixty-five accusations as an infringer of laws: he was acquitted sixty-five times. Cephalus was never accused: he was cited as a prodigy. (Cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, vi, 4.)

CHAPTER IV.

DEMOSTHENES—THE STATESMAN.

“Τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεὶ, μὴ τὸ ῥᾶστον λέγειν: Counsel the best always, the easiest never.” (*Oration on the Chersonesus.*)

BORN in 385, Demosthenes, at the age of thirty, by his oration against the law of Leptines (355), entered upon a political career that proved to be both glorious and bitter. Lucian put these words into Philip's mouth: “What Themistocles and Pericles were once for the Athenians, Demosthenes is now for his fellow citizens.” By this Philip meant that Demosthenes was his country's bulwark. Upon a closer examination the comparison is still good. Like Themistocles and Pericles, Demosthenes had both eloquence and experience in state affairs, a union always good, but especially so for the Athenians, among whom oratory had rapidly declined into a pretty exercise or an instrument of popularity. In Demosthenes the orator was merely auxiliary to the statesman. He never talked to gain success at the tribune, but to reform, organize, and create resources. At thirty-one (354) he submitted to the people a scheme of maritime reorganization (*On the Navy Boards*), the following year a proposal to reorganize the land force. When he advised to begin war, he at once explained the plans of campaign. He reproved the Athenians. “But what shall we do?” they asked him. “The contrary to what you are doing.” To this reply, excellent and decisive, but a little compendious, he added immedi-

ately: "I will enter into all the details, nevertheless, and may you be as prompt to act as to question." Having established the necessity of levies, he exclaimed: "What will be these troops, their number, the subsidies destined to sustain them? How shall these measures be executed? I will explain all and in order."

I. Political sagacity never deserted Demosthenes. Leptines wished, in the name of equity and the revenues, to reform the laws of exemption. Demosthenes proved that his zeal mistook the true interests of the commonwealth. Athens was prosperous, but was her prosperity assured forever? "Those who delivered Pydna, Potidæa, and other strongholds up to Philip, what motive induced them to injure us? Was it not evidently a hope of a prince's largesses? Would it not be better, Leptines, to persuade our enemy, if you could, not to reward those good servants, instruments of his own wrongs to us, than to propose a law that takes away a part of the gifts derived from benefactors? * * * Athenians, fear to sanction an evil law. If successful, Athens would be disgraced; if unfortunate, she would be deprived of her defenders." No war! cries a politician and short-sighted economist. War is a waste of our revenues. We must prevent extortions or correct them. Impoverishment of treasure lost not Oræa and Olynthus; but treason and improvidence. But war costs dearly. It will cost more to recede before the expenses it requires. Is not Athens rich enough to pay for safety? * Another

* *Oration on the Chersonesus.* An effort to give a portion of his revenue to save all her possessions is, then, truly magnanimous. "Ah, gentlemen! it is simple arithmetic. He who will hesitate can only disarm our indignation by the contempt which his stupidity inspires." (Mirabeau: Session of September 26, 1789)

time warlike humor pervades the assembly. War is decreed and in gigantic proportions. We speak of ten, of twenty thousand mercenaries,—armies magnificent upon paper (*ἐπιστολιμαίους δυνάμεις*). Such zeal inspires little confidence in Demosthenes. “You believe you cannot do too much. Begin with a little, and if that is not sufficient add what is needed. Of what good is too great an army? You could not support it. Let Athens’ actions be measured by her resources and necessities. At first we must carry on a piratical war (*ληστυεῖν*). Ordinary forces will suffice for that. Macedonia greatly favors it. Philip has the advantage in pitched battles.” History has been called the master of life, the dangerous school where we learn both good and bad lessons. The true master of human life is good sense. With Demosthenes pathetic good sense made the orator, and shrewd good sense the statesman.

Demosthenes had a strong judgment, never influenced by favor or resentment. He discerned the good and supported it with the cool firmness of a statesman who subordinates all feeling to the public weal. Thus he successfully resisted a people always ready to sacrifice public policy to sentiment. Philip planned the siege of Byzantium, which had revolted from the rule of Athens. The people were little interested in the fate of the rebel city. “By heavens! These people, misled by an evil genius, carry their folly beyond all bounds. Agreed, but I admit that we must spare these fools, for the safety of Athens is at stake.” Archidamus, king of Sparta, was about to attack Megalopolis, a city of Arcadia, allied to Thebes. Some orators pleaded for Arcadia, and others for Lacedæmon, with bitterness and passion. Were it not for

their Attic tongue they would have been mistaken for citizens of these two countries. No one spoke for Athens. Megalopolis had recently fought Athens. Let us forget the past. The interests of the commonwealth lie in the weakness of Sparta and Thebes, our neighbors. It was necessary to succor Megalopolis. Rhodes in the social war had escaped from the authority of Athens and substituted an oligarchie for a democratic form of government. Oppressed by aristocracy, the people of Rhodes implored aid of Athens. Athens ought to have aided them. She would have conciliated all popular governments and strengthened her own constitution, of which oligarchy was the implacable enemy. The Rhodians failed, but they were unfortunate. "Shall we say that the Rhodians merit their misfortune? The time is not well chosen for us to rejoice. In prosperity we should show great benevolence to the unfortunate, for the future is veiled to all men." It was necessary, then, to fight for the liberty of the Rhodians, and in a manner worthy of Athens. "You listen joyfully to eulogies of our ancestors, you contemplate their exploits and their trophies. Now know that these trophies were erected to inspire in you no sterile admiration, but a desire to imitate the virtues of the heroes who consecrated them." Later, Demosthenes would have persuaded the citizens to follow, in regard to Thebes, this course of intelligent generosity. When he expressed that sentiment it was to unite it with practical reason. The well ordered interests of the state were always the decisive rule of his counsels. When the question was Lacedæmon, or "accursed Eubœa," or "impious" Phocis, as Æschines called it, Demosthenes did not care to consider "the virtue" of the threat-

ened people, but only Athens' duty in not dishonoring herself by refusing her aid to oppressed Greeks.

The political sagacity of Demosthenes never knew the ingenious prejudice or selfishness of narrow souls. One of the special arguments of Philip's partisan orators was that it had been necessary for them to use his power in order to punish the barbarians. Demosthenes, more sincere and judicious, persuaded the Athenians not to make war upon the Great King (354).

"For the sake of our welfare, in the name of the troubles and suspicions sown in Greece, do not assail him. If we could throw ourselves upon him with one accord, I would say, Attack him, 'tis right; but since unity does not exist, let us not give the king one pretext for making himself arbiter of the rights of other Greeks. When tranquil, we make him suspected of a desire to attempt perhaps a thing of that kind; when we attack, we authorize him to seek aid against our hate in the friendship of other people. *Do not expose the wounds of Greece* by an appeal to arms, that will never be answered, nor by feeble hostilities; rest calm, confident, prepared! Great Gods! let not the monarch know that the Hellenes and Athenians are embarrassed, discouraged, and alarmed; truly, very far from it; but let him know that if falsehood, perjury, were not a disgrace in the eyes of Greeks, as it is a title of honor to his followers, you would have marched against him long ago; and that, not disposed to assail him now, for your own sakes, you pray the Gods to scourge him with the same vertigo which formerly visited his ancestors. If he happens to consider, he will see that your resolutions lack no wisdom." *

In counselling the defiant and prudent attitude, Demosthenes, having hardly entered upon his public ca-

* *On the Navy Boards.*

reer, gave proof of sagacity and of elevated sentiment that never deserted him.

Cardinal Richelieu allied himself to the Protestants of Germany, Francis the First to the Turks. Athenian Demosthenes persuaded the commonwealth to form an alliance with the barbarians.

“For all these reasons, I think you should send ambassadors to treat with the king; and lay aside those idle prejudices which have so often been injurious to your interests,—that *he is a barbarian, our common enemy*, and the like. For my own part, when I find a man apprehending danger from a prince whose residence is in Tusa and Ecbatana, and pronouncing him the enemy of our state, who formerly reëstablished its power, and but now made us such considerable offers (if you rejected them, that was no fault of his), and yet speaking in another strain of one who is at our gates, who is extending his conquests in the very heart of Greece, the plunderer of the Greeks, I am astonished, and regard that man, whoever he is, as dangerous, who doth not see danger in Philip.” *

Demosthenes, true to himself, did not hesitate to employ the gold of the great king against the gold of Philip, at the risk of being accused of reserving a part for himself. His fearful apprehensions were at length allayed by the realization of his prophecies, and the sight of Persian satraps helping the forces of Athens to deliver Perinthus.

This same good sense, free from all prejudice and fastidious regard of scruples, shone out again at the time of the accusation of Diopithes. This general had successfully, with his own authority, but for the benefit of Athens, attacked the Macedonian cities of the Hellespont, ravaged maritime Thrace, and imposed heavy contributions upon the Grecian colonies of Asia. These

* *Fourth Philippic.*

colonies complained to Philip, already irritated by the devastation of his territory. This prince demanded justice of Athens. Orators of the Macedonian party accused Diopithes of violating the peace and law of nations. Demosthenes defended him. The Athenians alone were guilty of those actions imputed to the bold general.

“We have no desire to contribute our own means, nor courage to fight ourselves, nor strength to renounce the bounties of the treasure, and furnish Diopithes the promised supplies; and instead of rejoicing in the riches he has gathered, we discredit him with an inquisition, jealous of the means he will employ, of the course he will pursue, in fact, of everything. If we send him no help, if he cannot sustain his troops alone, whence should he expect supplies? From heaven? Impossible! Then he must live from what he collects or begs or borrows. * * * I hear these rumors: *He will besiege Candia, he is betraying Greeks.* For such a man is full of solicitude for the Greeks of Asia. Undoubtedly it is more praiseworthy to care for foreign land than for home! * * * If Diopithes committed these acts of violence and captured these vessels, a few lines from you, Athenians, a few lines can arrest him.”

Diopithes' accusers demanded the recall of the general and the disbanding of his army. Splendid result! Ask Philip if he desires another; to answer his prayer would be foolish.

“Why license Philip to do all things, while he lets Attica alone, if you will not even permit Diopithes to succor Thrace without being accused of inciting war? But, by Jupiter, say the accusers, our mercenaries and Diopithes acted like true pirates. Our duty is to suppress these disorders. Be it so: admit it. I suppose the interests of justice alone have prompted this counsel; but these are my thoughts; you will accom-

plish the dissolution of one of the armies of the commonwealth by defaming the general who found the means of preserving it. Well, prove that Philip will also disband his troops, if Athens listens to your wishes. * * * Athenians, do not be deceived: only words and false pretexts are given you; 'tis only plotted and contrived that you remain inactive within and unarmed without, and permit Philip to execute all his plans in security."

Diopithes was maintained in his command: a just and wise decision, due to the politic good sense of the orator. Demosthenes preferred the safety of Athens to a great record of scruples. To disarm Diopithes before Philip, would have been to ally himself to the Macedonians. Demosthenes did not follow the love of an absolute equity to a candor that bordered upon desertion.

II. Theophrastus wrote a treatise on "Politics Adapted to Circumstances." This work, inspired perhaps in the contemporary of Isocrates and Phocion, by the spirit that prompted the most honored men of Athens to submit to the Macedonian yoke, was undoubtedly lost before the time of Cicero. Sinon, the author of the letter to Lentulus (*Ad Familiares*, i, 9), would not have failed to draw from it, in behalf of his political inconsistencies, arguments more plausible than those he borrowed, by aid of forced interpretations, from certain maxims of Plato. That fickle and versatile spirit, Cicero, believed that in changing his friendship and policy, he never proved false to his principles. But weak in character, he deceived himself as to the true motives of his political manœuvres. He invoked gratitude and resentment, necessity and convenience: "It is not proper to do violence to our parents or to our country." In his opinion, an honorable repose (*cum dignitate otium*) should

be the goal of all statesmen. (He did not attain it, for he was slain by Antony's satellites.) Demosthenes never hoped to pass his old age in that honorable repose. Like Cicero, he succumbed to the persecution of the heroes of the *Philippics*; but he did not, like him, essay the apology of selfish retractions. We cannot examine now the long speech of the inconstant friend of Pompey and Cæsar. Let us take only some traits to which Demosthenes would have assented: "We must know how to follow the spirit of our times. Behold the men who have excelled in the art of government: are they praised for having eternally followed one line of conduct? Old sailors sometimes yield to the tempest, which carries them still farther away from port. When by shifting sail and by tacking we can reach the haven of our hopes, it is foolish to persist in our first dangerous course. So, what we statesmen ought to propose for ourselves, is not unity of language but unity of purpose." For Demosthenes this unity of purpose was the independence of the Greeks. Unity of language failed him several times, notably upon one memorable occasion.

According to an ancient Athenian custom, the surplus revenues of Athens were distributed among the citizens who were present at religious ceremonies, to encourage their attendance, a reward of two oboles being given to each. This *diobole*, a sort of first offering to devotion, stimulated the religious zeal of the Athenians, as the tithes of prebends formerly rewarded canons for exactitude in office. This special fund was called the *Theoricon* (*θεωρία*). After the Theban war the Athenians, believing themselves secure, used the money saved, not only in bestowing rights of attendance upon the *Theories*, but in cele-

brating games and admitting poor people to the public festivals. Fearful that some day they might truly repent of this change, they decreed capital punishment against any orator who should propose to modify these dispositions so favorable to their pleasures. Theatrical representations being part of the ceremony of the great Bacchanalian Dionysia, for example, the *theoricon* enabled the indigent to unite with their devotions to Bacchus the pleasure of listening to Sophocles and Aristophanes; it warranted to the poor their entrance into the theater. The people of Athens thus made their entertainments gratuitous and sacred. Notwithstanding the law of death, Demosthenes, incapable of prevaricating silence, often found fault, sometimes with great caution, sometimes with marked energy, with this wasteful employment of the financial reserves of the republic, and he demanded that they be used to relieve the pressing necessities of the war. One day the orator justified these abuses which he had attacked. How shall we explain this unexpected contradiction?—by the controlling spirit of all Demosthenes' public acts, the welfare of the State. This question of the *theoricon* became a source of contention between the wealthy classes, whose contributions enriched the coffers of the state, and the poor, who enjoyed the taxes without paying them. Isocrates echoed the complaints of both parties, but especially those of the rich, whose condition "was even worse than that of the poor." Truly, poverty had become a profitable profession in Athens, an enviable sinecure. Aristophanes, in his *Plutus*, praised poverty so highly from a moral point of view, that it seemed the perfection of Antisthenes' maxim: Poverty is a blessing. The Charmides of Xenophon's

*Banquet** celebrates its profits and pleasures. His fortune once made him fear thieves and sycophants. Daily new taxes to be paid, and no liberty to leave the territory. But now that he is ruined, what a happy change! "How comfortably I sleep; the republic has confidence in me; I am no longer threatened, it is I who threaten others. A free man, I can go or stay. I appear: the rich arise from their seats, or make room for me in the streets. To-day I resemble a tyrant; I was then a slave. Then I paid tribute to the state; now the state, my tributary, supports me. I lose nothing, for I have nothing, and always live in the hope of bettering my fortune.

In 341, alarmed more than ever by the dangers of internal discord in the face of an enemy daily increasing, Demosthenes, unable to conciliate two factions, pronounced himself in favor of the stronger. He thought that the rich would be more easily reconciled to support the *theoricon* than the poor to lose its pleasures, and, in default of a perfectly equitable settlement, he chose a solution beneficial to the state. "Another evil afflicts the republic, engendering among us unjust complaints and unbecoming debates, and furnishing pretexts for those who do not wish to fulfill their duty as citizens. (The rich say, instead of arming the triremes at our expense, you can arm them with the gold you get out of us to amuse the proletaires.) I fear to touch this question, but nevertheless will attempt it, hoping that for the common good I may speak to the rich in behalf of the poor, and to the poor in behalf of the rich; but let us cease our invectives, provoked by theatrical distributions, and lay aside all fears that they cannot continue without calami-

* Chapter 4. (Cf. Isocrates.)

tous results. We can imagine nothing more essential to the success of our affairs and the firm establishment of our whole social edifice." In the continuance of the *theoricon* Demosthenes saw a solution of the social question,—a necessary solution, for Philip was at the gates.

Demosthenes was not of those stiff, unbending men who say, "Let the state perish rather than my principles." He could make concessions to the necessities of the moment; he was an *opportuniste*. The ancients esteemed the ready choice of expedients (*ἐὺζαῖρία*) as a kind of virtue; it is at least the necessary quality of a statesman. The Eubœan Callias was, according to Æschines, more remarkable in all his twists and turns than the Euripus, whose shores he inhabited. This capricious versatility is a great fault, but it is well to know how to adapt our course to the obstacles in our path. This characterized Demosthenes. Instead of the inflexible rigor of a theorist, of the irreconcilable *doctrinaire*, he possessed a suppleness rarely accorded to vigorous genius, and particularly remarkable in him. He struggled against Athens and Philip with a tenacity of conviction and patriotic ardor that nothing could weary or discourage. But the impetuosity of his obstinate assaults against the public enemies was not born of blind temerity. His judgment rather than his feelings urged the war; and he was the first to counsel peace when, in accordance with honor, the interests of the city demanded it.

Philip was awarded the place of Phocis in the Amphictyonic council, and even called honorable president of the Pythian games. The Athenians were humiliated by a condescension disgraceful to all Greece, and personally disturbed by the probable results of the

humiliation of the Amphictyons at the feet of the victor of the Sacred War; therefore they abstained from sending deputies to the Pythian solemnity. Philip pressed them to sanction the decree of the Amphictyons (346). The assembly was undecided. Demosthenes did not hesitate. He did not wish to endeavor vainly to dispute a trifling question of prerogative (τῆς ἐν Δελφοῖς σκιᾶς) with the Macedonian at the cost of a crusade of the Greeks against his country.

“Athenians, do not give any necessity or pretext for concerted attack upon you to the people who compose the congress, and who once called themselves Amphictyons. [The composition of the Amphictyonic council had been changed by the dissension of the Grecian cities, and the institution itself perverted by the precedence of a barbarian.] * * * What, in my opinion, is to be feared, and what have we to avoid? that the war, reserved for future years, will not afford a common pretext, a general complaint in all Greece against us. For if Argos, Messina, Megalopolis, and other states of the Peloponnesus, rallied with the politics of these cities, threaten us in their hate, aroused by negotiations begun with Lacedæmon, because we seem desirous of supplanting them; if Thebes, which, as you know, already hates us, loves us less because we recall her exiles, and give her many proofs of our malevolence; Thessaly, because we care for the safety of the Phocidian outlaws; Philip, because Athens refuses him a place in the general council of Greece;—I tremble lest all these powers, animated by particular resentments, and authorized by Amphictyonic decrees, should concentrate upon us in a federal war, and each people * * * rush to arms against a new Phocis. * * * To avoid the war, and yet to do nothing unworthy of Athens, to show all our prudence and the equity of our response,—these are, I think, our duties.”

The policy of Demosthenes had always been to unite Greece against Philip. Would it not have been

folly to have armed, by ill-timed and feeble protestations, Greece and Philip against Athens, who violated the sworn peace? Philip could not wait long for a legitimate cause of disagreement. Two years afterward, as protector and arbiter of the rights of the cities near the temple of Delphi, he begun again to plan invasions of Lacedæmon. Demosthenes this time said no more of peace. Philip, in violating it, had once more justified the convictions of the orator.*

In human hands the purest doctrines can become corrupt. That of opportunists had its dangers; it could furnish ready excuse for injustice and desertion. Grave and distinguished judges of every age, in their decisions, have considered the interests of Athens, * * * and the *circumstances*.† “Is not justice false to her first duty when she pulls the bandage from her eyes and seeks to learn the aspect of the heavens and the quarters of the wind? Cicero, who prosecuted the extortionate Verres, and defended the oppressive Fonteiſus the following year, the bitter enemy of Vatinius, soon after his friend, invoked opportune maxims to justify his changes.” In the name of the public

* Religious legislators themselves did not disdain opportunism. All the gods of paganism, except perhaps hospitable Jupiter, were touched more by an amphora of wine offered to themselves than by a cup of water given to the thirsty. Usually the richness of the gifts determined the measure of their favors: they ignored the goodness of grace. This exactness was burdensome to the poor, or Attica counted a great many of them on her meager soil, whence the religious maxim: “A few grains of incense honor the divinity more than a hecatomb.” This was to give a lecture to Olympus. (*Esprit des Lois*, xxiv, 23, 24.)

† *Pro Flacco*, 39. Cicero's changeableness did not save him from this humble assertion, “Scio me asinum germanum fuisse” (*Ad Atticum*, iv, 5), nor later from proscription. What would he have lost by taking a straight road without beating about?

good Demades and Æschines, statesmen of Athens, abused him with their usual frankness. Melanopus, the rival of Callistratus in the government, began more than one harangue in these words: "Citizens, Callistratus is my enemy, but may he to-day be governed by the interests of the state!" His intermittent enmity was softened by the silver of Callistratus. Nicodemus from Messina was more frank when he said: "I have changed my party, but not my sentiments. It is best always to submit to the stronger." Æschines thought to injure Demosthenes by affixing to him the epithet "fickle" (*παλίμφολον*). Theopompus took up the word, to the great astonishment of Plutarch. In fact, this calumny is surprising when aimed against a man who had lived and died, his soul inflamed by an unique passion,—hatred of the Macedonians,—and with a firm resolution,—the obligation of honor,—to fight them. Some transient alterations, far from weakening his constancy, confirmed it. It is praiseworthy for the statesman to appear inconsistent with himself when such appearances establish his disinterested fidelity to his country's good. But this disinterestedness must defy even the insults of suspicion.

Such was not always the opportunism of the Roman patricians. Porsena, allied to the Tarquins, marched upon Rome. Never did such a "terror" seize upon the senate. The people could receive the kings into the city and prefer peace to nominal independence, with which the rule of the usurers, their masters, deluded them. It was necessary to deceive them for the sake of public liberty. While the crisis endured the senate lavished favors upon them, and the means of sustaining them were of prime importance. Wheat was brought even from Cannæ.

The monopoly of salt, sold at exorbitant rates, was taken from a few private individuals and reserved for the state. Poor people were exempt from all imposts. "The poor paid tribute enough in raising their children." This benevolence of the senate bore its fruits. The plebeian justified Aristotle's observation: "The people fight well when they are fed." The horrors of siege and famine did not disturb for one moment the pleasant relations existing between the high and the low of the city; and Porsena, powerless against this union, was forced to retire with his royal clients. Bossuet* has praised "the wise senators" for their just condescension. He neglected to add that, the peril passed, they avenged themselves for their fright and forced humility before the exigences of aristocratic interests. The nobles had all to lose in the reëstablishment of the Tarquins; the plebeians could expect nothing but a change of yoke, and the second yoke would not be the heavier. Upon the death of Tarquin the senate again showed its true nature. "The joy of the patricians knew no bounds, and the people, until then cared for and tickled with constant attentions, lived from that moment exposed to the oppression of the great."† The senate had consented to be just in an "extreme necessity," as in other circumstances it surpassed the liberality of the most liberal,—a slyness not peculiar to Roman policy, if we can judge from an allusion of Camille Desmoulins: The *Jacobin*, C. Gracchus, proposed the division of two or three conquered cities; the *ci-devant* (aristocrat) Drusus proposed to divide a dozen of them. Gracchus

* Discours sur l'histoire universelle. (*Empires*, iii, 6.)

† "Nam cupide conculcatur nimis ante metutum." (Lucretius, v); Livy, ii, 9, 21: "Passato 'l periculo, gabbato 'l santo."

fixed the price of bread at sixteen cents, Drusus the maximum at eight. This proceeding was so successful that the people grew cold toward their genuine defender, who, once made unpopular, "was killed by the aristocrat Scipio Nasica, by a blow with a chair," at the first insurrection.* Such opportunism is nothing but weakness and falsehood.

III. Demosthenes would have been badly inspired to incite the Athenians to an untimely war as long as his efforts to convince them of its inevitable necessity were so easily paralyzed. The orator-minister at Athens had not at his disposal the resources of the chiefs of the Roman republic, nor those of the ministers of modern states. Cicero, the consul, was invested with the most extended power the law could confer next to the dictatorship. The head of the senate, arbiter, and governor of popular assemblies, he commanded the public forces and raised legions at his will. In a republic he was king of the city. Athens had nothing similar. There the real power fell to the orator, the leader and ruler of the multitude; but this power, dependent upon the personal influence of the citizen, and neither bestowed nor sustained by law, must be defended every day by the statesman whose work it is, and through whom alone it exists. His political enemies have the same rights and facilities to overthrow as he to maintain it. No legal term limits or prolongs it. Pericles governed Athens forty years; another politician might rule it a year, a day. For sixteen years (354-338) Demos-

* Livy, ix, 70: *Le vieux Cordelier*, No. 2. C. Desmoulins attributes by a mistake the death of Tiberius Gracchus to his brother Caius, the colleague of Drusus, and who, with others, perished also by a violent death.

thenes struggled for the welfare of Athens with no other aid than his own patriotism and genius. During this long ministry, when the opposition was represented by almost the entire city, what allies had he against the powerful seductions which Philip and his associates used with the Athenians for his destruction? How could he more effectually oppose them than by his personal efforts? Eloquence is also in our own days a force in government, but do the logical orations of the tribune alone obtain a favorable vote of the cabinet? Athens had no favors to offer, no titles of honor to bestow. The adversaries of Demosthenes tempted the people with the delights of peace; Demosthenes placed war before their eyes. They flattered the vices of the people; Demosthenes laid them bare and cured them with rough treatment. His opponents are the pensioners of Philip, the indifferent, the bad citizens, and even some honorable people. Philip counted, perhaps, among his adversaries more than one Timarchus; but he numbered also Phocion among his auxiliaries, voluntary or not. This pacificatory general was the only gratuitous ally of the Macedonian, but not the least precious. In fact, was it helping the Athenians to success in battle to declare it impossible? The *axe* of Demosthenes' orations also cut the nerve of resistance in the undecided. The attitude of Phocion encouraged distrust and disturbed sincere patriotism. Were the hostilities which Phocion condemned truly legitimate and wise? If he deceived himself, there was no disgrace nor risk in deceiving one's self with him, but only self-aggrandizement. The efforts of Demosthenes to awaken the national patriotism were frustrated by one of the most prominent citizens, impelled not by conviction, but by

command. If the principal general of the republic, elected forty-five times, embarrassed the policy of Demosthenes and increased for a time the difficulty of affairs, what can be said of incapable or treacherous generals? of Chares, of Charidemus? Demosthenes was the instigator of the war. All responsibility was thrown upon him. To him were charged difficulties, excesses, reverses, from within and without. A thousand obstacles arose before him and made his path uneven.

One of the most frequent causes of disorder in the city was the assessment of the taxes, a cause especially pernicious, since the financial organization was the basis of the military administration. The *liturgies*, or public services, were demanded according to the wealth of the citizens; but how estimate exactly the resources? and how many ways for the selfish to escape their obligations! The law of exchange, and above all the employment of the public treasure, provoked grave troubles.* Upon questions concerning taxes, the rich and poor disagreed. The necessity imposed upon rich Athenians to substitute themselves for the treasury, to supply civil or military demands, irritated them. On the other hand, the poor claimed maintenance by forced contributions from the rich, thus diminishing so much of the state tax, a part of which alleviated their poverty or furnished their pleasures: indigent or opulent continually wrangled over the public revenues. Demosthenes, in the midst of a conflict difficult to subdue, had much to do: how many abuses to reform in the old

* Demosthenes had already tried to remedy it in the oration *On the Navy Boards* by the ἀντίδοσις.

laws or in their application! The rich could formerly associate themselves in parties of sixteen for payment of taxes; each one thus paying only a small sum, provided only that the sixteenth had enough money to equip *one* ship. But little as this tax-payer and associate outfitter (*συντελής*) was burdened, he sought to evade the tax by taking refuge in the temple of Diana. The trierarchs that were less agile to flee to the feet of the shrines were thrown into prison. But, by waiting, the galley was not armed. In the meantime, less wealthy citizens, crushed by these same obligations, having lost through them their limited resources, were sometimes even unable to satisfy the law. Ships already on the sea were abandoned, others remained in port awaiting equipment. Demosthenes prevailed on them to adopt a system of proportional taxation, whereby each rich man was compelled to furnish, without associates, at least three vessels and a longboat. Those citizens whose property amounted to less than ten talents (about \$11,000), preserved the right of associating until their accumulated fortunes reached this sum. Owing to this reform the Athenian navy ceased to deteriorate, and the equipments were at last completed in time. Demosthenes had gained the cause of his country, in despite of all resistance of privileged orders. "The sum which they offered me for not proposing my law, or at least for delaying it, I dare not tell." After bribery the vessel-owners tried menaces. Demosthenes was prosecuted as an infringer of the laws, but his accuser did not obtain a fifth part of the votes. Notwithstanding selfish interests, the courageous minister of Athens succeeded in relieving the poor and in recalling the rich to their duty, and "since then all things occurred

peacefully," * but it was late (in 340), only two years before Chæronea.

Demosthenes had succeeded in reforming the trierarchy; he could not destroy, nor even weaken, the abuses of the *theoricon*. He would have wished that the allowances from the treasury were not an encouragement to indolence, but a remuneration for public service. "If you should to-day wish to throw off these habits, and to use the resources offered by your internal riches to reconquer your external possessions, you would be delivered from these alms, which resemble aliments, given to the sick by physicians: they do not restore them to health, but only prevent them from dying. Even so, the pleasures which you cherish to-day are not sufficient for all your needs, nor by insignificance do they lead you to disdain them and to return to useful labors; they are nourishment to your indolence. Do you wish, some ask, to transform them into pay? † I wish immediately a rule applying to all, that every citizen receiving his share of the public revenues, may be ready to relieve the different needs of the State. Does peace authorize repose? In your houses you rejoice in a better condition, sheltered from the unworthy actions which indigence imposes. Does an alarm come unexpectedly, as to-day? The donation makes you a soldier and justly compels you to protect your country. Has one of you passed the age of service? let him receive

* *Pro Corona*, passim. The civil pleadings of Demosthenes, relating to maritime duties or to affairs of maritime commerce, give interesting details about the abuse of the trierarchy. See especially the *Pleadings for Apollodorus* and *On the Naval Crown*.

† The Roman Senate had to give pay to the army before Veii, which bound it to an annual service: "Annua æra habes, annum operam ede." (Livy v, 3.)

what he has already received, undeservedly and unduly, in the name of the common law, for the inspection and administration of the affairs of the commonwealth. In a word, neither adding nor subtracting anything, I suppress all confusion, and establish order in the State by submitting to a common rule all tax-payers, soldiers, judges and citizens, employed according to their age and circumstances. I do not say: 'It is necessary to distribute to the idle the wages of the worker; to keep yourselves unoccupied in the midst of pleasures and uncertainty with no other aim than to hear the news: *The mercenaries of such a one have conquered.*' For such is now your life. I do not censure those who, in your stead, perform a part of your duties; but I demand that you yourselves should do for yourselves that for which you hire others, and not leave the post of honor won by your ancestors at the price of so many glorious perils." *

The establishment of an unparalleled remuneration, not under color of help, but of legitimate indemnity, rendered possible the organization of a standing army. Philip had such an army; Athens opposed him with troops levied in haste, and usually at the last minute. The occasion having passed, the fortifications were abandoned. Upon a new alarm, new preparations and new tumults occurred; nothing was determined, nothing established. With such a system Athens could do nothing opportunely. She must have an organized army in readiness, and thoroughly disciplined. "To day you ask, What are the intentions of Philip? Upon what point is he now marching? Perhaps, then, Athenians, you will trouble yourselves to ask, Where is the Athenian army? Where will it show itself?" But is

* *Third Olynthiac.*

that an Athenian army which is composed only of mercenaries? Demosthenes wishes that Athenians be enrolled in it, if only to watch over the mercenaries. He remembers that, by this mixture of the national element with foreign forces, Athens once conquered Lacedæmon.

“ But ever since our armies have been formed of foreigners alone, their victories have been over our allies and confederates; while our enemies have arisen to an extravagance of power. And these armies, with scarcely the slightest attention to the service of the state, sail off to fight for Artabazus, or some other person: and their general follows them. Nor should we wonder at it, for he cannot command who cannot pay his soldiers. What, then, do I recommend? That you should take away all pretenses, both from generals and from soldiers, by a regular payment of the army, and by incorporating domestic forces with the auxiliaries, to be, as it were, inspectors of the conduct of the commanders. For at present our manner of acting is indeed ridiculous. If a man should ask, ‘Are you at peace, Athenians?’ the answer would immediately be, ‘By no means; we are at war with Philip. Have we not chosen the usual generals and officers, both of horse and foot?’ And of what use are all these, except the single person whom you send to the field? The rest attend your priests in their processions. So that, as if you formed so many men of clay, you make your officers for show, and not for service. My countrymen! should not all these generals have been chosen from your own body; all these several officers from your own body, that our force might be really Athenian? And yet, for an expedition in favor of Lemnos, the general must be a citizen, while troops engaged in defense of our own territories are commanded by Menelaus. I say not this to detract from his merit; but to whomsoever this command had been intrusted, surely he should have derived it from your voices.”*

* *First Philippic*. Let us note the considerations of the orator in regard to mercenaries: Athens is at their discretion.

The complaints of the orator were but too well justified. Chares had abandoned the social war, to aid Artabazus in a revolt against the Persian king. Iphicrates, having become the son-in-law of the Thracian Cotys, had aided him in his hostile expeditions against Athens. This same Iphicrates came to receive hostages of Amphipolis; the city was about to surrender. A mercenary succeeded him, restored the hostages, passed into the service of the Thracian king, and Amphipolis was lost.

What shall I say of the habits acquired by the leaders of the mercenaries in the heart of Asiatic opulence and license? Chares had robbed the treasury, he bribed the orators, and the people acquitted him. Iphicrates was accused of treason, and saved his life by showing his sword and the poignards of his partisans who were scattered through the assembly. When military service became a trade, the soldier lost his ardor against the stranger, and the leaders of an army not really national soon ceased to be citizens. The suppression, or at least the transformation of the *theoricon*, would have weakened the evils connected with the use of mercenary troops. Neither the zeal of Demosthenes for the public welfare, nor his eloquence, could arouse the people, forgetful, as they were, of the virtues which are the means and safeguard of liberty.

All forms of government conceal the germs of evils that may ruin them. The wisest have their peculiar infirmities and dangers. The aim of the legislator should be to weaken these as much as possible, and first, to seek a constitution containing the fewest sources of abuse. Aristotle, without pronouncing himself absolutely in favor of a democratic government, has marked its nature and advantages with a precision that

equals an eulogy. "The democratic form," he says, "is the most lasting of all, since in it the majority rules, and the equality enjoyed makes it the most cherished of all constitutions. * * * Imagine a state of thirteen hundred citizens, a thousand of whom are wealthy; now deprive of all political power the remaining three hundred, as free, however, as the others, and their equals in all respects except that of wealth. Could that be called a democratic government? * * * There is no democracy, save where the free and poor make the majority and the ruling power." Aristotle advocated equity and clemency to the poor. "But," said he, "this double end is not usually obtained. It does not always happen that the heads of the government are the most pleasant men.* However, it is the interest of the state to treat the lower classes gently. "At Carthage the government always knew how to gain the affection of the people by sending them, one after another, into the colonies to enrich themselves. The higher classes, if they are intelligent, will endeavor to aid the poor and to furnish them labor. * * * Almost all legislators who have wished to found an aristocracy, have committed two errors almost identical. First, in bestowing too much upon the rich; and second, in taking too much away from the poor. In the course of time a false good necessarily gives rise to an undoubted evil. The ambition of the upper classes has ruined more governments than that of the lower classes." Philosophers and legislators consider the organization of capital as the greatest difficulty,—in their eyes "a peculiar source of revolution." Plato in his *Republic* solved the problem by suppressing property; † what is called

* *Politics*, vi, 10, 3; vii, 1; viii, 6.

† "La propriété, c'est le vol," a paradox ingeniously refuted by Laya in his courageous comedy, *L'ami des lois* (2 January, 1793).

striking at the root of the evil. Chalcedonian Phaleas tried to equalize property by advising the rich to give and never receive doweries; the poor, to receive and never to give. The author of *Politics* put little value upon these expedients designed to maintain among fortunes a kind of chimerical level, a necessarily unstable equilibrium. "The necessity is to level passions rather than property, and that equality is the result only of education regulated by good laws." Phaleas expected to suppress thieves and highwaymen by a decree; he was deceived. It is abundance, and not indigence, that commits great crimes. "No one usurps tyranny to be sheltered from the inclemency of the seasons." Covetousness must be mastered. Demagogues (and here is the stumbling-block of a popular government) flatter the people through personal ambition, to the detriment of the public welfare. When the higher classes become indignant, because all the public expenses are imposed upon them, they revolt against the injustice, and sometimes liberty perishes.* Therefore a wise policy will guard against extremes. Only a dishonest citizen can advocate equality of property, the worst of scourges. In the words of the author of *De Officiis*,† it is sufficient to equalize the inequalities by imposing taxes especially upon the rich, and by relieving the multitude.‡

These wise principles, borrowed by Montesquieu from the man of Stagira, were those of Demosthenes. Perhaps he has even, in this point of view, extended the obligations of the city to the utmost limits in the eyes of modern times. "We ought to pay willingly

* *Politics*, viii, 4; ii, 4; vi, 10; vii, 4.

† "Æquatio bonorum, qua peste quæ potest esse major?" ii, 21.

‡ *Esprit des Lois*, v, 5.

to our parents the debt justly imposed by nature and by law; but what each one owes his father the republic owes to each of its citizens, common fathers of the state. Thus, far from diminishing that which the state gives them, it should be required, this resource failing, to find others, that they might not be obliged to expose their poverty to all eyes." Thus not only individual labor, but also the state, should assist in diminishing poverty. "If the rich proceed upon these principles they will act agreeably, not to justice only, but to good policy; for to rob some men of their necessary subsistence is to raise a number of enemies to the commonwealth. To men of lower fortunes I give this advice, that they should remove those grievances of which the wealthier members complain so loudly and so justly (for I now proceed in the manner I proposed, and shall not scruple to offer such truths as may be favorable to the rich). * * * The rich should have their lives and fortunes well secured, so that when any danger threatens their country their opulence may be applied to its defense. Other citizens should regard the public treasure as it really is,—the property of all,—and be content with just their portion; but should esteem all private fortunes as the inviolable right of their possessors. Thus a small state rises to greatness; a great one preserves its power."* Demosthenes often implored respect for democratic equality. "There is no more fatal error than the aggrandizement of one citizen beyond the multitude." This multitude (*οἱ πολλοί*), the lower classes, are the objects of the greatest solicitude on the part of the Athenian politician. He recalls their duties to them, but he supports the right of indulgence by the rich for the

* *Fourth Philippic*, § 40.

benefit of the State. In this manner Demosthenes hoped to revive the internal, and thus the external, power of Athens. He has described and summed up his whole policy: "Such was the general tenor of my administration in the affairs of this city and in the national concerns of Greece. Here I was never known to prefer the favor of the great to the rights of the people; and in the affairs of Greece, the bribes, the flattering assurances of friendship which Philip lavished, never were so dear to me as the interests of the nation."*

IV. From the beginning Demosthenes' discernment penetrated the most obscure plans of the enemy. "I see the encroachments of Philip cause you more alarm in the future than to-day. Yes, the progress of evil forces itself upon my sight (344). May my conjectures be false! but I tremble lest we have already touched the fatal goal." Athens, on the contrary, so ready to suspect her eminent citizens, became confident and credulous as soon as her courtiers set forth the royal good faith of the Macedonian. She scoffed at the revelations of her wary orator, and looked with complacency upon the future. Moreover, should all oligarchies be considered by a democratic government as her natural and implacable† enemies, how much more reason had Athens to guard against a king!

"Various are the contrivances for the defense and security of cities, as battlements, and walls, and trenches, and other kinds of fortifications, all which are the effects of labor, and attended with continual expense. [What would Demos-

* *On the Crown*, § 109.

† In some states the oligarchs took the oath: "I shall be the constant enemy of the people; I will do them all the harm I can." Aristotle, *Politics*, viii, 7.

thenes have said of our war budgets?]

But there is one common bulwark with which men of prudence are naturally provided, the guard and security of all people, particularly of free states, against the assault of tyrants: What is this? Distrust! Of this be mindful, to this adhere. Preserve this carefully, and no calamity can affect you. 'What is it you seek?' said I. 'Liberty?' And do ye not perceive that nothing can be more adverse to this than the very titles of Philip? Every monarch, every tyrant, is an enemy to liberty and the opposer of laws."*

This distrust is especially demanded of Athens, for it is she that Philip hates and doubts above all.

"First, then, Athenians, be firmly persuaded of this: that Philip is committing hostilities against us, and has really violated the peace; that he has the most implacable enmity to this whole city, to the ground on which this city stands, to the very gods of this city (may their vengeance fall upon him!); but against our constitution is his force principally directed. The destruction of this is, of all other things, the most immediate object of his secret schemes and machinations, and there is, in some sort, a necessity that it should be so. Consider. He aims at universal power, and you he regards as the only persons to dispute his pretensions. He hath long injured you, and of this he himself is fully conscious; for the surest barriers of his other dominions are those places which he hath taken from us, so that, if he should give up Amphipolis and Potidæa, he would not think himself secure in Macedon. He is, then, sensible, both that he entertains designs against you and that you perceive them; and as he thinks highly of your wisdom, he judges that you hold him in the abhorrence he deserves. To these things (and these of such importance) add: that he is perfectly convinced that, although he were master of all other places, yet it is impossible for him to be secure while your popular gov-

* *Second Philippic*, § 23.

ernment subsists; but that if any accident should happen to him (and every man is subject to many), all those who now submit to force would seize the opportunity and fly to you for protection; and therefore it is with regret he sees, in that freedom you enjoy, a spy upon the incidents of his fortune. Nor is this, his reasoning, weak or trivial. First, then, he is on this account to be regarded as the implacable enemy of our free and popular constitution. In the next place, we should be fully persuaded that all those things which now employ him, all that he is now projecting, he is projecting against this city."*

The Athenians were incapable of submitting voluntarily to the yoke, or of deserting the cause of Hellenic liberty.

"As ambition is his great passion, universal empire the sole object of his views; not peace, not tranquillity, not any just purpose. He knows this well, that neither our constitution nor our principles would admit him to prevail upon you (by anything he could promise, by anything he could do) to sacrifice one state of Greece to your private interest; but that, as you have the due regard to justice, as you have an abhorrence of the least stain upon your honor, and as you have that quick discernment which nothing can escape, the moment his attempt was made you would oppose him with the same vigor as if you yourselves had been immediately attacked."†

"Thebans, Thessalians, Argives, and Messenians, are treated as his friends. He knows that at his first sign they would swell his army. You he abuses. And this reflects the greatest lustre upon you, my countrymen, for by these proceedings you are declared the only invariable asserters of the rights of Greece,—the only persons whom no private attach-

* *Fourth Philippic*, § 11.

† *Second Philippic*, § 7.

ment, no views of interest, can seduce from their affection to the Greeks." These considerations do honor to the magnanimity of Athens and the sagacity of her statesman.

Every step the Macedonian advanced strengthened Demosthenes' zeal in shaking the torpor of the Athenians. "It seems to me, Athenians, that some divinity who, from a regard to Athens, looks down upon our conduct with indignation, hath inspired Philip with this restless ambition. For were he to sit down in the quiet enjoyment of his conquests and acquisitions, without proceeding to any new attempts, there are men among you who, I think, would be unmoved at those transactions which have branded our state with the odious marks of infamy, cowardice, and all that is base. But as he still pursues his conquests, as he is still extending his ambitious views, possibly he may at last call you forth, unless you have renounced the name of Athenians!"* Philip's avidity seemed to be the spur with which the gods urged Athens; but the true spur was Demosthenes; incessantly he goaded her, benumbed by a lethargy from which she awoke but to die.

A statesman so vigilant and strong in the grandeur of his soul and genius, was Philip's most formidable enemy. Philip felt it and did him justice. After his second Philippic (344), the king of Macedonia, impressed with the exactness of his views, said: "I would have given my voice to Demosthenes to declare war for me, and I would have appointed him general. * * * I would willingly exchange Amphipolis for the genius of Demosthenes." Lucian faithfully

interprets the prince's sentiments when he ascribes to him these words:

"In spite of themselves Demosthenes arouses his fellow-countrymen, lulled to sleep as by mandrake, from their weary stupor. Taking little pains to be agreeable to them, his candor is the iron that strikes and burns their indolence. * * * If that single Demosthenes were only away from Athens, I would subjugate the city more easily than I did Thebes and Thessaly. * * * He alone watches for his country, discovers all occasions, follows our proceedings and confronts our armies. Nothing escapes him,—neither my stratagems, enterprises, nor designs. * * * In a word, this man is an obstacle, a rampart, that hinders me from taking away everything in the course of a walk. * * * If they made such a man as he absolute master of ammunition, vessels, circumstances, and money, I fear I should soon be forced to dispute Macedonia with him; he who, armed with decrees alone, surrounds me on all sides, surprises me, discovers resources, assembles troops, launches upon the sea formidable fleets, puts armies into the field, and everywhere equals me."*

Philip at Chæroneia fought against Demosthenes in fighting against Athens, and the defeat of the Republic was that of its statesman. Upon the field of battle, in the intoxication of victory, Philip thought first of Demosthenes: "*Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes of the Peanian tribe, has said* * * * " He recited, keeping time, the beginning of a decree of the patriot, and danced around the corpses that covered the plain; then recovering from his first transport, "he shuddered with fear at the thought that the wonderful eloquence of Demosthenes had compelled him to risk for several hours his empire and his life."†

* Lucian, *Life of Demosthenes*.

† Plutarch, *Life of Demosthenes*, ch. 20.

The political penetration of Demosthenes sometimes appeared at fault; his ideas of Philip and of the weakness of the empire did not always seem worthy of an intelligent statesman. In fact, Demosthenes does not spare his invective upon this "barbarian, worthy of all names one could wish to give him." He most willingly branded his envious jealousy and debauchery; he pictured him as surrounded, in his court at Pella, by a lot of fools, thieves, and debauched people, "abandoning themselves in their orgies to dances which I would blush to describe to you"; and still, in this respect, Demosthenes knew that the Athenians were little scrupulous with their eyes and ears. This satire upon Philip's morals was shabby, 'tis said: Æschines did right to reproach him for it. Why open the eyes to gross intemperance and close them to genius? Some say, Demosthenes was guilty of a graver mistake: he ignored the secret of Philip's power, a culpable error in an orator about to determine the destiny of Athens in a merciless combat; but it appeared at the beginning of the struggle and continued until the eve of Chæronea. The last *Philippic*, like the first, expressed unwarrantable disdain and unfounded hope.

"It is worthy your attention to consider how the affairs of Philip are at this time circumstanced. For they are by no means so well disposed, so very flourishing, as an inattentive observer would pronounce. Nor would he have engaged in this war at all, had he thought he should have been obliged to maintain it. He hoped that the moment he appeared, all things would fall before him. But these hopes are vain. And this disappointment, in the first place, troubles and dispirits him."*

* *Third Olynthiac*, § 21.

laid by divinity: "For great and unexpected success is apt to hurry weak minds into extravagances. Hence it often proves much more difficult to maintain acquisitions than to acquire them."

The temple of Philip's power apparently so threatening, is more imposing than real, and rests upon rotten foundations.

"For when forces join in harmony and affection, and one common interest unites the confederating powers, then they share the toils with alacrity,—they endure the distresses, they persevere. But when extravagant ambition and lawless power (as in his case) have aggrandized a single person, the first pretense, the slightest accident, overthrows him, and all his greatness is dashed at once to the ground. At present his successes cast a shade over him; for prosperity hath great power to veil such baseness from observation. But let his arms meet with the least disgrace, and all his actions will be exposed; for, as in our bodies, while a man is in health he feels no effect of any inward weakness, but when disease attacks him, everything becomes sensitive in the vessels, in the joints, or in whatever part his frame may be disordered. So in states and monarchies: while they carry on a war abroad, their defects escape the general eye; but when once it approaches their own territory, then they are all detected. Now such appears to be the fortune of this man, who is too feeble for the load he wishes to carry. * * * And I also, Athenians, would have believed Philip born to command fear and admiration if I had seen him rise by legitimate means. * * * But it is not possible, Athenians,—it is not possible that iniquity, perjury and fraud can support durable powers. By such adventurous means they may sustain themselves once for a moment; they may even promise the most flourishing future; but time exposes them, and they fall of themselves. In a house, a vessel, or any other structure, the base should be the most solid part, and likewise it is good to give prin-

ciples to action, a foundation of justice and truth,—now this is what to-day the enterprises of Philip lack.”

The statesman may here be said to be the dupe of the moralist; the patriot mistakes his wishes for realities; he deceives himself, and deluding one's self is more than a crime for a statesman. Æschines alleged that the promises of Philip misled him. Demosthenes rejected this excuse: “It is not admissible, neither in politics nor equity, for in fact you induce, you force no one to mix in public affairs; only when a man who is persuaded of his ability presents himself do you welcome him with the gratitude of a good and confiding people, and without jealous objection. He becomes your choice, and you put your affairs into his hands. If he is successful, he will be honored and will exalt himself above the multitude; but if he fails, shall he be cleared of it with excuses and evasions? This would not be just. Would the allies who have perished, and their wives and children, and so many other unfortunate victims, be indemnified for their disasters by the thought that it is the work of my folly, not to say that of Æschines? Very far from it.”* Now, can we rightfully use these words against their author, and throw upon him the responsibility of this blunder?

To us it seems easy to justify Demosthenes. Philip's weakness, as described by him, was not a fancy. Those domestic and national dissensions to which he points really existed; the very death of the conqueror through court intrigues proves it; and if Demosthenes, more confiding it seems than Phocion in the equity of providence and the fortune of Athens, preserved some hope till the end, the catastrophe of the battle of Chæronæa, whose loss was due solely to the rashness of

* *Embassy*, § 99.

Lysicles, then the sudden fall of Alexander's empire, proved that the orator's hopes were not wholly delusive. "If each city had had but one citizen like me at the post that I occupied,—what say I?—if but a single man in Thessaly, a single man in Arcadia, had thought as I did, no Greek on this or the other side of Thermopylæ could have been reached even with presents; but free and self-governed, without peril and without fear, they would all live happy in their own country, obliged for so much good to you, to all Athens, thankful to me." Demosthenes was not so blinded by his hatred of Macedonia as to believe and desire the impossible. That which he saw was not fanciful; and when often he feigned not to see it, he had reasons, easy to conceive, for hiding it from the people.

It is in fact injudicious to admit that the true state of affairs had escaped the penetration of such a mind. Demosthenes was reason and reflection itself. He passed his life in studying Philip, in watching all the turns in domestic and foreign affairs; and Philip, through his most wonderful qualities, escaped him. We would not know how to admit such a strange contradiction. Who, then, has given us the truest portrait of Philip, the general and the politician, unless the orator of the *Philippics*? Did Demosthenes ignore the advantages that gave to Philip the defeat of the Athenians and their democratic constitution? No, he perceived them clearly; but he did not believe that the whole reality ought to be placed before the eyes of his hearers. He satirized Philip's habits and his Macedonian nights (not Attic) passed with actors, outcasts of the Piræus; with a certain Callias, a public slave, rejected by Athens with disgust, and afterward the favorite of the king. He called to witness a person who had been in that country an

indignant witness of Philip's baseness. He treated the conqueror as a common drunkard,—for what purpose? To conceal by abuse the secret devotion of a man who received wages? Let us leave this frivolous interpretation to Æschines. He used thereby an orator's acknowledged right to exaggerate or curtail, according to the necessities of his case. A Peter of Russia could love wine as Henry IV and Louis XIV loved other pleasures, without being for that reason less worthy of the name of "the Great." Demosthenes did not exaggerate the extent of Philip's vices unreasonably, and he certainly would not have sought reasons for it if his auditors were merely such as Lycurgus, Hyperides, and Eubulus. But intellectual as were the citizens of Athens, a city without blockheads, the assemblies there were none the less popular assemblies. Oratory before the Areopagus or at the Pnyx, in the forum or before the senate, was under different conditions. Publius Scipio would not have dared, before the conscript fathers, to caricature the descent of Hannibal's army from the Alps, as he did before his army (Livy, xxi, 40). He would have thought only of instructing the wise company. But it was necessary for him to fortify the courage of his alarmed soldiers; and what surer way than to inspire them with contempt of the enemy? Demosthenes likewise devoted himself to remove the fears of the Athenians. To lessen Philip's strength in their eyes weakened him, for it strengthened the confident courage of those whom he fought. In general, Demosthenes paid homage to Philip when he wished to spur the Athenians to emulation; he denounced him, and justified the words of P. L. Courier, calling him "*the great pamphleteer of Greece*," when he wished to give them courage; now, this was above

all what they lacked. The orator did not even think of concealing his tactics. “To enumerate the elements of Philip’s power, and by this examination arouse you to your duty, does not seem convenient to me. And why? Because all that could be said in this respect would not be without glory to him, and not an eulogy to our conduct. * * * But that which before an impartial judge would cover you with ignominy, is what I shall try to tell you here.” While he disparaged their adversary he endeavored to strengthen their own feelings and raise them to the level of their ancestors; sometimes he played upon their fear. “Philip not only wishes to subjugate Athens, but to annihilate it,” an exaggeration suiting the purpose of the orator. Sometimes instead of exaggerating he attenuated the danger. Demosthenes called the Amphictyonic title decreed to Philip a “vain shadow.” Can we dare conclude that he did not foresee for what purpose the adroit Macedonian would use this remark? He foresaw it but too well; but powerless as he saw Athens to rescue this sacred weapon from a prince who, by the consent of all, had become the protector of Delphi and its Pythia, Demosthenes should be praised for speaking disdainfully of a title whose denial would have provoked a formidable levy of bucklers against his country. Let us continue to do homage to his wisdom and his designs; let us not impute to political blindness that for which the moralist and the orator may be more properly praised.

Enlightened judges have esteemed Demosthenes one of the greatest statesmen of antiquity; others have accused him of driving his country to the precipice. Was Demosthenes right or wrong in advocating war against the Macedonians? Polybius reproached him for it.

“The struggle of the Athenians against Philip tended to plunge them into still greater evils; and without the magnanimity of the king and his love of glory, the policy of Demosthenes would have caused them still heavier misfortunes.” Polybius reproves Demosthenes for having denounced as “traitors” the most important people of those cities that concluded an alliance with Macedonia. These citizens were not traitors, but rather “benefactors” and “saviors,” since their friendship for Philip preserved their country from the greatest disasters, and secured them very marked advantages over inimical cities. The friend of Scipio *Æmilianus* could not speak otherwise without running the risk of a trial. Polybius, friendly to the Romans in their struggle against *Perseus*, procured them the help of the *Achæan* league, whose cavalry he commanded; therefore he praises himself when he congratulates *Aristhenes* for having made the *Achæan* league pass over “properly” from the alliance of Philip to the friendship of the Romans; a policy which for the *Achæans* was a source of “security” and “aggrandizement.” Polybius’ views were narrow and selfish. He justified the desertion of nations on the ground that their secession was personally profitable to themselves.* Demosthenes considered interest higher than independence and national dignity. He accused the cities aiding Philip of failing in their duties to the Hellenic cause; Polybius insists upon the advantages which the alleged traitors procured for their country. Nevertheless Demosthenes affirmed that all the cities guilty of treason had more to suffer

* Polybius, xvii, 14, 13. Born at Megalopolis, in Arcadia, the historian would have greatly desired to protect his compatriots from the branding reproaches of Demosthenes.

from the triumph of the Macedonian than Athens herself, and history proves him right.*

Mably† quotes Polybius, and approves him: "This orator grossly deceived himself if he believed all the Greeks would consult the interests of the Athenians. If each republic, after the fall of the federal government, could count only on itself, and had none but foes for neighbors, why did Demosthenes believe himself justified in demanding that Thessaly, on the frontiers of Macedonia, and which Philip himself had delivered from tyrants, should become *ungrateful*,‡ and expose itself to the evils of war, to give Greece a *useless* example of courage, and appear attached to the principles of a union that no longer existed? If the Argives implored the protection of Philip, it was because Lacedæmon still desired to be the tyrant of the Peloponnesus, and because Macedonia alone could give them *useful* help. If the Thebans allied themselves with Philip, it was because they saw that the Greeks no longer wished to be free, and *that they thought it prudent not to offend the most powerful enemy of public liberty*. Why did not Demosthenes perceive that the injuries with which he afflicted the principal magistrates of Messenia, Megalopolis, Thebes, and Argos, far from preparing their minds for the alliance which he contemplated, were but able to multiply the civil hatred and domestic quarrels of Greece? By his inconsiderate conduct * * * he himself served the ambition of Philip. After having tried the feebleness, irresolution and timidity of the Athenians, why did he

* Grote, *History of Greece*.

† *Observations sur l'histoire de la Grèce* (édit. of 1791), iv, p. 157.

‡ Thus Polybius (*Examples of Virtues and Vices*, § 38) opposes the generous virtue of Philip to the ungrateful obstinacy of Athens.

wish that the other cities should do for them what they would not do for themselves? After having learned by experience the uselessness of the embassies with which he fatigued Greece, why did he not change his views? and can we not *condemn him as a statesman and as a citizen*, while we admire him as an orator?" Mably would very willingly accept the saying of the sceptics of Athens: "Demosthenes does not know his country; he is a fool."* In return he exalts the admirable sense of "Phocion, who, as great a general as Demosthenes was a bad soldier, knew how, by advising submission, to put himself within reach of his fellow citizens."†

We shall leave to Mably the care of refuting himself. Is it not in fact refuting one's self to render homage to Demosthenes in terms that assure him of our sympathy at the cost of the prince, his opponent? "Philip feared the impetuous eloquence that denounced him as a tyrant. He did not wish that the pride of the Greeks should be revived by awakening the memory of the great deeds of their fathers. To speak to them of the price of liberty was to force them to act with circumspection distasteful to an ambitious man. The more Philip endeavored to deprive Greece of her lib-

* Demosthenes, *Embassy*: ἐμβεβροντησθαι, τὴν πόλιν ἀγνοεῖν.

† Æschines (*Against Ctesiphon*) rails at a "long" decree of Demosthenes, "full of hopes that could not be realized, and of armies destined never to unite." Was this the fault of Demosthenes or that of the Athenians? This criticism is as good as the argument of Mably: "Demosthenes expected nothing from his enterprises, since in the great number of exordia that he composed in advance, one hardly finds two or three which he had prepared for a happy result." Demosthenes had not to fear that in case of success he would lack words; joy would assure him of the improvisation of an exordium to his liking.

erty, and to inspire her with a certain indolence that would prepare her to obey when she would be conquered, the more he saw with chagrin that the Athenian orator revealed his projects, taught the Greeks beforehand that they would some day blush for the servitude that was inevitable, and, in a certain way, rendered the fruits of his victories uncertain by preparing them to become unquiet and seditious. * * * Till then there had been no one in Greece but this orator, who, unraveling the ambitious plans of the Macedonian, had discovered the dangers with which the liberty of his country was menaced. If any man was able to draw the Athenians out of the disgrace into which their taste for pleasure had cast them, and to restore to the Greeks their ancient valor, that man was Demosthenes, whose burning orations inflame the reader even to-day. But he spoke to deaf people; and, thanks to the more eloquent gifts of Philip, from the time the orator in thundering terms proposed decrees, to conclude alliances, form leagues, levy armies and equip galleys, a thousand voices cried out that peace was the greatest blessing, and that it was not worth while to sacrifice the *present* to the imaginary fears of the future.* Demosthenes appealed to love of glory, love of country, love of liberty, but these virtues no longer existed in Greece; the pensioners of Philip stirred up and created in his favor laziness, avarice, and effeminacy."

"A victory due to such means has little honor, especially when we consider for what bad purposes it was used by a prince who could only be praised for having the art to de-

* "If the Arcadians neglected a *remote evil* to seek a remedy for the one *that oppressed them*, ought Demosthenes to make it one of their crimes?" (Mably.)

base the Greek and to destroy the remnant of courage they owed to their liberty. * * * Working but to satisfy his ambition, he employed the greatest talents and rarest gifts of genius but to construct an edifice which, after his death, must crumble into dust."

Thus Philip did not serve the cause of "humanity" as he ought to have done. He was not a provident man. Why then summon Demosthenes to trial, the enemy of a conqueror who did not even claim the excuse of having bettered what he conquered? In short, Mably has written in another work:

"With what noble and passionate firmness do free states defend their liberty! Macedonia had more trouble in subjugating several cities of Greece than entire Asia. Asia, once vanquished, submitted forever. Vanquished Greece did not at all allow herself to be overwhelmed with disgrace; * * * she still found enough courage in herself, under Alexander and after him, to resist her own vices and the powerful princes who had the art of dividing her. The desire to be free remained after liberty seemed to be irretrievably lost, and produced the Achæan league that could not be destroyed but by another republic destined to conquer all."

It is not very easy to comprehend how the author of these lines on the virtue of liberty could disown the orator whose passion was to awaken its desire. Mably's thoughts lack cohesion and precision, or, rather, his thoughts and his sentiments contradict one another. This was the eternal struggle of cold intellect, moved everywhere by interest, with the generous inspiration and impulse of honor. It is Demosthenes' glory to have ignored these internal struggles and to have done all that the dignity of Athens might come out triumphant. "Distrust the first move," said a politician. It is always the best. The first move-

ment of Demosthenes was that of his whole life. Mably has condemned him, but at the expense of contradictions that refute his iniquitous judgment.

An eminent genius, who has with distinction applied his high faculties to the exposition of philosophical doctrines, M. Cousin, has judged Demosthenes in one of his most magnificent lectures.* The passage merits citation: “Demosthenes, after all, was nothing but a great orator. Demosthenes, in his time, represented the past of Greece, the spirit of small cities and small republics, a worn-out and corrupt democracy,—a past that could be no more and that was no more. To revive a past irretrievably gone it was necessary to wager truly against the possible. It was necessary to attempt an unfolding of force and energy of which others were incapable, and himself like the rest; for, in short, one is always a little like others; one belongs to his time. So Demosthenes failed; I add, with history, that *he failed shamefully*. * * * The eloquence of Demosthenes is almost like his life. It is convulsive, demagogical, very unlike a statesman. He had enough of invective and dialectics, as well as of a skillful and wise use of language. But take the orations of Pericles, poorly arranged as they are by Thucydides, compare them with those of Demosthenes, and you will see what a difference there is between the eloquence of the leader of a great nation and that of the leader of a party. [It would be difficult to compress more errors into fewer words.] If the struggles of nations are sad, if the vanquished claim our pity, we must reserve our greater sympathy for the conqueror [for Cæsar, apparently, and not for Vercingetorix], since all victory infallibly indicates prog-

* *Introduction à l'histoire de la philosophie* : 10th lecture.

ress of the human race. * * * Unfortunate heroes excite in us deeper sympathy than nations. Individuality adds to sympathy, but even there 'tis better to be on the side of the conqueror, for it is always that of the better cause, that of civilization and of humanity, that of the present and of the future, since that of the vanquished is always that of the past. A great man vanquished is a great man out of place in his time. His triumph would stop the progress of the world. We must therefore applaud his defeat, since it was useful, since with his great qualities, his virtues and his genius, he marched against humanity and time."

Thus Demosthenes is culpable for having yielded to the allurements of patriotism, because he marched against humanity and time. The triumph of Greece would have arrested the progress of the world. These are grand expressions, but when time alone has revealed to us what was hidden from Demosthenes by the shadows of the future, it is easier than it is just to draw, at the expense of the generous citizen, the pompous conclusions of a transcendental philosophy.

His maxim was that of Pericles, not to seek, for the sake of our misgivings, to sound the future.* "Prophets should never sit in the council of statesmen."† What we attribute to the force of circumstances is often due to the mere weakness of men. Therefore the least questionable duty is here the nearest. With righteous souls the moral of the present will always prevail against the philosophy of the fu-

* "They have abandoned the uncertainty of success to hope, but think that they ought to count only upon themselves in the face of the present duty." (*Funeral Eulogy*, Thucydides, ii, 42.)

† Cf. De Rémusat (1834), cited by M. Stiévenart.

ture. Demosthenes may have spoken in the name of extinct virtue. Be it so, but he spoke in the name of virtue. Intelligent as Themistocles, he was not wholly ignorant of his inability to repair the edifice from the foundation, decayed by time. In Aristophanes, *Agoracritus* makes *People* pass over to the frying-pan and give him back his ancient virtues, together with youth. The counsellor of Athens could not effect this magical change; but he was worthy of praise for trying to draw from a dull old man the last spark of youthful ardor. So many others around Demosthenes counselled the useful, the present utility. It was well for the highest interests of Athens that the voice of their ancestors resounded for a last time on the tribune, that the emulation of the past was proposed as the pledge of certain esteem, at least of the respect of prosperity. Demosthenes, a worthy pupil of Pericles, said to the Athenians: "In deliberations of public interest the glory of our ancestors is the only law to consult. Each citizen, if he wishes to do nothing but what this law approves, ought, in mounting the tribune to judge a public cause, to think that with the insignia of his office he is invested with the dignity of Athens." He himself set the example. He struggled, in the name of national honor, against the selfishness of citizens, the paltry interests of that always abundant class of people attached exclusively to the prosperity of their own trifling affairs, to the inviolability of their own well-being,—the Chrysales of patriotism, whose horizon is a good soup and a well-cooked roast. Citizens like these were not scarce at Athens.* Aristophanes engaged them in the gross

* "One dies on politics, one lives on business," is their device. We suppose they will shortly translate *beneficium* as *benefit*.

pleasantries of his *Acharnians*, and employed his comic whims in increasing their number. Three cheers for ringdoves and thrushes, tripe with honey, eels from lake Copaïs, biscuits, nicknacks, beautiful dancers, and cool wine! Fie on war and its disgraces! In truth, Lamachus is well advanced, having gone to break his lance against the enemies. Pay attention! There he is coming back amidst the laughter of the theater, with a cut from a lance somewhere else than in the breast, groaning, limping, legs out of joint, head half split, and without his plumes!

This is the depth of Diceopolis' political morality. This just man and his equals saw in a buckler the picture of a cheese, in a spear a spit. They judged everything from the standpoint of good living and of enjoyment. Very often such were the Athenians of Demosthenes' time, when the love of peace at any price was much less excusable than at the time of the Peloponnesian war. The contemporaries of Aristophanes doubted whether it was their duty to dispute preëminence with Sparta, or to seek the aggrandizement of Athens in Sicily. Demosthenes' hearers could not doubt their obligation to drive the Macedonian from Greece. Thus the orator, in attacking Philip, obedient to the dictates of his conscience, could not fail, and if he failed, his mistake was happy, and more enviable than the cold prudence of the foreigner's partisans. There are situations where honor commands us to fight, though the cause be hopeless. If heaven has designs, it will always have power to accomplish them, and men at least will have obeyed that secret voice which inspired a hero of Corneille with this honest maxim: "*Do your duty, and to the gods leave the rest.*"

Now, it was undoubtedly Athens' duty to delay servitude by the manly efforts of an hour, and not to hasten it by a weak submission. Fancying one's self to discover the men of Providence, and aiding the evolutions of humanity by rallying to their standards, is to enter a dangerous way. Patriotism here can easily err.

Demosthenes, condemned by speculative philosophy and poetry, is acquitted by common sense and morality. It is a narrowness of honorable minds not to set themselves up as especially interested interpreters of divine commands, but to oblige themselves modestly to do their duty without words. Fénelon * declares that Atticus was wiser than even Cicero and Cato. Demosthenes, in his eyes, was wrong in struggling against Philip; it was impossible for him to restore his republic, and to guard her from danger. The preceptor of the Duke of Bourgoyne makes a distinction between the duty of a private citizen and that of a prince: "A mere private man ought to think of nothing but of regulating his own affairs, and of governing his family; he ought never to desire public offices, still less seek them." God has provided for this abstinence by entrusting the mission of governing a state to a prince, who would not be at liberty to abandon it, "in however bad a state it was." Without thinking of it, Fénelon eulogizes the republican constitution: where there is no monarch, the citizens inherit his duties, and ought, in his place and position, never to abandon, desperate as it may seem, the cause of the state. The republic is not intrusted to the care of a single man, but to the devotion of each of her children; Demosthenes' care did not fail her. "Seeing that all Greece

* Thirty-third Dialogue, *Démosthène et Cicéron*.

was humiliated, branded and corrupted, by those who received the gifts of Philip and Alexander for the ruin of their country, that his city needed a man and all Greece a city to take the lead, he gave himself to his country, and the city to Greece for liberty."

This homage, rendered by Hyperides to Leosthenes, seems to be addressed to the orator of the *Philippics*. Demosthenes was conscious of having served his country well, "an august and holy recompense in the eyes of him who esteemed virtue and honor." He enjoyed still another: roused by Æschines to avenge her defeat upon her counsellor, Athens, acknowledging his services, decreed him a golden crown, less brilliant, however, than that with which he enriched his country's brow. With all due deference to the critics vexed by his policy, Athens may be pardoned for a part of her long-extended weakness; her vigor, tardy, but worthy of her past, has merited and will still receive the eulogies of the future.

CHAPTER V.

ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DEMOSTHENES' ELOQUENCE.

“Λόγος ὥσπερ εἰζὼν τῆς ἐμῆς διανοίας . . . μνημεῖόν μου πὸν κάλλιον τῶν χαλκῶν ἀναθημάτων: This oration is like a faithful portrait of my thoughts, a monument far more beautiful than statues of bronze.” (Socrates.)

IN Demosthenes the statesman is reflected in the orator; Demosthenes is therefore the most useful model to be studied by men who are called upon to govern their equals by speech. His eloquence is practical and positive, born of affairs and used for them. In this sense we can well accept Rousseau's words: “Animated by Demosthenes' masculine eloquence, my student will exclaim, This is an orator! But in reading Cicero, he will exclaim, This is an advocate!” On the rostrum, Demosthenes disdains the artifices of art and the desire to please the mind by employing resources of the imagination. An oration in Demosthenes' style, delivered in our days before the English Parliament, or before the Congress of the United States, would produce a greater effect than the most magnificent harangues of the Roman consul. Cicero spoke before auditors who were moved by everything that displayed theatrical pomp. Rome's majesty was imprinted in his eloquence, and his eloquence was embellished like the patrician's toga. The Attic genius, as simple and precise as the pallium, was not adorned with this magisterial fullness. Demosthenes aimed at enlighten-

ment and conviction before all other things; and in treating public affairs without an apparent trace of literary care, he realized effective eloquence,—the only eloquence relished by our modern political assemblies. He carried the votes most difficult to win, and like Voltaire, he accomplished it without making a phrase. In him there was no show, no ostentation; no great words nor periods for effect. “His good sense spoke without any other ornament than its own force. He made truth intelligible to the whole people; he awakened them, he stimulated them, he showed to them the yawning abyss. All was said for the common safety, not one word for the orator himself.* All was instructive and touching, nothing brilliant.”

Demosthenes pursued his object constantly and bravely, without ever deviating to amplify; he abstained from all development, even that which would be most favorable to eloquence and most agreeable to the ears of the people, if it was not essentially necessary. Clearness, luminous precision, these were the secrets of his power.

“And if you will be persuaded, Athenians, first to raise these supplies which I have recommended, then to proceed to your other preparations,—your infantry, navy, and cavalry; and lastly to confine your forces by a law to that service which is appointed to them; reserving the care and distribution of their money to yourselves, and strictly examining into the conduct of the general; then your time will be no longer wasted in continual debates upon the same subject, and scarcely to any purpose; then you will deprive him of the most considerable of his revenues; for his arms are now

* Fénelon, *Lettre à l'Académie*. Cicero's orations are full of Cicero. Demosthenes' biographers cannot, to their deep regret, derive any information from Demosthenes' harangues.

supported by seizing and making prizes of those who pass the seas. But is this all? No; you shall also be secure from his attempts; not as when some time since he fell on Lemnos and Imbrus, and carried away your citizens in chains; not as when he surprised your vessels at Gerastus, and spoiled them of an unspeakable quantity of riches; not as when lately he made a descent upon the coast of Marathon, and carried off our sacred galley; while you could neither oppose these insults, nor detach your forces at such junctures as were thought convenient.*

“I have heard it objected, ‘that indeed I ever speak with reason; yet still this is no more than words,† that the state requires something more effectual, some vigorous actions.’ Upon which I shall give my sentiments without the least reserve. The sole business of a speaker is, in my opinion, to propose the course you are to pursue. This were easy to be proved. You know that when the great Timotheus moved you to defend the Eubœans against the tyranny of Thebes, he addressed you thus: ‘What, my countrymen! when the Thebans are actually in the island, are you deliberating what is to be done? what part to be taken? Will you not cover the seas with your navies? Why are you not at the Piræus? why are you not embarked?’ Thus Timotheus advised; thus you acted; and success ensued. But had he spoken with the same spirit, and had your indolence prevailed, and his advice been rejected, would the state have had the same success? By no means. And so in the present case, vigor and execution is your part; from your speakers you are only to expect wisdom and integrity.

* *First Philippic*, § 33.

† *Λέγειν τὰ ἄριστα*: to say only what is best to be said in the people’s interest is the utmost requirement of the law. The orator who fails in this duty is subject to the denunciation called *εἰσαγγελία*. Demosthenes willingly uses this formula in order to remind the Athenians of his devotion to the superior law of patriotism. (Hyperides, *Against Polyæctus*.)

I shall just give the summary of my opinion, and then descend. You should raise supplies, you should keep up your present forces, and reform whatever abuses may be found in them (not break them entirely upon the first complaint). You should send ambassadors into all parts, to reform, to remonstrate, to exert all their efforts in the service of their state. But, above all things, let those corrupt ministers feel the severest punishment; let them, at all times, and in all places, be the objects of your abhorrence; that wise and faithful counsellors may appear to have consulted their own interest as well as that of others. If you will act thus, if you will shake off this indolence, perhaps,—even yet, perhaps,—we may promise ourselves some good fortune. But if you only just exert yourselves in acclamations and applauses, and when anything is to be done, sink again into your supineness, I do not see how all the wisdom in the world can save the state from ruin, when you deny your assistance.”*

This is invincible evidence, and one that forces assent like an arithmetical demonstration, according to Æschines’ comparison.

Demosthenes ignored long preparations, he never “beat about the bush,”—he went directly to the facts. “Brief and without pretense will be my début, Athenians. In my eyes the sincere orator ought, from his first words, to clearly expose his proposition. When his opinion is known, if you wish to hear him further, he explains himself, he develops his plans and means. If you reject his proposal, he descends from the rostrum without fatiguing your patience and his voice to no purpose. I therefore enter at once upon my subject. Democracy is outraged at Mytilene, and you ought to avenge this injury. By what means?

* *Oration on the Chersonesus*, § 73.

I can tell you, when I shall have established the reality of this oppression, and your duty to put an end to it." Brief and full of sense, such is his aim; proofs and examples are at once presented in his thoughts; he confines himself to facts which are best known and best adapted to his purpose (*μάλιστα πράξειν*): he can choose. He never likes to hear himself speak, he has no leisure for it; he does not mount the rostrum to speak, but to act, if we can use such an expression. This brevity, always laudable, was particularly necessary in an orator whose reprimands contained no flattery for Athenian weakness. Sometimes they refused to hear him. Some cried, *Speak!* others, *Do not speak!* If the orator was able to triumph over the tumult, he did not conquer their rebellious dispositions. In such a case he hastened his speech, he knew that they were impatient to get rid of him.

Demosthenes' rapidity notably appeared in his exordiums. Aristotle compares the exordium to the poet's prologue, to the preludes of flute-players. We could further compare it to the preparatory movements of the wrestler when he wishes to make his hands and arms supple;* but with this difference, that the athlete strikes at nothing, while the exordium is destined at once to reach the adversary. The exordium is especially necessary to the advocate who supports, or appears to support, a bad cause. "It is more advantageous to him to stop at every digression than to come to his own affair. Thus slaves never answer directly when questioned; they use circumlocutions and preambles."† The deliberative exordium is generally

* Such is the prelude of Dares, the pugilist. (*Æneid*, v, 375.)

† Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, iii, 14.

short, sometimes useless. Everybody knows the subject under consideration; the exordium, then, has no other object than to awaken the attention of the hearers to the importance of the debate, and to inspire them with dispositions favorable to the person or to the orator's thesis. Demosthenes and his principles were sufficiently well known to the Athenians; he had only to use before them the common resources of the bar. Two statements were sufficient for him: "Judges, before all things, the thought that the abrogation of the law (of Leptines) is useful to the commonwealth, and, secondly, the interest of Chabrias' son, have made me consent to support these citizens with all my power."

His peroration was likewise remarkably simple. It was the formula familiar to the Athenians: "I see nothing more to say, and all my words have, I believe, been comprehended (*Contra Leptinem*)"; or a rapid review of the arguments developed. At the conclusion of the oration all is clear; the sentiment desired by the orator is inspired then or never. Many an orator prepares his peroration immediately after his exordium: he fears that breath will fail him at the end. Demosthenes did not fear these swoons; he felt strong and sure of himself; he had no weak troops adorned and surrounded by chosen soldiers; in him all was solid and ardent. An intense heat animated his harangues from beginning to end: his life, his soul, circulated in them from the first word to the last: *spiritus intus alit*. * * * What good is it to adjust a peroration carefully prepared to a discourse which is all peroration? The orator concludes with some grave and simple words, without using pathetic gestures or oratorical efforts; he descends from the ros-

trum with the same step and with the same air as he mounted it.*

Demosthenes had little success in improvisation; but when he was compelled to speak impromptu, he did it with an energy superior to that of his written orations. This compulsion to do himself injustice by departing from his natural course, imprinted upon his mind an agitation the result of which was remarkably vigorous language. Then, without doubt, escaped from him those bold terms or images with which *Æschines* reproaches him.† Not endowed with the gift of easy productions, he also failed in the indiscreet vivacity of his imagination and his thoughts. In his orations he sometimes appeared to be transported by a divine inspiration. His nature was irascible and violent; sometimes he inclined to wrangling and to the abuse of subtile reasoning. At all times he had to govern himself and to undergo a severe preparation. Improvisation would have given him loose reins; the pen restrained him. Thus calmed and chastised, he was not only protected from the railleries of comic poets, but incomparable in point of beauty. He was unexpectedly called upon to mount the rostrum: "I am not prepared," was his excuse. He knew the exigencies of an artistic people, whose delicacy had more than once chagrined his début. He judged it prudent to meditate and to write his harangues

* Modern speakers, in general, think that they must make a great effort at the close. Taste among the ancients was different. A Pindaric Ode of Horace (Lebrun deemed it worthy to be translated by his own hand) concludes thus: "The young calf which is to liquidate my debt has a white spot on his forehead, the rest of him is of a dun color" (iv, 2). Pindar finishes the *Fourth Olympic* thus: "Even young men's hair often turns white before their age warrants it."

† *Against Ctesiphon*, § 166.

thoughtfully, in order to satisfy the people and to justify himself if malignity should compel him to defend himself, as in the *Oratio in Midiam*, against the assaults of Athenians, who were the first to profit by his admonition.

Demosthenes' imagination was more vigorous than prompt. With all that, he was timid. A vigorous exercise had rendered his voice sufficiently powerful to triumph over the roar of the waves. It was, perhaps, always difficult for him to overcome the emotion which the storms of the popular assembly aroused in him. It was, no doubt, to the preoccupation of an orator who was easily disconcerted and obliged to entrust his strong reflections to an attentive memory that Demosthenes owed the meditative and anxious attitude ridiculed by Æschines.* An easy and spontaneous eloquence would have given him more freedom and abandonment. It would have doubled his powers. Sudden inspiration is one of the most powerful instruments of speech, and the source of irresistible effects. If living words affect us more than reading, what advantages instantaneous eloquence has over the premeditated oration? In place of being reduced to silence by an unworthy adversary, it is always ready for his orders, never at his mercy. It follows him over his own ground. Against his prepared sentences it offers arguments which spring from a sudden conception, and which are in the highest degree marked by the expressive beauty of living nature. The spec-

* On the rostrum, before speaking "he rubbed his forehead"; he assumed "the attitude of a charlatan who meant to impose on his hearers"; that is to say, his attitude was grave and collected. (Æschines, *Embassy*, § 49.) "When he composed he held his pen in his mouth and bit it." (Plutarch, *Life of Demosthenes*, 29.)

tator who sees them born assists the creative act of the genius; he admires it, and this admiration disposes him to be easily persuaded. A penetrating glance from a calm orator confounds and chastises an interrupter. A fortunate rally can reëstablish a battle that has been almost lost. What does it profit to be right if we cannot prove it at once, when the refutation must, without delay, destroy the effect of an adversary's oration? Without improvisation, the orator in the heat of the contest is disarmed as soon as he has spent the arrows brought from his shop. Improvisation assures him of a supply that is ever new. See how Cicero, by an extemporaneous outburst, dismayed Clodius in that passionate altercation before the senate, a graphic description of which is found in one of his letters (*Ad Atticum*, i, 16). An extemporaneous debate is a duel in which the attack and reply cross each other with the rapidity of two swords. Victory is sometimes the reward of the most agile dexterity.

To be wanting in improvisation is therefore a grave defect in a statesman, especially at Athens, where the citizens of the Pnyx, daily occupied in the current of public affairs, represented a permanent parliament. The eloquent ministers of the state were also called upon to act as her ambassadors. Now, what are we to think of an Athenian deputy who is deficient in oratory? Demosthenes must have suffered cruelly before Philip for having failed in prompt eloquence, on which his contemporary orators prided themselves. Python of Byzantium flattered himself on his ability to write, but he also knew how to improvise. Demades had a prompt conception and ready language. In his extemporaneous speeches he often completely reversed all the arguments which Demosthenes had

carefully studied and premeditated. Sometimes also, when he saw Demosthenes troubled, he came to his assistance and aided him in regaining control of his audience. What are we to say of Æschines, whose eloquence, according to his rival's testimony, flowed abundantly, like the rolling waves of a torrent? Demosthenes must have been touched by his own inferiority in this respect. Modern orators are more felicitous. Words have wings and fly away; writings remain. Without mentioning Cimon, Themistocles, Phocion, and Pericles, who have left us nothing of their eloquence, how little of Demades' brilliant improvisations remains to us, and what a great damage has Æschines, our orator's rival, inflicted on Greek letters by transmitting so little of his fertility! The *Three Graces*,* due to Æschines' chisel, increase our regret for having been deprived of such masterpieces which were born from day to day of inspired but fragile designs.

Plutarch, in his comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero, does not admire the habit of continually exercising the talent of "haranguing and pettifogging." Athens was not wanting in fertile speakers, always disposed to improvise an opinion. Demosthenes preferred to polish the expression of his thought as he matured his deliberations. Thus he did not fear repetitions. When a period, a comparison or an entire development, thoughtfully elaborated, appeared to him as near as possible to the desired ideal, and worthy of being peremptorily preserved, he had no scruples to use it again and again. He wished to submit the Athenians to the control of his speech, and to direct

* The ancient critics thus designated Æschines' works: *Against Timarchus*; *Oration on the Embassy*; *Against Ctesiphon*.

their attention to the public good; whence his perseverance in repeating until he accomplished his object. Socrates* excused himself for always saying the same thing upon the same subject to the sophists, thinkers who were very changeable. Demosthenes concentrated his attacks upon the same weak points of the Athenians. Perhaps they are wounded by these repetitions. To whom do they attribute them? Are they not the first authors? “Change your conduct, and I will change my language.”

True and noble thoughts, when once in a mould worthy of them, are always pleasant to hear. If they are applicable to the subject, it is unnecessary to search for their origin and the date of their birth. Within an interval of two years (355–353), at the close of his oration *Against Timocrates*, Demosthenes reproduced an invective which had already been directed against Androtion. He did not pretend to dissimulate the repetition, but he announced it in such a manner that it was pardoned: “I have already had occasion to pronounce the words which I am about to say to you; but only those of you heard them who assisted in the debates provoked by Euctemon.” The tribunals changed judges every year. The audience was almost entirely renewed. The orator thought it unnecessary to renew himself. Elsewhere, Demosthenes alleged that he returned to facts already mentioned, and in the same terms, for the instruction of young classes who had been neither witnesses nor hearers. Theophrastus’ great talker (Ἀλάος) “recounted what applause one of

* The Pierrot of the *Festin de Pierre* is Socratic on this point. To Charlotte: “I always tell you the same thing because it is always the same thing; and if it were not always the same thing, I would not always tell you the same thing.”

his orations received which he delivered in public, and he repeated a great part of it." The author of the oration *On the Crown* sometimes resisted this temptation, which had such influence on the Greek mind. He said he feared that "such retrospective eloquence would fatigue the judges in vain." When he was assured of escaping this danger he was less scrupulous. He drew before the eyes of the Messenians "dazzling examples" of Philip's perfidy. He considered it useful to repeat them before the Athenians, and he repeated his little address whose "judicious truth" had (he himself takes care to inform us) excited the "roaring acclamations" of the Messenians.* The Athenians saw, if they did not all feel like Demosthenes, the alarms at the news of the capture of Elatea. Ctesiphon's defender did not omit to picture it before their eyes. This picture was not merely, under the orator's pen, an illustrious testimony of his courageous devotion. He found another opportunity to charm the people with the refreshing remembrance of his incomparable eloquence. "On that day, then, I was the man who stood forth. And the counsels I then proposed may now merit your attention on a double account: first, to convince you that of all your leaders and ministers I was the only one who maintained the part of a zealous patriot in your extremity, whose words and actions were devoted to your service in the midst of public consternation; and secondly, to enable you to judge more clearly of my other actions, by granting a little time to this."† Demosthenes omitted

* In the *Embassy* Æschines reproduced, in substance, an oration already pronounced by him before Philip, and repeated previously in the assembly of the people. It was therefore delivered three times.

† *Pro Corona*, § 173.

a third reason; it is that he derived as much pleasure from repeating his orations as did his fellow-citizens from hearing them. Homer never fails to repeat *verbatim* the messages or the speeches of his characters. It is his advantage,—his naïve simplicity. The Attic orators followed this example in order to please their hearers and themselves, and did it with artistic scruples. It was well; let us imitate it. The better is sometimes an enemy of the good. It is thus with our virtuosi. If they excel in certain pursuits, in which their talent has full scope, they continue the same pursuits, and will compel the world to admire their execution. *Il nous faut du nouveau, n'en fût-il plus au monde.*

On this point the French are more Athenian than the Athenians themselves. The Greeks love novelty (Aristophanes did not forget to entertain them with new inventions), but the beautiful allured them still more; though it might be repeated many times. It was never unacceptable to them. Thus they allowed no one to practice originality with impunity. It would have been even dangerous, especially for an accused man, to do it with *éclat*. “Now if I ask you to listen to an oration quite different from those habitually delivered before you, you will not be angry with me, but pardon me, reflecting that the particular nature of the attacks against me renders these explanations of a new kind necessary. * * * I hesitate to speak, for I have such new and strange opinions to expose to the consideration of you all that I fear you will, at my first words, fill the tribunal with your murmurs and cries. * * * I beseech you, however, not to become prepossessed with the idea that I would have been so foolish, when I am under an accusation, as to choose a method

of defense which contradicts your opinions, if I did not think that this part of my oration accorded with that which precedes.”*

Sometimes the Athenian orators took care to remark that their sentiments were those of their hearers. Like Aristogiton's accuser, they defended themselves from being original. “I will say nothing new, nothing original, nothing particularly remarkable (περιττόν).” Superiority was the danger to avoid. Pericles dissimulated his. “I will endeavor, in accordance with the law, to meet the desires and sentiments of each one of you to the best of my ability.”† He was satisfied with the honor of being in harmony with the city, and of being alone the interpreter of all. Thus the speakers considered the susceptibility of hearers who would be insulted by an elevation and richness of thought by which they might, perhaps, feel humiliated. The people desire that the man be one of their number, and like them. Nero became the idol of the plebeians by publicly sharing their tastes. The literati of Rome denied the appellation of learned, and shared the popular prejudices against the Greeks. Aristides the *Just* was exiled. Athens would have tolerated him if he had merely merited the qualification of *moderate* citizen (μετρώς). Under Caligula and Domitian, probity was an offense to the emperor. The Athenian people were tyrannical; their jealous temper imposed equality imperiously and in all respects; all eminent merit, even in eloquence, made them distrustful.

It is therefore not astonishing that the Athenian orators aspired to originality only indifferently. They cared little for it; they did not fear to resemble their

* Isocrates, *Antidosis*.

† *Funeral Oration*. ii, 35, fin., 45.

rivals, to copy them as they copied themselves.* Innovation in thought stimulated them less to emulation than elegance of expression. Isocrates' testimony is significant in this respect.

"Past events are a common domain, open to every man. To make use of them fully, to draw from them suitable reflections, to enliven them with charms of expression, is the office of the skillful. The surest means, in my opinion, to promote all the arts, and the superior art of speech, would be to honor and to admire, not those who first grappled with a subject, but those who brought it to perfection; not the author anxious to speak of things which have not been touched upon before him, but the talent capable of treating a known subject in a manner that cannot be equaled."†

II. Perfection of form in language, as in all other things, was the desired aim of the Greek artist. Now perfection is rarely improvised.‡ Pascal tells us that we should not fear to repeat the proper word when we have found it. Our pulpit orators have extended this principle to entire pages, when careful reviewing brought them to the highest degree of beauty possible to reach.

Fénelon, in his third *Dialogue on Eloquence*, de-

* Demosthenes and Isæus established the utility of the torture in the same terms. "Having to express the same thoughts, I do not think that I ought to trouble myself to express in another manner what has been presented felicitously. * * * I would be unreasonable if, seeing others profit by what belongs to me, I was the only one who did not dare to use what I myself composed. Isocrates (*Letter to Philip*).

† *Panegyric on Athens*, § 9.

‡ Sometimes a sudden inspiration creates at once a perfect masterpiece (cf. Plato's *Ion*). Thus from patriotic feeling was born, with a perfect harmony of words and song, the finished hymn of *Rouget de l'Isle*; but these effusions are the exception.

mands that the preacher shall speak with effusion, and pour his soul out in a touching and familiar sermon. These pastoral exhortations are capable of powerful effects, but they also have their dangers: it is dangerous to improvise at the foot of the altar. Bossuet's method is safer: Bossuet revised his sermons without recoiling before patient erasures. What Bossuet, Bourdaloue and Massillon did in the christian pulpit, which is devoted to the saving of souls, the political orators of Athens could not refuse to their love of art and of the state. It was not, however, without sometimes exposing themselves to criticism. Demosthenes thought that he ought to exculpate himself for having written the *Oratio in Midiam* before appearing at the tribunal. He said that he had prepared a bill against the opposing party, a rich collection of the crimes and insolences of the criminal. He offered to give the judges a lecture on it. Nothing was more natural, in the eyes of the heliasts, than to see an accuser carefully draw up and magnify his brief against his adversary: this was the right of an enemy. Condemnation was passed on the memoirs, but not on the perfect beauties of the speech itself; for the speech was a snare to captivate the artistic sensibility of the hearers: "Perhaps Midias will add that I have studied and prepared all that I am now saying. Yes, Athenians, I have studied it; why should I deny it? I have weighed it with all the care imaginable. In fact, I would be foolish if, after the outrages which I have received and am still receiving, I had neglected the accusation which I am about to present to you. As to my oration, Midias himself wrote it; for the author of a bill of accusations is really that man whose actions have furnished the sub-

ject, not that one who has taken care to elaborate the arguments which, by my right as a citizen, I lay before you to-day. Such is my custom, Athenians: I agree with Midias. But he, undoubtedly, has never made a wise reflection in all his life. For if he had only reflected a little, he would not have acted with such extravagance.”

Isocrates, a professional writer, also apologized to the people, but in a different tone. He declared to the admirers of familiar orations that he knew as well as any one the merit of simplicity. Master of all the resources of his art, he could be brilliant and simple at his will. The severity of these austere writers betrayed them: they reserved their eulogies for works whose weakness could not discourage them. Thus the author of the *Panegyric* was neither surprised nor intimidated by their disdain for his fine diction. Orontes asked indulgence in favor of his sonnet: he had so little time to write it. Isocrates, more sincere, made this candid confession to the detractors of finished orations: “Most orators, in their exordiums, assuage their audience in advance; they prelude by pretexts to the oration which they are about to deliver. Some allege the little leisure given them to prepare themselves; others the difficulty of finding expressions equal to the grandeur of the subject. As for me, if I do not speak in a manner worthy of the subject, of my reputation, of the time devoted to the composition of this oration, (nearly ten years, the duration of the siege of Troy!) and finally of the long experience of my whole life, I do not ask any forgiveness; I consent to ridicule and contempt.”* Renown and length of time compelled him to submit.

* *Panegyric*, §§ 11 and 14.

All written orations, however, owe to the reader qualities which the harangues that are born of daily disputes in the forum do not possess. "A written oration derives its merit from expressions rather than the thought it contains." * If the author wished to polish it with his pen, it was apparently in the hope that it would be admired by posterity. Now, how can he be assured that it will reach its destination, if not by the imperishable and inalienable beauty of diction? "Well written works," says Buffon, "will be the only works that will pass to posterity." Modern law protects literary property; the genius of the writer will protect it as surely. Bossuet and Demosthenes are less "liable to be robbed" than Harpagon.

To the reasons which Demosthenes alleges to justify the artistic work done in the introduction of the *Oratio in Midiam*, we can add one relative to the fitness of revising it after delivery: "Written orations appear meagre when delivered in public. The finest harangues at the bar seem ordinary when they are read in print. It is because they are made for action, and if they are not used for action they no longer produce their effect, but appear insipid." †

Action was their dominant virtue (*ὑποκριτικὴ τέχνη*), and that was precisely the power of which they were deprived. As soon as they were written they needed the essential merit of written orations, which was a scrupulous perfection of style. Thus Demosthenes' harangues, so powerful by action, were weakened when transferred from the tumultuous tribunal to paper. They were like a statue with dim eyes, substituted for the living athlete. They would never seem languid and cold, even without the revisions; and yet,

* Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, iii, 1.

† Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, iii, 12.

notwithstanding their innate vigor, they must necessarily gain by being reviewed before reading. In the cabinet the writer reanimates his work with a new life; with purity of language, with perfection of design, with the coloring of pencil, he unites at his leisure pathetic energy and the beauty of expression; finally, he uses all the secrets of his art capable of making the marble breathe, and of giving, by force of illusion, the warmth of life and action to the motionless canvas.

As to the proofs of revision, they are numerous in the orations of Demosthenes and his contemporaries. Thus we do not find to-day, in the oration *On the Embassy*, several expressions or traits criticised by Æschines. Demosthenes profited by his enemy's criticisms; he suppressed them as soon as he made his final revision. The harangues of the two rivals contain many passages as follows: "I learn that my adversary will excuse himself in this manner. * * * He will, I know, offer this objection. * * * He will give me this reply. When he will say to you, * * * do not listen to him; if he insists, answer him," or other analogous formulas. Evidently the speeches in which these anticipations are met have not reached us in their primitive form. Perhaps in civil cases the logographers were so unfaithful as to mutually communicate their arguments,—the client was the only one to suffer; but in political and passionate debates this supposition is inadmissible. Never did Æschines and Demosthenes extend their disinterested love of art to such a degree that they refrained from dealing the blows which their hatred demanded. These literary preoccupations do not agree with the eulogy of Fénelon, which we have referred to. In Demosthenes "not one word is for the orator." * * * Pytheas re-

proached this same Demosthenes for bestowing so much labor on his orations that they smelt of the lamp; Æschines, for using expressions that were polished to excess (περιέργους). Like Thucydides, according to the remark of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Demosthenes preferred a studied diction to ordinary and natural language, aiming at originality of attitude and relief. How can we harmonize this apparent contradiction? It is true Demosthenes did not pursue the beauty of diction to aggrandize himself; he disregarded himself and looked only to his country's interests; but even his country's safety made him an excellent artist. "Demosthenes did not strive after the beautiful; he created it without thinking of it. He used language as a modest man uses his coat, to cover him." With all due deference to the author of *The Letter to The Academy*, Fénelon, Demosthenes aimed not only to dress his thoughts decently, but to present them under a costume which attracted the eyes of those who admired the exquisite perfections of form everywhere. Demosthenes did strive for the beautiful, and thought of it constantly, but he knew how to realize it with an imperceptible art;* he assiduously studied his eloquence, but this study never in the least deprived him of his nature and his disinterested sincerity.

The orator, even after his studious labors by the lamp, could always apply to his political harangues the words which close the *Fourth Philippic*: "Such is the truth, Athenians, told in all frankness, with simplicity and devotion. I know nothing better to say." He might have added, if he had Isocrates' disposition, I could not say it in better terms, nor with a more persuasive talent. Demosthenes was precise and rapid

* *Λαυθάων ποιέει.* (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, iii, 16.)

in his thoughts, measured in his vigor, warm and sober in his style; in a word, he was a perfect Attic. The audience made the orator. The Areopagus acquitted a courtesan who was accused of impiety because she was beautiful. The Athenian people likewise were indulgent toward Æschines, the friend of Philip, because he was eloquent and handsome. In order to be master of such a city, and to exercise Pericles' undisputed ascendancy over it, Demosthenes had to derive his power from the union of the practical eloquence of former ages with the polished eloquence which his contemporaries exacted. His attainments had to be such that it would be said of him, "The Graces reposed on his lips; when he opposed the will of the Athenians, when his voice, animated by his country's interests, assumed the severe tone of reprimand, it had to render agreeable and popular the censures which it hurled at men who enjoyed the favor of the people." * If Demosthenes as an orator of the state had to be artistic on the rostrum, he certainly should have the privilege of being artistic when writing his orations in his cabinet. There he no longer addressed the men of Athens; he pleaded in a manner his cause before posterity. He meant to subjugate us also by his sound reasoning, his elevated sentiments, and his perfect language. If he has treated us as Athenians, let us not complain of it.

We have praised Demosthenes' brevity and his disdain for all that was merely ornamental. This eulogy applies without restriction to the *Philippics* and to the harangues, which are exclusively political and full of action. His other orations sometimes contain specimens of pure charms, which alone afford us pleasure in reading them, and dissuade us from pronouncing

* *De Oratore*, iii, 34.

them tedious works. Papyrus is patient; the Athenian judge who did not share with Philocleon the Aristophanic privilege of eating his soup before the audience was, perhaps, not always so patient, and yet the Greek mind was generally indulgent toward orations delivered for the sole object of pleasing. Tragedy sometimes permitted them. Such were the long geographical sketches in Æschylus' *Prometheus* and the detailed description of the Pythian games in Sophocles' *Electra*, a picture sufficiently interesting, according to the taste of the Athenians, to make them pardon an anachronism. The recital of Hippolytus' death, for which Fénelon reproached Racine, would certainly have found mercy before the Athenians. Even in civil speeches, where the clepsydra measured the time, Attic sobriety was not always averse to agreeable amplifications. Demosthenes, in his oration *Against Neæra*, went back even to Theseus in order to prove citizenship at Athens by history,—a digression undoubtedly well received by the audience, but not indispensable to the debate. The speech *Against Lacritus* contains an enumeration of the Athenian tribunals and their respective attributes, which is instructive to us but useless to the case. Did the dicasts find particular pleasure in an enumeration of the complicated cases for which they used to go and receive their three oboles? We are tempted to believe it when we see Demosthenes renovating and displaying his judicial knowledge in the speech *Against Androtion*, and Hyperides adorning the exordium of his oration *For Euxennipus*.* Demosthenes' speech *On the*

* Demosthenes (*Against Aristocrates*) opportunely recalls the six criminal procedures disregarded by Aristocrates' decree. This enumeration, remarkable in several respects, is here a powerful argument.

Embassy contains two splendid digressions, worthy of the orator's gravity, but they are none the less digressions (*purpureus pannus*). The first is the description of the contagious plague which destroyed all Greece, a description so justly admired by Pliny the Younger;* the second is a thrilling recapitulation of Philip's invasions,—an eloquent page of political history, but foreign to the demonstration of Æschines' culpability.

Aristotle has clearly described the different conditions of the tribune and bar in this respect: "Deliberative oratory does not admit the digressions which are received at the bar, where the orator can inveigh against his adversary, speak of himself, and arouse the people's passions. Deliberative oratory opens up a field to malice less vast than judicial oratory. In fact, deliberative discussions appeal to the interests of the people. Here the hearer is judge in his own cause, and the orator ought to be satisfied with showing that what he supports is truly such as he describes it to be. At the bar this is not sufficient. It is very useful to engross the hearer's mind. In fact, when the interests of another are at stake, the judges only seek their own satisfaction, listen for their pleasure, accord all to the orator, and forget their duty as judges. Thus in several places the law forbade the orator to enter upon digressions which were foreign to the subject. But in the public assemblies those who deliberated on state affairs greatly observed this rule."† Those speeches of Demosthenes which are both political and judicial possess qualities natural to the eloquence of the tribune and that of the bar. The orator, who was both an advocate and counsellor of the people, here gives free

* *Letters*, ix, 26.

† *Rhetoric*, iii, 17, i, 1.

scope to his powers, and realizes, by virtue of the variety of his means, the ideal eloquence, a triumph which, according to Cicero, was reserved for judicial causes, and especially for works in which the two kinds of eloquence united their resources and peculiar beauties.*

When Demosthenes revised his orations he suppressed all proofs, the letters, treatises, law-texts, decrees or projects of decrees, and testimonies. Some of these documents, which were very often necessary for the cause, and sometimes almost useless, served to give the orator and the judges relief. "These facts are well known to you," said Lycias in the speech *Against Eratosthenes*, "and I do not see the necessity of producing witnesses. However, I will do it; for I need rest myself, and several among you will be pleased to hear as much testimony as possible on the same subject." The tribunal was not only refreshed, but charmed, when the testimonies were from the poets, such as Solon, Homer, Hesiod and Euripides. The author has carefully reproduced these testimonies, to the great satisfaction of the reader. He suppressed the others. The latter might have given some respite to the audience, inasmuch as they would cause a short suspension of close attention, since they were insipid.

* Demosthenes' orations, with the exception of his speeches, which are purely civil, may be divided into three classes: First, orations which are at the same time civil and political, and composed for others (*Against Androtion*, *Timocrates*, *Aristocrates*). Here the orator does not speak in his own behalf, and does not appear in the contest. Second, orations in which he defends his own interests, and which belong both to the deliberative and judicial classes (*In Midiam*, *Embassy*, *Pro Corona*). Third, harangues before the people, in which Demosthenes exclusively performed political work, and spoke as a responsible counsellor.

Demosthenes did not give them to the reader; he left them in the *echinos* (lawyer's satchel), as literary rubbish.* Many of the official pieces transcribed in the oration *On the Crown* are spurious. One orator has preserved some of them, which are manifestly authentic: the decree of the Byzantians, that of the Chersonesians, and Demosthenes' decree. The first two, proofs of the acknowledgment of the people whom Athens had saved were too honorable to the minister of Athens to frustrate his apology. The third is a pathetic speech delivered before the Thebans against Philip. In it we can easily trace the orator's hand and soul. Certain civil speeches have the advantage over political harangues of not being deprived of their supplementary proofs. Thus the orations *Against Neera* and *Against Lacritus* have come down to us in their complete form. Such has been the will and caprice of the copyist or of the times, which destroyed or preserved them blindly. Destiny, with its inequalities and injustices, extends its empire even over writings: *habent sua fata libelli*. We do not speak of certain convincing pieces which were of a special and fragile nature, and unworthy of being preserved, for example the *nose* which a poor devil of Tanagra left under the tooth of his enemy, Aristogiton.

Titus Livius recapitulates the decrees of the senate, even the most important, in place of transcribing them; for example, that of the Bacchanals. In the last edition Demosthenes generally omitted technical documents in which there was no oratorical display. Crassus wrote but little (*Brutus*, 44), and even his written

* Thus we have only the titles of Chabrias' services; of the bills drawn up against Midias; of the administrative documents (military and financial) of the *Third Philippic*; of the financial plan of the *First*.

orations do not contain all that he said at the tribune. He sometimes deemed it sufficient to indicate certain points without treating them thoroughly. Such appeared like headings of chapters, or at the most brief summaries. The Roman orator disdained the glory of a writer. Not caring to transmit the beauties of form, he was particular to represent clearly the essential groundwork. A different sentiment guided Demosthenes in his selections. He sacrificed the unworthy portions which could not be treated in an elegant manner.

Quæ desperat tractata nitescere posse, relinquit.

Documents whose loss is obvious to modern readers had little value in his eyes. He seemed to fear that posterity would not be interested in certain particular topics; he wished to transmit to posterity orations embellished with such developments as would earn admiration in all countries and at all times.

III. Hence the suppression of a thousand local or temporary circumstances, which were undoubtedly present to the mind of his hearers, but which are passed over in silence with the reader. To these details Demosthenes expressly preferred political, administrative, moral theses, in which eloquence was displayed with all its advantages, and this to the great displeasure of modern criticism. Why is it so difficult to assign exact dates to the *Olynthiacs*?* It is because they do not contain sufficient precise indications of the circumstances which preceded or called forth the orator's speech. It would be easy to assign De-

* Dionysius of Halicarnassus gave the *Olynthiacs* in an order contrary to that of the manuscripts and of the most ancient commentators.

mosthenes' works to their proper time and events if history were found repeated in them from day to day. These details would throw light on his harangues for us, as the frame of the historical narrative throws light on those of Thucydides. But Demosthenes did not write for critics or historians of the future, but for the learned.

Attic eloquence did not dislike commonplace things, taking this word in its highest acceptation. It willingly effaced the realities of the moment that it might elevate the oration to considerations which were superior to actual events. Thus the sculptor effaced the personal traits of the victor in the games in order to substitute for it an anonymous and impersonal beauty, but its effect was sure and universal. There is in Demosthenes' eloquence a trace of philosophical spirit which is attached less to those particular accidents which are modified to infinity and pass away than to the general and immutable element. The author of the *Antidosis* eulogized general developments and successfully applied his talent to them. By this means, but by this means only, he justified the complacent praise which Socrates gives him in the *Phædrus*: "In this young man there is philosophy." To this spirit of generalization are attached political or moral theories, recitals of principles, oratorical definitions, and portraits (the true democrat, the faithful ambassador, the sycophant, etc.), which are diffused in the works of masters of oratory. Their style was indebted to that manner of majestic gravity which, even at the time when the tribune was most exciting and militant, recalled the union of the milder eloquence of former ages with moral philosophy. Themistocles' harangue

on the Greek fleet of Salamis ruled over all opposition.*

The Athenian people, frivolous and ideal as a poet, were also very capable of abstract meditation. Their philosophers, Plato, even Aristotle, whose eloquence Cicero compares to a golden stream (*flumen aureum orationis*), were consummate orators; their orators likewise were fond of philosophical considerations. The first speech against Aristogiton presents a remarkable proof of it. Lysurgus, says Ariston's defender, has already treated the cause profoundly. "As to me, I wish to entertain you with thoughts which will direct all deliberation on state interests and laws. Permit me, Athenians, in the name of Jupiter, permit me to use here that method which is natural to me and has my preference. I could practice no other." And immediately he enters upon general reflections, morals, laws and public order. "I will say nothing new nor striking, nothing special nor original (*ῥέτωρ*), but that which you all know as well as myself." No man can announce the commonplace things which follow this declaration in a more determined manner. The orator interrupts them a moment in order to make valid certain proofs which escaped from Lysurgus. But he quickly returns to his accustomed manner. He bows before Adrastia and Nemesis; he recalls the universality of religious sentiment. "All nations have erected shrines to Justice, to Law, to Modesty. Although an honest man's heart may be the most beautiful and most saintly sanctuary, those which his hand has raised are not less worthy of veneration. But what sacrifices were ever offered to Impudence, to Perjury, to Ingratitude,—vices which dwelt in Aristogiton's heart?" Later he traces *à priori*

* Herodotus, viii, 83.

the picture of this public snarler's partisan; and at the close, in a pathetic appeal, he asks the judges with what conscience they will ever dare prostrate themselves before Cybele, if, false to their oaths, they violate the laws intrusted to their defense.

It is unnecessary to mark clearly in what sense and in what measure Demosthenes favored general developments; even in these specimens he remains himself, that is to say, sober and rigorous. "Persons of no instruction persuade the multitude more easily than the learned. In fact, they have recourse to commonplace things, to general considerations; the learned to things which they know, and which pertain to the subject."* In this respect Demosthenes' eloquence is both learned and popular. Always and everywhere he confines himself closely to his subject and remains a precise logician. Nevertheless, if he is not one of the school of Buffon, who seeks general terms as the most noble, he admires general themes as the best adapted to eloquence. Thus, having selected a theme, Demosthenes develops its thoughts with sound reasoning and not phrases, by producing arguments and facts. These developments are entirely different from commonplace things or abstract conceptions, without direct application or supplementary proofs; but with all that, they are of such a character that he could repeat them almost indifferently every time he mounted the rostrum.†

* Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, ii, 22.

† Here are some of them: It is the orator's duty to give the best counsels, yours to follow them. Equity is the only solid foundation of the undertakings of men. If you wish to fight the public enemy successfully, at first chastise your domestic enemies, the traitors. Venality is the never-dying worm of Greece. If Athens does not save the people who are attacked by Philip, there will come a day when she cannot save herself. Defiance is the surest rampart of free

The situation, on the whole, always remains the same; the orator's objective also remains the same; and consequently his eloquence, rich and various in its means, is uniform in the common basis of ideas and sentiments. Demosthenes' political orations, especially the *Olynthiacs* and *Philippics*, do not reflect, like the orations of our modern assemblies, the various incidents of the political life of each day. They all have a familiar air; they are all born of necessities and of the same spirit.

These reflections on general developments are especially applicable to the orations of Demosthenes, which belong to the purely deliberative class; in those which belong in some degree to the judicial class, the orator, without hesitation, enters upon arduous discussions of facts and dates. From minute details he draws indications or proofs with the marvelous sagacity of his civil speeches, in which he finds it necessary at every moment to offer comments on the laws. Thus the oration *On the Embassy*, notably in the first part, is a concise controversy in which Demosthenes seizes his adversary hand and foot, and binds him in all manners. If he retreats, he follows him step by step; if he advances, he incloses him in iron bands, without permitting him to escape from them. He constantly holds him at the sword's point, and baffles all his disguises and efforts to disengage himself. Æschines is a Proteus; but Demosthenes

states. Philip is the aggressor,—to fight him is to defend ourselves. Philip hates and distrusts our republic; his sole aim is to destroy it. Do not depend on another, nor on the gods, if you do not aid yourselves. Athens has always been more careful of her honor than of her money. At all times she has preferred the rights of the Hellenes to her own advantages. She ought to be inspired by the unanimity of her ancestors.

knows how to entangle him so cunningly in his strong and inflexible meshes of argument, that he cannot escape him. If he does not succumb under his adversary's blows, he at least receives them all; he withdraws from the contest defeated, if not prostrated.*

In the second part of the harangue, general themes find place,—it is because the oration *On the Embassy* belongs to both the tribune and the bar. Likewise, the oration *On the Chersonesus* contains a debate which relates to Diopithes, and considerations on general politics. Only one of Demosthenes' exclusively political harangues is really technical,—the *Oration on the Navy Boards*. The author has taken care to show this peculiarity of his work: “As for me, Athenians, imbued with these reflections and other similar ones, I have not employed boasting expressions, nor useless and long orations; but your preparations, their best form, their greatest haste,—such is the difficult subject which I have taken the pains to investigate.” Demosthenes pursued this course so much more willingly because he could not permit this rigid oration to face the tribune. Our political orator of thirty-one years would undoubtedly have needed an authority in which he was wanting, even after his success against Leptines, to make this dry work agreeable to an audience of amateurs. We doubt, with the wise critics, that the *Oration on the Navy Boards* was ever delivered.

* He reminds us of Entellus, who makes blows fall like hail-stones on Dares.

Nec mora, nec requies, quam multa grandine nimbi
Culminibus crepitant, sic densis ictibus heros
Creber utraque manu pulsat versatque Dareta. (*Æneid*, 7, 458.)

Judicial oratory dwells on the past, deliberative on the future. The deliberative is, therefore, the more difficult; but it is, in turn, the more beautiful,* for it is nourished with the noblest material. Eloquence is free from the miseries and petty passions of every-day life. Besides the interests and safety of private individuals, it watches the interests and safety of the commonwealth. It does not stop to torture a law text which may be left a prey to eternal chicanery. Like the Roman pretor, it does not oversee trifling things. It is occupied with public duty, political and social justice, national honor, and the human and divine laws which are the unchangeable interpreters of the conscience of all times. Demosthenes' soul was adequate to these sublime objects, and his eloquence equaled them without an effort. This preëminent dignity was due to the orator's taste for general developments, and to the superior talent with which he gave finished expression to the conception and sentiment of what was true and beautiful.

* Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, i, 1; iii, 17.

CHAPTER VI.

ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DEMOSTHENES' ELOQUENCE.

(CONTINUED.)

THE spirit and life of Demosthenes' eloquence was born, in a great degree, from the nature of his reasoning. He employed no long, logical deductions, but a series of striking observations, recollections, examples, and convincing pictures. Demosthenes often proved without reasoning. He spoke and painted the truth. He repeatedly impressed the hearer with it. He urged him, hurried him, compelled him to march with him. His power was invincible. Compelled to yield to the evidence, the Athenian could cry out, as did Marshal Gramont at the foot of Bourdaloue's chair, "By heavens, he is right!"

His motto was, Not words, but deeds (*ὅν λόγος, ἀλλ' ἔργον.*) You lost your opportunity at Heræa, Athenians; do not lose it again at Olynthus. See the mistakes which caused you to lose Amphipolis; avoid falling into them again. Philip protests with his pacific designs. Consider the plan of his usurpations which he has perfidiously followed, and which Demosthenes now unrolls before the eyes of the assembly. Apology and parable are suitable to orations delivered before the multitude, and it is easier to invent them to please the people than to draw examples from history. "But examples have more weight in deliberations; for the future generally bears a great resemblance to the

past.”* Demosthenes had too rich a provision of examples at command to have recourse to fable, and the vivacity of his arguments further aided the natural force of the lessons which he drew from the past. “It is folly and cowardice, in the presence of such examples, to constantly recoil before duty, * * * to imagine, on the faith of the enemy’s orators, that Athens, by her grandeur, is out of all danger. How shameful to say in the future, after the event: *But, just gods! who could have expected it? We should have done this, not that.*” All nations that have perished could to-day make many such tardy reflections. “But what doth it avail them now? While the vessel is safe, whether it be great or small, the mariner, the pilot, every person, should exert himself in his particular station, and preserve it from being wrecked, either by villainy or unskillfulness. But when the sea hath once broken in, all care is vain.”† For Demosthenes’ history is literally “the torch of truth,” the “mistress of life.” (*De Oratore*, ii, 9). His maxim was that “past events ought to always be present to the minds of the wise.” His conduct conformed to this precept: “Observing affairs from their beginning, foreseeing their results, announcing them to the people, is what I have done.” An eloquence thus furnished with coherent reflections, and recollections must be rich in demonstrations from facts. It was not Demosthenes who convinced and put the Athenians to the blush; it was the reality he drew before their eyes. Zeno compared eloquence to the open hand, dialectics to the clinched fist. Demosthenes’ eloquent dialectics united the advantages of both processes. He developed truth with

* Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, ii, 20.

Third Philippic, § 67 et seq.

irresistible éclat; and he dealt blows on the contradictor from which he could not recover.

Demosthenes, as a political orator, owed much to the logographer. From Isæus, his master, he learned to cut down his long sentences, to chasten his style, and to soften its harshness. He especially accustomed himself to dialectics in the midst of the arduous discussions of cases which bristled with as many thorns as a *hedgohog*, and which contained tedious arguments. Demosthenes would not have been so powerful against Philip if the gymnastics at the bar had not developed his language and mind. Traces of these strengthening studies are found in the orator's art to seek the reason of things and the motives of actions. "Reflect for a moment, Athenians. You have often made war on democracies and oligarchies; you know it as well as I do. But the motives which armed you in both cases none among you, perhaps, inquired into. What are these motives?" And the orator indicates them with sagacity. He likewise excels in analyzing the human mind: if he wishes to exculpate himself from the diverse sentiments to which his enemies might attribute his action against Æschines, he reviews all the suppositions of malevolence, and shows their vanity like a skillful logician. He explores the soul of the Macedonian king, and discovers his most secret calculations with a perspicuity which was sharpened for these divinations by his exercise in detecting the true motives of Philip's orators, who practiced deceit and falsehood. Thus his practice at the bar developed the penetration of a genius which was naturally observing.

One of Demosthenes' most powerful forms of argument was the dilemma. We do not see how Æschines could have answered this:

“Now, consider in your minds how convincing the proof of his guilt will be. I presume that Æschines, the defendant, must have addressed those speeches to you,—those about the Phocions and Thespiæ and Eubœa (supposing he was not, from a corrupt motive, intentionally playing false),—from one of two causes: either because he had heard Philip expressly promise to effect and do the things in question, or else because he was charmed and beguiled by Philip’s general liberality, and therefore expected those things from him also. There is no other alternative. Now, in either of these cases he ought, beyond all other men, to detest Philip. Why? Because, so far as it depended on Philip, he has suffered the utmost indignity and disgrace. He has deceived you; he has become infamous; he is judged to be a lost man, if he had his deserts. Had due proceedings been taken he would have been impeached long ago; but now, through your simplicity and good nature, he attends his audit and chooses his time for it. Is there one of you who has heard the voice of Æschines accusing Philip?—who has seen him pressing any charge or speaking to the point? No one. Every Athenian is more ready to accuse Philip,—any, indeed, that you like,—though none of them has assuredly sustained personal injury. I should have expected language like this from him if he had not sold himself: ‘Men of Athens, deal with me as you please. I believed. I was deluded. I was in error. I confess it. But beware of the man, O Athenians! He is not to be trusted. He is a juggler, a villain. See you not how he has treated me?—how he has cajoled me?’ I hear no language of this kind, nor do you. Why? Because he was not cajoled nor deceived, but had hired himself and taken money when he made those statements and betrayed you to Philip, and has been a good, true and faithful hireling to him, but a traitorous ambassador and citizen to you, deserving to perish not once, but three times over.”*

* *Embassy*, 102 et seq.

Where can we find a closer alliance of logic and passion?

Without having a prompt imagination on the rostrum, Demosthenes sometimes found happy replies. Pytheas once told him that all his arguments smelled of the lamp. Demosthenes retorted sharply upon him, "Yes, indeed; but your lamp and mine, my friend, are not conscious of the same labors." This same Pytheas was dissuading his fellow citizens from uniting themselves with the Athenians: "As some sickness is always supposed to be in the house into which asses' milk is brought, so the city which an Athenian embassy ever enters must necessarily be in a sick and decaying condition." Demosthenes turned the comparison against him by saying: "As asses' milk never enters but for curing the sick, so the Athenians never appear but for remedying some disorder." Æschines reproached him for his excessive movements on the rostrum. "It is not for the orator, Æschines, but for the Ambassador, to hold his hand under his cloak."

Demosthenes' formal refutations had a vigor at least equal to the sallies of his replies. Here is a specimen in which both logic and sense are united: "I know, indeed, that Æschines will avoid all discussion of the charges against him; that, seeking to withdraw you as far as possible from the facts, he will rehearse what mighty blessings accrue to mankind from peace, and, on the other hand, what evils from war; in short, he will pronounce a panegyric on peace, and take up that line of defense. Yet even these are so many arguments to convict him. For if the cause of blessings to others has been the cause of so many troubles and such confusion to us, what

else can one suppose, but that by taking bribes these men have spoiled a thing in its own nature excellent? Oh, but—he may say, perhaps,—have you not preserved, and won't you preserve through the peace, three hundred galleys, with stores for them and money? In regard to this you must understand that Philip's resources likewise have been largely augmented through the peace, in supplies of arms, in territory, in revenues, of which he has gained an abundance. * * * But that establishment of power and alliances, through which people hold their good things either for themselves or their superiors,—ours has been sold by these men, and gone to ruin and decay; his hath become formidable and mightier by far. It is not just that Philip, through these men, should have augmented both his alliances and his revenues, while what Athens must naturally have gained by the peace they set off against what was sold by themselves. The one has not come to us in exchange for the other,—very far from it: one we should equally have had, and the other in addition but for these men. Moreover, has Æschines the right to declare himself the author of the peace?

“What I am about to say is strange, yet perfectly true: if any one is really glad of the peace, let him thank the generals for it, whom all accuse. Had they carried on the war as you desired, the very name of peace would have been intolerable to you. Peace, therefore, is owing to them: perilous and unstable and insecure has it become through these men having taken bribes. Bar him, bar him, then, from any argument in favor of peace, and put him to his defense for what he has done.” *

* *Embassy*, §§ 88, 96.

The comparative study of the orations of Demosthenes and Æschines at first suggests one remark,—the identity of their means. Their arms seem to have been chosen exactly equal, as if for a duel. The two orators draw powerful effects from the decrees which they place in contrast. They eulogize Solon and their ancestors. They speak with the same respect of the majesty of the laws and the guardians of the city. Both declare their sincerity, their disinterested devotion to the commonwealth, and they censure the Athenians for their indulgence toward flattering demagogues. If they recommend themselves by the same oratorical manners, they blacken the character of their enemy with the same stains. Æschines and Demosthenes had souls that were covetous and ridiculously vain. They attached a higher price to the specious beauty of their orations than to truth; to an ephemeral success on the rostrum than to the safety of the state. Æschines was at first the enemy, then the hireling, of Philip. Demosthenes, at first the accomplice of Philocrates, subsequently became his accuser. They incessantly changed their politics, faithful only to the unchangeable inspiration of their own interests. They invoked the same examples,—that of Arthmius of Zelea. They reproached each other for complicity with the enemy, by the intermedium of the spy, Anaxinus, or of Aristion, Demosthenes' young friend. Demosthenes alone has ruined all. He was damned. Æschines alone has lost all. He was the chief of the traitors. Demosthenes falsified concerning the woman of Olynthus. His entire harangue is therefore a falsehood. Æschines attacked Ctesiphon in place of provoking Demosthenes face to face. The whole groundwork of his accusation is therefore as contrary to justice

as it is to truth. The two adversaries pursue the same tone in a docile manner. "As to his tears, his wailing voice, when he will cry out: *Where am I to flee, Athenians? exiled from Athens, I no longer have an asylum*; answer him: Ah, Demosthenes, where will the Athenians fly? where will they find money and allies? what resources has your ministry assured the republic?" "This culpable deputy will weep over himself. He will perhaps present his little children. He will show them before the rostrum. With the children of this man, judges, compare in your minds the children of so many allies and friends, dispersed, wandering and miserable, afflicted with cruel evils on account of him, and much more worthy of compassion than the sons of so criminal a father and of so treacherous a traitor. Think of your own children, and of their descendants, from whom Philocrates and Æschines (allusion to the *perpetual* peace) have taken away all hopes." The orations *On the Crown* and *On the Embassy* might have been written in juxtaposition, since Æschines would wish to see the ancient and the new decrees compared. Their constant affinities, their exact parallelism, is striking. The two antagonists attacked each other like two powerful athletes of equal size. Every member of their bodies was developed and peculiarly fitted to cope with the antagonist: *hæret pede pes, densusque viro vir*.

These similarities depend upon two principal causes: the orations of the two rivals were revised with care, after the debates, so that no weak points were left uncovered, no advantages unseen; they were adjusted to each other during leisure hours. Furthermore, at the bar and on the rostrum of Athens, certain arguments or oratorical proceedings were employed out

of respect for tradition. The orator did not, perhaps, draw great and powerful effects from them, but if he disregarded them, he ran the risk of appearing too confident in his own ability and disdainful toward sacred custom,—a neglect doubly dangerous before a sensitive and formal audience. For more than a century (1635–1755), until Duclos, the prizes decreed by the French Academy for the finest eloquence drew their subjects from ethics and moral philosophy. Long after him, the orations on reception followed a certain outline which had been traced beforehand (as was that of the funeral orations at Athens), and the only thing to relieve the monotony was the talent of the new member. The tyranny of usage was likewise imposed on Attic eloquence. Without speaking of the uniform developments which the uniformity of situations produced, the orators of the Pnyx or the logographers sometimes willingly bound themselves to *socomes* which were not necessary, but decorous. They prayed the judges to defend themselves from the instances of solicitors, to rigidly confine the orator to the subject; they contrasted the wise parsimony of recompenses in former times with the indiscreet prodigality of the present time; the severity of their ancestors with the indifference of their descendants. Themistocles was banished; Cimon condemned to pay a fine of fifty talents. To-day, when our public enemies are convicted, they are acquitted for twenty-five drachmas.

The occasion can justify these and other similar commonplace remarks; but there are some to which this excuse is injurious. Thus bold pleaders, in order to impose upon the tribunal of judges and readers, offer to yield the floor to their adversary. “Let him speak

of my water-drinking, I consent to it." They launch bold challenges (*πρόκλησις*) on paper, assured that they will not be taken at their word. "He asserts that the delegates of Greece were then among you. * * * Well, then, Demosthenes, mount this platform. I yield it to you. * * * If you can prove that their presentation to the council, and the decrees are of the date which you assign to them, I will descend and condemn myself to death." These challenges are simple modes of speaking, so much so that sometimes the author of the interpolation immediately passes on and continues to address the audience without awaiting, even for the sake of form, his adversary's response. They administer the torture with as much ease as the simple oath. "We therefore produce our slaves and deliver them to the question; I will interrupt myself if the accuser consents to it; the executioner will come immediately and put them to the torture before you if you order it." The opposing party does not answer, as it is supposed, and the orator triumphs. "Then Demosthenes refuses my challenge, does not accept the testimony of slaves when put to the torture, and takes Philip's letter." In reading the Attic orators we would suspect the Athenians of enjoying the spectacle of torture as naturally as Perrin Dandin; and yet, the humane city of Minerva never saw this incident produced before an audience.

Among the conventional proceedings of Greek eloquence there are some very striking peculiarities. Respect for the letter of the law has been able to dictate to a council of war this sentence: The accused is condemned, first to death; second to a fine of one dollar (the assessment for the offense of public drunkenness). The Attics generally at first demanded the punishment of their adversary, but they did not long maintain this

rigor; they retreated very gracefully, and were satisfied with a fine. “Those Athenians who wish to rid themselves of Aristogiton, whose crime against the law is evident and manifest, have only one thing to do,—to condemn him to death, or at least to such a fine that he cannot pay it during his life.” (Aristogiton did not atone for the crimes of which he was convicted, either with his head or purse; later he had still to escape from the teeth of another “dog of the people,” Dinarchus.)

The accuser rarely forgot to ask the court to refuse the criminal permission to speak. Æschines did not disregard this established custom. Permitting Demosthenes to exculpate himself before the judges is authorizing him to involve them in perjury. Let Ctesiphon himself establish harmony between his decree and the laws if he can, and the cause will be judged. If the decree is found to be illegal, Demosthenes can speak in the special pleading, which relates to the fixing of punishment. Laharpe was indignant at this “revolting” pretension of Æschines. He would have been more inspired not to take it so seriously. The Greeks, no doubt, had not the high respect and idea of justice and law which exist among modern men; and even reduced to its true work, this custom of barring the defender from the right of speech bears a strong contrast to the institution of our official advocates. Nevertheless, the Athenians were not unprovided with moral or common sense to such a degree that they saw in it anything but an instigation, which was sanctified and almost imposed by hatred. Hyperides said to Polyenctes, the accuser of Euxenippus: You do not wish that any one should assist and give him the support of his words. On the contrary, you advise the judges not to listen to those who will mount

this rostrum in his behalf; and nevertheless in our city, among so many excellent institutions, is there anything more beautiful, more conformative to democracy, than to behold, in the presence of judicial dangers which threaten an accused man who is unable to defend himself, a well wishing citizen using his right and departing from the crowd,—advancing and coming to his aid,—to acquaint the judges with the truth of the case? Polyeuctes' pretension, contrary to justice, would likewise have been so to the reality of practice. Polyeuctes himself, besides other Athenians who were called to his assistance before the court, had recourse to ten orators in his suit. Demosthenes likewise shows us “all orators” under arms for their rich client Midias. The venerable traditions and proceedings of Greek eloquence made each of the two orations *On the Crown* the counterpart of the other. Never did harangues resemble each other more in exterior forms, never were harangues more dissimilar. The two bodies are almost equal, but as to soul and heart, what a profound difference!

The form of Demosthenes' oration is often dramatic. Now it is a dialogue between the hearer and himself, or between the Athenians, or between the Athenians and Philip; now it is a monologue of the king reflecting on the surest means of accomplishing his projects in all security. Demosthenes moderately uses the apostrophe, the *grape-shot of eloquence*, according to P. L. Courier, but always with fitness and energy.

“Some of our orators, I observe, take not the same thought for you as for themselves. They say that you should keep quiet, though you are injured; but they cannot themselves keep quiet among you, though no one injures them. Come, raillery apart, suppose you were thus questioned, Aristode-

mus: 'Tell me, as you know perfectly well, what every one else knows, that the life of private men is secure and free from trouble and danger, while that of statesmen is exposed to scandal and misfortune, full of daily trials and hardships, how comes it that you prefer, not the quiet and easy life, but the one surrounded with peril?' What should you say? If we admitted the truth of what would be your best possible answer, namely, that all you do is for honor and renown, I wonder what puts it into your head that you ought, from such motives, to exert yourself and undergo toil and danger, while you advise the state to give up exertion and remain idle. You cannot, surely, allege that Aristodemus ought to be of importance at Athens, and Athens to be of no account among the Greeks. Nor again do I see, that for the commonwealth it is safe to mind her own affairs only, and hazardous for you not to be a superlative busybody. On the contrary, to you I see the utmost peril from your meddling and overmeddling; to the commonwealth, peril from her inactivity. But I suppose you inherit a reputation from your father and grandfather which it were disgraceful in your own person to extinguish, whereas the ancestry of the state was ignoble and mean. This, again, is not so. Your father was a thief if he resembled you, whereas by the ancestors of the commonwealth, as all men know, the Greeks have twice been rescued from the brink of destruction. Truly the behavior of some persons, in private and in public, is neither equitable nor constitutional. How is it equitable that certain of these men returned from prison should not know themselves, while the state that once protected all Greece, and held the foremost place, is sunk in ignominy and humiliation?"*

The scenes in the Agora and Pnyx present in Demosthenes lively pictures. Scarcely has the lot designated the judges when intrigue besieges them. The question is, which of the two parties can best show

* *Fourth Philippic*, 70.

contempt for the law. They are like two armies drawn up in battle array (*παράταξις*), and emulating each other in factious zeal (*παραγγελία*) to charm the conscience of the heliasts. The tribune is no calmer. Demosthenes has just mounted it. Posted near him, one on the right, the other on the left, Æschines and Philocrates cry out, interrupt and torment the orator with sarcasm. "Great wonder, Athenians, that Demosthenes and myself are not of the same opinion: he drinks water and I wine!" and the Athenians laugh. After Philocrates' impertinence, Æschines exhibits his by addressing the assembly. Compelled by outcries to descend from the tribune: "Among so many criers, how few would be willing to fight, if it were necessary." Aristogiton had no equal in shouting the cry of war at the Agora. One day the citizens were being enrolled; our warrior crawls to the assembly leaning on a crutch, and his leg bandaged. Phocion, who was presiding, seeing him from afar, cried out: "Clerk, write down Aristogiton, lame and cowardly." Aristogitons were numerous at Athens. They revenged themselves for their cowardice in the innocent struggles of the public place during the session. "If they appear in the assembly, their arms are vociferations, audacity, calumnious imputations, invectives of sycophants, impudent gestures, and other similar practices. Nothing, in my opinion, is more contrary to deliberations, more dishonorable to Athens. By these scandalous excesses they triumph over our wisest regulations; they make a jest of the laws, of presidents, and of all conveniences." Such are the madmen, the wild beasts (*τὰ τοιαῦτα θηρία*) who encumber the tribune to-day." This dissoluteness of the *ecclesia*, exaggerated, no doubt, by the orators

when it was their turn to suffer from it, had perhaps become a custom; and custom modifies everything. Such small disorder, when passed into the custom, loses much of its malignity. This is credible, since the storms of the Attic swarm were inoffensive and easy to calm, like the great conflicts of the bees in Virgil:

Pulveris exigui jactu compressa quiescent.

In the Council of the Five Hundred (this testimony is borrowed from the same painter of the parliamentary violences at Athens) a weak grate kept off the public and made them respect the secret of deliberations. The Areopagus was seated in the royal portico and surrounded by a mere rope, which kept off the troublesome and insured tranquillity. As soon as the clerk cried out *Retire*, all the magistrates, appointed by lot, consulted in peace, under the protection of the laws, without fearing the insults of the most violent. These and a thousand other equally noble rules afforded respect and surety to the state. Perhaps the day will come when a mere rope will with us be a sufficient barrier in a similar case; but even up to this time French petulance could learn lessons of respectful discretion from Athenian democracy, which is termed so undisciplined.

Demosthenes was nurtured in the school of Thucydides, and in imitating this orator as his master he surpassed him. Bossuet confessed that he read little of Demosthenes. "The study is too difficult for those who are occupied with other thoughts." In fact, substantial and concise, he gives us much to meditate on. He charms the reader and demands all his attention, but his profundity remains luminous. His orations are concentrated and limpid. Sometimes reasoning

suffocates passion in the austere historian. His strong logical conceptions are addressed to the intelligence rather than to real hearers. Demosthenes often allows the general idea to mingle with the impression of actual reality. The words *reason, consider, reflect*, are found in him every moment. He wrote his harangues for the Athenians and for the thinkers of the future; but their augmentation is always allied to an intense passion with direct effect. Besides facts which speak and “cry out” (ἀντὰ Βοᾶ) themselves, we find in them warm exhortations, which constitute their charming conclusions. Emotion and demonstration, reason and passion,—such is his eloquence.

II. The law of the tribunals forbade the pathetic at Athens, a striking indication of the extreme sensibility of the Hellenes. Æneas was reproached for weeping more profusely than was becoming to the founder of an empire. The heroes of Homer, tender and ferocious in their turn, were not less prompt to be satiated with tears (γούτο τέρπεσθαι). According to Herodotus (vi, 21), the Athenians fined the poet Phrynichus for making them weep in the theater over *The Capture of Miletus*, and they prohibited by a decree the representation of the drama because it awakened the memory of domestic misfortunes. On the tribunal the orator was forbidden to move the people by relating the misfortunes of another; but here also customs were more powerful than laws. The accuser employed the least justifiable resources of art and hatred to prejudice the judges against his adversary. It would have been rigorous to deprive the accused of the natural right of petition. “If I had to prosecute Midias for an illegal motion,—for being an unfaithful ambas-

sador or some other similar crime,—I would not think myself obliged to address you with prayers, persuaded then that the part of the accuser was to furnish proofs, that of the accused to use supplications. But * * * since I have been struck, outraged as no choregus was ever outraged before, * * * I will not hesitate to implore you, for, if I may be allowed to say it, I am the accused, since a want of judicial satisfaction makes an intense prejudice press upon an insulted citizen."

Custom tolerated the use of the pathetic in orations, and especially permitted the accused to assist his defender's eloquence by affecting the judges with his tears. Demosthenes feared the effect which Midias' lamentations might produce upon them. "What then remains? Ah! by Jupiter! compassion. For Midias will present his young children. He will shed tears. He will supplicate you to pardon him for their sake. This is his last resource. But (you are not ignorant of it) piety is due to the innocent victim of intolerable severity, not to the culprit who is justly punished. Who could have pity on the children of Midias, when he has not had pity on the children of Straton?" Farther on the orator redoubled his efforts, so much did he wish to prevent the emotion of the court. "He will come, I know, to lament with his children. He will express the most humble declarations. He will weep. He will make himself as miserable as possible. * * * I have no children myself, and I could not, by producing them here, bewail and weep over the outrages which I have received. It is therefore rational to treat the victim less favorably than the prosecutor?"*

The poet of the *Wasps* has not forgotten this trait of customs in the lawsuit of the dog Labes. (Cf. Racine, *Plaideurs*, iii, 3.)

The impression of pity was much more powerful when the orator was accused himself, and united his pathetic pleading to the spectacle of his family in tears. So Æschines presented his whole family on the rostrum in his oration *On the Embassy*. Sometimes the advocate, respectful toward the law, entrusted the care of exciting pity to his client. "Euxenippus, I came to your aid as far as I was able. It remains only to beseech your judges, to implore the assistance of your friends, and to make your children mount this place." This conclusion of Hyperides is according to Attic tradition, and conciliates all. The same design to harmonize the law and the interests of the pleaders sometimes caused the orator, in the midst of his oration, to dissimulate pieces for the purpose of exciting pity. Demosthenes, in his second oration *Against Aphobus*, paints before the judges' eyes his mother's grief, her anxiety for the issue of a lawsuit which can deprive her of her last resources, and prevent her from marrying her only daughter. He conjures them in the name of their wives, their children, and all they possess. Then he closes with a phlegmatic conclusion, as if he wished to be pardoned for having shed tears.

No man at Rome ever thought of reproaching Cicero for his pathos. Æschines reproached Demosthenes for his; he marks the lamentable tone of his voice, the expression of an illegal and hypocritical grief in his eyes. Æschines would have been pleased to see the law master here, and to see Ctesiphon's defender deprived of one of the greatest resources of his eloquence. Demosthenes, far from abdicating, used against Æschines all his right to pathos, but with a violence of emotion peculiar to him. Pathos was usually born in him from an elevation of sentiment;

he charmed the soul by his exaltation; he transported his hearers by his generosity and moral reasoning. This intense passion, constantly springing from the bottom of his heart, seems to be unconscious of itself, so sincere and naïve is it. "In spite of the passion that carries me away, I perceive that water is going to fail me, and that I am losing my way in orations and recriminations which would take up whole days (*Antidosis*).” The author of the ode *On the Conquest of Namur* likewise tells us of the "learned and sacred intoxication" which transports him. Demosthenes did not feel conscious of his transports because he did not seek them.

Æschines attributes to Demosthenes this pathetic interrogation: "When he will demand of you, Athenians, where can I take refuge, etc. * * *" Farther on: "When at the close of his oration he will call near him the accomplices of his venality to defend him. * * *" There is nothing like this in the oration *On the Crown*. Æschines feigned to foresee these oratorical buoyancies, in order to have the advantage of using them and of bringing around the tribune the shades of Solon, Aristides and Themistocles: "Do you not believe that the warriors who died at Marathon and Plataea, that the very graves of our ancestors would wail, if the man who confesses that he has worked against Greece, in concert with the barbarians, were crowned?" Ctesiphon's accuser develops this prosopopœia with fervor and makes it effective in the close. Demosthenes is sometimes content to indicate one or two of them occasionally, and leaves the care of reviving their ardor to his hearers. "When Midias, surrounded by his children, will entreat you to grant them his acquittal, then imagine that you

see me appear, escorted by the laws and your oaths, begging you, soliciting you to pronounce in their favor." "Now, consider, reflect how just the indignation of these illustrious dead would be, if they had any idea of what we are doing to-day." (*Against Leptines.*) Reflection is here closely united to emotion, and this alliance well measures Demosthenes' pathos. His *prosopopœiæ* are of such an Attic sobriety that they could find place in a pleading. That which closes the speech against Macartatus, and in which Sositheus evokes, in the name of a child, all the deaths of Buselus' family, is by far the longest and most touching of our orator. Demosthenes knew better than any other man the common sources of pathos, but he disdained to draw from them. "True eloquence mocks at eloquence." (Pascal.)

Demosthenes' pathos is very seldom affecting. Give this material to Æschines,—a picture of the desolation of Phocis in ruins. If he wished, he could put into this picture emotions of the most touching sensibility. The accent of Demosthenes' soul is different; he discloses to the Athenians the source of the catastrophe of Phocis, and he interrupts his exposition with this cry: Shocking and pitiable spectacle! On our late journey to Delphi we were compelled to see it all,—houses razed to the ground, walls demolished, a country stripped of its adult population; a few poor women, little children, and miserable old men. No language can do justice to the misery now existing there; and yet I hear you all say that this people once gave a negative vote to the Thebans on the question of enslaving us. If then, your ancestors, Athenians, could return to life, what vote or judgment would they pass upon the authors of this destruction of Phocis? In my opinion,

though they stoned them with their own hands, they would consider themselves pure. For is it not disgraceful,—is it not, if possible, worse than disgraceful,—that people who had then saved us, who gave their vote for our preservation, should have met with an opposite return through these men, and be suffered to incur greater misfortunes than any Greeks ever knew? Who, then, is the author of them? Who was the deceiver? Æschines,—who but he?*

Sentiments of national dignity, branding of ingratitude, hatred toward the traitor Æschines,—these are the true sources of Demosthenes' pathos, rather than the picture of the misfortunes of Phocis, or another similar subject capable of exciting pity.

The nature of the conflict which he supports for his public life is "full of daily struggles and sufferings," and his own nature willed it to be so. Demosthenes' eloquence is the image of his character; there is something rough in both. Dionysius of Halicarnassus attributes this kind of roughness to a scrupulous imitation of Thucydides' style. We must rather find its source in a soul whose steadfastness borders upon severity. Demosthenes could not apply to himself the words of Antigone: "I am created to love, not to hate." His incisive words can better accuse than defend.† Hermodenes marks its biting sharpness (*δριμότης*); Æschines its sharp bitterness (*πικρῶν*). According to the taste of Ctesiphon's accuser, Leodamas the Acharnian had not less force than Demosthenes, and he had more pleasantness (*ἡδίων*).

* *Embassy*, § 64.

† Only two of his civil speeches are defensive. One *For Phormio* (he had even pleaded against this person a short time previous), the other *For Apollodorus*, on the subject of the naval crown.

This want of pleasantness did not exclude ingenuity in our orator. Could he have been an Athenian if he had no ingenuity? "One day when he was desiring to address a large meeting in the city, the people would not have heard him had he not informed them that he only wished to tell them a story. Hearing this, they listened to him, and he commenced in this manner: "Once upon a time," he said, "there was a man who hired an ass to go from this city to Megara. About noon, when the sun was burning hot, both the driver and the hirer sought the shade of the ass, and mutually hindered each other. The owner said that the traveler had hired his ass, and not its shadow. The traveler, in opposition to him, maintained that the whole ass was under his jurisdiction." Having thus commenced his story, he withdrew. The people recalled him, and begged him to finish the story. "Ah," said he, "how eager you are to hear a story about an ass's shadow, and you will not listen when I speak of your most important affairs."

We find proofs of Demosthenes' ingenuity in several passages of his writings, in certain untranslatable delicacies of style, in which the art of the Attics is surprised by a play on words of different shades of meaning, by passing from the proper to the figurative sense; by delighting the mind with refined thoughts and language, accompanied by a mixture of delicate irony and subtility.* Sometimes even Athenian taste did

* Aristotle (*Rhetoric*, iii, ii, 3) cites this passage from Isocrates: τῇν τῇς θαλλάτης ἀρχῇν (empire) ἀρχῇν (principium) εἶνα: τῶν ζαζῶν. Cf. *Oration on The Chersonesus*. ὁμῶν ὕγιαίνοντων (sound body), εἰ δὲ τοῦς τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιοῦντας ὕγιαίνειν (sound mind) φήσασιν. Farther on: ἔχοντ' ἀφελέσθαι (destroying tyrants) δεῖνολ, καὶ πάντας

not recoil before puns, if they can be so considered. Aristophanes is prodigal of them. Athenian orators ventured to use them with great circumspection. They meant that puns and ambiguities (*ῥυμυμία*) should always respect the law of urbanity (*ἀστειον*). Usually they disdained these doubtful pleasantries, and avoided them, even where they most naturally presented themselves. Æschines, said Demosthenes, would give from his *blood*, rather than from his *oration*; and Ctesiphon's accuser, in his turn, said: "This man has on his shoulders not a *head*, but a source of *revenues*,—a farm." Few modern men would have resisted the temptation to replace the sayings of the two orators by these: he would give his *blood* rather than his *water*; he has not a *head*, but a *capitol*. A commentator, chagrined at seeing Æschines on such an occasion, utterly wanting in wit à la Française, effaces the word *revenue* (*πρόσοδον*), and substitutes for it *capital* (*κεφάλαιον*). This is too kind. To these doubtful niceties the Attics preferred traits after Gorgias' taste: "A little sparrow had dropped some excrements from its stomach upon him." The sophist raised his eyes and said: "That is not fair play, O Philomela"; as if he should say: "That does not look well, princess."

Notwithstanding the delicacy of his wit, frequently ingenious, Demosthenes had little success in pleasantry. In Cicero's judgment, he is an accomplished model of urbanity; but he seems to have ignored the well known piquant (*facetous*) playfulness of Lysias and Hyperides. According to the author of the fifth

ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἀφελέσθαι (to charm, to excite to liberty) ἔτοιμοι. Severe Aristotle himself said that it was necessary to use epithets as seasoning, ῥόδσματι, not as food, ἐδέσματι.

of the letters attributed to Æschines,* his jests never made any one laugh except Ctesiphon. Quintilian was disposed to judge them in like manner: "They show clearly that this kind of wit was not displeasing to him, but that nature did not endow him with it."† The author of *Oratorical Institutions* has a right to feel triumphant here, and to assert that Rome surpassed Athens in pleasantry, as well as in touching pathos (*miseratione et salibus vincimus*). The Greeks can console themselves for this inferiority. It is better to be wanting in that talent which produces laughter than to abuse it as did the Roman consul. But was laughter of so high a value at the Athenian court? There was no need of exciting the Athenians by it.

The pleasantries of Demosthenes have something peevish, or even the roughness of sarcasm. Æschines is ungrateful for attacking Demosthenes, for he furnished him a living. Without devoted citizens who fight against the Macedonian, whence would the hired orators of Philip receive their revenues? Demades one day said to him, "That Demosthenes should reprimand me is like the hog governing Minerva." "Ah," said Demosthenes, "this Minerva was caught in the act of adultery, the other day, near Colyttus." Demosthenes defied the accomplices of Philocrates to come and justify themselves on the rostrum. Under differ-

* The pleading against Calicles, a suit on a gutter, contains this passage: "When all shall have been drained from me, the water will remain with me. By Jupiter! what will I do with this water? Will Calicles force me to drink it?" A pick-pocket named *Chalcous* was ridiculing him for his nightly toils: "I understand that my lighted lamp vexed you. But, Athenians, do not be surprised by all the thefts that are committed. Our thieves are of brass (*χαλκοῦς*) and our walls of clay."

† Quintilian, vi, 3. (Cf. *Orator*, 26.)

ent pretexts, no one appeared there. What is Phrynon's pretext? "He has a son-in-law in Macedonia." This Phrynon had sent his son, a handsome youth, to Philip. The Athenians readily used euphemisms. A euphemistic juriconsult, Tourreil, called an exploit a *stamped compliment*; a salary, a *coined gratitude*. Thus Philip's hirelings at Athens were his *guests*, his *friends*. The household flatterers of Dionysius, living at his table, when they did not die from his fancies (Διονυσιο-νόλαες), were called *artists* and skillful men (τεχνίτας). Sycophants were "curators (ἐπιμεληταί) of public and private affairs." Thieves and pillagers, or brigands and pirates, modestly declared themselves "men who labor to acquire." Everybody must live, and poverty is an attenuating circumstance. Imperious necessity confounds all ideas of what is allowed and prohibited. This indulgence, which was shown by Demosthenes to needy Charidemus, is an oratorical concession. In general, he sees men and things as they are: he calls a cat a cat, and Philocrates a ———.

Even his praises savor of rudeness. One of his colleagues on the embassy to Macedonia extolled, on the rostrum at Athens, Philip's marvelous qualities. Demosthenes, in Philip's presence, ridiculed the foolish flattery. "I have not praised your beauty,—the most beautiful of beings is woman; nor your ability to drink,—this eulogy is due to a sponge; nor your memory,—this is the merit of a sophist who deals in words." His unpremeditated frankness is one of the grievances which Æschines brings against him. He has the *rusticity* of a *barbarian*, like the Great King, writing to the Athenians with the delicacy of a crowned Turcaret: "I will not give you gold; do not ask me for it; you shall have none." His abruptness provoked "before the deputies

of all Greece an explosion of uncommon laughter.” He interrupts the people with great cries; he is a Bœotian (*βοιωτίζεσι*) worthy of sympathizing with that coarse people. Are we to be astonished at it? He is a Scythian (a peasant from the Danube) by his mother, not an Athenian.

It is seldom that Demosthenes’ irony is sufficiently free from passion to be lively. His smiles are not malicious, but contracted and half grimacing. Another orator would have chastised with a lighter hand the cowardly self-conceit of Midias and his zeal, which was always unseasonable. If the danger is on the sea, Midias procures supplies from the Egyptian Pamphilus. If the contest is to be tried on land, Midias runs to the assembly and loudly promises to fit out a trireme. He is always just where there is no danger. He is elected hipparchus, and he cannot assist in a procession on horseback without losing his stirrup, and, furthermore, his nag is borrowed. Instead of agreeably enjoying himself at the expense of this boastful blunderhead, Demosthenes employs in the recital of his subterfuges the epithets of *coward*, *execrable* man, etc. For jocularities he substitutes invective. The author of *Nicomachean Ethics* allows the magnanimous to use scornful irony. Such is most frequently that of Demosthenes. Horace played with the human heart by pleasingly ridiculing its weaknesses. Juvenal vigorously branded its vices. The same difference distinguishes our orator from other Attics in the use of irony. Demosthenes’ irony is especially indignant and virulent.

“Evidently, Æschines, these evils move you, and the Thebans inspire you with pity,—you, who have lands in Bœotia and who cultivate the fields of which they were robbed; and

I rejoice,—I, whose head was immediately after demanded by the author of these disasters.” * * * “By such a language, you miscreant, while of the deeds of our ancestors you made sport and havoc with your tongue, you ruined all our affairs. And out of all this you are a land-owner and become a considerable personage. For here again: before he had wronged the state so grievously he acknowledged that he had been a clerk and was under obligation to you for electing him, and he behaved himself with decency; but since he has wrought such infinite mischief he has drawn up his eyebrows, and if any one says ‘the ex-clerk Æschines,’ he is at once his enemy and says he has been slandered; and he traverses the market with his robe down to his ankles, walking as sharply as Pythocles, puffing out his cheeks:—one of the friends and acquaintances of Philip for you. That’s what he is now,—one of those that would be rid of the people and regard the present establishment as a raging sea,—he that formerly worshiped the dining-hall.”*

Irony is a resort skillfully managed by the tragic poets. In them it is sometimes derisive, as in the mouth of the Nicomedes of Corneille; sometimes as bitter as in Racine’s *Orestes*. Demosthenes gives to his a sort of dolorous acidity. The ancient comedian Archias allured Demosthenes with pleasing words. “Quit your asylum; I will conduct you to Antipater; he will do you no harm.” From the place where he was seated, Demosthenes beheld him. “Archias, you never moved me on the stage; your good promises will not move me more to-day.” Archias is enraged and threatens:

* *Embassy*, § 313; *Pro Corona*, § 41. The oration *On Halonnesus* is animated from one end to the other with a fine irony and capricious spirit, which turns those acquainted with Demosthenes from attributing this piece to him. Demosthenes would have commented on Philip’s letter with biting penetration and an acidity very remote from the liveliness of Hegesippus. He has developed almost the same ideas, but in an entirely different manner.

“Now you speak like an inspired man, on the Macedonian tripod (the Macedonian is his oracle); a moment ago you acted the part of a comedian.”

III. He that would gather in Demosthenes all the energetic expressions that tend to place the object before our eyes, would have to transcribe nearly all his writings. His intensity is often born of brevity: “In five days only, Æschines pronounced his falsehoods; you believed them; Phocis was acquainted with them, surrendered herself, and perished.” It is also born of the agitating (*ἐνεργουμένη*) image that paints and communicates life. In the pleading *Against Macartatus*, he says that he at first thought of offering to the view of the judges a genealogical table of Agnias’ descendants; “but as all, and especially those who are farthest from me, could not have seen it distinctly, I am obliged to trace it orally and to address the whole tribunal at once.” The orations of Demosthenes are speaking pictures; living paintings and striking reliefs abound in them. Rhetoricians who were curious to cite models of hypotyposis, had a rich harvest to gather from his works. Besides, energy seems to have been the common quality of the Attics during the Macedonian period. “Hyperboles,” says Aristotle, “are becoming to youth and to wrath; the orators of Athens make very frequent use of them.” For want of youthful ardor, the passions excited by the political contests during Philip’s time sufficed to suggest bold figures. Even a pure Attic, Lysias, did not hesitate to write in a funeral oration: “It is just that Greece be *shorn* (*ξεῖρασθαι*) on the tomb of the brave who perished at Salamis, since her liberty was buried with their courage.” Æsion, a contemporary of Demosthenes, could allow himself this

expression : The Athenians have “turned their city into Sicily.” Hegesippus was advising them to exterminate Philip’s partisans, “if you have your brains in your heads and not in your heels.”

Demades says that he guides the wreck of the republic (πολιτεῖεσθαι τὰ ναυαγία τῆς πόλεως). “The news of the conqueror’s death creates an emotion at Athens. “Athenians, Alexander is not dead; for the world would be filled with the odor from his corse.” (Demades.) Hyperides was reproached for an illegal motion. “It is not I who made this proposition; it is the battle of Chæronea. Did you not see the laws which forbade it? The arms of the Macedonians, veiling them with their shadows (ἐπισκιάσει), concealed them from my view.” Demosthenes “is composed of words, * * * deprive him of his tongue, and he will then become a mere flute without a mouthpiece.” (Æschines.) The greater portion of Demosthenes’ expressions, which are cited by Æschines, are not found in his harangues; they are usually improvised sallies that owe even the privilege of having struck his rival’s memory to their vigor.

Cicero permits the orator to use expressions almost poetic (*verba prope poetarum*). Aristotle, less indulgent, censured as poetic a number of terms and images which the scrupulous Isocrates himself would undoubtedly have accepted. He does not wish that we should say: “Philosophy is the bulwark of laws.” “You have sown shame; you have reaped misfortune.” So Voltaire, in an emotion of ill humor against J. J. Rousseau, saw an example of “excessive extravagance” into which the “would-be wits” fall while moved by “a mania for making themselves singular.” It was in this image: “I was cultivating hope, and I saw it fade every day.” The author of the *Philosophical Dic-*

tionary is here more Attic than Demosthenes himself would have been. His poetical figures are numerous, and he often borrows them from scenes of nature. The audacious Python launches against the assembly floods of impetuous eloquence (πολλῶ ῥέοντι). Without the reveille of the Thebans the burden of the war would have fallen upon Athens like a torrent in winter (χειμάριον). If a reverse befalls the city, Æschines immediately starts from his repose, like a sudden gust of wind (ὥσπερ πνεῦμα ἀνέσφυγ). Philip's attack is "a hail-storm that ruins the harvest." "This decree (of alliance with Thebes) expelled the danger which enveloped the city like a cloud."* Cicero extolled this merit in Demosthenes' elocution: "The frequent use of metaphors is, in the eyes of certain critics, the principal merit of his eloquence; and, in fact, we rarely find a passage in his works in which his ideas are not introduced in a salient form; yet he is the only orator who knows how to give to all, or at least to nearly all his thoughts a lively turn and a luminous splendor."† Demosthenes owes the picturesque relief of his style to the vivacity of his imagination and also to the genius of his colored and expressive mother-tongue. The Greeks made it in their own image, and handled it as a painter handles his brush.‡

* Τοῦτο τὸ ψήφισμα τὸν τότε τῆ πόλει περιστάντα κίνδυνον παρέλθῃν ἐποίησεν, ὥσπερ νέφος. (*Pro Corona*.)

† Cicero, *Orator*, 39; *De Oratore*, i, 28. "L'éloquence est une peinture de la pensée." (Pascal.)

‡ The carelessness of the Athenians will be a *breakneck* for them (ἐκπραχλίσθῃναι). The Byzantians would have submitted to all, *swallowed* (εἰσφάγεσθαι) all, rather than fall into the hands of Philip. This prince was sounding the Hellenes with a golden probe (διεζωδώνιζε. This word properly signifies to test a spirited horse by the sound of hand-bells, and it suggests the idea of jingling pieces of

The coarseness of Demosthenes' images did not always find grace before Æschines. He mentions several which the vivacity of improvisation alone could justify. "Do you not remember his odious and incredible words? How could you ever patiently tolerate them, O men of iron? He said to you from this tribune: *They nip the buds of the republic; they cut off the sprouts of democracy; they have broken off the nerves of our resources. We are packed up in a bundle and sewed into straw mats. They pierce us as with larding-pins.** From whom are these expressions, shocking beast, or rather these monsters of language?" Cicero condemned images that were less bold. "The African's death has deprived the republic of its generative power (*castratam*); Glancia, the excrements of the senate (*stercus curiæ*),"† and nevertheless he pleaded attenuating circumstances in favor of Demosthenes. It is easy, said he, to coolly catch a word of fire and turn it into derision when the aroused minds of the hearers have had time to grow cool; but do not these temerities of language find their excuse in the passionate heat of debate? Pliny the Younger, a man of talent and very desirous in his letters to follow Cicero step by step, recalled this passage of the *Orator*. He justifies some of his expressions, which are "inflated and violent" according to the judgment of his correspondent Luperens, but which are "audacious, full of intelligence and sublime," according to

gold in the ears of the Greeks. The least reverse suffices to overthrow all, ἀνεχαίττισε. This is said of a horse that capers and throws off his rider by shaking his mane (χαίτη). It would be easy to multiply these examples.

* Τινὲς τὰ στενὰ (πρωτόν) ὥσπερ τὰς βελόνας διείρουσι.

† *De Oratore*, iii, 41; *Orator*, 8.

the author's taste. He alleges the examples of Homer, Æschines, and Demosthenes, and he extols the "dazzling grandeur"* of those traits which Ctesiphon's accuser has censured. The fragments of Demosthenes which Pliny cites certainly deserve this eulogy; but who will dare to confer it on the comparison of the larding-pins, which indeed is not Attic?

Antithesis is often employed in Demosthenes' pleadings. It tends to brevity by rapidly placing face to face two ideas which the *clepsydra* did not always permit him to develop. Thus the pleading *For Apollodorus* contains two antitheses, which recapitulate it with great effect. Demosthenes' antitheses never have *false windows*, designed for symmetry. "What I fear is, not that Philip may be living, but that the hatred toward the prevaricators, and the eagerness to punish them, may be dead in the heart of the state." The antithesis, or contrast of things, is one of his favorite methods. An almost continual parallel is established, in the orations *On the Embassy* and *On the Crown*, between the birth, education, family, private and public life, of the two adversaries. The bright and clear light of Attica gave the Athenians a taste for luminous relief. Demosthenes, in this respect, knew the force of parallels (*παράλληλα*), and did not conceal his intention to profit by them. "With my conduct compare theirs. Light will shine from this parallel."†

We will conclude these remarks on Demosthenes' elocution with the citation of a page which reproduces some of the traits of the expressive physiognomy of his eloquence.

* *Granditas elucet.* (*Letters*, ix, 26.)

† This taste for contrasts was practiced by the comic poets. Timocles calls him "a man who dislikes orations and never made an antithesis."

“What matters, they will say, the loss of Serrhium, of Doriscus? Let these insignificant spoils accumulate. They will finally raise themselves to a disastrous ‘sum-total.’ Do you believe you are wise in purchasing peace at the cost of such concessions? ‘I fear that some day, like imprudent borrowers, who procure passing ease at large interest, and consequently see themselves deprived even of their patrimony, we, also, will pay dearly for our indolence; and that, for having devoted all to pleasure, we will sooner or later undergo the necessity of suffering many hardships to which we formerly objected, and of trembling for the very soil of our country.* * * * You must, Athenians, from to-day, shake off this weakness. See how far this man has pushed his arrogance. He does not even now leave you a choice between action and repose. He threatens. He utters, they say, insolent speeches. Incapable of contenting himself with what he has captured, he surrounds himself each day with a rampart of new conquests, and while we are remaining inactive, he is encircling us and infesting us on all sides.

When then, Athenians, when, pray, will you do your duty? What are you waiting for,—an event? necessity? But what other understanding can you have of what is passing before our eyes? As for me, I know of no more pressing necessity for free men than dishonor. Tell me, will you always go to and fro on the public square, asking each other ‘What is the news?’ Ah! what news could be greater than that a Macedonian is the conqueror of Athens, and the ruler of Greece? ‘Is Philip dead? No, he is sick.’ What difference is it to you whether he is dead or sick? If any misfortune has befallen him, you will very soon make another Philip, with the vigilance which you now use in your affairs.”

IV. The disposition of Demosthenes’ plans sometimes needs more light. Exactitude of method is one of the superiorities which modern men manifest over the

* *First Olynthiac*. “Si noles sanus, cures hydropicus.” (Horace.)

ancients. The admirers of antiquity had a giant task to sustain, in the time of Charles Perrault, when they undertook to prove that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* left nothing to be desired as a composition. The intelligent admirers of Homer could allege the difference of taste in former ages and in our own; and in fact, a modern tragedy similar to Sophocles' *Ajax* would not escape criticism. With us the drama ends with the death of the hero: the Greeks heard with delight the four hundred verses (more than one-fourth of the tragedy) which survived the true conclusion. No doubt they were less moved than we by the indistinctness in the canvas of one of Demosthenes' works. What is, in detail, the plan of the oration *On the Crown*, or more particularly the plan of the oration *On the Embassy*? The critics contend over this question: instead of examining the diverse opinions expressed in this debate, we will substitute a certain number of incontestable observations, suggested by an assiduous reading of the orator.

Would Demosthenes, an accomplished artist, have cheerfully deprived his master-piece, worked with jealous care, of one of the essential forms of literary beauty,—that of order? We cannot admit it, especially when we see him so eager to give the merit of disposition to simple sentences. Each of the stones whose combination will constitute the oratorical edifice is hewed by Demosthenes with admirable art. This same art presides over the formation of groups which are born from their assemblage. In consequence of this wise structure, the group, or partial development, forms a little harangue which has its own commencement, its middle and its end; it constitutes an organized and complete body. Why is the organism

of the whole work less striking, and so incommodious as to disjoint it? It is because the ordinary method yields to a superior art, which disregards those rules of convenience in order to attain effects which rules could never teach.* Modern critics expect to find in the *Pro Corona* a plan designed according to the prescriptions of the rhetoricians, and they do not find it there. Who is at fault? Sometimes, by a wrong method they imagine they have discovered between certain parts of the work mysterious lines which do not exist; is the orator responsible for their fancies? He did not always disclose his secrets to them; it was their duty to discover them. Demosthenes has not always a regular plan; he has a wise disposition, which is justified by a determined and premediated design, not on the observation of common practices, but on the effect to be produced. Thus the artists to whom we owe the wonderful beauty of the Parthenon allowed the columns to deviate from the perpendicular; they contracted certain parts of the monument's ornamentation; they diminished the intervals progressively, altered the rectilinear surfaces, to attain certain delusions of perspective; the right line is not always the shortest line to lead to the accomplishment of art. Demosthenes, like the Athenian architects, used inclined planes and curves: he was justifiable.

The great compositions of the deliberative class are not bound to the same exactitude as the works of the bar. An Athenian lawyer's speech had to present a sim-

* It is instructive to study, in this respect, one page of the *Oration on the Chersonesus*. In noting the words: $\pi\rho\omega\tau\omicron\nu$ * * * $\gamma\upsilon\omega\gamma\alpha\iota$, * * * $\delta\epsilon\iota\upsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$ $\epsilon\lambda\delta\epsilon\iota\gamma\alpha\iota$, then $\epsilon\lambda\delta\acute{o}\tau\alpha\varsigma$ * * * $\xi\gamma\omega\chi\acute{o}\tau\alpha\varsigma$ we can see with what care he arranges his words.

ple and clear order. On this condition alone the client could trust it to his memory. On the other hand, a little design, easy to be seen at a glance, must be elaborated more exactly in its lines than a large picture rich with episodes, and whose learned complexity is destined to produce a powerful effect of harmony. These large canvases object to a close examination; smaller drawings ought to be able to endure the indiscreet curiosity of the glass. The political oration is better adapted to be heard than to be read. The reader, master of his own time and of himself, wishes to taste all at his leisure, and to take everything into consideration. While reading he analyzes his impressions and the different qualities of the work; he sometimes even rests to penetrate it more thoroughly. The hearer, less exacting, only asks to be convinced and entertained; he especially desires emotion, action, sensible and repeated statements. Now, these redoubled expressions will be given him by the rich succession of arguments and passions, of which the mass (*ὄχλος*) of the political oration is composed. If the orator succeeds in proving and affecting, without following a plan of irreproachable regularity, his success acquits the writer. A baker asked whether he should make the pie hard or soft. "Can you not make it good?"* "Demosthenes, says Ulpian, does not follow method, but he is guided by what is advantageous." If without method he wins our suffrages, what more can we ask? All's well that ends well.

According to their own criticisms, Æschines and Demosthenes delivered "confused and embroiled orations." The two orators gave this criticism precisely to the passages of their harangues in which they were

* Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, iii, 16. (Cf. Horace, *Ad Pisones*.)

the clearest,—too clear, in fact, to suit the adversary's will. These are tactics addressed to the judges. They wish to persuade the judges that they have not clearly heard the orator, when they have comprehended him perfectly.

Let us not, therefore, believe their criticism. Æschines (and on this point he does himself justice) contrasts the order and clearness of his oration with Demosthenes' premeditated and artificial confusion. He announces a luminous (*σαφές τεκμήριον*) exposition of his enemy's iniquities; he intends that there should be "no difficulty in following him." In fact, the plan of the oration *Against Ctesiphon* is neatly traced and faithfully followed.* That of the speech *Against Aristocrates*, one of Demosthenes' most remarkable speeches, is equally irreproachable in this respect. Usually, however, his manner is less methodic than that of Æschines, Hyperides, or Isocrates. He indicates an idea and sets it aside; later he returns and develops it; he

* Æschines pretends to have formed the plan of the third part of his oration on that which he knew ought to be adopted by Demosthenes. Demosthenes will divide his administration into four periods. Æschines then examines these four periods successively. The truth is that there is no relation between the speeches of the two adversaries, either in the disposition of the whole, or in the development of parts. In his oration Æschines has followed an order which differs from that of the act of accusation; now, it is to the order of the act of accusation that Demosthenes devotes himself in his defense. The portion of Demosthenes' oration which is devoted to the apology of his ministry offers no trace of the four epochs mentioned by his accuser. Why, then, has Æschines attributed to him a plan which exists only in his own imagination? Is the object of this disguise to show that he does not fear to follow him over the ground of his own choice? Elsewhere he attributes in advance to Demosthenes pathetic apostrophes which Demosthenes did not use. This gratuitous fiction gives him an opportunity for sharp replies. This is the whole secret of his artifice.

announces a proof, and he delays to give it; he commences a contrast, and he stops in the midst of it. He marks out the plan which he says he intends to follow, and he does not follow it (*Against Timocrates*, second part). Demosthenes draws strong general lines which divide the subject into its essential parts, but that which fills up the intervals is disposed of without rigorous order. Occasionally he recapitulates forementioned grievances and demonstrated facts. These landmarks, these beacons indicating the route already passed and that which remains to be traveled, are not superfluous. The orator frequently leaves his road to toil on the right and left in foot-paths where he neither loses his time nor his pains, for they forward him to the desired end; but instead of a straight line, they are windings and turns to and fro, like those of a free improvisation. "But let us speak of the decree of invitation (to the feast of the Prytaneum): I had almost forgotten this point, one of the most important of my cause.*"

If it is sometimes difficult to follow Demosthenes in the windings of his plan, it is always easy to comprehend the ruling idea of his orations. Every one of them is inspired by a dominant thought—the soul of the entire composition. Thus the oration *On the Crown* is summed up in the lines which form the epigraph to the work. This unity of principal thought and communicated expression makes the true unity of the oration. Demosthenes, an obstinate and tenacious orator,

* These artifices of the orator are frequent. "Clerk, take again the decree in favor of Chabrias; look it up, search for it; it ought to be here somewhere" (*Against Leptines*), and especially *Against Aristocrates*. Cicero imitates the Greeks even in these little tricks. "These two statues are called Canephores. "But the artist * * * who is he,—who, pray? * * * You are right; it is Polycleetus." (Verrines, *De Signis*, iv, 3.)

does not wish to appear such. He insists on determining proofs, but not at once; he leaves them and returns to them again. When the hearer has once been drawn over to that point which pleases him, he knows how to hold him there without fatiguing him with monotonous repetitions. On the contrary, he studies to dissimulate the persistence of his means under a variety of forms and skillful weaving. His plans do not form a chain, but a net which Vulcan would not have disowned.

Demosthenes' composition resembles the open order of military tactics. It is not the regular disposition of a regiment in files, marching with uniformity and symmetry, with all its detachments in their regulated positions. His exordiums, we have seen, never have those showy plumes with which studied orations are wont to be adorned. Narration, confirmation and refutation take part in the conflict like irregular troops, without any precise method; the peroration is everywhere at the same time, like a good general animating all with his presence. The entire harangue is a legion dispersed into sharp-shooters, advancing, retreating, obliquing to the right and left, according to the accidents of the ground and the necessities of the contest. All arguments, like scattered soldiers, concur in the same action; strike the same enemy, obey the same directing thought; but how far is it from the order of parade! The scrupulous observation of the rules of art is here subordinated to the requirements of the action. The art, the only necessary art, is the art to conquer.

The liberty of Demosthenes' plans belongs to a personal cause, the orator's genius; and to general causes, the traditional customs of Attic eloquence. Diversions were familiar to them (in spite of the law which forbade

them to wander from their subject), but especially anticipated refutations, written after the charge.

The composition of Æschines' oration *Against Ctesiphon* seems to us irreproachable, save some long tirades in the second part, due to this process of prolepsis. In general, the harangues exchanged between Æschines and Demosthenes, are, as a whole, attacks and replies; or replies and rejoinders at the same time. They finished them after the debate, according to the means employed by the adversary. These additions, after important inlaid work, are as so many incumbering overcharges; they destroy the economy of the primitive oration, and are prejudicial to the simplicity and purity of the composition. Two works kneaded together cannot have the harmonious homogeneity of one work moulded by a single cast.

Demosthenes was asked, What is the first quality of the orator?—action. And the second?—action. And the third?—still, action. This remark clearly proves that Demosthenes had suffered from the imperfections of his own action. Action, “the eloquence of the body”* had for a long time been somewhat defective in Demosthenes. Whence the obstacles that at first discouraged him: “Of all orators, I take the most pains; I have almost exhausted my powers in training myself for eloquence, and with all that, I cannot make myself agreeable to the people. Ignorant sailors and drunkards occupy the rostrum, and they are heard while I am disdained.” The comedian Satyrus knew the cause of the evil, and prescribed a remedy for him. He made Demosthenes recite, then recited himself, some verses from Euripides. Demosthenes was struck with the different effects which they

* “Quasi sermo corporis.” (*De Oratore*, iii, 59.)

produced when spoken by himself and by his friend. He saw the power of the art of declamation, and, at the cost of an obstinate struggle, he succeeded in acquiring it; without, however, correcting his action in a certain impetuosity, the object of Æschines' criticism.

At Rome, an orator might make use of the most vehement gestures; he could touch the earth* without wounding the taste of connoisseurs. Attic Æschines, a constant attendant at the palæstra, reproaches his rival for not frequenting it. Demosthenes might there have acquired a measured suppleness, a harmonious proportion of movements,—that grace and dignity of attitude so admired by the Greeks. Instead of that he preserved the habit of sharp and violent movements. He does not mount the rostrum, he jumps (*ἀνεπήδησεν*) on it; he does not present himself to the *ecclesia*, he rushes on it. Do not expect that he, like Pericles, will hold his hand under his cloak; calm on the rostrum, and as erect as the statue of Apollo. He leaves this bearing to Solon, the personified moderation of ancient orators; he prefers gestures as irregular as his conduct. On the rostrum he throws himself to the right and then to the left (*ζόζλω περιδινῶν σαυτόν*); he becomes as enraged as a wild beast (*θηρίον*).

In his *Discours de Réception* to the French Academy, Buffon has painted in lively colors the eloquence of action that “speaks to the body,” and that which, born of the soul and thought, speaks to the soul and mind. Demosthenes, master of these two eloquences, united the charm of action with that of conviction and passion. Imagine him standing on the

* Vidi Antonium terram tangere. (Cicero.)

rostrum, animated with indignation against a miserable accuser, full of noble thoughts and generous sentiments due to the memory of his ancestors, having completely in his power the double pathos of gestures and speech, and we can then have some idea of the transports which such words as the following produced on a sensitive people :

“Such was the commencement and first step in the reconciliation of Athens and Thebes. Before then the countries had been led by these men into discord, hatred and jealousy. * * * As to me, I have confidence enough to say, If anyone now can point out a better course, or, indeed, if any other was practicable but the one which I adopted, I confess that I was wrong. For if there be any measure now discovered which (executed then) would have been to our advantage, I say it ought not to have escaped me. But if there is none, if there was none, if none can be suggested even at this day, what was a statesman to do? Was he not to choose the best measures within his reach and view? That did I, Æschines, when the crier asked: ‘*Who wishes to speak?*’ not ‘*Who wishes to complain of the past or to guarantee the future?*’ While you, on those occasions sat mute in the assembly, I came forward and spoke. However, as you omitted then, tell us now: say what scheme I ought to have devised; what favorable opportunity was lost to the state by my neglect? what alliance was there, what better plan, to which I should have directed the people?

“But no. The past is with all the world given up. No one even proposes to deliberate about it. The future it is, or the present, that demands the action of a counsellor. At the time, as it appears, there were dangers impending, and dangers at hand. Mark the line of my policy at that crisis. Don’t rail at the event. The end of all things is what the Deity pleases. His line of policy it is that shows the judgment of the statesman. Do not then impute it as a crime to

me that Philip chanced to conquer in battle. That issue depended not on me, but on the Gods. Prove that I adopted not all measures that according to human calculation were possible; that I did not honestly and diligently, and with exertions beyond my strength, carry them out; or that my enterprises were not honorable and worthy of the state, and necessary. Show me this, and accuse me as soon as you like. But if the hurricane that visited us hath been too powerful, not for us only, but for all Greeks besides, what is the fair course? As if a merchant, after taking every precaution, and furnishing his vessel with everything that he thought would insure her safety, because afterward he met with a storm, and his tackle was strained or broken to pieces, should be charged with the shipwreck! ‘Well, but I was not the pilot,’ he might say; just as I was not the general. Fortune was not at my control; all was under hers.’

“Consider and reflect upon this. If, with the Thebans on our side, we were destined to fail in the contest, what was to be expected if we had never had them for allies, but they had joined Philip, as he used every effort of persuasion to make them do? And if, when the battle was fought three days’ march from Attica, such peril and alarm surrounded the city, what must we have expected if the same disaster had happened in some part of our territory? As it was (do you see?), we could stand,—meet breath. Mightily did one, two, three days help to our preservation. In the other case,—but it is wrong to mention things of which we have been spared the trial by the favor of some deity, and by our protecting ourselves with the very alliance which you assail.

“All this, at such length, have I addressed to you, men of the jury, and to the outer circle of hearers; for, as to this contemptible fellow, a short and plain argument would suffice. If the future was revealed to you, Æschines, alone, when the state was deliberating on these proceedings, you ought to have forewarned us at the time. If you did not foresee it

you are responsible for the same ignorance as the rest. Why do you accuse me in this behalf, rather than I you? A better citizen have I been than you in respect of the matters of which I am speaking (others I discuss not at present), inasmuch as I gave myself up to what seemed for the general good, not shrinking from any personal danger, nor taking thought of any; while you neither suggested better measures (or mine would not have been adopted) nor lent any aid in the prosecuting of mine. Exactly what the basest person and worst enemy of the state would do, are you found to have done, after the event; and at the same time Aristratus in Naxos, and Aristolaus in Thasos, the deadly foes of our state, are bringing to trial the friends of Athens, and Æschines, at Athens, is accusing Demosthenes. Surely the man who waited to found his reputation upon the misfortunes of the Greeks deserves rather to perish than to accuse another; nor is it possible that one who has profited by the same conjunctures as the enemies of the commonwealth can be a well-wisher of his country. You show yourself by your life and conduct, by your political action, and even your political inaction. Is anything going on that appears good for the people? Æschines is mute. Has anything untoward happened or amiss? Forth comes Æschines, just as fractures and sprains are put in motion when the body is attacked with disease.

“But since he insists so strongly on the event, I will even assert something of a paradox, and I beg and pray of you not to marvel at its boldness, but kindly to consider what I say. If, then, the results had been foreknown to all,—if all had foreseen them, and you, Æschines, had foretold them and protested with clamor and outcry,—you that never opened your mouth,—not even then should the commonwealth have abandoned her design, if she had any regard for glory or ancestry or futurity. As it is, she appears to have failed in her enterprise,—a thing to which all mankind are liable if the Deity so wills it; but then, claiming precedence over others,

and afterward abandoning her pretensions, she would have incurred the charge of betraying all to Philip. Why? Had we resigned without a struggle that which our ancestors encountered every danger to win, who would not have spit upon you? Let me not say the commonwealth or myself. With what eyes, I pray, could we have beheld strangers visiting the city, if the result had been what it is and Philip had been chosen leader and lord of all? But other people without us had made the struggle to prevent it, especially when in former times our country had never preferred an ignominious security to the battle for honor. For what Grecian or what barbarian is ignorant that by the Thebans, or by the Lacedæmonians, who were in might before them, or by the Persian king, permission would thankfully and gladly have been given to our commonwealth to take what she pleased and hold her own, provided she would accept foreign law and let another power command in Greece? But, as it seems, to the Athenians of that day such conduct would not have been national or natural or endurable. None could at any period of time persuade the commonwealth to attach herself in secure subjection to the powerful and unjust. Through every age has she persevered in a perilous struggle for precedence and honor and glory, and this you esteem so noble and congenial to your principles that among your ancestors you honor most those who acted in such a spirit, and with reason; for who would not admire the virtue of those men who resolutely embarked in their galleys and quitted country and home rather than receive foreign law, choosing Themistocles, who gave such counsel, for their general, and stoning Cyrsilus to death, who advised submission to the terms imposed; not him only, but your wives also stoning his wife? Yes, the Athenians of that day looked not for an orator or a general who might help them to a pleasant servitude. They scorned to live if it could not be with freedom; for each of them considered that he was not born to his father or mother only, but also

to his country. What is the difference? He that thinks himself born for his parents only waits for his appointed or natural end. He that thinks himself born for his country also, will sooner perish than behold her in slavery, and will regard the insults and indignities, which must be borne in a commonwealth enslaved, as more terrible than death.

“Had I attempted to say that I instructed you in sentiments worthy of your ancestors, there is not a man who would not justly rebuke me. What I declare is, that such principles are your own. I show that before my time such was the spirit of the commonwealth, though certainly in the execution of the particular measures I claim a share also for myself. The prosecutor, arraigning the whole proceedings and imbittering you against me as the cause of our alarms and dangers, in his eagerness to deprive me of honor for the moment, robs you of the eulogies that should endure forever. For should you, under a disbelief in the wisdom of my policy, convict the defendant, you will appear to have done wrong not to have suffered what befell you by the cruelty of fortune. But never, never can you have done wrong, O Athenians, in undertaking the battle for freedom and safety of all! I swear it by your forefathers, those that met the perot at Marathon, those that took the field at Plataea, those in the sea-fight at Salamis, and those at Artemisium, and many other brave men who repose in the public monuments, all of whom alike, as being worthy of the same honor, the country buried, Æschines,—not only the successful or victorious! Justly. For the duty of brave men has been done by all; their fortune has been such as the Deity assigned to each.

“Accursed scribbler! You, to deprive me of the approbation and affection of my countrymen, speak of trophies and battles and ancient deeds, with none of which had this present trial the least concern; but I,—O you third-rate actor!—I, that rose to counsel the state how to maintain her preëminence, in what spirit was I to mount the hustings? In the spirit of one having unworthy counsel to offer? I should

have deserved to perish! You yourselves, men of Athens, may not try private and public causes on the same principles. The compacts of every-day life you are to judge of by particular laws and circumstances; the measures of statesmen by reference to the dignity of your ancestors; and if you think it your duty to act worthily of them, you should every one of you consider, when you come into court to decide public questions, that, together with your staff and ticket, the spirit of the commonwealth is delivered to you. But in touching upon the deeds of your ancestors there were some decrees and transactions which I omitted. I will return from my digression."*

Such is the development which Demosthenes calls the *paradox* of his oration. Two reasons have persuaded us not to detach it from the frame which the author has given it. This immortal oath, more honorable to Demosthenes, according to Cardinal Duperron, than if the orator had raised from the dead the warriors whose memory he evokes, is not an eloquent climax placed at the close of the oration, like Æschines' *prosopopœia*. It is a digression, a kind of unpremeditated parenthesis, spontaneously bursting from the orator's soul. Cicero or Mirabeau would undoubtedly have reserved it for the peroration; Demosthenes, the accomplished artist, did not. This trait gives an idea of the wise economy of his great orations. Furthermore, to isolate his apostrophe to the heroes of Marathon, is to weaken it. It must be produced as the orator himself produced it; we must mark the progression of the sublime *crescendo* whose thunder (*ὅδ' μὰ τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι*) is the culminating point. After this peal of thunder the orator gradually becomes calm. Demosthenes seems to obey the inspiration that governs him, as the waves of the

* *Pro Corona*, § 154 et seq.

ocean obey the force which raises and calms them. In reality he remains in full possession of his genius; while appearing to follow the emotions of his soul with docility, he directs them. Jupiter illuminates the heavens and thunders at his will. Demosthenes acts in like manner, but not in the manner of Pericles; for in him a vehemence of passions bursts forth,—a vehemence of actions and words of which Pericles was ignorant. He has the sudden spring of a lion that leaps upon the weapon which has pierced him; he invokes all the gods and goddesses of Attica, and Pythian Apollo against the impure bigot who dares to treat him as sacrilegious. He interrupts a citation in order to launch against him an imprecation; he crushes him with scorn: “May the gods, may the Athenians who are here present, destroy you, wretch, depraved citizen, vicious actor!”

When Dionysius of Halicarnassus was reading a page of Isocrates, he felt an impression like that of limpid oil agreeably flowing into his ears. He thought he heard the calm harmony of a spondaic song in Dorian style. When he took up an oration of Demosthenes, enthusiasm seized him. He was agitated in every sense by the different passions governing the human heart; he experienced the transports of the priests of Cybele. In Plutarch’s time there was to be seen at the Prytaneum, “on the right, on entering,” a portrait of Demosthenes with a sword at his side. This sword was glittering in the hands of Demosthenes on the rostrum; it was the attribute of the king of eloquence, as in the first circle of Dante’s *Inferno*, it consecrates the command of Homer, “the sovereign poet.”

V. Demosthenes marked at different times the efficacy of oratorical precaution and manners: “Eloquence

falls powerless on ill-disposed hearers," and so he always studied his hearers carefully. The interest of Athens imposed a duty on him of not saying truths too readily, nor striking too blindly. He attacks the *theoricon*, but not openly. He would destroy this abuse without inconsiderately falling upon the sword of the law which protects it. Courage among the Greeks never excluded prudence. Like the preachers of Louis XIV, he sometimes congratulates the Athenians on qualities of which they are totally destitute. Athens was the fatherland of jealousy, ingratitude and ostracism. Demosthenes pretends to forget it, and makes his counsels agreeable by eulogies which he is desirous to see merited.

"If you confirm the law of Leptines, the suppression of immunities will be attributed to envy. Now, of all dishonorable vices, it is most essential that you should shun this, Athenians. Why? because envy is an unmistakable mark of a bad nature, and the envious can allege no excuse to obtain pardon. Besides, there is no disgrace from which our state should be freer than from envy, — our state to which all kinds of baseness are repugnant. How many proofs bear witness to it! See, you alone, among all nations, honor the brave with public funerals and funeral eulogies, in which you celebrate their exploits. This custom characterizes a nation passionately devoted to virtue, and incapable of envy toward those who owe to it their reward. You accord, also, at all times, the highest honors to the victors in the gymnastic contests at which crowns are awarded. These honors cannot be extended beyond a small number of fortunate ones; and yet you are not jealous of them; you hold nothing from them. Let us add that Athens never seems outdone in generosity, so far does the grandeur of her gifts excel the services received. All these traits, Athenians, are proofs of justice, virtue and magnanimity. Do not, then, to-day, take away from our

country what was her glory in all ages; and, for the sake of aiding Leptines, to personally outrage some citizens who displease him, do not deprive the city and yourselves of the good reputation which has always followed you. In this judicial combat, the only question at issue is to know whether the national dignity is to be preserved pure, and worthy of its past, or shall it be degraded and annihilated."

Demosthenes praises Athens for her aversion to envy. In the meantime, the irritation of this passion was one of the greatest means employed by her orators. It inspired them with invective and calumny against the adversary, and imposed on them strict obligation and modesty.

Modesty is a decency which the ancients, in general, little knew. "I am pious Æneas, whose renown and glory is known beyond the stars." To whosoever asks his name and race, the son of Venus, unknown in Libya, is obliged to repeat the echoes of this fame beyond the stars. By his ingenious vanity, Cicero was worthy of living in the heroic age. Justly proud of a consulship from which his poetic enthusiasm even dated the birth of Rome, the vanquisher of Catiline would, according to his own assertion, sing his praises in prose and verse. (*Ad Atticum*, i, 19.) Isocrates, a timid rhetorician, praised himself with an intrepid assurance. In his *Panegyric* he boasted of having eclipsed his predecessors, vanquished and discouraged all future rivals. The author of the *Antidosis* could, with impunity, confide to the readers all his pride. Willing or unwilling, on the rostrum he ought to have imitated Demosthenes' discretion.

The oration *On the Crown* is an apology; the orator felt its dangers: "I will often be obliged to speak of myself; I will endeavor, then, to do so with all becom-

ing modesty. What I am driven to by the necessity of the case will be fairly chargeable to my opponent who has instituted such a prosecution." In the examination of his government, so honorable to him, he conceals himself as much as possible. "Afterward I dispatched all the armaments by which Chersonesus was preserved, and Byzantium, and all our allies; whence to you there accrued the noblest results,—praises, eulogies, honors, crowns, thanks from those you succored." Demosthenes desired to be crowned at the theater in the interests of Athens: "Is not the proclamation at the theater made for the benefit of those who confer the crown? For the hearers are all encouraged to render service to the state, and praise the parties who show their gratitude more than the party crowned." In proportion as the orator advances in the justification of his ministry, and wins the sympathy of his audience, he dares to become less reserved; but still what circumspection? "What then! will they say, have you such a superiority of force and courage that you alone suffice to do all? I do not say this; but, in my eyes, so great was the danger of the republic, that it seemed to be my duty to disregard all consideration of personal safety, and, as a citizen, to provide for all without neglecting any. * * * Therefore I placed myself at every post." At the moment when the judges are about to pronounce sentence, the orator wishes them to forget the emotions of his fierceness, legitimate, if you please, but which perhaps had escaped him, and he only desires to profit by his reputation of a "good citizen."

Narrow minds incline to envy: all things appear great to them. The Athenians were high-minded:

jealousy had no access to them through this channel; it was born among them from a lively feeling of equality. Allied to emulation, envy could be easily produced in a city in which all had the same rights, the same ambitions, and where no one was so high or so low as not to be susceptible of awakening jealous sentiments. The citizen accused of envy by the splendor of a singular glory had but one means to obtain pardon from his compatriots: this was to associate with them. The orator of the oration *On the Crown* used this artifice and was acquitted.*

The orator's task at Athens was a difficult one: all had their liberty of speech except the sincere counsellor. "Franchise is a common right in our city, to that degree that you extend it to foreigners and slaves. We see that the slave here has more liberty of speech than the citizen in some other commonwealths; but you have completely banished this liberty from the tribune." Euphræus revealed the Macedonian's manœuvres to the Oritians. Philip's hirelings threw Euphræus into prison, as a disturber of the public peace. The people, instead of whipping them to death (*ἀποτυμπανίσαι*), insulted their victim and "dragged him in the dust." The year had scarcely passed when Philip appeared at the foot of their ramparts, and proscription and murder decimated the enslaved city. Euphræus' predictions were justified. The fate of Euphræus did not discourage Demos-

* Certain orators accused Pericles of ruining the commonwealth with his monuments. "Do you find," said he to the assembled people, "that I have spent too much?—Yes, and much too much. Very well; these expenses shall be charged to me; but, in return, my name alone shall figure in the inscriptions of the edifices." At these words all the people cried out that he could take from the treasure enough to cover the expenses without sparing anything.

thenes; he left to others those harangues which enrich their authors and destroy the state. Demagogues humble themselves before the people, the dispensators of favors, in order to master and delight them. "What do you desire? what decree shall we propose? what can we do to please you?"* Demosthenes, like a true friend, reprimands instead of flattering them. The people of Athens, "formerly the guardian of our common liberty," have fallen very low. At the mercy of their own weakness, they judge of their power by their corpulence, of the strength of the state by the abundance of its markets. These places abound in provisions of all kinds; everything that flatters the senses has here a rendezvous from all points of Greece; but for essential provisions, the finances of the state, devotion of the allies, disinterestedness in public burdens, courage in war; of all these "there is a want worthy of laughter."

"Well, sir, this looks bad, but things at home are better. What proof can be adduced?—the parapets that are white-washed?—the roads that are repaired?—fountains and fooleries? Look at the men of whose statesmanship these are the fruits. They have risen from beggary to opulence, or from obscurity to honor. Some have made their private houses more splendid than the public buildings, and in proportion as the state has declined their fortunes have been exalted. What has produced these results? How is it that all went prosperously then, and now goes wrong? Because anciently the people, having the courage to be soldiers, controlled the statesmen and disposed of all emoluments. Any of the rest was happy to receive from the people his share of honor, office or advantage. Now, on the contrary, the statesmen dispose of emoluments. Through them everything is

* Cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, vi, 5; viii, 9.

done. You, the people, enervated, stripped of treasure and allies, are become as underlings* and hangers-on, happy if these persons dole you out show-money or send you paltry beeves; and, the unmanliest part of all, you are grateful for receiving your own. They, cooping you in the city, lead you to your pleasures and make you tame and submissive to their hands. It is impossible, I say, to have a high and noble spirit while you are engaged in petty and mean employments. Whatever be the pursuits of men, their characters must be similar."

The same thoughts were already expressed by the poet of the *Knights* with a still bolder figure. Comedy always enjoyed the privilege of whipping while laughing. The general Demosthenes announces to the pudding merchant Agoracritus the oracle which calls him to supplant Cleon in the favor of the people.

"*Demosthenes*: To-day you have nothing, to-morrow you will have all, chief of happy Athens,—felicity, wealth and power. *Agoracritus*: Why don't you let me wash my tripe and sell my pudding, instead of making a fool of me? *Dem.*: What a moon-calf! Your tripe! Don't you see these benches loaded with people? *Ag.*: Yes. *Dem.*: You will become their master,—master of them all, master of the market, of the harbors, of the Pnyx. You will be able to trample on the senate, to dismiss the generals, to load them with chains, to put them in prison, to have a jollification in the Prytaneum. *Ag.*: I? *Dem.*: You. But you don't see all yet. Mount your basket and look at all the islands that surround Athens. *Ag.*: I see them. Well? *Dem.*: These warehouses, these merchantmen? *Ag.*: Yes, no doubt. *Dem.*: Is any mortal happier than you? Turn your right eye to Caria, and your left toward Chalcedonia. *Ag.*: Is it considered fortunate to

* This is the passage, no doubt, but corrected, in which Æschines mentions the intolerable "monsters" of expression.

squint? *Dem.*: No; but you will become a dealer in all that."

Aristophanes returns to the charge in the *Wasps* against the spongers of the good people who become their victims.

"These fellows extort from the allies hundreds of talents by menace and intimidation; and you,—you are contented if you receive a trifle of your own power. * * * In return for so many toils on land and sea, you are not even given as much as a clove of garlic to eat with your small fish, and yet you are their master."

The comparison of Demosthenes and Aristophanes is commendable to the orator. Demosthenes opens the people's eyes upon the fraudulent administration and corrupt proceedings of their rulers. His aim is to bereave them of all credit, to reëstablish order in the administration, and civic virtues in their hearts. Aristophanes arouses the mob against the usurpers of their power, without suggesting any improvement. He wishes to disgorge the peculators and intriguers who feed upon the interests and finances of the state, and for the sole purpose of gorging the people in their turn. Did he ask to see the public wealth employed for the prosperity of Athens? No, but for universal enjoyment.

"If they wished to assure the well-being of the people, nothing would be easier for them. We have now a thousand tributary cities. Let them order each one of these to support twenty Athenians, and our twenty thousand citizens will eat nothing but hares, will drink nothing but pure milk, and always crowned with garlands, in the midst of perfumes as sweet as the exemption from military service. They will enjoy the delights to which the great name of their country and the trophies of Marathon entitle them." (*Wasps*.)

But Demosthenes does not thus understand the public censor's rôle. Free from party passion, he does not scourge any category of citizens for the benefit of another. He brings the whole city to trial. He does not arouse ignoble lusts, but generous sentiments. The audacities of Aristophanes were not dangerous. He pierced the demagogues with his arrows, shielding himself behind the envious avidity of the multitude. Later his language strengthened the credit of Philip's friends. Preserve peace at all hazards! Demosthenes braved the resentment of the Athenians; he exposed himself to their blows when he wounded them in order to heal them.

The Athenian people were a good prince. We know the chivalric manner in which Cleon one day discharged the people: "To-morrow our affairs, citizens; a sacrifice awaits me at home; I have guests to entertain." Stratocles announces a victory and invites the Athenians to celebrate it with a thanksgiving. After the feast, the people learn that the victory has been a defeat; they become angry: "Well, of what do you complain? Have I not given you enjoyment for three days?" The people are more patient than kings. This democracy, ridiculed by Aristophanes, had, however, something good: it suffered reprimands under the rudest form. "Strike, but hear," said Themistocles to Eurybiades; the Athenians hear without striking. A people who are affable sovereigns do not invoke the principle of authority with which kings crown themselves. They allow the authority of courageous reason to prevail; the severest counsels do not injure their majesty. La Fontaine advises him who frequents the *cœur du lion* to be

"Ni fade adulateur ni parleur trop sincère,"

and to answer sometimes equivocally. With the popular lion Demosthenes, in an emergency, disdained shifts; he had nothing of the courtier. We dare not speak the truth to our kings,—sometimes they do not deserve it. Good citizens speak it to their people, but do they always profit by it?

VI. Æschines exalted the ancestors, in order that he might the better vilify Demosthenes. Demosthenes extolled the Athens of Themistocles and Miltiades in order to elevate the Athens of his own century to their height. This parallel is, says he, full of instruction. These great national remembrances, if they do not remain sterile, would suffice to awaken the fortune of the city. Demosthenes always has them present in his mind; for “every harangue addressed to an illustrious commonwealth ought to appear higher than the orator, and to be estimated, not according to the importance of a single citizen, but according to the majesty of Athens.” Faithful to his maxim, Demosthenes always supported the cause of his country’s honor. The adversary of political “false coiners,” whose counsel tended to alter the national character, he labored to preserve its purity, from the oration *Against Leptines* (355) even to the day of Chæroneia, when “the sun of Greece was extinguished.” He did not speak to Scythians, to Siphnians, or to people of that kind, but to a nation whose glory awakened them to high pretensions and manly designs. What! yield to Philip, when the dignity of their ancestors rises before the eyes of the Athenians, inciting them to rival their virtues! Rather die than give such advice.

“Prepare yourselves, and make every effort first, then summon, gather, instruct the rest of the Greeks. That is the

duty of a state possessing a dignity such as yours. If you imagine that Chalcidians or Megarians will save Greece, while you run away from the contest, you imagine wrong. Well for any of those people if they are safe themselves. This work belongs to you; this privilege your ancestors bequeathed to you, the prize of many perilous exertions.” *

The whole world, said Pericles, is the tomb of our braves. Their memory, engraved on columns, is intrusted to a more durable monument,—the admiration of future generations. “Be emulators of these heroes; consider that happiness is in liberty, liberty in courage, and do not recoil before the dangers of war.” † Demosthenes, the political heir of Pericles, used the same language before the Athenians, but with greater authority. It was no longer a question of dispute as to who should have the hegemony in rival Greek cities, but how to save the liberty of the Hellenes against a foreigner. The high opinion which a people entertain of themselves is one of the elements of their power. Demosthenes inspired these proud sentiments in the hearts of his contemporaries. He wished to maintain them at their proper level by elevating them above other men. Formerly they were worthy to command; let them prove themselves to-day unworthy of being enslaved.

The magnanimous man has a passion for honor; “he seeks what is beautiful and without fruit, rather than what is useful and fruitful.” This grandeur of soul was peculiar to Athens. With all her orators, and some of her poets, Demosthenes rendered conspicuous the hereditary generosity which, since Œdipus and the Heraclidæ, made the city of Minerva a refuge for the oppressed, while Thebes voted for the destruction of

* *Third Philippic*, § 73.

† *Funeral Oration*, Thucydides, ii, 43.

Athens under the hands of Lysander. Lacedæmon without pity destroyed the vanquished city (405), as she had formerly sacked Plataea (427). Athens, after Leuctra, prevented the Thebans from annihilating her secular enemy Sparta. This magnanimous rôle, always proudly sustained, made the Median wars the most beautiful page of her golden book. In the midst of almost universal egotism,* Athens remained faithful to Hellenic interests. In this respect she had those who envied her, but no rivals. A century and a half later it was a "shameful and pitiful sight"† to see Greece soliciting the bribes of a Macedonian prince whom she could have made a client, and the cities jealously disputing the favor of a monarch who oppressed them. It was not in Demosthenes to save Greece from this shame, but it was due to him that his city at least was saved from it. Notwithstanding the decay of ancient virtues, he knew how to make this city worthy of herself, and he himself did not degenerate, nor was he inferior to those ancestors whom he extolled. Plutarch attributes this singular judgment to Theophrastus. "Demosthenes is on a level with his city, Demades is above it." Demades, whom Antipater said was naught but tongue and stomach,—a venal tongue, an insatiate stomach, whose greediness the Macedonian complained he could not satisfy. If Plutarch exactly reported Theophrastus' words, such a judgment, even when restricted to the eloquence of the two persons, justly surprises us when coming from the lips of a philosopher who ought to understand *characters*.

Athens counted more than one citizen who was struck with the imperfections of her constitution, and disposed to praise that of Sparta to the detriment of

* Plato, *Laws*, iii.

† Justin, viii, 4.

Athens. A common prejudice : everyone is wounded by the defects of his own government; everyone perceives but the good qualities of his neighboring governments. Leptines, hostile to immunities, alleged that Lacedæmon gave no similar recompense. Here Demosthenes had an opportunity for judicious reflections on the imitation of foreign customs. In fact, each people have their genius, consequently their manners and their laws. Each political system has its advantages, providing that all regulations in it concur and are inspired by the same spirit. A law which is good in one country becomes bad in another, if, instead of finding laws allied to and sympathetic with itself, it finds that it is expatriated, as it were, among strangers. At Sparta the recompense for merit was the participation in the power of the senate. At Athens it was a crown, exemption from public duties, and the hospitality of the Prytaneum. "Things are well arranged both here and there." For, in an aristocratic state, the distribution of authority is a pledge of harmony among the nobles (*ἀριστοί*) who are called to govern the city. Where the people rule, the recompenses which they decree ought to entertain the emulation of virtues, without interfering with the principles of popular sovereignty.

"In general, it seems to me that before praising the laws and customs of other cities, and censuring your own, you ought to prove that they are better than yours. But since, thanks to the Gods, public affairs, concord and everything is better at home, why will you disdain your own usages and run after those of others?"

Not so much imitators of their neighbors as their neighbors were of them, the Athenians were proud of the originality of their constitution, which was like the

originality of their genius. And they were wise in maintaining between their genius and their laws a harmony which facilitated their execution and guaranteed their duration. We do well and faithfully only what we do in accordance with our natural character.*

Demosthenes did not close his eyes upon the defects of the democratic constitution, but he did not wish that abuse should be invoked in order to proscribe usage. What human institution does not give access to abuse? It is easy to deceive the people (*Against Leptines*). Is it right to declare them incapable? Let the geometer choose the geometer, the pilot select the pilot. Such was one of Plato's favorite maxims, insinuating that philosophers alone were fit to govern men. Aristotle did not approve this opinion. If individuals, when isolated, are not equal to a learned specialist, when united they will be better, or at least equal to him. (No person ever had more *esprit* than Voltaire, if it be not the whole world); and then, in many cases, the artist is not the best appreciator of his work. The architect will be content with the house which he has built. The father of a family who dwells in it will perhaps be less satisfied. "The best judge of a feast is not the cook, but the guest."† Let us therefore acknowledge the competence of majorities, "if they are not composed of the degraded mob." One of the incontestable advantages of the power of the greatest

* Thucydides, ii, 34.

† *Politics*, iii, 6. The multitude is, in general, better than the individuals. "A feast of contribution (ἐξουσιον) is always more splendid than one of which the expenses are defrayed by a single person. The larger the body of water, the less corruptible." In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, x, 10, Aristotle declares the mass incapable of right and virtue. He stamps them with forfeiture. The politician has invalidated the unjust sentence of the moralist.

number is that it will never act against its own interests. On the contrary, the interests of a monarch and the interests of his subjects are different. (*Second Olynthiac.*)

Æschines encouraged Philip to enslave Athens by showing him the weak points in that democracy; moreover, the orator who delivered the keys of the place to the invader was the same man who, in reference to the unbridled desires of Timarchus, saw the height of crime in an attempt upon the liberty of the cities. "Here are passions which filled the haunts of brigands, made the pirates mount their swift ships, attempted to slaughter citizens, to serve tyrants, and to destroy democracy," which, according to Herodotus, is "the most iniquitous and criminal action that can be committed among men." In doing homage to liberty, the Greeks paid it a debt of acknowledgment; for their greatness, since the expulsion of the Pisistratidæ, was its work. They were further indebted to it for having repulsed the barbarians; they were proclaimed worthy, and born to command "those slaves by nature."* In the eyes of the Hellenes, the empire was the legitimate lot of the best, and Athens pretended to rule over the rest of Greece, an ambition which other great cities by an equal right shared, and which was a source of incurable evils for the whole nation.

In this respect Demosthenes did not judge his fellow-citizens with impartiality.

"Your good nature hinders you from increasing your dominion and usurping power; but you also prevent every other state from seizing power. If any state surprises a garrison, you take it back. In short, you are zealous to put obstacles

* Aristotle, *Politics*, i, 1; Herodotus, v, 78, 92.

in the way of all who are ambitious for empire, and to arouse all people to liberty."

Athens summoned people to liberty because she invigorated herself by making popular governments for her allies. But did she never abuse her hegemony, and was not the very cruelty of her authority one of the causes of her defeat by Lysander? It was not the arts of Athens, nor even her pleasures, that ruined her in the struggle with Sparta, but the burden of tyranny, intolerable to her allies, and her haughty pretensions which her political wisdom or virtues did not then justify. Athens ruled over Greece during a period of seventy-three years, Lacedæmon during twenty-nine. Thebes, after Leuctra, received this inheritance. None of the three cities knew how to preserve it. The Thebans made themselves insupportable by their pride and arrogance. Master of the Acropolis at Athens, Lysander, dressed like a priest, the minister of divine vengeance, immolated with his own hand the Athenian general Philocles, a signal for the slaughter of three thousand prisoners. Athens was more humane in respecting the rights of war, but with what crimes she can be reproached! By decimating themselves in turn, the preponderating cities had prepared the way for the Macedonian. Under the pretext of watching with jealous care Hellenic equilibrium, they sacrificed harmony, that is to say, national power, for the passion of equality.

No one ever suffered, said Demosthenes, the city invested with the hegemony to abuse its power, and to-day all allow Philip to mutilate and pillage Greece at his will.

"And you must be sensible that whatever wrong the Greeks sustained from Lacedæmonians, or from us, was at

least inflicted by genuine people of Greece; and it might be felt in the same manner as if a lawful son, born to a large fortune, committed some fault or error in the management of it. On that ground one would consider him open to censure and reproach, yet it could not be said that he was an alien, and not heir to the property which he so dealt with. But if a slave or a spurious child wasted and spoiled what he had no interest in,—heavens, how much more heinous and hateful would all have pronounced it! And yet, in regard to Philip and his conduct they feel not this, although he is not only no Greek and no way akin to Greeks, but not even a barbarian of a place honorable to mention; in fact, a vile fellow of Macedon, from which a respectable slave could not be purchased formerly.”*

Yes, Macedonia was disdained before Philip. Philip was feeble and small in the beginning, but he became great on account of the divisions into which the Hellenic family splintered their forces, and this was due to the defiant† hostilities of cities which were oppressed longer and more imperiously by Athens than by any other state. The yoke of Philip, the cunning politician, did not frighten cities that were wearied of tyrannical rule. This rule was insupportable, because their common origin and equality of rights excited a most irritated jealousy in the hearts of the subjects. Demosthenes was indignant at seeing a barbarian use with impunity a license which had been refused in Greece to Greeks. He could not endure the idea that Athens, after a long and glorious suzerainty, should abdicate the protectorship of the Hellenes. We can understand these sentiments of

* *Third Philippic*, § 30.

† The Athenians sent Proxenus to aid Phocis. The Phocidians rejected their savior; they suspected that he wished to seize their cities, which were shortly afterward destroyed by Philip.

the patriot; but should he be astonished at the apparent indifference of states which witnessed a conflict between two masters, the most dreaded of whom was not the stranger? During the grandest epochs of Grecian history, national sentiment was not unanimous. What must it have been after more than a century of internal struggles, reciprocal defeats, moral weakness and decay? Athens saved Greece from the barbarians: she was rewarded by the consented royalty of the Hellenic world; but she abused her power, and when she confronted Philip she found herself alone. Her heroism in the present, her despotism in the past, concurred to make a void around her. At the last hour Thebes extended her hands to her, but it was too late. The rest of Greece was either forced to submit to Macedonian law, or silently accepted it. Rarely do nations have a different lot from that which they deserve, and, in spite of fatality which is an easy excuse, they are like individuals, the first artisans of their own fortune.

CHAPTER VII.

ORATORICAL CONTESTS IN POLITICAL DEBATES AT ATHENS.

“*Ἀγῶνας μὴ μόνον τάχους καὶ λόγων καὶ γνώμης, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων ἀπάντων, καὶ τούτων ἅθλα μέγιστα*: Athens instituted contests not only of agility and strength, but also of eloquence and learning, and of all other accomplishments; the prizes for these were magnificent.” (Isocrates, *Panegyric*.)

THE individual changes manners and tastes according to the age; the universal man, who represents humanity, changes inclinations and knowledge according to countries and centuries. To note the physiognomy peculiar to each race, and to replace the works of different ages in the period which gave them birth, is the principle of historical criticism. Neglected by the ancients, and their scrupulous imitators of the seventeenth century, this principle has been imposed since the eighteenth century upon all careful criticism of justice and truth. Beyond this we can “trifle,” according to Pope’s expression, but never criticise. Faithful to this method, let us seek in the artistic spirit and in certain moral dispositions of the Greeks an exact understanding of their eloquence.

In the orations *On the Embassy* and *On the Crown*, Demosthenes’ contest against Æschines is, in certain respects, confounded with his contest against Philip. Here the orator endeavors to unmask the prevaricating ambassador; then, conquered by Philip and his allies in the Agora, subject to public hatred as the

author of irreparable disasters, he glories in having been the soul of the struggle in which his country succumbed; and while his adversary, apparently justified by Chæronæa, wishes to humiliate and defeat his rival, Demosthenes, confounding his cause with that of the city, establishes between the minister of Athens, Athens herself, and the gods, a joint and several liability, which forces the Athenians to choose between the justification of Demosthenes and the condemnation of the heroes of Marathon. Demosthenes so well pleads his cause and the nation's honor, that the people proclaim, to the confusion of Æschines, that the inspirer of Chæronæa has well served his country. Never was there a more imposing spectacle than to see a people avenging themselves upon their conquerors by a magnificent protestation of right against power, of duty against interest. Never did a finer work of oratory honor the political tribune. Such is the great contest between Demosthenes and Æschines, and the two great orations in which the struggle manifested itself with the greatest splendor; but, without exposing ourselves to the reproach of weakening such works and diminishing such intellectual giants, let us consider them under different aspects. Demosthenes was not merely a public counsellor, animated against Æschines by a patriotic hatred; he was also his rival in eloquence. In him the artist is united with the citizen, and in this grave and generous figure, passions and certain individual traits enable us to recognize in the minister of state the man and the Athenian. Still more clearly do we see the rival and artist appear in Æschines, who was always an orator rather than a citizen.

Demosthenes' hearers were artists charmed with elo-

quent language. They esteemed it so highly that Æschines, in order to induce them to surrender to Philip, did not forget to praise the Macedonian's eloquence. They listened to their orators as virtuosos; they assisted in the debates at the tribune like assistants at a concert,—a spectacle that was intended to charm the mind and ear equally. Panegyrical orations, says Isocrates, in which the interests of the cities or of entire Greece are discussed, have, as all know, a great analogy to rhythmical and musical compositions, and afford the same pleasure to the hearer.* The people, said Cicero, are very sensitive to harmony. “If the poet wrongly uses a long or short syllable in a verse, the whole theater will cry out.” In the forum, on the contrary, the assembly loudly applauded a happy conclusion of a *dichoreus*.† The city of Minerva was even more delicate in this respect. The Athenians turned their attention from the most important reasoning to ridicule, an unusual formula of oath, or a mistake in the pronouncing of accents. An ungraceful movement of the shoulders, a gesture abrupt or ill suited to the words, an unaccustomed expression, excited the uproar of the Pnyx. This was sufficient to draw the ridicule of the comic poets. On the tribune, and even before a modest tribunal, the Athenian orator was like an actor on the stage. He had to satisfy in every point the artistic exigencies of his audience. Virtue is more pleasing when enhanced by the beauty of the body. On the same ground, physical imperfections at Athens depreciated eloquence and compromised its success. Pélisson is said to have abused the permis-

* *Antidosis*, §§ 46, 47.

† *Patris dictum sapiens, temeritas filii cōmprōbāvit.* (*Orat.*, 50, 51, 63.)

sion accorded to men of being ugly. Paris was more indulgent than Athens. Socrates was, perhaps, the only Hellene whose ugliness the Athenians overlooked; and it is possible that he might have escaped the hemlock if he had had the beauty of Alcibiades.

The suitors of Demosthenes' civil cases were often wanting in these seducing advantages, which were lavished on this favorite of the Athenians. They excused themselves for it as best they could. If their exterior leaves much to be desired, they are, nevertheless, brave people. "My figure," said Apollodorus, "is not agreeable, my walk precipitated, my voice hoarse. I know it, Athenians. I am not one of those whom nature has favored. These defects which are offensive have many a time done me harm, but" * * * All that did not prevent him from being superior to his adversary Stephanus, and from being in the right against him. Nicobulus asked Pantœnetus for a sum of money which he had loaned him. The debtor essayed to pay him in abuse. He gave him the title of a great trotter (*ταχὺ βᾶδιζων*), as if justice were measured by the length of the strides.

"As to my gait, to my manner of speaking, judges, I will frankly speak of it. I know myself, I know my defects. * * * The only profit they bring me is to displease some citizens. Is this not unfortunate for me? But what am I to do? When I loan money, is this a reason that it should not be given back to me, and that I should even be made to pay a fine? Assuredly not! * * * It seems to me that each person is as nature made him. To destroy her works is impossible. If this were not so we should all resemble one another."

My opposing party is ugly, therefore he is wrong. My creditor stammers, then we are acquitted. These abusive deductions were feared by plaintiffs who were

deformed by nature, and forced them to offer candid excuses.

Among the spectacles which made Athens an enchanted abode there was none more popular than oratorical contests,—real feasts of intellect, in which the sentiment of art too easily effaced that of justice. The Athenians, like fine connoisseurs, delighted in this recreation without caring much about the cause itself. *Æschines* regretted the good old times which his father *Atrometus*, an old man of ninety-five years, praised, when judges were more attentive to their business. “Nothing is so ridiculous, on the contrary, as that which is practiced in our days. The clerk reads the decree of the accused; the judges, inattentive and distracted, listen to the reading as if it were a foreign detail or a song (*ἑπωδῆς*).” * Formerly the heliasts demanded that the laws and decrees which determined their decisions should be read and re-read before them, as in architecture the plummet is used to determine whether a wall is perpendicular. The hearers of *Æschines* and *Demosthenes* were especially fond of eloquence which would hold them spell-bound. As for the subject of the trial, it was often left in the shade. The accused was interested in flattering this disposition of the tribunal; he turned his attention from the principal point and readily devoted himself to agreeable digressions. The clepsydra measures the time easily, the day has fled, and the meeting breaks up without having punished either of the two parties.” See how, in defiance of the oath of the heliasts,—“I will pass a sentence on the subject of the debate,”—the trial of the *Embassy* was without result.

* The Roman judges gave place to far greater scandals, if we can give credence to a fragment of *Caius Titius*.

Above all things the orator was obliged to please such hearers,—an obligation imposed on Demosthenes more imperiously than on any other orator, for he had to contend against Æschines, a rough warrior armed with all the advantages of eloquence and a noble physique, and also assisted by the weakness of the Athenians. Demosthenes, therefore, could not neglect any of the resources of his art in order to captivate an artistic people and to triumph, by the charm of his diction as much as by the solidity of his arguments, over the repugnance of effeminate citizens who were little disposed to the self-denial which their austere duty demanded of them. Demosthenes has more than once marked this necessity of charming the Athenians in order to save them. What must be done to make them favorably disposed? “We must not only skillfully display oratorical manners, but especially must we move them by the invincible allurements of a beautiful language.” Justly convinced of the power of words to govern men, and in particular the Athenians, Demosthenes wished to be an accomplished orator; he had a love for the art, and he was patriotic. This was the salvation of the commonwealth. Therefore Demosthenes’ eagerness to penetrate the hearts of his fellow-citizens through this avenue, outside of which the orator must necessarily go astray. Therefore the careful revisions of those parts which he esteemed the surest to make an artistic and moral impression; therefore his repetitions distasteful to our modern customs, and before which ancient ingenuousness did not recoil; therefore, finally, the refusal to mount the rostrum without being prepared.* Moderately endowed with promptitude of imagination, so necessary to an improv-

* These different points have been treated in ch. v.

isatore, Demosthenes feared to trust to the accidents of inspiration, and by a possible failure to compromise the authority of a single word necessary to the welfare of the state. Thus Demosthenes prepared himself, in the studious contemplations of his closet, to be persuasive on the rostrum. He ascended it provided with all his arms, and confident that he was master of his delicate hearers, whom it was difficult to satisfy, but who were easily led by a man capable of pleasing them with generous sentiments and exhibitions of art.

Among the most desirable virtues, the Greeks place the virtue of *antagonism*,—a composition of stature, velocity and strength. This virtue, one of the elements of happiness, won the admiration of the Greeks at the great national games. Pindar extolled the runners and pugilists who were crowned at Olympia as the most glorious of mortals. This virtue delighted the people at the theater, where the comic and tragic poets offered them two spectacles equally enjoyable, contests of passions and contests of intellect. Antagonistic virtue even delighted the tribunals, witnesses of fencing combats in which the vigor and vivacity of the mind were displayed. Æschines and Demosthenes sometimes used comparisons which made their debates resemble gymnastic contests. Visconti mentions two statues of Lysias and Isocrates represented as athletes, emblematic of the analogy between the contests in the arena and those of the tribune and bar. In the athletic engagements of the judicial class, the antagonists could practice the definition of bodily strength given by Aristotle:

“Strength is the ability which one man has to move another as he wishes; now, he can move him only by pulling, or pushing, or raising, or bending, or crushing him. The

strong man, then, will be strong in consequence of all these abilities or some of them."

Æschines and Demosthenes excelled in this strength which they manifested in their pleadings and in those mixed orations which belong both to political eloquence and to the eloquence of the bar, and which wonderfully complies with flexibilities of all kinds. The idea of competition, of contest (*ἀγών*), was one of the essential ideas of the Greek mind; we meet it on every page of their works. Thus Demosthenes compared the war between Athens and Philip to a contest in which the prizes would be Chalcidia and Thrace. The ideas of a people are the natural reflection of their morals. The life of an Athenian was an exercise of perpetual emulation. Athens had competitions in strength, activity, intellect, and beauty: rewards were offered for excellence in all these talents.

The inclination among the Greeks for antagonism had its source in the spirit of emulation and a strong desire for glory. Glory was their ruling passion, their only desire according to Horace (*præter laudem nullius avaris*). After the athlete Timanthes became old, he exercised in archery; for his love of glory did not grow old. A voyage compelled him to suspend exercise. On his return he felt that his strength was waning: he erected his funeral pile and threw himself into the flames. He lost his strength and his hope to vanquish; he deemed himself unworthy of living. The rhapsodist Nicærat, forced to yield the palm for declamation to Prædys, did not die a tragic death, but from that moment he let his hair grow and took no care of his person. To receive a crown at the theater on the day of the new tragedies, not from the whole people, which would be too high an ambition for most men, but from

his deme, from his tribe, was at Athens the dream of the most unpretending. Wealthy citizens sometimes set their slaves free; in return, they enjoyed the pleasure of having their names proclaimed by the herald in the presence of all the Greeks. The generals likewise envied this popular honor. Charidemus and Diotimus furnished eight hundred shields for the young recruits; Nausicles supported two thousand soldiers at his own expense. What was to be the greatest recompense for these patriotic sacrifices? A crown at the Panathenæa. The orators could not be less sensitive to public homage, and the means for them to acquire it was to excel in intellectual contests.

II. Their political debates were sometimes transformed into oratorical jousts. Deliberative eloquence was then confined to the *epidictic* class. In Demosthenes' eyes, Ctesiphon's accuser did not seriously think of receiving justice for pretended misdemeanors, but he merely desired to display his talent (*λόγων ἐπιδοξάζειν τινά*). In fact, in their apparently most infuriated duels the Greeks sometimes aimed at a literary success as well as personal vengeance. They wished to strike their adversary cruelly, but with art. Æschines and Demosthenes, bitterly engaged in a spirited discussion, endeavored to crush each other under the weight of the reprobation of the city, but they also desired, in the face of all Greece, to display their oratorical superiority. For this reason they took the time to deliver themselves of their academical thrusts. In 344 Demosthenes gave a presentiment of Æschines' accusation, but the direct and formal attack was not made until 342, five years after the questionable embassy. Demosthenes attributed this delay to an honorable motive,—a desire not to trouble the state with unsea-

sonable debates when it was engaged in such difficulties with Philip. "I have said enough to awaken your remembrances. Save us, great gods, from a rigorous examination of these perfidies!" Æschines, in his turn, did not deliver his speech against Ctesiphon until 330. He had, it is true, from 338 until the day after Charonea, attacked the motion of Demosthenes' friend, but the speeches had been delayed eight years.* Why this long postponement?

This is one of Demosthenes' favorite objections. He constantly referred to it in order to edify the judges on the honesty of his enemy. If I was culpable, why not denounce me at the very moment of the misdemeanor, and convict me, taken in the act? "What would you think of a physician who, having prescribed nothing for a patient during his illness, comes after his death to the ceremonies of the ninth day to tell his parents in detail the remedies which would have cured him?" In the very midst of great events, you would not have dared to traduce me. The evidence of facts and public indignation would have confounded you. To-day the time seems favorable to insult me, "as if from the summit of a rubbish-cart," and to pay your respects to Alexander. To the embarrassing reproaches of Demosthenes, Æschines replied with fine sentiments, and especially with a recital of injuries :

"After the battle we had no leisure to think of your punishment. While sent on the embassy we labored for the safety of our country. But, not satisfied with impunity, you solicited rewards; you made Athens an object of laughter to

* The judges did not press the matter more than the orators. Demosthenes tells us of an action brought against Midias, and pending eight years. The *pede Pæna claudo* of Horace applies too well to the lame justice of Athens.

the rest of Greece! Then I arose and accused you. * * * My silence, Demosthenes, was due to the simplicity of my life. Content with little, I do not desire to enrich myself by dishonest means. Thus I speak, I am silent because of reflection. But you! when paid you become mute; when the gold is gone, you cry out. You neither speak in your place, nor in accordance with your convictions, but you are subject to him who hires you.*

Besides these motives, false or sincere, there is another motive, not avowed, but powerful. If the adversaries defer hostilities during long years, it is in order to assure themselves of greater chances of victory. Delay is not prejudicial to them. Therefore, instead of denouncing the enemy when it would be most useful to the state, they patiently watch for the most favorable moment to humiliate a rival. The affair can be carried; the opportunity becomes auxiliary to the artist. Demosthenes had good reasons for not being mistaken, and he betrayed his adversary's secret when he said: "Æschines wished to accuse me at his opportunity and at his ease." To-day he enters the lists. He imagines, it seems, that you have come to assist in an oratorical contest (*ρήτορων ἀγῶνα*), and not to examine a minister's conduct; to pass judgment on the beauties of language, and not to weigh the interests of the state.

Demosthenes himself sometimes sacrificed to oratorical cares. When outraged by Midias in the exercise of his functions as choregus, he prepared numerous memoirs against that insulter. He confessed that he had written carefully the speech in which he demanded justice. He invoked the people against the impious Midias with all the vehemence, hatred and

* *Against Ctesiphon*, §§ 218, 225, 227.

ability possible, then, when his work was finished, he left it in his portfolio. It seems that his desire was less to pronounce it than to write it. The author of an oration full of bitterness and gall,—a virulent pamphlet in which he swears to be inexorable,—Demosthenes suddenly disarms himself and sheathes his sword. He subsides and Midias is spared his life. This unexpected event warrants this conclusion: violated law, outraged religion and danger of the public safety, were not the orator's only cares and considerations in his oration against Midias. By the side of a satisfaction for damage, he placed a satisfaction of self-love. He produced this masterpiece of invective through his hatred for Midias and his love for honor. He wished to inflict on his enemy the punishment of a posthumous disgrace, and to leave to posterity an imperishable monument of his eloquence.

In order to carry off the palm in the contests at the bar, there were no artifices which adversaries did not employ. They vied with each other in the artifices of court (*πάλαισμα δικαστηρίου*). They exchanged the epithets of sophists, monkeys, foxes; that is to say, of knavish and sly rogues. Demosthenes said Æschines is like the finest flour (*παιπάλημα*), capable of passing through the finest sieve. He turns here and there; he changes every moment. Æschines was even sharper. An old pettifogging knave (*περίτριμμα ἀγοράζ*), he slipped from between the hands of his antagonist and escaped the greatest embarrassments. He was “clever at all things (*πάνδευσος*), treacherous (*πανούργος*).” * Panurge,

* Strepsiades, in the *Clouds*: “Let them (the sophists) do what they please with me. I deliver my body to them. Blows, hunger, thirst, heat, cold, are of little importance. Let them flay me, providing that I escape my debts,—providing that I have the reputation

in Rabelais, practiced sixty-three methods of procuring money when in need. The most honest was to steal. The champions of the Greek tribune likewise left no stone unturned. Dissimulations, inventions of every kind, alteration of dates, facts and texts,—all arms were lawful if they aided in vanquishing the enemy. Truth, right, respect for one's self and for others, were of little importance. Success acquitted the orator of everything. Did not grave and serious Pindar write that "we must do everything in order to triumph over our enemies"?* In his definition of power, in which he makes a complete enumeration of the methods by which a man can be moved, Aristotle says nothing of a method proscribed at the public games, but which was held in high esteem by the tribunals, namely, tripping the adversary (*ὑποσσελίεσεν*). Philip practiced this against the Greek cities. The wrestlers of the judicial and political arena had no scruples in employing it:† hence the agility and flexibility of their argumentation and the stratagems with which they reproached one another, and yet had recourse to them.

An Athenian orator's aim was at first to have right, of being a bold knave, a ready talker, impudent, brazen-faced, noisy, skillful to weave lies, an old stager of chicanery, a real table of laws, a word-mill, a fox that passes through every hole, as supple as leather, as slippery as an eel, an insincere and crimeful braggart, a cheat with a hundred faces, crafty and unbearable, fond of good dishes. Such are the names with which I wish to be saluted. On this condition let them treat me as they please; and, if they wish, by Ceres! let them make a pudding of me and serve me up to the philosophers!"

* *Χρὴ δὲ πᾶν ἔρδοντ' ἀμυνρῶσαι τὸν ἐχθρόν.* (*Third Isthmiac*, 81.)

† Plato compares the rhetoricians playing with the quibbles of sophistry to "those who place their foot before you in order to make you fall, or who remove your chair when you are about to sit down, and then laugh heartily when they see you on the ground."

or the appearance of right, clothed in good language, then to delight his hearers with eloquent words as often and as long as possible. With Demosthenes, said Æschines, it is difficult to find place to say a word; Æschines, replied Demosthenes, is not a man who yields to anyone: "He would give his blood sooner than any of his oration." This was an allusion to the clepsydra that measured the orator's time.* The rivalry of the two adversaries often bordered on jealousy; that of Demosthenes appeared "hyperbolic" to Æschines. Perhaps he was not exempt from it. At one time he paints his adversary as an incomparable orator, a prodigious statesman, carrying his head high and cheered by the assembly, then descending from the rostrum with "great majesty" (*μᾶλα σεμνῶς*). At another time he makes malicious allusions to the physical advantages, and to certain superiorities of his rival. Demosthenes refused to improvise: Æschines was always ready. Demosthenes never let his lamp go out,—slowly, laboriously he prepared his way. Æschines seemed to ignore the work of the file

* On August 3, 1789, a member of the National Assembly proposed that the president have a *five minute* hour-glass on his desk, in order that when the five minutes were passed the orator might be invited to sit down. An ecclesiastic immediately asked that the president's watch supply the place of the proposed hour-glass for the time being. An orator observed that, as the motion had not yet been adopted, they could not conform to it. The discussion began: the hour-glass succumbed to it. The fear of going beyond the prescribed limit might trouble the orator and thereby render him "unintelligible." "History presents to us but one epoch in which the hour-glass has been the measure of eloquence. * * * To enslave to a pendulum, and to measure the right of the representatives of an active and intellectual nation," and that "after two hundred years of despotism" and obligatory silence, was an unacceptable proposition, etc. The Assembly rejected "the tyranny of the dial."

and was eloquent by nature. Demosthenes intentionally exaggerated this enviable facility, and compared it to a river which rolls in torrents.* Demosthenes congratulated Æschines on his excellent memory; he himself often saw his weakness in this respect. Æschines could pronounce long tirades in "a single breath"; his pronunciation was clear, his voice harmonious and sonorous. Both were faulty in Demosthenes. Several times Demosthenes extolled these qualities of Æschines. That admirable declamation recalled to his mind his own long and painful efforts to correct an interrupted respiration and his faulty pronunciation; therefore his eulogies were ironical and impregnated with envy. Æschines is well adapted to tragedy; he knows how to assume dignity and to acquit himself like Solon. He is a "fine statue," and what lungs! Never had a public crier stronger lungs. His two brothers were also loud-talkers (*μεγαλόφωνοι*); it is a family characteristic.

A powerful voice was an advantage particularly admired by the ancients. Cicero appreciated its value, if we can judge from this remark: "What voice, what lungs, what vigor could describe this outrage!" Iron lungs (*ferrea vox*) were indispensable auxiliaries before the tumultuous multitudes of the forum and the Pnyx. When Æschines harangued the *Ten-Thousand* in Arcadia, he discovered the advantage of his. Even in the halls of our modern assemblies, a weak voice must compromise the orator's victory, if the meeting is a stormy one. The orator needs a voice capable of mastering the tumult and the audience. Mirabeau had a voice that was pleasing in the diapason of seduction, and "terribly resonant in the accents

* Ἄνω ποταμῶν οἱ λόγοι ἐρρόυσαν. (*On the Embassy*.)

of fury." Could he have been master of the assembly as well without this formidable thunder?

"In public exercises whoever possesses these three advantages,—a powerful voice, harmony and rhythm,—carries off the prize. At the theaters to-day, the comedians carry off the palm from poets; likewise in oratorical contests (*πολιτικὸς ἀγωνίας*), the orator gifted with graceful gestures is the favorite."*

A melodious voice, the essential element of action, must have exercised a strong influence over the musical and artistic organization of the Athenians, that Demosthenes should ridicule Æschines' voice with such sarcasm. He sneered at it on every occasion,—we might say that he refuted it, so much did it seem to be an argument in favor of his rival and a natural instrument of victory. Æschines said that Demosthenes' voice was shrill and sharp (*ὀξεῖαν*); that he was obliged to modify it with great labor. Æschines had a voice like a "siren," and the orator of the *Embassy* pleaded against it as against a formidable adversary.

"If you keep watch upon him thus, he will have nothing to say, but will raise his voice here and have exercised himself in spouting all to no purpose. About his voice, too, it may be necessary to say something; for I hear that upon this, also, he very confidently relies, as if he can overpower you by his acting. I think, however, you would be committing a gross absurdity if, when he played the miseries of Thyestes and the men of Troy, you drove and hissed him off the boards, and nearly stoned him to death, so that at last he desisted from his playing of third-rate parts; yet now that, not upon the stage, but in public and most important affairs of state, he has wrought infinity of evil, you should pay regard to him as a fine speaker. Heaven forbid! Do not you be guilty

* Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, iii, 1.

of any folly, but consider: if you are making trial of a herald, you should see that he has a good voice, but if of an ambassador and undertaker of public duties, that he is honest, that he demeans himself with spirit as your representative like a fellow citizen toward you. * * * Further, when you see eloquence or a fine voice or any other such accomplishment in a man of probity and honorable ambition, you should all rejoice at it and encourage its display, for it is a common advantage to you all; but when you see the like in a corrupt and base man, who yields to every temptation of gain, you should discourage and hear him with enmity and aversion; as knavery, getting from you the reputation of power, is an engine against the state. You see what mighty troubles have fallen upon the state from what the defendant has got renown by." *

The ill-concealed spite which these qualities of Æschines inspired in Demosthenes was probably augmented by a circumstance which must have been humiliating to our orator. Demosthenes' spirit of emulation often involved him in indirect contests with orators whom he honored by seeming jealous of their success. In the oration written in the name of Androcles against Lacritus, Isocrates' pupil, we find a feeling of sorrow expressed which the young Demosthenes felt because he was unable to pay that famous master for lessons which were held at too high a price. "As for me, by Jupiter and all the gods, I never was jealous of sophists, nor did I blame any one for giving money to Isocrates. It would be folly on my part to be disturbed by such cares." He did, however, trouble himself to vilify an art which, according to him, did not recognize its debts, and paid its creditors with falsehoods. If such seems to be the vivacity of Demosthenes' feelings

* *Embassy*, § 337.

as regards obscure rivals, what must have been his chagrin when a solemn oratorical contest appeared to confuse him in the presence of the Macedonian king! Æschines painted this scene, and his malevolence is evident; nevertheless the truth can be determined. The deputies were deliberating on the language that they should use before the king. Demosthenes promised that he would "open sources of never-failing eloquence, and that he would sew up the mouth" of the Macedonian king. Audience was given. Demosthenes, the youngest of the ambassadors (as he says), was invited to speak last.

"All were attentive, and relied upon words of irresistible weight, for his magnificent promises had even reached the ears of Philip and his courtiers, as was learned later. When all his hearers were thus disposed, the lion of the tribune, terrified nearly to death, muttered a dismal exordium, said a few words on his subject, then suddenly ceased, became disconcerted, and finally could not say one word. Philip seeing his embarrassment, encouraged him, and informed him that he ought not to imagine that he had suffered the disgrace of an actor at the theater. He invited him to meditate, and, after recalling his memory, to continue. But when once disturbed and the thread of his written oration lost, he could not recover himself, and further efforts were of no avail. When nothing more was to be said the introducer asked us to retire. Philip's officers called us back. When we returned and were seated, the king began to respond briefly and in order to each of our orations. He commented especially on mine, and justly, since, as I knew, I had not omitted anything that ought to be said, and several times he pronounced my name. As for Demosthenes, whose rôle had been so ridiculous, he did not address to him one word, as I remember. Thus this man was choked with anger."*

* *Embassy*, § 34.

Demosthenes could not rest under this defeat. A second trial gave him some hope of revenge; this time he asked to speak first, but without much more success, according to Æschines. This fruitful and able orator forgot all important points. He said what he ought to have passed over in silence, and omitted what he ought to have said. Fortunately Æschines was there; he filled up the gaps in Demosthenes' flat and ridiculous harangue and screened his impertinences.

III. And so, even in the presence of the invader, the ministers of Athens, invested with her powers, responsible for her salvation, remembered their oratorical rivalries. They persisted in their little passions of rivalry, and did so in the finest language.

It is astonishing to find them rival artists in their private debates? They were almost as attentive in their appreciation of words as of actions. At one time Demosthenes praises Æschines' brevity; more often he criticises his long speeches; or he even offers an approbation, an involuntary homage, to a talent which "has charmed every Athenian." Æschines turns Demosthenes' vehement action into ridicule. He counterfeits his attitude when about to begin his speech; he rubs his head (τρίψας τὴν κεφαλὴν); he ridicules some of his gestures, "as if the safety of Greece depended on a word and the motion of his hand." He censures an expression, a metaphor. He amuses himself by playing the rhetorician, in the oration *On the Crown*, in the midst of a discussion which was the most important ever tried before the people whose honor was at stake in the suit. What does he mean by saying to "extort" the alliance of peace, instead of using the word "separate"? Is this not a term as displeasing

as the man who permits it? Demosthenes boasts of having fortified "our city with walls of brass and steel."* What pride and what presuming language! Is it in good taste to say: "The Pythian priestess philippizes?" This disrespectful manner of speaking is characteristic of an ignoramus. Æschines, in his turn: He uses large words, emphatic apostrophes, which smack of the stage. "O earth, O heavens, O virtue!" He remembers, it is true, his profession as tragedian, but, when Æschines is summoned, he exercises it with the majestic tone of a Rhadamanthus. What impertinence! Elsewhere, Demosthenes writes a page of literary criticism, artistic and even theatrical, on the iambi of Euripides' *Phœnix*, and on a statue of Solon. At times the oration *On the Embassy* turns to criticise poetical erudition. Æschines declaimed some verses from Solon, and attempted to draw from them some arguments against Demosthenes. Demosthenes returned the blow, and cited Solon on the love of gold and of venality. To a fragment from Euripides he replied with a fragment from Sophocles. Against every scholar he placed two. Æschines wished to destroy, in advance, the effect of a citation from Homer, to which the general, the defender of Timarchus, ought to have recourse:

"You ought to speak of Achilles, Patroclus and Homer, as if our judges were ignorant. You are very important. You affect a vain erudition which tends to humiliate the people. Let us show that we, also, are not ignorant of literature and learning. Since they quote the wise, and have recourse to sentences expressed in their verses, cast your eyes

* Demosthenes (*Pro Corona*) has substituted stone and brick for steel and brass. He corrects the terms, but he emphasizes the thought.

with me, Athenians, on the philosophical poets who, as all confess, unite genius and virtue. See how they distinguish a modest and well selected affection from the intemperance of an injurious libertinism.”*

And Æschines had the clerk read (this time sure to be heard), then he himself commented on the extracts of the *Iliad* and of Euripides, “a very moral poet.”

The Athenian orators used an acknowledged right when they invoked the testimony of poets. The ancient poets of Greece had been both theologians and moral teachers. Solon united the statesman, the poet and the philosopher. Homer and Hesiod were sacred books among the Athenians. Æschines appealed to Fame to establish the unworthiness of Timarchus. How was her testimony, which the verses of Hesiod had consecrated, to be repudiated? Demosthenes referred to Orpheus, representing Justice standing near Jupiter’s throne with eyes open to the actions of mortals. Among the preambles in his decree on the alliance with Thebes, he cited reminiscences from *Œdipus* and the *Heraclidæ*. Æschines appealed to Theseus and his sons to establish, before Philip, the fact that Amphipolis was, from its origin, an Athenian land. Under Tiberius, the Ephesians endeavored to prove before the senate that Ephesus and not Delos witnessed the birth of Diana and Apollo.† The legends of the Greeks formed a part of their archives; the orators deduced arguments from them and quoted the poets with more authority than Cicero in his works of philosophy. The Latin writers especially drew ornaments from them; the Athenian orators found in them official documents intended to convince and to delight.

The accuser of Timarchus and of Demosthenes was a

* Embassy, § 141.

Tacitus, *Annales*, iii, 60.

scholar who conveniently transformed his address into a work of art which was elegantly polished. Cicero, the most brilliant and faithful imitator of the Greek orators, also made use of his art against Verres, a famous collector, probably one of Lord Elgin's ancestors. While declaring that he was not a connoisseur nor interested in trifles, the orator of *De Signis* wrote an oration in which certain parts resemble a mixture of political pamphlets and a review on the *Musée des Antiques* or on *Le Salon*. When we hear such abuse lavished on an enemy (*in Pisonem*) as monster, beast, fury, ass, hog, eunuch, etc., * * * it would seem that Cicero was eager to tear him into pieces. Not at all; his hatred was more refined. "I have never desired thy blood." What then did he desire? His dishonor. "If you and Gabinius were crucified, would I derive more pleasure from seeing your bodies lacerated than from seeing your reputations mutilated?" There is something more dreadful than to be crucified; it is to be placed in the pillory of history after one's death; and, during life, to be disgraced and humiliated. Piso did not escape this punishment. "Piso dishonored, despised, condemned to fears, to the anxieties of the guilty and trembling; such is what I long wished to see, and I have seen it."* The torments of the infernal regions, furies, flames, burning torches that harass the wicked, are suited to the theater. True punishment is the folly of the criminals, the delirium of Orestes and Athanas; this is the horror which they inspire in others and in themselves. In connection with this development, which recalls Æschines and Lucretius,† I discover another on the calmness of the sage in the midst of the most frightful tortures. Inclosed in Phal-

* Videre te volui, vidi. *In Pisonem*, 41. † *De Rerum Natura*, iii, 991.

aris' bull, he says that "it is pleasant," and that "he is not moved by it, so trifling is it." * In reference to this epicurean conception, worthy of the strongest paradoxes of the stoics, the author disserts upon the true character of the doctrine of Epicurus, upon the exact meaning of the maxim for pleasure; and, singular enough, the philosophical criticism of the orator in his oration *In Pisonem* surpasses in justice and sincerity that of the philosopher of the *De Finibus*, where Cicero refutes epicureanism in a manner unworthy of an advocate. Elsewhere there are poetical reminiscences, verses from Ennius or imprecations from Thyestes. Cicero forgets Piso in order to produce a work worthy of a scholar and philosopher. He informs us that he owes his eloquence more to his walks in the Academy than to the laboratories of rhetoricians; the invective against Piso has, in fact, philosophical pretensions, a sententious and moral tone. But his philosophy and morals, we must confess, are not always found in good company. It would have been better for the author of this work had he been less of a moralist and more of a man, had he been possessed of less philosophical or poetical erudition and more delicacy. Cicero followed the Greek custom of blending the pamphlet with literary preoccupations. Therefore a sensible incongruity of the coarse insults and the culture of the writer's mind. The care that he takes to turn from his wrath in order to improve his reasoning indicates to us that he is not, at the bottom of his heart, as hateful as he professes to be.

The artistic cares which are so abundant in the Greek orators do not harmonize with the cries of death resounding in all their invectives. They cruelly

* *In Pisonem*, 18, 20.

demand their adversary's head. Do not take them at their word. They practice diatribes which they inherit from iambic poetry. The iambic poet bites, the pamphleteer lacerates.

One is not as melancholy, the other is not as cruel, as might be imagined. The last is not at all sanguinary. He is from Athens, the most humane city, which excluded from her frontiers iron, stone and wood that was guilty of unconscious homicide, and punished an Areopagite for killing a sparrow that took refuge in his bosom.* The hearers were likewise too artistic to be impartial judges. The oration *On the Embassy* did not receive a decision or penalty. The two adversaries were painfully wounded. The Athenians considered them acquitted. The judges, delighted with their invectives and the charming beauties of their eloquence, retired satisfied, without thinking of punishment. The issue of the trial of the *Crown* was very similar. Demosthenes endeavored to exaggerate, Æschines to weaken, the consequences of a condemnation for Ctesiphon's friend. "Fear nothing for Demosthenes. If he is deprived of a crown, the reward for his heroic virtues, this magnanimous Ajax will not die of despair." We do not know why Demosthenes should have been repudiated by the Athenians. When Æschines was disowned by them, he did not think of hanging himself. Defeated in an oratorical contest in which his eloquence was at stake rather than his character, he modestly took his departure after his overthrow and retired to Rhodes, yielding to his rival. At the age of forty-eight, says a writer of the seventeenth century, Mme. de Montbazon was still so beau-

* The Areopagus in its turn killed a child who had put out the eyes of a bird.

tiful that she eclipsed Mme. de Roquelaure, the most beautiful lady of the court, and only twenty-two years of age. One day the two found themselves together in an assembly. Mme. de Roquelaure was obliged to retire. The great ladies of the century of Louis XIV submitted to the empire of beauty. The empire of intellectual beauty was likewise recognized and respected by the adversary of Demosthenes. When Milo was condemned and was enjoying his exile, eating figs in Provincia and fish at Massilia, he entertained cruel resentments and nourished projects for vengeance. Æschines had no such thoughts. He did not corrode his heart in digesting a bloody affront. Undoubtedly the high-minded orator was stung by his defeat; but the object of his culture, his eloquence, did not desert him. He became a voluntary exile, and without paying the thousand drachmas to which the law condemned him, he continued to live in the enjoyment of his art. He opened, we are told, a school, where he, more agreeably, perhaps, than ever, tasted the delicacies of beautiful language by teaching it. He delighted his pupils and himself by reading his harangues, even the one which succumbed under Demosthenes' nobler effort. After hearing Æschines' accusation the audience cried out: "Ah! how could you fail to triumph with such a speech?" "Listen," responded the teacher, and he read to them Demosthenes' reply. The admiration of his hearers was unbounded. "Ah! What if you had heard the lion himself?"*

Instead of blushing at Demosthenes' overwhelming refutation, he recited it publicly, and even praised it

* τὴ δὲ, εἰ ἀντὶ τοῦ τοῦ θηρίου ἀντιζώεσσι. Cicero (*De Oratore*, iii, 56) weakens the text in translating. Si audissetis *ipsum*.

with a light heart. He himself, an artist of the highest order, found in Demosthenes' masterpiece the realization of a perfect art. He appreciated it as if he were a disinterested reader. Ctesides was renowned for an unfavorable picture which he painted of Queen Stratonice. Because that princess did not tender him an honorable reception he painted her rolling (*volutantem*) with a fisherman, with whom she was said to be too intimate. He exposed his picture in the harbor of Ephesus, and then fled with full sail. The queen forbade the picture to be removed "because of the extreme resemblances of the portraits."* The indifference of the artistic queen reminds us of Æschines rolled in the dust by Demosthenes and applauding him. This gallant manner of extolling a work which branded him inspired Laharpe with profound astonishment.

"I do not understand, I confess, how he had the courage to read Demosthenes' harangue before his pupils. One can without any crime be less eloquent than another; but how can he confess without blushing that he has been so evidently convicted as a calumniator and a bad citizen?"

One of the advantages of historical criticism is to prevent or to diminish this kind of surprise. We are not astonished, however, when we consider in the works of the two rivals their political and private enmity, the influence of artistic preoccupations, and the character of an oratorical contest.

* *Pliny the Elder*, xxxv, ch. 40, § 15.

CHAPTER VIII.

INVECTIVE IN GREEK ELOQUENCE.

“Φύσσει πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὑπάρχει τῶν λοιδοριῶν καὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἀκούειν ἡδέως. * * * Δεδώκατε, ἔθει τιτὶ φάυλω, πολλὴν ἐξουσίαν τῷ βουλομένῳ συκοφαντεῖν, τῆς ἐπὶ ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἡδονῆς καὶ χάριτος τὸ τῆς πόλεως συμφέρον ἀντικαταλλατόμενοι: It is natural for all men to willingly listen to invectives and accusations. * * * By a pernicious custom you grant all license to calumniators, and you prefer to hear personal injuries discussed, rather than the interests of the state.” (*Oration On the Crown.*)

THE ancients were unacquainted with the freedom of the press, but they enjoyed the freedom of insults. As for the orators, their saturnalia and freedom of speech lasted during the whole year. The freedom of the Greek tribune equaled that of the comic theater; it even continued a longer time. The legislator required comedy to moderate its boldness (*Ad Pisones*, 281); that of eloquence was never checked. The dissoluteness of ancient comedy well deserved to be suppressed by law. Never did the *Iambics* of Archilochus contain more malice and anger than Aristophanes' pamphlets against Hyperbolus and Cleon; they are outrages, floods of insults, torrents of wrath. The *Knights* frequently present a spectacle, perhaps less pleasing to us than to the Athenian people, of repeated affronts, which remind us of the licentiousness of the festivals of Priapus and Bacchus. Thespis' tumbrel covers the public and private life of the character represented with filthy rubbish, which bears no resemblance to Atticism.

Even at the Pnyx and before the tribunal the orators assailed one another with calumny and outrage, without limit or measure. On both sides there was the same animosity, the same violence. It was like the whip-lash constantly whipping the top; like boiling water when it causes the kettle, unable to contain it, to grumble.

“Chorus: Our man [Cleon] is boiling. Enough, enough! he overflows; withdraw some of the wood and skim of his threats.”

Instead of calming the furious dispute, the chorus excites it; it enrages Cleon and Agoracritus against each other like two cocks.

“Chorus: Bite, lacerate your enemy, pick off his crest, do not return until you have devoured him. * * * Strike, strike the villain who has thrown confusion among the knights,—strike the public thief, the gulf of plunder, the devouring charybdis, the rascal, the rascal! I cannot repeat this name enough, for he is a rascal a thousand times a day. Come, strike, push, overthrow, crush, hate him as we hate him; stun him with your blows and cries. * * * Strike him with all your might, punish him with the lash, chastise him in every manner,—Oh, vigorous contest! Oh, intrepid heart, you are the deliverer of the city and of us all! Have you punished him sufficiently in this crushing assault? How can we express our joy and praise you worthily?”

Aristophanes is here a very cruel commentator on Athenian eloquence. Agoracritus and Cleon sometimes recall to our mind Demosthenes and Æschines, which must be regretted for the sake of the Greek tribune. This assimilation is justified by the study of their speeches, considered as pamphlets. Let us first cite the causes which have rendered their resemblance possible.

The first is the inferiority of moral delicacy among

the ancients. The orators of Athens and Rome were little inspired with Plato's love for justice. "Let the people scorn you, if they think best, and, by Jupiter, even suffer them to strike you in that ignominious manner which you have mentioned [on the cheek]; for such an injury is nothing, if you are really an honorable man and practice virtue." (*Gorgias*.) The ancients generally preferred revenge to the forgiveness of injuries, a virtue recommended even by heathens,* and at all times difficult. "I know how to love a friend, but also to return hatred for hatred. I will come upon my enemy unexpectedly by following the windings of secret bypaths." Aristotle, in the analysis of those passions which nourish eloquence, does not forget wrath, and the pleasure experienced in yielding to it. Wrath, said he, implies a resolution to revenge, a hope to succeed in it, and the joy of anticipating the revenge; "and then we enjoy in our imagination a delightful satisfaction similar to that of a dream."† Cicero declared that he had often been angry with Piso. The immortal gods crowned his desires. Piso's humiliation delighted him. "What satisfaction, what pleasure, what joy it brought to me!" *He did much good for his friends; much evil to his enemies.* Such was the most honorable epitaph of great personages, such was the envied eulogy of cities. Pericles decreed it in favor of the ancestors of those warriors whose funeral oration he pronounced.

In the Roman republic, where for many years aristocracy was predominant, satirical freedom was moderated by the fear of perishing under blows of the staff.‡

* *De Officiis*, i, 11, 25.

† *Rhetoric*, i, 11, 12.

‡ *Formidine fustis* (Horace, *Epistles*, ii, 2.) The law of the Twelve Tables was formal in this respect: "Si qui populo occentasit carmenve

Dabunt Metelli malum Nævio Poetæ.

The Metelli will apply the rod to Nævius, the poet. This same rod at Paris, in later days, while waiting in the shade of the Bastille, fell upon the shoulders of another poet, Arouet, from the hands not of Metellus, chevalier de Rohan, but from the hands of his servants. This was an indication of fear to apply the rod in person. Homer's heroes did not hesitate to exchange gross insults. When Achilles was deprived of his captive he treated Agamemnon as an impudent dog. He was about to draw "his great sword" from its scabbard; blue-eyed Minerva checked him. Do not offer violence, but insult him with abusive language to your heart's content. Achilles, in accordance with the injunction of the wise goddess, reprimanded him unsparingly. "Drunkard, who hast the effrontery of a dog and the heart of a hind, base king and devourer of thy people!"* These familiarities were permitted among kings. But when a villain, Ther-sites, dared to tell these same plain truths, vigorous blows of the scepter (the heroic rod) applied upon his shoulders until his blood flowed freely, made the insolent babbler respectful to his superiors. Scepter and rod were unknown to the democracy of Athens. Diogenes, with all grace, asked Alexander to stand out of his light. Perhaps he would have been less reserved if he had not been a philosopher.

condidit quod infame faxit flagitiumque alteri, fuste ferito." "That law which best detected the design of the Decemvirs was the capital punishment pronounced against the authors of libels and poets. This was but the spirit of the republic, in which the people loved to see the great humiliated. But people who wished to destroy liberty feared writings which could recall the spirit of liberty." (*Esprit des Lois*, vi, 15.)

* δημοβόρος. (*Iliad*, i, 231; ii, 212.)

The orators at Athens were less philosophers than cynics in their invectives; the right of defamation was unlimited. A law of Solon protected the dead from scandal, but not the living. To hold one's tongue when insult was offered would have been derogatory to one of the prerogatives of the democratic constitution. The author of the *Funeral Eulogy*, which was attributed to Demosthenes, praises, in democratic states, the advantage of favoring what we call parliamentary inquiries. Oligarchies, and especially despotisms, do not tolerate them, or at least render them useless. The guilty settle their difficulties with their rulers and their crimes remain unknown to the people, or unpunished.

"But in a democracy, one of the greatest privileges which the wise ought to support is the liberty of publishing the truth with frankness and without opposition. The author of a shameful deed cannot seduce an entire people; they are humiliated by him who reveals the ignominious truth,—humiliated by the pleasure which witnesses experience in hearing the accuser."

This privilege of popular government is praised in the oration *Against Androtion*.

"Solon knew,—yes, he knew well,—that the government most hostile to dangerous citizens was that in which one man was permitted to reproach another for his infamous acts. What government was that? The democratic, * * * for in an oligarchy it was forbidden to speak disparagingly of the chiefs, even if their lives surpassed Androtion's in turpitude."

If the feudal Greek of Homer's time had, in this respect, experienced the democratic liberty of Athens, we would have a different character in Agamemnon. With pride and boasting, the king of kings carried off Briseis. Among the high and low no one was found

who objected to it. An Achaean publicly censured such violence,—and who was the defender of right against force? Thersites. Before the full assembly he attacked Agamemnon, whereupon Ulysses termed him an insolent babbler, and made him weep under his blows. The Greeks applauded Ulysses' exploit, which in their eyes was a manly act; and at the sight of Thersites' wounds and tears "they were delighted and laughed heartily." The army did not foresee the evils which the wrath of Thetis' son was about to bring upon them, and which the triumph of the accuser Thersites would have spared them.

Athens would have thanked Agamemnon's adversary for an invective which was useful to the commonwealth. Her orators, however, were wrong to insult in order to please, when it would have sufficed for the defense of the city to use reason. But we must remember that the law of progress is imposed and social morals are perfected with time. Many errors of democratic liberty which were tolerated at Rome and Athens are condemned by law and public conscience in modern republics, less democratic than the ancient, but more civil.

Nausicaa accused the Phæcians of loving "bitter scandal" and "insolent insinuations." * The Athenian, who was from his birth malicious and backbiting, deserved the same reproach. The sight of a contest of invective pleased him as much as a quail-fight; especially if scandal seasoned it. Young and old were present at Timarchus' trial, just as a certain class of our people

* *Odyssey*, vi, 273. Nicknames were fashionable at Athens. Demosthenes received those of *Argas* and *Battalus*; Æschines' mother, that of *Empussa*; Aristophon, that of *Ardettus*; Hegesippus, that of *Crobylus*.

to-day are anxious to hear the private affairs of litigants with closed doors. The Athenian people preferred invective, even injurious, to a friend. Demosthenes was very much devoted to the people, and yet he permitted Æschines to insult them; while Philip, as our orator informs us, did not permit Demosthenes to insult Æschines in his presence. The tragic poets did not forget to satisfy this taste of the Athenian people. Sophocles' *Ajax* closes with a long dispute (ἔριδος τις ἄγων), often insulting. In it Teucer addresses Menelaus with "insane" and "robber of votes" (κλεπτὴς ψηφοποιός). Agamemnon coming on, the scene is prolonged and embittered. Teucer, stung by the appellation of "big ox," "slave," and "barbarian," humbles Agamemnon by reminding him of his family history. Thy father Atreus served his brother Thyestes the abominable feast in which he ate his own children; thy mother, a Cretan, was caught in the act of adultery, and thrown into the sea like food to dumb fish, etc. * * * Before Ulysses, who finally has come to settle the quarrel, Agamemnon excuses himself for having at first refused burial to Ajax. "It is not easy for a king to be just." He does not think of excusing his violent language. The spectators, far from being surprised, were pleased with the whole.

To these general causes we will add some others that were peculiar to the modes of eloquence and judicial organization at Athens. In transforming their harangues into pamphlets, the Athenian orators made diversions which were useful to their cause. They turned the attention of the judge from the principal point, sometimes difficult to establish,* and at the

* The Romans also used this same method of digression *παρεκβάσεις*: Quintilian, iv, 3). Indignation, pity, hateful envy,

same time they procured his complaisance by flattering one of his most decided inclinations. Aristophanes, in the hope of branding a detested enemy, cast handfuls of coarse salt on a mixed audience in which all conditions, all ranks were found in one theater.* His muse, sublime and ridiculous, sometimes shakes, with Iacchos, the sacred torch of the initiated; sometimes, with Xanthias (*Frogs*), she voluntarily soils her wings in the mud of cross-roads. Likewise, the Athenian orator, speaking before an assembly, not selected but popular, sometimes forgot the dignity of an art that was formerly imprinted with the gravity of moral philosophy; he remembered the instincts of a people inclined to raillery, jealous, fond of outrage, and disposed to avenge themselves by such means on superior talents and prominent men. In connection with bursts of the grandest eloquence, he did not fear to descend to invectives that were pleasing to his hearers or even impudent.

At Athens the public minister's right of initiative was extended to the entire public: any citizen could enter a criminal charge against another. This disposition of the law, extolled as an excellent prerogative of democratic government, favored accusation and encouraged enmity. Sycophants, covetous and hateful grumblers, hoped to obtain a part of the criminal's fortune if he was condemned. In all cases they satisfied their hatred. Besides, the decision of the suit was not intrusted to a few serious judges who were imbued with the sanctity of their functions,

invective (*convicium*), are so many means "of resting the judge" and of unbending him. Sometimes invective is the very foundation of the oration; for example, the *Oratio in Pisonem*.

* Rusticus urbano confusus, turpis honesto. (*Ad Pisones*, 213.)

nor to a limited and chosen jury; but to a multitude (sometimes fifteen hundred persons) ignorant of the laws and subject to all popular passions; a partial and blind mob who sat day after day for their three oboles, and consoled themselves for the miseries of their humble condition by striking those of whom they were jealous, or imagined they had a right to hate. This class of judges, irritable and malicious,* was armed with smarting darts, always ready to pierce. And how the accused caressed this dreaded master! The greatest prostrated themselves before him, "brushed the flies from him, took the sponge from the pot and blacked his boots" (*Wasps*). The most powerful purchased his clemency, and woe be to him who had formerly wounded him!

Imagine a tax-collector falling into this wasp's nest! What revenge such a mob would take on him! This was the lot dreaded by poor Euxitheus. And yet he was a very modest person. His mother, a little haberdasher, had to serve as nurse, and he himself sold ribbons at the market. But he had been demarchus, and an honest demarchus; he exacted payments from the tenants of sacred groves; he forced the plunderers of the public treasure to restitution. When accused he had everything to fear. Androtion's case was still worse,—he had been a careful tax-collector, and his accuser was Demosthenes. Androtion, taking cowardly advantage of their precarious position, molested two

* To endeavor to moderate them was like trying to "cook a stone." (Aristophanes, *Wasps*, passim.) The Athenian people were dissatisfied if a promised accusation was abandoned; it was taking away their prey. They felt ungrateful to Timotheus and Demosthenes for failing to keep their promise to accuse Iphierates and Midias. (Cf. Antiphon, *Oratores Attici*, §§ 69, 70.) A judicial error delivered the *Hellenotamee* to punishment.

courtesans, Sinope and Phanistrate. He seized their furniture. Was his aim to take vengeance upon them for the outrages of the libertines, who, instead of paying him for his kindness, beat him? Androtion, a pitiless persecutor, forced the poor to hide themselves under their beds, or seek shelter in their neighbor's house. A more oppressive tyrant than ever were the Thirty. He broke open the houses of citizens or changed them into prisons! Even under the eyes of the sovereign people we see this unworthy magistrate eager to persecute the innocent, when his infamous acts declare him unfit for public office; for he is known "to be guilty of the most revolting excesses. He is impudent, audacious, haughty, dishonest, fitted for anything except to exercise an official function in the democracy." * We will pass these crimes, and even worse than these. Judge if, with an indigent † and revengeful monarch of the suburbs, such an invective was well received and the defamation efficacious.

The Athenian law required every citizen to defend himself in person before the court. Often the complainant, unskilled in eloquence, asked his barrister for a written speech; but both were very careful to dissimulate this strange recourse. The author of the speech stamped it with his client's spirit and passion; the client pronounced it with the sincere emphasis of his own resentment, and demanded vengeance with the earnestness of an outraged man. In modern times, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant address the audience.

* *Against Androtion*, § 47.

† He relied upon the triobole to purchase his dinner. (*Wasps*, verse 300.) The confiscations from which he hoped to receive his part increased his covetousness. (*Lysias, Against Epicrates, Oratores Attici*, § 1).

Even if he should desire it, he has not the leisure to inveigh against the magistrate, the author of the address. The Greek pleader and defendant endeavored to justify themselves by attacking the adverse party or the accuser. If the logographer substituted himself in place of the client, appeared at the bar and attacked the adversary directly, he was bound to prove by the animosity of his attack that he prosecuted him as a private enemy. The more violent his oration, the less would be the belief that he had undertaken the defense of another for money. Modern advocates declare their disinterested impartiality; the logographer, his personal enmity or sometimes contrary feelings. Hyperides thought it advantageous to declare before the Areopagus that he was the lover of Phryne, his client. For a stronger reason the plaintiff did not hesitate to express his own affections.

The logographer reviewed his adversary's entire life and abused him without mercy. Such outrages are the exception with our advocates. The Greeks insulted merely to insult. They wished to dishonor their enemy, to brand him with public contempt in order to more certainly produce the legal dishonor (*ἀτιμία*) pronounced by the judge, and that in a spirit of revenge and enmity which was either real or feigned, but in any case earnestly professed. The logographer had little shame, as his oration was generally delivered by another. Perhaps he would have recoiled before certain articulated calumnies if their author was known. Anonymous insults ignore all modesty.

The Athenian tribunals took no pride in establishing their sentences on right. Very often they were ignorant of the law, and if Æschines is to be believed, who in his experience as clerk often witnessed the in-

different inattention of the judges, they took but little care to learn it. The orators on their side appealed as much to passion as to law.* In order to be successful they inspired the judges with favorable or hostile prejudices. To this end the advocate did not give way sometimes before real infamies; for example, that of a son publicly outraging his mother's honor in the hope of destroying the testimony of a brother whom he thought necessary to prove a bastard.† Such suitors did not scruple to use invective, therefore they employed it unsparingly. For want of argument they used insult, and often succeeded by this means. Hyperides, Dinarchus and Stratocles, Demosthenes' accusers in the case of Harpalus, prosecuted "the patient" on charges and outrages of every character; but precise facts and conclusive proofs were ignored. They dispensed with all that should carry conviction. It seemed that the accused was convicted before trial. What was most necessary to carry the decision of a popular tribunal? Passionate reasoning, whose pathos concealed the weakness or the absence of proofs. Rigorous demonstrations were not more necessary to the Athenian orators than to Swift, when he wished to arouse the Irish against Mr. Wood and his money scheme in a pamphlet which was based, not upon reason, but upon passion and skill, and which triumphed over virtue and right.‡

The Athenian logographers made a careful distinction between *conviction* (ἐλεγχος) and *invective* (λοιδορία). This was only in theory. In practice they confounded

* Ὅργιζεσθαι! (*Against Leptines*, § 119.) Σφόδρα καὶ ὀργιζεσθαι. (*Against Eratosthenes*, passim.)

† *Against Stephanus*, i, § 83.

‡ Taine, *English Literature*.

them. Sometimes invective seemed to be forced upon the orator when he had to establish the unworthiness of a proposer of a bill or law. A law of Solon forbade citizens of infamous character and spendthrifts the use of the tribune. Androtion proposed an illegal decree. Diodorus attacked him. In his eyes Androtion was twice culpable: first, for having made a motion contrary to the laws; second, for having made it at a time when the unworthiness of his life legally forbade him to submit to the people even a regular proposition. Androtion reproached his accuser for deceiving the tribunal (who was engaged in another suit than that of Diodorus) with imputations destitute of all proof. Demosthenes, the author of Diodorus' speech, replied that he did not depart from the question, and that his so-called insults were proofs. A modern tribunal would see a manœuvre foreign to the case in the defamation of the accused. In certain cases at Athens abuse was argument. The pamphlet was a demonstration which disarmed the adversary by degrading him when his character prevented him from being right. The law on unworthiness was therefore very favorable to invective. It was always easy in a city of lax morals to attack the private life of a political adversary. It is a common self-love to declare worthless any man whose acts wound our feelings or interests.

Modern men consider the validity of a motion, not the character of the proposer. They consider rather what it is than whence it comes. The Greeks sometimes refused to distinguish between the political personage and the private man, as if a citizen of questionable character could not offer useful advice. Socrates declared that a man unable to govern his house well

was unable to govern the state well (*Memorabilia*, iii. 4). "The affairs of a private individual are not as numerous as public affairs; herein lies all the difference." This Socratic prejudice seems to be an echo of Solon's law, which Æschines comments upon in these terms against Timarchus :

"In the legislator's opinion, he who has badly administered his domestic affairs will not manage public charges better. It is impossible for the same man to be a vicious citizen and a good magistrate, and it is not proper to permit an orator who is more careful to arrange the order of his orations than the course of his life, to speak from the tribune." *

Therefore, to attack one's private life is not only a right, but a duty. It is a disagreeable proof salutary to the city. From this it happens that "personal enmities are turned to the welfare of the government," according to the Athenian proverb. Unfortunately the orators, by abusing the law of unworthiness, weakened its beneficial qualities. Too often pamphlet eloquence and private resentments profited more by it than the commonwealth. †

* *Against Timarchus*, § 30.

† Invective sometimes formed a part of the oration. Sometimes it pervaded the entire speech. Demosthenes' speech *Against Timocrates*, and Æschines' harangue *Against Ctesiphon*, are composed of a judicial discussion and a pamphlet. In Demosthenes' harangue *On the Embassy* hatred occupies as much space as demonstration; but the oration *Against Timarchus* is from beginning to end an invective. Sometimes invective, in the same cause between two orators, seems to have been reserved to one of them. Thus Demosthenes' oration *Against Androtion* is a deuterology in which invective predominates. This is equally true of the oration *Against Aristogiton*. Lycurgus, before the author of this second pleading, has especially treated the question of right.

II. In purely civil cases invective always preserved something of the moderation of the Attic style. Demosthenes, in his oration *Against Phormio*, paints Apollodorus in all but flattering colors. But his reproaches are mild compared with the outrages that are lavished in public and criminal cases. Private and public life were equally a prey to the accuser. No wall, no respect for decency, protected them. Abuse from the rostrum seemed to be one of the forms of political life, as it was one of the forms of eloquence. The violent and wise employed it equally.* Plutarch declares that these excesses are unworthy of a statesman, and more injurious to the insulter than to the insulted. It seemed to be difficult for ancient democracies to prevent this abuse of liberty, and the great men of Athens even preferred transitory humiliation and insult to ostracism. Such insults in our day would provoke bloody conflicts. At Athens they were endured with philosophical resignation. Moreover, the blows received were never mortal, and the injured person was somewhat comforted by the hope of returning them on some occasion. Insulting, insulted, outraging, outraged; such was the common condition, relieved, of course, by the prospect of revenge and the thought of equality.

Glaucetes, Menalopus, Androtion, and Timocrates, were perhaps less moved than modern readers by the insults which Demosthenes puts in the mouth of his client Diodorus (*Against Timocrates*). Aristogiton, who

* Antiphon, invective against Alcibiades; Lysias, against Eratosthenes and the Thirty; Dinarchus, against Demosthenes (trial of Harpalus); Lycurgus, against Leocrates, a fugitive merchant after Chæroneia, and against Lysicles; Hyperides, against Demades, and even against Demosthenes, his friend.

never blushed, could receive his accuser's assault without much commotion. We must conclude that either Aristogiton committed the crimes imputed to him, and in that case the author of such acts was able to endure a just representation of them, or that he was innocent, and therefore his enemy's odious exaggeration destroyed its own force, and fell upon his incredulous audience without effect. Aristogiton left his father in prison; the old man died. His excellent son refused to bury him, and even brought suit against those who discharged *his* duty at *their own* expense. He struck his mother; he sold his sister for exportation.* Zobia, a woman, received him kindly at her house. He dragged her before the magistrates, and endeavored to sell his benefactress. Thrown into prison, he stole from a fellow-prisoner a bill of exchange, and besides, he cut off his nose.

From the private man judge the citizen.

"No man in Athens is stained with greater and more numerous vices. Why, then, should we save him? He is the people's dog, they say; yes, but one of those curs which, instead of biting what we call wolves, devour the sheep whose guardians they pretend to be. What orator has he summoned

* 'Επ' ἐξαγωγῇ ἀπέδοτο. Timocrates was also reproached for disposing of his parents in this manner. "A deputy who was a guest of Timocrates and an inhabitant of Corcyra, a city hostile to Athens, wished to have his sister (we omit his motive). How much for her? So much. Take her. * * * And now she is in Corcyra." (Didot.) Satyrus declared to Philip that he would not derive any profit (κερδανῶ οὐδέν) from the daughters of his friend Apollophanes, when he besought that prince to give them to him (*Embassy*). Aristophanes represents a Magarian as less particular. He sold his two young daughters for a little garlic and a measure of salt. "Oh, Mercury, god of commerce, would that I could sell my mother and wife at the same price!" With such men Philip could easily come to an agreement.

to justice since his reappearance on the rostrum? None but private individuals.* It has been said that when a dog has once tasted mutton he should be killed. Therefore kill Aristogiton as soon as possible. He renders you, Athenians, none of the services of which he boasts; his designs are altogether criminal and impudent. * * * He advances on the public place like a viper or scorpion, with poisonous sting; he darts from side to side spying his unfortunate victim in order to pierce him with his calumnies, or afflict him with some evil, or intimidate him and then impose upon him. * * * A savage, a vagabond, an enemy to all good society, he is ignorant of the blessing of civility, friendship and all the inclinations of honest people. He prowls about, escorted by monsters with whom painters surround the impious in Hades,—Imprecation, Calumny, Envy, Sedition, and Discord. Such is the wretch whom the infernal gods, far from pitying, would consign to the ranks of the impious; and you, not satisfied with pardoning this criminal who has been delivered to your justice, would accord to him not only impunity, but favors which have been refused to benefactors of the commonwealth.

“If a cancer, a gnawing ulcer, or any other malady, has triumphed over remedies, the physicians burn them out or cut them out with the knife. In like manner banish, expel from Athens, this incorrigible beast; exterminate him from the city before he wounds you. None of you, perhaps, have ever been bitten by a viper or a tarantula, and I hope you never will be. Nevertheless as soon as you see one of these animals, you readily kill it. In like manner, Athenians, as soon as you see the reptile called sycophant, full of gall and poison, do not await until he bites some one of you, but let the one who is first threatened always strike him.” †

* “Quid immerentes hospites vexas, canis

Ignavus adversum lupos?” (Horace, *Epodes*, 6.)

† Didot. The comparison of orators with vipers seemed established at Athens. (Cf. *Oratores Attici*, § 84.)

Æschines treated Timarchus no better; and yet he declared that he used the greatest moderation toward him. He could have exposed his childhood to opprobrium. He generously declined to do so. He was willing to forget it, like the acts of the Thirty, previous to the archonship of Euclides. But with what rapture he compensated himself on the youth and manhood of the accused! We will not cite any of the prosecutor's address. Its impudence equaled that of his own life. The speech *Against Midias* is more approachable. It presents the special character of a tribunitial pamphlet, and recalls the harangues of the plebeians, arousing popular indignation against the insolence of the Appii. Cicero taught his pupil to excite the passion of envy, "the most penetrating of all." Livy's orators never employed this device with more art than did the author of *In Midiam*.

"Must I tell you, Athenians, that between the rich and us, the mass of the people, there exists neither equality nor common right? No, neither of these exists. The wealthy are granted all the delay they desire before appearing, and their crimes are superannuated and cold when they are discussed before the tribunal. But among us the perpetrator of a trivial offense is condemned immediately. They have witnesses ready to come forward and prostitute themselves (*φθιπέσθαι*) at their call, and all the slanderers fly to them to accuse us; and in my case you see how citizens have even refused me a testimony of veracity. Consider why you are assembled here together. Isolated, you are too weak to compete with citizens who are proud of their friends, their riches, and a thousand resources, but from your union you derive a force superior to each of them, and you check their insolence.

"Where, then, is his magnificence? Where are his burdensome magistracies? I do not see, unless we consider his

palace at Eleusis, which obscures all homes in the neighborhood. Where are his great liberalities? The two white horses from Sicyon, with which he conducts his wife to the mysteries of Ceres, or wherever her whims may direct; the three or four slaves who always attend him when strutting about in public places; when speaking of his precious cups, his vases and his rich flagons, in a tone loud enough to be heard by the passers by.* What advantages, citizens, do you derive from Midias' opulence and from his pompous luxury? I do not know, but I see the outrages which he, proud of his gold, has perpetrated on the multitude and on the first whom he encounters. * * *

"Wealthy and eloquent, this enemy of the Gods sees in others only impure beings, beggars and worthless people (τὸν οὐδέν). What will this proud contemner not do if he is acquitted! As soon as the first sentence condemns him, Midias declaims, inveighs and protests. If the question is an election, Midias of Anagyrontes advances to the front. He is Plutarch's man of affairs. He is involved in secrets. Athens cannot hold him. Now, in all these motives he evidently has no other object than to show that the sentence of the people has not reached him. He does not fear it. He does not dread the consequence. To think that he would degrade himself if he should seem to fear you, to boast of braving you,—does not this, Athenians, deserve death ten times? Yes,

* Midias displays his riches. He therefore insults the poor people. If he was simple in his mode of life, and reserved in his manners, would he escape slander? Not at all. Stephanus has an austere figure. He walks along the walls. He means to pass for an humble man, and is only an avaricious egotist, whose sole thought is the protection of his purse. A frowning look, a cold exterior, will serve him as a barrier against solicitors and beggars (Didot). It is difficult to satisfy all and the Athenian sycophant. Nicias was brave in war. He lived at Athens, and his heart was always sad at the thought of informers. He seldom went out. He walked very discreetly on the public ways, and always had money in his hand for the needy. (Plutarch, *Life of Nicias*.)

he imagines that you will be unable to pronounce on his fate. Wealthy, audacious, haughty in his notions, haughty in his language, violent, bold, when will you seize him if he escapes you to-day?

“If he were innocent in other respects, the orations with which he addresses you, the circumstances under which he pronounces them, would, in my opinion, deserve the severest punishment. You know that when news favorable to our country, and delightful to us all, has been announced, Midias has never been seen among the number of those who congratulated the people and shared their joy. But if one of those reverses, which we would all have wished to avert, happens, he is the first to rise; he immediately mounts the tribune, he adds insults to the misfortune of the times, and, triumphing in consequence of the silence to which sadness and misfortune have reduced you, he exclaims: ‘Indeed, Athenians, you are strange people; you do not go to the war, you refuse to contribute to it, and then you are surprised at your want of success! Do you imagine that I will contribute for you, and that you will enjoy my liberality? Do you believe that I am disposed to equip vessels in which you will not embark?’ Behold how he insults you, and on every occasion he unveils that bitterness and malevolence which his heart secretly nourishes against the people. Well, then, Athenians, when he will employ his lamentations, his tears and his prayers to abuse and mislead you, answer him in your turn: “Indeed, Midias, you are a strange man. You are lavish in your insults; you refuse to suppress violence with your hands, and then you are surprised to find yourself the victim of wickedness! Do you imagine that we will bow under your blows, and that you will strike us with impunity? that our suffrages will pardon you, and that you will persist in your violence?”

Demosthenes attributed to Midias words which had more than once honored our orator, but he clothed

them in accents of haughty contempt when applied to Midias. He reproached Midias for using them, as Æschines, in a later day, reproached Demosthenes for the same words and to the same end — exciting popular feeling against a courageous censor. Demosthenes in fact eulogized Midias without intending to.

“Suppose, Oh Judges, that our wishes reject this provision, and that it will not be realized; but suppose that these men, with Midias and his equals, are masters of the commonwealth. A private citizen arrested in the ranks of the people, guilty of some offense toward one of those men, but a mild offense compared with Midias’ insult toward me — suppose this citizen appears before a tribunal composed of such judges, do you think that he will receive pardon, or the right to defend himself? Will they immediately pardon him? will they hear the prayers of a man of the people? will they not rather cry out: ‘The envious, the miserable wretch! he is insolent; he ought to deem himself fortunate that he is permitted to live!’ Treat them, Athenians, as they would treat you; be not dazzled by their riches or their credit; but consider what you are. They have much property, in the possession of which no one troubles them; in their turn let them not trouble you in the security of yours; the law assures every citizen the enjoyment of his rights.”

In other words, be toward the wealthy what the wealthy would be toward you,—pitiless and lawless. This is a strange way to defend the rights of the people, and to plead equality. “I ask that the acquittal or condemnation shall not depend on the will of such or such a one; but that the accused shall receive the judgment due him according to facts which protect or defeat him. Such is the spirit of democracy” (*Embassy*). Thus spoke Æschines’ ac-

cuser. Midias' accuser seemed to understand the laws of democracy otherwise. He created hatred among citizens by the iniquity of retaliation; he added fuel to the flame of spite and popular jealousy, and when he saw the audience exasperated, and worked up to the pitch to which his personal passion carried them, he did not forget to say when sentence was about to be pronounced: "Remain firm in the opinions which you hold at this moment." So much did he fear that the kindled hatred would grow cold, and vengeance would escape him!

Demosthenes, the statesman, strengthened himself by holding the balance of power between the different parties of the city. He addressed them with an authority which was justified by an impartial devotion. Personal feeling inspired the private citizen with recriminations worthy of a seditious demagogue. What wonder that the sycophants often had the best of the case before a tribunal prepared in this manner? if Demosthenes stooped like them to employ the basest passions? if he stirred up the poor against the rich, the low against the great? The *Oratio in Midiam* was not pronounced. It ought never to have been written. We see in it a remarkable specimen of the license of Athenian eloquence and an illustrious example of the power which custom had over minds that were badly governed. It was necessary to brand an adversary, and under all circumstances to render him odious in order to condemn him before the people. Demosthenes submitted to this usage and did not deem it derogatory. The evil which he did his enemies his enemies inflicted on him every day. Why should Demosthenes not insult Midias when Æschines convoked all Greece before the heliasts to insult Demosthenes?

According to Demosthenes, Æschines raised the debate *On the Crown* merely to have an illustrious opportunity to drag him in the mud. The pamphleteer's violence and desperation seem to justify this suspicion. Æschines' regret is that his virtuous indignation is not shared by the people. "Such is your disposition toward Demosthenes. Habit has hardened you on the recital of his crimes. You must change, Athenians; you must be indignant and punish if you would save the wreck of the commonwealth."* The orator aided them to the best of his ability in inspiring proper sentiments. "If there is in any part of the world any kind of perversity in which I cannot prove that Demosthenes has excelled, I demand death." These are declarations rich with promises, and if the insulter did not hold to them it was no fault of his. If he attacked a man he noted his dissolute manners and his contempt for all family affections. We know how he wept over his daughter. Go and ask Cnasion what price he laid upon his faithful wife. We are told that it costs more to support one vice than two children. Demosthenes, who has no (legitimate) children, labors hard to support his vices. Very soon ruined, he sells himself to clients, an unfaithful logographer, a hireling and deceiver of both parties. This enemy of tyrants (ὁ μισοτύραννος) sold himself to Philip and Alexander, and then insulted them in order to better conceal his game, which all know. There is not a single member of his body, not excepting his tongue, which he has not sold, and yet he claims to be an Aristides! Midias boxed his ears in public,—a fortunate encounter! Demos-

* Didot. We here make an allusion indistinctively to the invectives directed against Demosthenes in the speeches *On the Embassy*, *On the Crown*, and in the pleading *Against Timarchus*.

thenes will cash these handy-cuffs. No money is unacceptable to him, not even that which he hoped to extort from his cousin, Demomeles of Peania, by inflicting blows upon his own head with his own hand.

As a public man, Demosthenes must have elbow room, he must do things on a great scale. Formerly he contented himself with the cheating of rich orphans, with the defrauding of his pupils, and with the despoiling of an unfortunate exile, Aristarchus. Henceforth this "purse-cutter" (*βαλαντιοτόμος*) will pilfer the finances of the state. He will turn to his own profit the tributes of our allies. He will attribute to himself the liberties of foreign people. Was he not convicted of the theft of sixty-six talents offered by Darius, at a time when nine of those talents would have secured the safety of the Thebans, whose misfortune drew so many tears from him? Did he not pilfer a whole squadron of sixty-five vessels? Such a man, returning to his trade of sophistry, ill deserves to succeed in his oratorical schemes. And what an insidious address he has! What perfidy in his speeches! Does the impudent, perjured debater forget that "he must change his hearers or the gods?" He is a "modern Ther-sites" as regards his insolence and cowardice. Brave in words, cowardly in combat, ever ready to talk and impotent to act. Stained with all vices, he affects virtue. (*ζάθαρμα ζηλοτύπον ἀρετήν*.) He has been implicated in two assassinations.* A violator of the most sacred laws, he prosecutes his friends criminally

* Greek calumnies sometimes border on the ridiculous. A disciple of Epicurus, Idomeneus of Lampsacus, accused Pericles of having treacherously killed Ephialtes, his intimate friend, the confidant and coadjutor of his plans. "I do not know," says Plutarch (*Life of Pericles*, 10), "where Idomeneus met with this calumny, which he vents with great bitterness against this great man."

and has them condemned to death. He accuses others of versatility,—“this deserter whom the scorching iron has neglected to brand,” this “brute, unworthy of the name of man.” The most notorious criminals of Greece, Eurybates and Phrynondas, were ordinary scoundrels compared to him. What wonder if the malediction connected with his impure nature and with his impiety has ruined the state and provoked disasters which have disturbed the world?

This modified sketch from Æschines’ tablets gives some idea of the violence expressed in the original, and inspires us with little confidence in Æschines’ innocence. You are angry, therefore you are wrong. Demosthenes touches the secret wound with the sharp point of his stylet. The wounded man cries out. Unable to justify himself, he offers insult. “You know, of course, on the late occasion in the Piræus, when you would not allow him to be your envoy, how he shouted out that he would impeach and indict me, with cries of ‘Shame, shame!’” Yet all that is the prelude to numerous contests and arguments, whereas these are simple, and perhaps but two or three words, which a slave bought yesterday might have spoken. “Athenians, it is atrocious. Here is a man accusing me of what he himself has been concerned in, and saying that I have taken money, when he has taken it himself.” Nothing of this kind did he say or utter. None of you heard him, but he threatened something different. Why? Because he was conscious of guilt, and not independent enough to speak those words. His resolution never reached that point, but shrank back, for his conscience checked it. No one, however, prevented him from indulging in general abuse and calumny.”*

* *Embassy*, § 209.

Even here Æschines betrays himself. His violence is turned against himself. "I have seen men," says he, "who drew hatred on themselves by speaking too distinctly of others' turpitudes." It is not Æschines' clearness or frankness that defames him in our eyes, but the very excess of his rage.

Demosthenes frequently complained of Æschines' "cruelty." This cruelty was very apparent in the bitterness and envenomed address of his invectives. Never was an orator more dexterous in painting feelings and actions in odious colors, and in flattering the base instincts of the multitude to the detriment of an enemy. The terms in which Demosthenes characterizes Æschines' outrageous hatred are not too strong. Æschines smears him with mud (*προπηλατισμός*); he vomits upon him "old dregs" (*ξωλοκρασίαν*), and the frightful mixture of his corruption and iniquities." We can understand how Demosthenes, lacerated by so venomous a tooth, twice believed that he ought to appeal to all the immortal gods in his exordiums. It seems that their united protections would not be sufficient to save him.

III. Demosthenes declared that he was not "fond of invective by nature" (*οὐ φιλολοιδόρος φύσει*). He had no particular taste for insults, but if he was not fond of pamphlets, he was occasionally very competent to use them. We have already mentioned the impressive sensibility of Demosthenes. Æschines compared him to a woman on account of the vivacity of his passion (*γυναικείῳ ἀνθρώπῳ τῇν ὀργήν*). Now, every sensitive mind is naturally vindictive. Byron and Pope in their satires afford striking illustrations of this. Those minds which are most accessible to kind impressions are sometimes

so to contrary emotions; their sensibility forces them to be always profoundly touched. And so Demosthenes, who had a nervous nature and was easily moved to tears, seemed more capable than the phlegmatic of piercing resentments. This is apparent from the smarting wound which the outrages of Midias inflicted on his pride. Even after long days the wound pierced him.

"It is by an enemy when sober, in the morning, with outrageous intentions and not under the influence of wine, in the presence of a great number of citizens and strangers, that I have been insulted. * * * It is not the blow, it is the affront, that excites my wrath. A free man not only deems himself unworthy to be struck, but he deems himself unworthy to be struck and insulted. Many circumstances accompanied the blow, some of which cannot, Athenians, be expressed by him who received it. The action, the look, the tone of a man who strikes to insult, who strikes through hatred, who strikes with clinched fist, who strikes upon the cheek; this is what provokes, this is what exasperates men who are not accustomed to be covered with mud."

The affront which Æschines offered in the eyes of all Greece could be no less grievous to him. Compelled to defend himself, Demosthenes did not wish to abandon the tribune and be worsted (*ἔχων ἑλαττωρ*). He therefore returned outrage for outrage "with a moderation as great as possible," confining himself to "strict necessity." Æschines prescribed his course. He pretended to demonstrate that Demosthenes' private fortune had precipitated the ruin of public affairs. Demosthenes established the fact that he was better than Æschines, and born of better ancestors, and that in all respects the condition of his entire life had been happier than that of his accuser. The compass of the antithesis can

easily be conjectured. Æschines' entire life was demeaned, and not only Æschines, but his friends, had to pass under the orator's lash. This proceeding, justified in this case by particular circumstances, was, however, familiar to Greek eloquence. Parents, friends and defenders of opposing parties were maltreated in like manner.* They did not even always await the person's birth to ridicule him; they anteceded the cradle. Midias was born, as all know, secretly, mysteriously, like a certain hero of tragedy. As soon as he was born his mother wished to do him justice in advance. Like a woman of good sense, she sold him; another woman bought him. Foolish woman! Could she not have made a better purchase at the same price? * * * The rest in the future. Aristophanes did not curse his enemies as far back as the fourth generation, but he unmercifully persecuted them (for example, Lamachus and Cleonymes) in their infancy. Greek eloquence was equally unmerciful. Æschines, who termed Demosthenes the "bastard of a sword-cutler," could not cast reflections on his father and mother as he would like to do (his father was a "freed-man, it cannot be denied); he therefore went back to his grandmother, "a barbarian," and to his maternal ancestor, a certain Gylon, who "was condemned to death as a traitor." Demosthenes said that he feared to give details concerning Æschines' family because they would be unworthy of his accuser. And yet he gave them and even lavished them without much regard for his own dignity.

We regret to see so finished a work as the oration *On the Crown* disfigured by gross outrages which are repugnant to modern delicacy. We could pardon De-

* Lysias, *Against Eratosthenes*, §§ 62, 78.

mosthenes for his railleries addressed to Æschines' father, the slave *Tromes* (the Trembler) transforming himself into *Atrometus* (the Fearless). But does it become him to condemn Glaucothea, the common courtesan Empussa, the gypsy who married every day in the week? Even Aristophanes does not ridicule, to such extremes, the herb-seller who presented Athens with Euripides the sophist. Æschines allows his family to be traduced before the tribunal called to pass judgment on the *Embassy*. It is also traduced in Demosthenes' oration, but under the maledictions of an enemy who spits in his face. What has become of the magnanimous and patriotic magistrate who was inspired with the majesty of Athens? While hearing Æschines and Demosthenes one would believe himself transported from the Propylæa to the midst of the market-place. A merchant-woman recognized Theophrastus by his foreign accent. The accent of the two antagonists was undoubtedly Attic; but did Atticism find place in invectives which were apparently borrowed from the heart of the Piræus?

We will here omit what our orator likewise ought to have omitted, and we will only quote a page which is worthy of him :

“ But you, the man of dignity, who spit upon others, look what sort of fortune is yours compared with mine! As a boy, you were reared in abject poverty, waiting with your father on the school, grinding the ink, sponging the benches, sweeping the room, doing the duty of a menial rather than a freeman's son. After you were grown up you attended your mother's initiations, reading her books and helping in all the ceremonies. At night, wrapping the noviciates in fawn-skin, swilling, purifying and scouring them with clay and bran, raising them after lustrations, and bidding them say ‘*Bad I*

have 'scaped, and better I have found'; priding yourself that no one ever howled* so lustily,—and I believe him! for don't suppose that he who speaks so loud is not a splendid howler! In the daytime you lead your noble orgiasts, crowned with fennel and poplar, through the highways, squeezing the big-cheeked serpents, and lifting them over your head, and shouting *Era Saba*, and capering to the words *Hyes Attes, Attes Hyes*, saluted by the beldames as Leader, Conductor, Chest-bearer, Fan-bearer, and the like, getting as your reward tarts and biscuits and rolls, for which any man might well bless himself and his fortune!

“ When you were enrolled among your fellow townsmen,—by what means I stop not to inquire,—when you were enrolled, however, you immediately selected the most honorable of employments,—that of clerk and assistant to our petty magistrates. From this you were removed after awhile, having done yourself all that you charge others with; and then, sure enough, you disgraced not your antecedents by your subsequent life, but hiring yourself to those ranting players, as they were called, Simylus and Socrates, you acted third parts, collecting figs and grapes and olives like a fruit-er from other men's farms, and getting more from them than from the playing, in which the lives of your whole company were at stake; for there was an implacable and incessant war between them and the audience, from whom you received so many wounds that no wonder you taunt as cowards people inexperienced in such encounters.

But passing over what may be imputed to poverty, I will come to the direct charges against your character. You espoused such a line of politics (when at last you thought of taking to them) that, if your country prospered, you lived the life of a hare, fearing and trembling, and ever expecting to be scourged for the crimes of which your conscience ac-

* *Ὁλολύξαι* designates a sharp cry probably analogous to the *youyou* of the Mussulmans. (Cf. Demosthenes, *Embassy*, § 209, *βοῶντα καὶ ἰὸν ἰὸν*.)

cused you; though all have seen how bold you were during the misfortunes of the rest. A man who took courage at the death of a thousand citizens, what does he deserve at the hands of the living? A great deal more that I could say about him I shall omit; for it is not all I can tell of his turpitude and infamy which I ought to let slip from my tongue, but only what is not disgraceful to myself to mention.

"Contrast now the circumstances of your life and mine, gently and with temper, Æschines, and then ask these people whose fortune they would each of them prefer. You taught reading; I went to school. You performed initiations; I received them. You danced in the chorus; I furnished it. You were assembly-clerk; I was a speaker. You acted third parts; I heard you. You broke down, and I hissed. You have worked as a statesman for the enemy; I for my country. I pass by the rest; but this very day I am on my probation for a crown, and am acknowledged to be innocent of all offense; while you are already judged to be a pettifogger, and the question is, whether you shall continue that trade, or at once be silenced by not getting a fifth part of the votes. A happy fortune, do you see, you have enjoyed, that you should denounce mine as miserable.

"Come, now, let me read the evidence of the jury of public services which I have performed. And by way of comparison, do you recite me the verses which you murdered:

"From Hades and the dusky realms I come."

And

"Ill news, believe me, I am loth to bear."

"Ill betide thee, say I, and may the Gods,—or at least the Athenians,—confound thee for a vile citizen and a vile third-rate actor!

"Read the evidence!" †

Demosthenes was not as disinterested in personal passions as he professed to be. We can conjecture

† *Pro Corona*. (Cf. *Embassy*, passim.)

this from the very care which he took to defend himself against such a charge, and from his eagerness to throw upon his adversary the suspicion of such feelings. At the time of the Amphissian war, Demosthenes wished to reveal Æschines' manœuvres without delay; his mouth was closed: "Some suspected me of wishing to bring against him, through personal animosity, a chimerical accusation." The mutual animosity of the two orators was a secret to no one at Athens. The pleading *Against Theocrines* distinctly made allusion to it. "When the case was called, a man swore that the accused (Demosthenes) was ill; and in the meantime Demosthenes was running about, inveighing against Æschines." Zeal for the public welfare, we may suppose, was not always the sole motive of Demosthenes' fervid persecution of Æschines, but at least he had the advantage of probity. One day the Athenians wished to force him to accuse a citizen; he refused, and when the people murmured, he said: "Athenians, I will always give you my counsels, even when you do not wish them; but I will never play the sycophant, even when you wish it." Demosthenes proved Æschines a sycophant, and with more dignity than the aggressor ever manifested.

Now, that which consoles the reader for the outrages which Demosthenes lavished upon his enemy is the thought that the interested ally of the Macedonians was not, upon the whole, worthy of esteem. We could not pardon him for having insulted and ridiculed Æschines' humble occupations and his necessitous family, if he had not the right and cause to stigmatize the citizen. Demosthenes revenged the commonwealth and the people by revenging himself. Therefore no one could tell, by hearing his indignant

voice, what sentiment inspired him,—hatred for *Æschines* or love for Athens,—to such a degree was his eagerness to combat him mixed with personal animosity and patriotism. The constant union of these two passions, which seemed to nourish each other in him, gave to his invectives a generous accent, which raised them above an ordinary pamphlet. When he showed the prevaricating deputy running after Philip to the quarry, or selling a city to which he and his friends owed so much, his discourse united an address embittered with private resentments to one of solemn reprobation offered up by his country.

“ Five or six days after, when the Phocians had been destroyed, and this man’s hire had come to an end like anything else, and *Dercylus* had returned from *Chalcis*, and reported to you, in assembly at the *Piræus*, that the Phocians were destroyed; and you, men of Athens, naturally on receiving that intelligence, were smitten with compassion for them and terror on your own account, and passed a vote to bring in your women and children from the country, and to repair the garrisons and fortify the *Piræus*, and offer the *Heracleian* sacrifice within the city,—in this state of things, when the commonwealth was in the midst of such confusion and alarm, this clever, and powerful and loud-voiced orator, without any appointment by the council or the people, went off as ambassador to the author of all the mischief, taking into account neither the illness on which he grounded his excuse, nor the fact that another ambassador had been chosen in his stead, nor that the law provides the penalty of death for such conduct, nor how monstrous it was, after reporting that a price had been set upon his head in *Thebes*, when the *Thebans* had in addition to the lordship of all *Bœotia* become masters also of the *Phocian* territory, to take a journey then to the heart of *Thebes* and the *Theban* camp; so insane was

he, so intent upon his pelf and reward, that in defiance and despite of all these considerations he took himself off. * * *

“He forgot that the safety of the country is our safety; that in this same country his mother owed to her profession of initiations and of purifications, and to the money accruing from these practices, the means by which she reared him and all his brothers; that here lived miserably his father, who was a schoolmaster; furthermore, that here these brothers, subaltern scribes and servants of all magistrates, made money; and finally, that, after you chose these public clerks, they were fed for two years in the Tholos (a home for the State’s boarders), and that he himself left this same country as an ambassador. He has considered none of these benefits, and far from providing for the prosperous voyage of his country, he has prostrated and submerged her. * * *

“And yet you open your mouth and dare to look these men in the face! Do you think they don’t know you? — that they are sunk all in such slumber and oblivion? He calls his venality friendship, indeed; and said somewhere in his speech: ‘The man who reproaches me with the friendship of Alexander.’ I reproach you with friendship of Alexander! Whence gotten, or how merited? Neither Philip’s friend nor Alexander’s should I ever call you; I am not so mad; unless we are to call reapers and other hired laborers the friends of those that hire them. For upon what plea of equality or justice could Æschines, son of Glaucothea, the timbrel-player, be the friend or acquaintance of Philip? I cannot see. No! you were hired to ruin the interests of your countrymen. Philip’s hireling I called you once, and Alexander’s I call you now. So do all these men. If you disbelieve me, ask them; or rather I will do it for you: Athenians, is Æschines, think ye, the hireling or the friend of Alexander? You hear what they say.”*

Is it hatred of an enemy or devotion to his country that gives Demosthenes the impetuous animation with

which he crushes his adversary beneath the weight of his reasoning and his wrath !

“ His acts in the embassy having been thus disgraceful, so many, nay, all of them, having been treason against you, he goes about saying: ‘What name does Demosthenes deserve, who accuses his colleagues?’ Verily I accuse, whether I will or no, having been so plotted against by you during the whole of my absence, and having the choice of two things left me, either in acts of such a description to be thought your accomplice, or to accuse. I say that I have not been your colleague at all in the embassy, but that you did many heinous things as ambassador, and I did what was best for these people. Philocrates has been your colleague, and you and Phrynon his, for you all did these things and approved of them. But where is the salt? Where the social boards and libations? Such is the rant he goes about with, as if doers of justice, and not doers of iniquity, were the betrayers of these things! I know that all the presidents on every occasion sacrifice in common and sup with each other and pour libations together; and the good do not on this account imitate the bad, but if they find any of their body committing an offense they inform the council and the people. In like manner the council offer their opening sacrifice, banquet together, join in libations and ceremonials. So do the generals, and I may say nearly all the magistrates; but do they on such account allow impunity to their members who commit crime? Far from it. Leon accused Timagoras, after having been four years his co-ambassador; Eubulus accused Tharrex and Smicythas, after having been their messmate. The famous Conon of old accused Adimantus, after having shared the command with him. Which, then, violated the salt and the cup?—Æschines, the traitors, the false ambassadors and acceptors of bribes, or their accusers? Assuredly the men of iniquity violated, as you have done, the sanctities of their whole country, not merely those of private fellowship.

“What man in the commonwealth should you say was the most odious blackguard, with the largest stock of impudence and insolence? Not one of you, I am certain, could even by mistake name any other than Philocrates. What man speaks the loudest, and can utter what he likes with the clearest voice?—Æschines the defendant, I am sure. Whom do these men call spiritless and cowardly with the mob, while I call him reserved?—Myself; for never was I intrusive in any way; never have I done violence to your inclinations. Well, in all the assemblies, whenever there has been a discussion upon these matters, you hear me always both accusing and convicting these men, and positively declaring that they have taken money and sold all the interests of the state; and none of them hearing my statements ever contradicted them or opened his mouth or showed himself. What can be the reason that the most odious blackguards in the commonwealth and the loudest speakers are overpowered by me, who am the timidest of men and speak no louder than any one else? It is that truth is strong; and, on the other hand, the consciousness of having sold your interests is weak. This takes off from the audacity of these men; this warps their tongues, closes their mouths, chokes and keeps them silent.”*

Is it not to be regretted that an orator capable of such animation should have recourse to invective? What avails it to taunt an enemy when one has the power to crush him?

IV. The violence of Greek invective wounds us. It touched the Athenians but lightly. The habit of being witnesses or hearers of the greatest moral defects in a city of reckless manners had deadened their sensibility. In certain matters they were hardened and astonished at nothing. Virulent pictures alone were capable of moving them. The pamphleteer was

* *Embassy*, §§ 188, 206.

obliged to strike hard, to transform his pen into a hot iron. See how Aristophanes preaches morals to his fellow citizens:

The Unjust: "Young man, follow my lessons and you can satisfy your passions, dance, laugh, and blush at nothing. If you are caught in adultery, remind the husband of Jupiter's example. Can you, a mere mortal, be stronger than a god? *The Just*: And if they arraign your pupil, how will you prove that he is not a crapulous debauchee? *The Unjust*: And where is the harm in being crapulous? *The Just*: Is anything worse than such a reputation? *The Unjust*: Well, what will you say if I worst you on this point? *The Just*: I ought to hold my tongue. *The Unjust*: Well, then, answer me, what are our barristers? *The Just*: Debauchees.* *The Unjust*: Well said; and our public orators? *The Just*: Debauchees. *The Unjust*: Then you perceive that you have been talking nonsense! And the spectators, what are they, for the most part? Behold them! *The Just*: I behold them. *The Unjust*: Well, then, what do you see? *The Just*: By the gods! they are almost all debauchees! Look here, this one I know to be such, and that one, and that other man who wears long hair. *The Unjust*: What have you to say? *The Just*: I am vanquished. Debauchees, in the name of the gods, receive my cloak! I pass into your ranks."

Æschines reproached Demosthenes' hearers for tolerating bold expressions. "You are iron-clad (ᾧ σιδηροειπέ!)!" Aristophanes' moralists proved more clearly to what degree their epidermis was thick and enduring.

As regards malicious remarks, the ancients were generally more patient than we. A citizen insulted Phocion while speaking in public. The orator stopped, and when the man had finished his abuse, imperturbable,

* Ἐξ ἐδρου πρῶτον. (*Clouds*, verse 1080 et seq.)

he continued: "I have already spoken to you of the cavalry and heavy-armed troops; it remains for me to discuss with you the light troops." During an entire day an insolent hanger-on insulted Pericles in the public square without the latter responding a single word or ceasing to expound the laws. In the evening Pericles quietly retired to his home, still followed by the insulter, with invective on his lips. Arriving at the door of his house, as it was now night, he called one of his slaves and said: "Take a light and conduct this man home." * When Julian the *Apostate* was at Antioch, a city given to frivolity and raillery, he heard the people ridiculing his austere manners and his long philosophical beard. Instead of an edict to revenge the imperial majesty which had been publicly insulted, Julian responded with the *Misopogon*: It is good for the people to

* The modern orator is not so lenient; he immediately disposes of his interrupter, and then continues his argument. "The brilliant but erratic orator, the late Thomas Marshall, of Kentucky, toward the close of his life, when unfortunately, his oratorical inspiration was too often artificial, was making a speech to a crowded audience at Buffalo, when he was interrupted by a political opponent, who, pretending not to hear distinctly, tried to embarrass him by putting his hand to his ear, and crying out, 'Louder!' Mr. Marshall thereupon pitched his voice several times on a higher and yet higher key, but the only effect on his tormentor was to draw forth a still more energetic cry of 'Louder, please, sir, louder!' At last, being interrupted for the fourth time and in the midst of one of his most thrilling appeals, Mr. Marshall, indignant at the trick, as he now discovered it to be, paused for a moment, and fixing his eye first on his enemy and then on the presiding officer, said: 'Mr. President, on the last day, when the angel Gabriel shall have descended from the heavens, and, placing one foot upon the sea and the other upon the land, shall lift to his lips the golden trumpet, and proclaim to the living and to the resurrected dead that time shall be no more, I have no doubt, sir, that some infernal fool from Buffalo will start up and cry out, 'Louder, please, sir, Louder!''" (Dr. Mathews, *Oratory and Orators*.)

have intellectual men as emperors. The Duke de Montausier would have sent the traducers into the river. With this system the rivers of Attica would have been filled very soon. The Athenians were more tolerant. They saw a tribunal exercise in invective; they were pleased with it as with an entertainment, and were only reasonably affected by it.

Demosthenes dwelt upon the poverty of Æschines' family. This disparagement of the mean condition of individuals did not well agree with the fondness which the Athenians had for democratic equality. Their law ordained that any man might be prosecuted who reproached a citizen, man or woman, for pursuing the lower branches of trade. "Never did the obscurity of his rank at Athens debar a poor man from public employment. No man was reproached for the confession of his poverty, but for his indolence" (Thucydides, ii, 37). Aristophanes verifies the same fact in his own manner when he pictures the state in the hands of dealers in tow, in sheep, in leather, and in pudding. When he ridicules young Æschines as a school janitor, his brothers as subordinate scribes or painters of tambourines, Demosthenes feels that he is coasting near rocks. "In the name of Jupiter and the other gods, let no man accuse me of senselessness! I believe a man is bereft of reason when he ridicules poverty and glories that he has been raised in opulence." Called time and again as logographer to defend the lower classes, he always took care to speak of the poor with sympathy, and to establish their claim to compassion. "Poverty reduces free men to low and servile professions, which ought to elicit commiseration for them, and not ruin them. Let not poverty be civil death, judges; it is in itself a great evil." All his oration *Against Eubulides*

is a touching plea in favor of humble professions and of the necessitous. Why, then, is he not inspired with these sentiments in his diatribes against Æschines' parents? First, it is because the accuser's declamations on Demosthenes' pretended bad fortune compelled him to debase that of his adversary; and then, he knew that with all their love for equality, the Athenian multitude did not hesitate to receive kindly, though it might be at their own expense, all prejudices against wealth. The people of Capua did the same thing at a later day. The plebeians revolted, cursed their senators, and threatened to subject them to punishment. If it is proposed to supply the places of the detested nobles, the crowd answers with scornful cries to the names of plebeians who are proposed to succeed them: This man is unknown; that man's a beggar.* Far from wishing to hear them speak, they dishonor them; and finally they are resigned to support the senators whom they at first contemned.

Philocleon, in the *Wasps*, perceiving that he has inadvertently acquitted the accused, faints. This trait does not give us a favorable idea of the clemency of Athenian judges. Demosthenes, the statesman, said to his hearers: "Be formidable in combat; in the tribunals be humane." The same orator, before the court, contrasts the severity of his ancestors with the negligence of his contemporaries in regard to the greatest criminals; he considers their humanity naïve (εὐφροσύνη) simplicity. He turns against Æschines the words of the accuser of Timarchus.

"Will you not remember what he said on his accusation of Timarchus, that there was no good in a commonwealth

* Cum humilitatem sordidamque inopiam objicerent. (Livy, xxiii.)

which had no sinews to stretch against malefactors, or in a government where mercy and canvassing had greater power than the laws; and that you ought to have no pity either for the mother of Timarchus, an old woman, or for his children or any one else; but consider this, that should you abandon the laws and constitution, you would find none to have pity on yourselves." *

The judges were always too compassionate in the eye of an Athenian accuser. He would protect their hearts with triple bands of brass against pity. "To death" was the formula consecrated at Athens in criminal cases, with variations more or less eloquent. "Seize and punish this pirate whose oratorical cruises are desolating the commonwealth." (Æschines.)

The Athenians did not think the pamphleteer altogether serious; and with good reason, for the pamphleteer himself was not deluded as to the import of their cries of death and the issue of the debate. Demosthenes demanded Æschines' head, a criminal head (*κακή κεφαλή*). Kill him! (*ἀποκτείνετε*) "not once, but three times." He deserves "capital punishment." After having appealed so eagerly for blood, he becomes calm at the close of his oration; he sees and says things more coolly. He no longer speaks of actual punishment, but of civil death, metaphorical death, which merely deprived the condemned of his rights as a citizen (*deminutio capitis*). Even his last word does not prescribe any definite punishment. He simply demands the chastisement of his adversary (*τιμωρησάμενους*). These evasions can be attributed to a particular motive. The trial of the *Embassy* was not, properly speaking,

* Demosthenes, *Embassy*. This passage is not found in Æschines' oration. Did the author suppress it, or did Demosthenes attribute it to him gratuitously?

a formal accusation of high treason (ἐῖσαγγελία), but a prosecution in rendering accounts (θύνη). Now, in cases of this character the penalty was not determined by law, but was left to the discretion of the tribunal (ἀγὼν ἀτίμητος). This, in a measure, accounts for the indecision of the orator in requiring punishment, and his vague conclusions. But the dominant reason of the contradiction into which he cunningly falls is his feeling of certainty that he will not obtain the required capital punishment. He knows the moral indifference of his hearers, and he knows that they are more disposed to relish the malicious pleasure of hearing outrages lavished upon Æschines, than to share the patriotic sentiments of the orator against him. In Æschines Demosthenes prosecuted a private and public enemy. What personal grievance had the Athenians against him? They did not love their country enough to hate him.

Theocritus' accuser observes the simulated enmities of orators who, after lacerating each other at the tribune, go and banquet in company before the audience and divide the benefits of their concert. (Aristophanes compares these to two men sawing a log, one of whom pushes, the other pulls.) Such defenders do not hesitate to whiten or blacken one's character, according to circumstances. Their client's interest, and especially their own, causes them to change their language on any occasion. Among the ancients this was one of the weak phases of judicial eloquence. * As a logographer

* Antony, the type of a Roman advocate, never wished to write anything, for fear of consequences. He wished to be able to contradict himself at his pleasure, and he thus spared himself the recantations for which Cicero, the severe censor and panegyrist of Vatinius, of P. Sulla, and of Piso, sought to excuse himself. (*Pro Cluentio*, 50; *Ad Familiares*, i, 9; ii, 16; *Pro P. Sulla*, 3.)

Demosthenes could not escape it. He exalted or prostrated before his feet the same persons, according as they were his adversaries or his clients. Although we ought, in this respect, to consider the customs of the Athenian bar and the indulgence which held them together, political eloquence never pretended to enjoy the same tolerance. The orator's contradictions are without excuse when respect for public interests imposes opinions really personal, and sincere convictions. If Demosthenes' eagerness to stigmatize Æschines can, under any condition, appear pardonable in our eyes, it is because he is firm and sincere in his hatred. The source of his wrath is always evident; Demosthenes confesses it most frankly: "I abhor these men, because I saw them in the embassy to be villainous and execrable, and I have been deprived, too, of my personal distinctions since, through the corruption of these men, your displeasure has fallen on the whole embassy."*

Æschines never confessed his hatred toward Demosthenes, because he could not mention the motives without condemning himself. He hated him with a spirit of vengeance (for Demosthenes had unmasked him), and in consequence of jealousy which dishonorable men have for those who have pursued an honorable course. His defamations disclosed the weakness of his bad faith. He did not dare to compare that man, whom he represented as a reservoir of infamies, with his contemporaries; and for a good reason,—he knew that he was superior to them. He was, therefore, compelled to seek his rivals in the past, whose eulogy never chagrined panegyrists or hearers. He discussed with power and dignity the lavishness of public re-

* *Embassy*, § 223.

wards, an indiscreet profusion which discouraged the good without correcting the bad.

“Do you think, Athenians, that an athlete, in order to win a crown at the Panathenæa or in the other games, would be willing to enter a pugilistic mêlée, or any other trying contest, if it were to be given not to the most worthy, but to the most intriguing? Not one would be willing to do it. But because the prize is rare and difficult to acquire, the victory glorious and immortal, he willingly exposes his body to peril and endures the severest toils. Consider yourselves, then, the judges of the lists in which the contest is for civic virtue. If you give rewards to a small number, to the worthiest and according to the laws, many athletes will contend for the prize of virtue. If you gratify the first ambitious comer with it, you will pervert the best applicants.*

“That you may conceive the force of what I here advance, I must explain myself still more clearly. Which, think ye, was the more worthy citizen,—Themistocles, who commanded your fleet when you defeated the Persian in the sea-fight at Salamis, or this Demosthenes, who deserted his post? Miltiades, who conquered the barbarians at Marathon, or this man? The chiefs who led back the people from Phylè?† Aristides, surnamed the Just, a title quite different from that of Demosthenes? No; by the powers of heaven, I deem the names of these heroes too noble to be mentioned in the same day with that of this savage. And let Demosthenes show, when he comes to his reply, if ever a decree was made for granting a golden crown to them. Was then the state ungrateful? No; but she thought highly of her own dignity. And these citizens, who were not thus honored, appear to

* There was erected on the Agora a bronze statue of a political ally of Æschines, Demades, the orator of the Macedonians.

† From Phylè, *i.e.*, when Thrasybulus had expelled the thirty tyrants, established by the Lacedemonians in Athens, at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war.

have been truly worthy of such a state; for they imagined that they were not to be honored by public records, but by the memories of those they had obliged; and their honors have there remained, from that time down to this day, in characters indelible and immortal. There were citizens in those days, who being stationed at the river Strymon, there patiently endured a long series of toils and dangers, and, at length, gained a victory over the Medes. At their return, they petitioned the people for a reward; and a reward was conferred upon them (then deemed of great importance) by erecting three Mercuries of stone in the usual portico, on which, however, their names were not inscribed, lest this might seem a monument erected to the honor of the commanders, not to that of the people. For the truth of this I appeal to the inscriptions. That on the first statue was expressed thus:

“Great souls! who fought near Strymon’s rapid tide;
And brav’d the invader’s arm, and quell’d his pride.
Eïon’s high tow’rs confessed the glorious deed;
And saw dire famine waste the vanquish’d Mede.
Such was our vengeance on the barb’rous host;
And such the gen’rous toils our heroes boast.

“This was the inscription on the second:

“This the reward which grateful Athens gives!
Here still the patriot and the hero lives!
Here, let the rising age with rapture gaze,
And emulate the glorious deeds they praise.

“On the third was the inscription thus:

“Menestheus, hence, led forth his chosen train,
And pour’d the war o’er hapless Ilion’s plain.
’Twas his (so speaks the bard’s immortal lay,)
To form th’ embody’d host in firm array.
Such were our sons—Nor yet shall Athens yield
The first bright honors of the sanguine field.
Still, nurse of heroes! still the praise is thine,
Of ev’ry glorious toil, of ev’ry act divine.”*

* *Against Ctesiphon*, § 177 et seq.

This eloquent page develops a great moral and political truth,* but Æschines makes an unjust and malevolent application of it. Demosthenes was in the right when he refuted it thus:

“ We have heard his encomiums on the great characters of former times; and they are worthy of them. Yet it is by no means just, Athenians, to take advantage of your predilection to the deceased, and to draw the parallel between them and me who live among you. Who knows not that all men, while they yet live, must endure some share of envy, more or less? But the dead are not hated even by their enemies. And, if this be the usual and natural course of things, shall I be tried, shall I be judged by a comparison with my predecessors? No, Æschines, this would be neither just nor equitable. Compare me with yourself, with any, the very best, of your party, and our contemporaries. Consider, whether it be nobler and better for the state to make the benefits received from our ancestors, great and exalted as they are, beyond all expression great, a pretense for treating present benefactors with ingratitude and contempt; or to grant a due share of honor and regard to every man who, at any time, approves his attachment to the public. And yet, if I may hazard the assertion, the whole tenor of my conduct must appear, upon a fair inquiry, similar to that which the famed characters of old times pursued; and founded on the same principles; while you have as exactly imitated the malicious accusers of these great men. For it is well known that, in those times, men were found to malign all living excellence, and to lavish their insidious praises on the dead, with the same base artifice which you have practiced. You

* “ It is a general rule that great rewards in a monarchy and in a republic are a sign of their decadence, because they prove that their principles are corrupt; that, on the one side, the sense of honor has no longer any force; that, on the other, the quality of citizenship is weakened.” (*Esprit des Lois*.)

say, then, that I do not in the least resemble those great characters. And do you resemble them? Or your brother? Do any of the present speakers? I name none among them. I urge but this: let the living, thou man of candor, be compared with the living, and with those of the same department. Thus we judge, in every case, of poets, of dancers, of wrestlers. Philamnon doth not depart from the Olympian games uncrowned, because he hath not equal powers with Glaucus, or Karistius, or any other wrestler of former times. No; as he approves himself superior to those who enter the lists with him, he receives his crown, and is proclaimed victor. So do you oppose me to the speakers of these times, to yourself, to any, take your most favorite character; still I assert my superiority. At that period, when the state was free to choose the measures best approved, when we were all invited to engage in the great contest of patriotism, then did I display the superior excellence of my counsels, then were affairs all conducted by my decrees, my laws, my embassies; while not a man of your party ever appeared, unless to vent his insolence. But when we had once experienced this unmerited reverse of fortune; when this became the place not for patriot ministers, but for the slaves of power, for those who stood prepared to sell their country for a bribe, for those who could descend to certain* prostituted compliments; then, indeed, were you and your associates exalted; then did you display your magnificence, your state, your splendor, your equipage, while I was depressed, I confess it; yet still superior to you all, in an affectionate attachment to my country.†

Indulgence is due to the pamphleteer who answers the provocation of a pamphlet, especially if he is justified in appealing to the righteousness of his cause.

* He alludes to the complimentary addresses sent to Alexander, which he insinuates were procured by Æschines and his party.

† *Pro Corona*, § 314 et seq.

The oration *On the Crown* unites the dignity of a national harangue with the ardor of a philippic against Æschines. Æschines' invectives are inexcusable. He calumniated Demosthenes, and, by insulting him, he forwarded a victory desired by the Macedonians.*

* It would be interesting, but foreign to our subject, to follow the thread of invective at Rome under its diverse forms; then the *fescenine* poems up to Seneca's pamphlet, the *Apocolokyntosis*, or metamorphosis of Claudius Cæsar into a pumpkin. The iambic and satirical poets would find their proper place then, and in the first line the *hendecasyllabi* of Catullus (*Odes*, 29, 42, 54, 57, 93). Cæsar replied to Cato's *Anti-Cæsar* by the *Anti-Cato*. At first, irritated by the verses of Catullus (*irascere iterum meis iambis*), the dictator, instead of essaying to reply to them in the same tone, responded to them like an intelligent man, by an invitation to dinner. The *Epodes* of Horace are a feeble echo of the *hendecasyllabi*. For the *aqua-fortis* of Catullus, the poet of Tibur frequently substituted engravings on copper-plate. Fulvia, the wife of Marc Antony, had one cheek much larger than the other. An acquaintance of the triumvir, the rhetorician Sextus Clodius, dared to comment on her deformity, which was, at least, very impolite. This insulting equivocation, "far from diminishing his favor with Antony, only tended to augment it. Fulvia, more jealous of her husband's honor, pierced the tongue of the orator of the *Philippie* with a needle, by way of retaliation.

The "delicate and gentle" Virgil (*molle atque facetum*) has allowed invective to mingle in the pleasing pictures of his *Bucolics*. Damætas and Menalcas (*Third Bucolic*), before engaging in a poetical joust, gallantly use the epithet "robbers," in memory of the *Carmen amæbeum* of ancient Latium. This persistence of invective (*convicium*) in Latin literature justifies the words of Horace: "Manserunt, hodieque manent vestigia ruris (*Epistles*, ii, 1, verse 160; ii, 2). Roman urbanity always bordered on rusticity. Cicero lavished insults scarcely tolerable at the forum and before the senate, where Cincas believed he had seen an assembly of kings worthy to rule the earth, and which even the author of the *Third Philippic* calls "the chiefs of the most august council of the universe." In the midst of these pamphlets charged with symmetrical insults, but without shame, what became of the Roman dignity and the minute *decorum* of the *De Officiis*? The code of Roman manners regulated the voice, the walk, the gesture, the carriage of the toga, and the least details of external life. On the chapter of defamatory insults it was mute.

CHAPTER IX.

GREEK ELOQUENCE IN THE LIGHT OF TRUTH AND MORALITY.

“Τὸ ζέϋρος ἥδὲ, καὶ ἀπὸ φευδῶν ἐΐη: Success is sweet, even at the cost of falsehoods.” (Sophocles, cited by Plutarch.)

“Δαίνυται σοφία μείζων ἄδολος τελέθει: Sincerity of talent magnifies it.” (Pindar.)

WITH the law of the transformation of species signalized by science in nature, there is another law which is even more striking, that of the persistence of the essential characteristics of genera and races. The Gaul of our day is in many respects the Gaul of Julius Cæsar's time. Likewise the Hellenes, who were contemporary with Philip, had preserved the original type of the Greeks of ancient Troy. The culture of centuries had mollified their character, but did not efface it. One of their features is the spirit of knavery and delusive fiction. “The brave grandfather” of Ulysses, as Homer calls him, Antolycus, surpassed men in the art of robbery and perjury. He owed this eminent quality, a reward for his pious sacrifices, to Hermes, the god of invention and eloquence. Ulysses was worthy of such an ancestor. We know with what skill the Ithican king wove artificial falsehoods. “I hate,” says Achilles, “as I hate the gates of Hades, the man who conceals one thought in his heart and expresses another.” Ulysses, to whom Achilles declared this sentiment, reproduced elsewhere a formula for it, with an expressive variation. “I hate, as I hate the gates of Hades,

the man 'whom want itself can force untruths to tell.' " * He did not absolutely hate disguise, but the wretch who lived on fiction, as the epopee. If the beggar Iros uttered an untruth for a mouthful of a goat, Iros was wrong. But if the object was to preserve from the covetousness of another the wealth with which Ulysses was laden on his return from the country of the Phœacians, falsehoods became legitimate. What fertility in Ulysses' fictions! Very skillful would be the man who could surpass him in artifices, even among the immortals. Minerva rendered this homage to her favorite hero, and when Ulysses (deceptive and defiant) † was bent on dissimulation before her, the goddess said to him: "Let us cut short these deceptions, we are both perfect masters of knavery; let us not display our dexterity, but let us speak frankly." ‡

A hero destined, as it seems, to perpetual suffering, like Hercules, but superior to the suffering, and fortified by a courage which the waves of adversity cannot submerge, the Ithican king attains epic grandeur through these qualities. He is alone, without resources, against numerous and determined adversaries. His profound craft, his unique arms, find an excuse in the necessity and in the legitimacy of his pursued object,—regaining his property and revenging his outraged hospitality. His falsehoods are therefore nat-

* *Odyssey*, xiv, 156; cf. xix, 395; *Iliad*, ix, 312.

† Themistocles declared to Aristides that the allies did not believe him on his word, and he entreated him to assure them, in his place, of the investment of the Greek fleet at Salamis. Aristides himself found the majority of the Grecian generals incredulous. Later Themistocles spoke to the Greeks in a more sincere tone, and was then believed. (Herodotus, viii, 80, 81, 110.)

‡ *Odyssey*, xiii, 291, 296, εἰδότες ἄμφοι κέρδεα (κέρδος, artifice and gain).

ural. But Ulysses is a great artist. It is not sufficient for him to deceive; he must please. With the poet he amuses himself with recitations, pronounced by turns to Minerva, to Eumæus, to the applicants, displaying a fecundity of variations, in which appears the desire to justify a high reputation and to flatter the most vivacious tastes of his hearers. The lesson which is drawn from the bloody catastrophe of the *Odyssey* is solemn. It seems, then, that not only in the great scenes of expiation, but also in the diverse resolutions which prepare them, all ought to be grave. The details ought to participate in the serious character of the catastrophe. If Homer had thus conceived his work, he would have displayed a studied art, a just feeling of dramatic fitness and harmony of colors. In return he would have been less artless and truthful. Besides the terrible drama which he develops before our eyes, the poet has painted the life and spirit of the Greek race true to nature. By a strange contradiction in the tragic and moral grandeur of his argument, there is apparent, in the fictitious narrations of his hero, an exuberance of imagination, which proves that the rhapsodist and Ulysses, by delighting in these games, obey an instinct of the race.*

In spite of time and philosophy, the Greeks always preserved certain impressions of native dispositions. In vain did the dislike for deceptiveness engage Plato to proscribe it under its most innocent forms, and to banish from his republic the art, preëminently imitative, of epic and dramatic poetry. The criticism lavished on the *hypocrisy* of Homer and Æschylus rather surprised than corrected the nation, which the hyper-

* Cf., in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*, the lesson on practical morality given by Ulysses to Neoptolemus, verse 79 et seq.

bolical Juvenal (iii, 100) afterward said was entirely composed of comedians. The moralists of Greece spoke like Achilles. Ulysses remained the patron of the men of action. The political stratagems (manœuvres bordering on duplicity) to which Themistocles had recourse, in order to protect his own and the interests of Athens, are well known. Demosthenes regretted that "the most illustrious man of his age" could not rebuild the walls of Athens by main strength rather than by "deceit."* The orators of Athens in the practice of their art never shared the delicate scruples of the author of the *In Leptinem*. If Greece ventured much in politics and history, she was no less venturesome in eloquence.

Among the methods of delusion practiced by the Attics, some were nearly innocent. Contrary to the law which forbade them to depart from the subject (τὰ ἐξαρώνια), they aimed to distract the judge in order to arouse or baffle his attention. Paraboles, apologies, stories, comic traits, jokes; nothing was neglected which could amuse the judges. He who laughs is unarmed. "One could no more derive advantage from an Athe-

* *Against Leptines*. At Salamis he pretended to have deserted the Hellenic cause. He deceived the Great King by secret advices, which were apparently favors, but really perfidies, and, whatever might happen, beneficial to him who gave them. "This language was inspired in Themistocles by the desire to secure for himself the favor of the Persian, in order that, if any disgrace was to await him on the part of the Athenians, he could find refuge in that country, a fact which afterward happened." Herodotus said that Themistocles was a "wise man and a man of good counsel." (Herodotus, viii, 109, 110, 75.) He applied, by anticipation, the Lacedæmonian apothegms against the Spartans. "To deceive our enemies is an action as just and glorious as it is pleasing and useful." (Agesilaus.) "To the skin of the lion, which is not sufficient, let us sew the skin of the fox." (Lysander.)

nian by annoying him, than from a Lacedæmonian by amusing him.” * Sometimes they used means more serious in appearance, and oracles, even in civil causes, came to offer their appoint to the confirmation. Political orators readily employed these divine arguments, pious frauds which were undoubtedly often efficacious, since success alone could support their employment. Herodotus (i, 60), in reference to the appearance of an apocryphal Minerva at Athens, was astonished that the Athenians, an intelligent people, should allow themselves to be caught in so coarse a snare. The snare of oracles was often set for them. The poet Aristophanes, who favored ancient prejudices, ridiculed but could not eradicate the practice.

Among human practices, rhetoric taught that of magnifying or diminishing objects (*αὐξήσεις, μείωσεις*). Such an artifice was natural to their desires and excusable, when it was merely a sophism of innocent self-love. † However, it is as just to represent men and things under their different aspects, as it is useful to know the strong and feeble among them. Neither the absolute nor the perfect are found in this world. It is the privilege of rhetoric to take possession of the natural complexity in the human soul and in truth, and to profit by them. The poet Simonides ‡ refused to celebrate the victory of a team of mules,—it was repugnant to him to take the lyre for the purpose of singing of half-asses (*ἡμίονους*). Was this a scheme in order to draw a higher prize for his verses? The premium was increased; the poet sang without scruples: “Hail, offspring of noble mares; hail to your feet, fleet as the tempest.” “And

* *Esprit des Loix*, xix, 7.

† Molière, *Misanthrope*, ii, 5.

‡ Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, iii, 2 fin.

yet," remarks Aristotle, "they were the offspring of asses."

Each, according to circumstances, sees things from a certain standpoint. The same Phœceans were severely censured by Æschines, but kindly treated by Demosthenes; their sacrilege became an "inequitable action;" the Caucasus was transformed into a mole-hill. Innocent Timarchus was greatly to be pitied. "Because a citizen in the bloom of life, distinguished by his figure, and not foreseeing the suspicions to which beauty was exposed, conducted himself negligently, Æschines accused him of prostitution!" The author of the *De Oratore* (ii, 72) recollects, not without a certain satisfaction, his art of exaggerating or attenuating weak or advantageous parts. Æschines and Demosthenes practiced the same method, but did not acknowledge it. The three talents given to the state by Ctesiphon's friend were reduced, in his accuser's mouth, to a hundred minæ, diminished almost one-half. Demosthenes was even less reserved. The faults which constituted a motive for Alcibiades' banishment were peccadilloes compared with the crimes of Midias. Alcibiades mutilated the Hermes, an impiety deserving severe punishment; but was there not a great difference between such a mutilation and the inversion of all sacred things, which was the manifest crime of Midias, who insulted Demosthenes? Alcibiades struck Taureas in his functions as choregus; "but it was one choregus who struck another."* Among colleagues these outbursts of vivacity apparently established no precedent. * * * Who proves too much proves nothing; indiscreet art betrays itself, and exaggeration makes the judge distrustful, as

* *In Midiam*, § 147.

the drinker distrusts mixed wines.* The Greeks excelled in all kinds of counterfeiting; but here fraud is transparent and denounces the falsifier.

II. Pascal believed in witnesses who suffered torture. It would not always have been prudent to believe in witnesses at Athens who displayed their wounds. Ulysses, disguised as a beggar, completed his travesty by covering himself with "disgraceful wounds." Pisistratus, who was a great admirer of Homer as well as of Sisyphus' son, inflicted wounds upon himself and his mules (they were unable to prevent it) and rushed into the agora. He said that he had barely escaped being murdered, and asked the people to give him a guard! The people were deceived and granted him a strong guard. Faithful to a tradition that had become classical, the Athenians, through cupidity or hatred, lacerated themselves with their own hands. One petitioned a physician to inflict gashes upon his head, another slashed his own head.† Such wounds furnished proofs against the adversary.

Who thus disfigures his face to exact money from his antagonist, or to defeat him, will not hesitate to disfigure the truth. *La grande Mademoiselle* confessed that she used her imagination when her memory failed her. The Attics were as unscrupulous, and the exact truth was their least care. In the *Antidosis* and the *Panathenaicus* Isocrates gives two contradictory assertions on the same subject. Here the Thebans refused, there they accorded burial to the Argives. We would imagine the rhetorician embarrassed at such a flagrant mistake.

"Do not imagine that I am unaware that I make an as-

* *Rhetoric*, iii, 2; the actor Theodorus. Cf. *Odyssey*, iv, 277 et seq.

† *Against Bæotus* and *Against Ctesiphon*.

sertion here contrary to what I have elsewhere manifestly written. I do not think that any one of those who would make this comparison would be so unenlightened or so malevolent as not to consider that I have given proof of wisdom by speaking then in such a manner, and to-day in another. I hold that what I have just said is well said and to the point." (*καλῶς καὶ σύμφωνα τῷ νόμῳ*.)*

(When he composed the *Panathenaicus* Athens and Thebes, secular enemies, were united against Philip: hence this retraction favorable to the useful allies.) Isocrates made this confession at the age of ninety-seven. What was he awaiting that he might be serious? If he should live three ages, the Athenian would still be frivolous, and his frivolity would laugh at truth.

The hearers were even less devoted to it. Between them and the orator it was always understood that art and success were of prime importance, and that it was proper to accept the most categorical affirmations without questioning them. Falsehood was a part of the right of defense. It was the natural arm of the accused.

"You are aware that, since the existence of men and trials, no criminal was ever condemned on his own confession. Effrontery, denials and falsehoods are offered, pretexts are forged: everything is done to escape punishment."

This naïve remark of Demosthenes does not merely confirm the adage, "Every bad case is deniable." It recalls the use which Greek orators daily made of all kinds of fiction. Self interest and rhetoric conspired to instruct them.

Although reserving the right of ethics, which admits only just causes and arguments founded on truth, Aristotle does not fear to enter into the details of rhetorical rules for falsehoods. He aims to teach, not

* *Antidosis*.

how to use them, but how to refute them. The motive is laudable, and, we confess, the orator who has been trained to plead the pros and cons by any means, will not on that account necessarily be a dishonest man. We must, said Saint-François de Sales, have wealth "in our purse, not in our heart." In this condition wealth will not poison us more than the poison stored in the laboratory injures the druggist. In like manner the orator could preserve dangerous receipts in his mind in order to baffle them when necessary without admitting them to his esteem. Unfortunately the rhetorician, who is so well instructed in handling these forbidden arms, will be easily tempted to use them. Flee falsehoods, but here is a receipt to falsify *incognito* and with profit. Is this not exposing the pupil to temptation? Is it certain that he will distinguish the theory from the practice, as it is necessary to distinguish in Aristotle the preceptor speaking in his own name from the savant who is wholly devoted to his analytical genius?

Dispassionately the philosopher dissects the vices of the human mind and soul. He shows their corruption without dreaming that he might be accused of corrupting, and that the purity of his intentions closes his eyes against the dangers of his work. "All is good to the good." The corollary to the proposition is equally true. Now, neither Aristotle's rhetoric nor his politics have ever instructed perfectly honest classes. On many a page has the Stagirite expressed in touching terms man's sympathy for man and the moral beauty of philanthropy.* That does not pre-

* "Man has all kindness toward man." "Whoever has made extensive voyages can see how much man is to man a sympathetic being and friend." (*To Nicomachus*, vii, 1; *Rhetoric*, i, 15; ii, 21-24.)

vent him from stating, on two occasions, as argument this precept worthy of Machiavel: "Insane is he who murders the father and allows the children to live." Elsewhere he gives the motives which are to be alleged for praising the *dog* (an animal admitted to the heavens in the zodiac), or the *mouse* ($\mu\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$, the radical of *mystery*). Aristotle is not more of a sophist in this passage than he was a depraved moralist shortly afterwards. He indicates the instruments suited to such or such a work without stopping to consider it. He makes an inventory without appraising. This is an object not of reproach, but of regret. Aristotle clearly understood human virtue. "In general," said he, "men do wrong when they can." The multitude, according to him, is incapable of good and education. Why did not the author of these sentences, which are severe even to injustice, foresee the abuse which human malice could make of curious but too disinterested analyses?

The Athenian bar justified the term *malice* ($\alpha\alpha\omicron\upsilon\delta\rho\gamma\omicron\nu$), which Aristotle applied to judicial eloquence, and the want of esteem for advocates. The profession of logographer was necessary at Athens. The people would have been dissatisfied without it, and yet they condemned those who were logographers. One of the insults which orators exchanged was that of logographer. This discredit was due to several causes: distrust of a powerful art, which promised victory even to bad causes; the character of venality attached to an institution which was quickly transformed into handiwork; the suspicious morality of their professional or oratorical proceedings. Demosthenes, when speaking in his own name or in the name of his clients, expressed himself very modestly on the power of his

eloquence. He aimed to dissimulate it, fearing lest he might awaken the distrust of the tribunal. His adversary perceived this, and unmasked his false modesty. "Beware, judges, of Demosthenes' abilities. A consummate magician (γόγης), he represents things as he pleases by the aid of speech. His eloquence is the scandalous triumph of fascination" (τετρατεσία).* Æschines, in his turn, in the midst of the ignominious outrages with which he is covered, is especially indignant at hearing his voice compared to the song of the Sirens (a remark more effective than any other to injure him in the minds of his hearers). Is it possible that a logographer, "molded of words," and of "artificial" words, should reproach another for knowing how to use words? It is evident that Demosthenes initiates the youth in the fraudulent tricks of rhetoric, and executes them himself with the effrontery of a charlatan, who laughs behind the scenes at the credulity of his public. Returning to logic, let us see how the skillful man, in the presence of his pupils, boasts of his dexterity in juggling. (*Against Timarchus.*)

The Athenians voluntarily made use of hired defenders, but disavowed it and pronounced it illegal. Isocrates at first followed the practices of logographers. Eventually, when frequently summoned to justice for violating the law which forbade the use of artifices before the courts, he ceased to write orations for others, and confined himself to the composition of rhetorical treatises.† Thus the profession of rhetorician was viewed with suspicion, like all smuggling,

* He is the most amusing manipulator of all our politicians, the sharpest of our sophists, the most subtle and most insatiable of our jugglers. He is the Bosco of the tribunal" (*Timon*). Oh, eternal equity of political wisdom!

† Cicero, *Brutus*, 12, fin.

and its products, too often adulterated and sophisticated, were greedily sought in secret, and publicly dishonored.

Poor as their soil, the Greeks became soldiers, logographers or pirates, mercenaries of the sword or pen. Public opinion was more indulgent toward the pirates of the sea than toward those of the tribunals. In the same speech (*Against Aristocrates*) Demosthenes pardons Charidemus, who was needy in his youth, for having pillaged the allies of Athens on a plundering expedition, and he stigmatizes rhetoricians as the scourge of their country. He recalls the herald's imprecations against the orator who spread a snare for the counsels of the people or for the heliasts.

Neither human codes nor divine threats had the power to suppress an evil, whose extent was measured by the Draconian laws of Plato. If an advocate were convicted of chicanery he suffered temporary suspension. In case of a second offense, death. If he were guilty of cupidity, death. The logographer always had to defend the good cause gratuitously.* Theo-

* *Lois*, livre 11^e; tome de la traduction de M. Cousin. The *Capitularies* of 802 give testimony of an unequivocal distrust toward advocates. One would say that Charlemagne knew Athens and her logographers: "Et nemo in placito (tribunal) pro alio rationare usum habeat defensionem alterius injuste, sive pro cupiditate aliqua, minus rationare valente * * * sed unusquisque pro sua causa vel censu vel debito rationem reddat, nisi aliquis sit infirmus aut rationis nescius: pro quibus Missi vel Priores, qui in ipso placito sunt, vel judex qui causam hujus rationis sciat, rationatur complacito" (Pretz, *Lois*, tome i, p. 92). Cf. *Mémoires de l'Académie des Sciences et Belles-lettres de Toulouse*, 1878. *De la légende politique de Charlemagne au dix-huitième siècle et de son influence à l'époque de la Révolution française*, par M. A. Duméril. Napoleon I still remembered, as it seems, his illustrious patron. *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène*, Nov. 14, 1816, § 14: "I would wish to establish a law that neither solicitors nor advocates should be remunerated, except those who win their cases. * * * I am

pompus said of Athens that she swarmed with Bacchie poetasters, sailors, pick-pockets, sycophants, false witnesses and lying ushers. "Favor me with your testimony," became proverbial in Greece. It was necessary to undergo three condemnations as a false witness before incurring infamy. Athenian justice in this respect was surrounded with precautions of bad augury. The accuser in a case of murder, before the Areopagus, took his oath standing, adorned with the sacred ribbons of a ram, a hog, and a bull, which had been sacrificed according to certain rites; he pronounced upon himself, his family and his race, extraordinary and terrible imprecations, in case he bore false testimony. "This formidable and solemn preparation," says Demosthenes, "nevertheless was not sufficient to render him credible." From this candid observation we can estimate how much confidence the judges had in the ordinary oath.

"Even when perjury could have assured me the condemnation of my persecutors, I would not have purchased it at such a price: I have too much respect for the tribunals, and the protection of the Gods is more precious to me than all the joys of revenge."

This protestation was necessary; thus the oratorical customs willed it, but these were very different from the real customs.

A client of Demosthenes, Chrysippus, mentions two testimonies of Lampis, one before the tribunal and the other before an arbiter. As this last testimony injures his cause, he reverses it with this distinction:

convinced that my meaning is clear." The Emperor wished to dissuade advocates from supporting bad causes. It would perhaps have been more effective to discover means by which he might compel judges never to condemn good causes.

“Judges, to render false testimony before you and before an arbiter is not the same thing. In the first case, in fact, great wrath and vengeance threaten the false witness; in the second it is scarcely a misdemeanor, and without danger.” (*Against Phormio*).

Callistratus employs a strange argument in his favor: Olympiodorus denies that I am his associate. To prove that I am his associate, I declare that on a memorable occasion I favored him in a trial with false testimony. And thereupon the irreproachable plaintiff recounted the falsehoods of Olympiodorus and of his witnesses. Callistratus not only did not contradict it, but confirmed it all: “All that was concerted between us. Then our interests were evidently common; we were then associates. * * *” And they were certainly worthy of each other. What a singular method of pleading one’s cause, and recommending oneself to the mercy of the judges!

The deliberative orations, says Aristotle, are nobler (*καλλίων*) than those at the bar. Under these conditions they were naturally superior, and yet, when they were so, it was due to the elevation of subjects familiar to political eloquence rather than to the purity of the means which the orators employed. The tribune constantly confounded itself with the bar and borrowed from it its passions and its most suspicious methods of discussion. If Demosthenes’ *Philippics* were the only monument of his political eloquence, the orator’s glory would not have raised him to the height to which his debates with Æschines carried him. But his glory was not thereby diminished. His harangues, inspired solely by patriotism, are decidedly true and generous, and worthy of receiving for an epigram the words by which

Thucydides characterized the statesman. * The rest of his work (without speaking of the logographer) does not offer in the same degree the alliance of artistic and moral beauty. In the face of the Macedonian, Demosthenes stands a lasting model of an orator and a citizen. In the face of his rival, Æschines, he appears the first of orators; but he betrays himself as an Athenian advocate, and bears the imprint of detestable customs which had been consecrated by his city: at all times it has been difficult not to howl with the wolves, a fact which Voltaire felt and expressed.

III. The Athenians were too assiduous in the schools of the sophists not to have contracted habits difficult of eradication. It was said of them, and they almost proved it, that by oratory they could make things appear what they were not; all was conjecture, all was possible: instead of convincing proofs and peremptory reasonings they used plausible conjectures and specious probabilities. Thus, the orator would base his argument on a public rumor really spread or forged by himself, and on presumptions unfavorable to his adversary. Why would Aristion not be Demosthenes' secret emissary to Alexander? Calumny is certainly a strong forte, but oratory is also very powerful. It is essential to render probable by skillful reasoning that which is least true. Æschines wishes to prove that Demosthenes has been an accomplice of Philocrates, an assertion quite incredible (*ἀπιστότερος*), which fact he does not conceal; but this is not in his eyes a reason to renounce it. The sophists urged the acceptance of the eulogy on Busiris,

* II, 60: To know (*γινῶναι*), to explain (*ἐξημενέειν*) state interests (*τὰ δέοντα*): to love his country (*φιλόπολις*) to be superior to wealth (*χρημάτων πρξίσσων*).

on the dust, and on the fever. It is not more impossible to believe the paradoxical (*παράδοξον*) opinion that the orator of the *Philippics* was the pensioned friend of the Macedonians. Of what use is speech, if not to illuminate obscure things, to obscure luminous things, and to give to objects whatsoever appearance is desired?

According to the testimony of Quintilian (ii, 17), Cicero boasted that in the criminal trial of Cluentius he threw so much dust in the eyes of the judge that he compelled him to see things only through his (Cicero's) eyes. The Athenian orators often might have been equally confident. Whoever has not recoiled before the task of supporting Demosthenes' philippism, an invention bordering upon folly (*ἐγγυτάτω μανίας*), can dare all.

The Athenians, moreover, were sceptical. They had their reasons for not believing in the incorruptible virtue of the people. These dispositions encouraged the orator to undertake all and trust to the moral indifference and to the credulity of the people; and then the audience of the Pnyx was not that of the Areopagus. Before the latter Æschines saw many suitors succumb, in spite of their eloquence and the authority of their witnesses; others, without witnesses and in spite of uncultivated language, triumphed. This venerable assembly did not express themselves on fine orations (*Against Timarchus*); before the tribunal of the heliasts oratory reigned supreme. Now, when have scruples ever checked the ambition to reign?*

* "It is often the case in deplorable debates that the man without eloquence (*ἄγλωσσον*), but of valiant heart, is overcome by forgetfulness while the highest reward is offered to the polished falsifier (*αἰόλω, ψεύδεται*). The secret suffrages of the Greeks would give the prize to Ulysses, and Ajax, deprived of his shining armor, was engaged in a struggle with death." (Pindar, *Eighth Nemæan*.)

The penalty of death was enacted against every citizen who gained authority by a false law. In practice, the judge was constrained to relax a rigor which, if faithfully executed, would have quickly decimated the bar and the tribune. "Laws make the morals of a state." Demosthenes might have added that laws without morals avail nothing. With the Athenians they were much less the expression and the fruit of character than among the moderns, and even on many points they harmonized badly enough with the morals. Notwithstanding the threats of punishment, the texts of laws and decrees were often falsified and even forged. *Æschines* and *Demosthenes* accused each other of being forgers, and both appealed to the public registers, irrefutable proofs of manifest misdemeanors. *Æschines* particularly apostrophized them with veneration.

"Excellent, Athenians,—excellent is the institution of the public archives. Unchangeable, they do not submit to political metamorphoses, but they permit the people to scrutinize at their will those men who, after a criminal administration, suddenly disguise themselves as honorable citizens."

Is this impudent irony, or must we admit that the collection of Athenian laws, charged with contradictory dispositions, was an arsenal from which every man could take such arms as he needed? Even this explanation would not suffice to illuminate the flagrant contrarieties of several assertions of the two adversaries. Thus *Demosthenes* boasts of his integrity in the same circumstance in which, according to *Æschines*, he has been accused (*ἔξῃ λῆγχι θῆς*) of having pilfered a squadron more powerful than that which vanquished the Lacedæmonians at *Naxos*. The substance of the offense was not, however, easily concealed. *Demosthenes* reproached *Æschines* for having entered

against him the suit of Ctesiphon a long time after the events, although previous to that time "he had never accused him, never prosecuted him." Æschines returned a direct contradiction, and recalled different circumstances in which he had not only accused Demosthenes, but had clearly convicted him (*καὶ παλαιὸν ἐξήλεγχε*) of sacrilege, corruption and theft.* Whom are we to believe? One of the two is certainly an unpardonable falsifier. Perhaps they have both in turn been guilty of falsehoods and deserve the appellation of orators of

* Æschines accused Demosthenes of maladministration in the affairs of Eubœa and of the extortion of money from the Oritians. Demosthenes made no reply to these grievances. Dissen gives a weak explanation for his silence. Æschines, says he, added these calumnies to his public oration. Demosthenes, therefore, was unable to refute before the people objections of which he was ignorant. Demosthenes himself revised his orations. Why did he not profit by these revisions and destroy the grievances which had been stated against him? Criticism on this subject is reduced to conjectural appreciations; however, we know how considerations of state in Greece were affected by bribes. At Artemisium the Eubœans offered Themistocles *thirty* talents if he would persuade the allies to remain in the waters of Eubœa. Themistocles in his turn bribed the commander-in-chief, the Spartan Eurybiades, with *five* talents. *Three* talents seduced Corinthian Adimantes. The fleet did not leave its anchorage at Artemisium. "Thus a special favor was accorded the Eubœans, and Themistocles himself enjoyed great profit"; that is to say, twenty-two talents on thirty. (Herodotus, viii, 4, 5, 112.) By holding the allies to their post, the Athenian general served Eubœa, entire Greece and himself. This method of conciliating public and private interests places politicians on slippery ground. Mirabeau made this mistake. The political organization of Athens rendered disinterestedness difficult to orators. They governed the republic from without, the administration from within, and their functions were not remunerated. In the negotiation of foreign affairs, when individuals or cities solicited favors not prejudicial to the state, the orators perhaps reserved for themselves a portion of the sums given. This was the reward they took through a medium profitable to all parties.

bad standing (ῥήτωρ παράσημος), which the accuser of Timocrates applied to the falsifiers of the laws.

The art of falsifying seems to have been earnestly prosecuted by Greek orators. They invented facts, and then proofs of the facts. The chain was logical. It is not sufficient to edify an imposture; it is necessary to prop it up firmly. Truth is self-sustaining; insincerity never has sufficient support:

“This man, an inimitable juggler, incapable of speaking the truth, even inadvertently, has a method peculiarly original. When an ordinary boaster offers a falsehood he is careful not to express himself with clearness and precision, for fear of being confused. If Demosthenes derides truth like a boasting impostor, he at first falsifies under oath and under terrible imprecations upon himself. Then he fearlessly announces that which he knows is never to happen, and even calculates its epoch. Persons whom he has never seen he cites by name. * * * If he wishes to state inventions as real, he mentions the day of their occurrence. He forges the name of a witness to his invention. A wonderful mimic, he dupes his hearers by imitating the language of truth. He is a knave doubly worthy of your intense hatred, since he slanders characters of known probity.”*

* *Embassy*, §§ 153, 99. “If thou hast begun, finish; nunquam tentabis, ut non perficias,—this maxim of Cardan was practiced by the Athenian orators, and sometimes against them. One of the most pathetic passages of the *Pro Corona* is that in which the orator appeals to the Athenians on the true character of Æschines. Is he the *guest* or the *hireling* of Philip? (See above.) According to a legend of an Athenian savor, the orator, in pronouncing the word *μισθωτός*, might have intentionally changed the accent and said *μίθοτος*. Meander concerted with Demosthenes to play this comedy. He first raised the question of accent by believing *μισθωτός*, and all the people followed him. The grave Ulpian became the echo of this anecdote, which is sufficiently refuted by the gravity of Demosthenes’ character, but which is valuable as a proof of the levity of the Greek mind in general.

What are we to think of this accusation of shameless falsehoods and perjuries? Phidias, says Æschines, seems to have made the statue of Minerva to provide this man with a source of perjuries and profits. On the comic stage the Athenians mocked their gods; on the tribune they treated them in like manner; and perhaps public levity assured the orator and the poet equal impunity. Æschines' imputations baffle the critic. Ulpian reproaches Demosthenes for having arranged the stories which he recounts to suit his fancy; for example, that of Glaucetes (*Against Timocrates*). In this case the orator never fails to summon public notoriety to the aid of his inventions. This is a method of persuading each hearer that he should be ashamed to consider or to doubt what he imagines he alone does not know. Demosthenes discloses this artifice in the speech *Against Bæotus*: "That of which each of you is ignorant believe not to be known by your neighbor, but demand a convincing proof of the alleged fact." The observation of this advice would have sometimes embarrassed the political orators, but they were acquainted with the levity of their hearers, and knew that with them they could be at ease.

As there are pious falsehoods, there are oratorical falsehoods. The Greeks wrote treatises upon the art of creating laughter (*Περὶ γελαιῶν*); examples were not wanting at Rome or Athens to compose treatises on the art of perverting the truth. Cicero recommended that the pleadings be sprinkled with little lies: *Est mendaciunculis adspargendum*. Sometimes these were not little fictions for seasoning, but anecdotes developed to please. Quintilian, the instructor of the Roman advocate, surpassed his master in this respect; he drew up the Code of "false narrations." He ex-

posed the theory of "colors." And with what solicitude! Do not forget, said he to his pupil, that every liar should have a good memory. Above all, when it is necessary to lie, do not hesitate to lie persistently. By frequently repeating the same thing you will finally render it credible, and perhaps in the end you will be convinced yourself."* Nevertheless Roman urbanity never compared with the audacity of Attic asteism, and nothing in Latin eloquence, even the most deliberate, equaled the romantic episode of the female captive of Olynthus.

"When Philip took Olynthus, he celebrated Olympic games, and invited all kinds of artists to the sacrifice and the festival. While he was feasting them and crowning the conquerors he asked Satyrus, our comic actor, why he alone preferred no request, whether it was that he had observed in him any meanness or discourtesy toward himself. Satyrus, they say, replied that he wanted none of the things which the others asked, that what he should like to propose would be very easy for Philip to oblige him with, but he was fearful

* Quintilian, iv, 2; vi, 3, imposes upon the master of eloquence a venerable probity (*sanctitas docentis*), which is difficult to reconcile with his precepts on the art of training witnesses, of defending all professions, even that of worthy Mercury (*Ieno*) ii, 4; the author of the formula *vir bonus* makes a poor defense for this contradiction (xii, 1). (Cf. *De Oratore*, 25, 52, 72, 79, 81; 59, 54.) To aid his theories Quintilian cites different passages of Cicero: *Pro Roscio*, 21 (Chrysogonus to the audience); *Pro Cluentio*, 21 (story of Cepasius and of Fabricius): "In all this there is only one thing true, that is that Fabricius quitted the tribunal" (Cf. *De Officiis* ii, 14). "It is sometimes the duty of the defender to support the plausible even against truth. I would not dare speak thus, especially in a philosophical work, if such were not the sentiment of Panætius, a stoic of considerable reputation." See (*De Republica*, iii, 4) the apology for injustice, by Philus. Carneades played this game without considering it dangerous; Cato thought differently. The Greeks were, above all, men of intellect; the Romans were, before all, men of government.

of being refused. Philip bade him speak out, assuring him in handsome terms that there was nothing he would not do. Upon which, they say, he declared that Apollophanes, of Pydna, was his friend; that after he had been assassinated his relations in alarm secretly removed his daughters, then little children, to Olynthus. "They," said he, "now that the city is taken, have become prisoners, and are in your hands: they are of marriageable age. Give me them, I pray and beseech you. Yet I wish you to hear and understand what sort of a present you will give me, if you do give it. I myself shall derive no profit from the grant; for I shall give them in marriage with portions, and not suffer them to be treated in any manner unworthy of myself or their father." When the company heard this, there was a clapping of hands and shouts of applause from all sides, so that Philip was touched, and gave him the girls. Yet this Apollophanes was one of the persons who killed Philip's brother, Alexander.

"Now let us contrast with this banquet of Satyrus another banquet, which these men held in Macedonia; and see if it has any likeness or resemblance.

"These men were invited to the house of Xenophron, the son of Phædimus, one of the Thirty, and off they went. I did not go. When they came to the drinking he introduced a certain Olynthian woman, good-looking, and well-born also, and modest, as the case proved. At first, I believe, they only made her drink quietly and eat dessert; so Iatrocles told me the next day; but as it went on, and they became heated, they ordered her to sit down and sing a song. The woman was in a sad way; she neither would do it, nor could; whereupon the defendant and Phrynon said it was an insult, and not to be tolerated, that a captive woman, one of the accursed and pestilent Olynthians, should give herself airs; and — "Call the boy"; and — "A lash here." A servant came with a whip; and as they were in liquor I imagine it took but little to exasperate them. Upon her saying something or other, and bursting into tears, the servant rips off her tunic

and gives her several cuts on the back. The woman, maddened by the pain and the whole treatment, jumps up, throws herself on the knees of Iatrocles and overturns the table; and had he not snatched her away, she would have perished by drunken violence; for the drunkenness of this scoundrel is terrible. There was a talk about this female in Arcadia before the Ten Thousand; and Diophantus made a report to you, which I will compel him now to give evidence of; and there was much talk in Thessaly and everywhere." *

This is a pathetic recital, and all its details are expressive. Satyrus had the glory of obtaining from Philip the pardon of those daughters whose father had murdered Philip's brother. The deputies are going to feast at the house of one of the Thirty, the detested oppressors of the city. Æschines and Phrynon (this Phrynon is well known) play the principal rôles in this odious orgy. On the next day an honorable man, a friend of Demosthenes, gives him an account of it. This scandal was known through all Greece. But above all, what are we to think of an Athenian ambassador capable of dishonoring his country by such violences, and of applauding the ruin of the Olynthians at a time when dignity, devotion to friendship and hospitality, and most noble and manly generosity, are found in a comedian? Is not the parallel overwhelming to Æschines? "Notwithstanding his guilty conscience, this polluted wretch will dare to look you in the face, will raise his voice presently and talk about the life he has led. Ah me, this chokes me!"

What is astonishing here is the boldness of the narrator. Between art and falsehood the interval is slight.†

* *Embassy*, § 192.

† Breve confinium artis et falsi (Tacitus). This contrast is malignant (ζαχόρυθες ἀντιθέτων) and false (ψευδοδύμενος). Hermogenes, *Περὶ μεθόδου*, 15 L, Spengel, vol. ii, p. 439 ; cf. *ibidem* 19, p. 442.

The allurements of an injurious contrast forced Demosthenes to calumny. Æschines' oration gives an entirely different version of a portion of this recital. Names of persons and facts are changed.

"You undoubtedly recall these abominable rhetorical artifices which Demosthenes promised to teach his young pupils, and which he has used to-day against me. You have seen him shed tears, moan over Greece, praise the comedian Satyrus for having, at a banquet, demanded of Philip *some of his friends who were prisoners, and who were employed to cultivate the vineyards of the prince*. Continuing his remarks, and raising his sharp and criminal voice with a great effort, he presented this revolting opposition: A man who plays the part of Carion and Xanthias appears so generous and magnanimous, and I, counsellor of a great commonwealth! I, who gave counsel to the Ten Thousand in Arcadia, I have not been able to suppress my insolence. Excited with wine at a feast which was given by *Xenodochus*, one of Philip's courtiers, I *dragged a female captive by her hair*, and armed with a lash I whipped her severely. If, then, you had believed him, or if Aristophanes had confirmed his falsehoods, I would have succumbed, although innocent, under a disgraceful accusation."

Consummate art is that which is hidden. In the first version Demosthenes had underlined the contrast, in the second he let the reader do it. In order to strengthen the recital and render it agreeable, he embellished it with new colors. Instead of the laborers in Philip's vineyards he substituted the young daughters of Satyrus' friend. These marriageable ladies were introduced here in order to play the counterpart of the Olynthian female captive who was so indignantly maltreated by Æschines.

Demosthenes, attaching a great value to his banquet invention, according to Æschines, essayed to conse-

crate it by the false testimony of a supposed relative of the imaginary Olynthian.

“See how he prepared this accusation long beforehand. One of the foreigners residing at Athens is the Olynthian Aristophanes. He was recommended to Demosthenes, whose eloquence he had heard extolled. By kind attentions and seductions Demosthenes intended to engage him to render false testimony against me. If he consented to appear before the judges, and to arouse their indignation by declaring that I had been drunk, and outraged a captive who was his relative, Demosthenes promised him five hundred drachmas immediately. He would receive five hundred others after the evidence. Aristophanes replies (we have his own word for it) that his exile and his actual destitution had suggested to Demosthenes the idea of a well-planned speculation; but he is grossly mistaken as to his character. He would do nothing of the kind. To establish the truth of what I advance, I am going to produce Aristophanes himself as a witness. Call Aristophanes of Olynthus to me and read his evidence. Also summon Dercylus, the son of Autocles of Agnontes, and Aristides, the son of Euphiletus of Cephisia. They heard the facts from his own lips, and reported them to me.”

Here we see Demosthenes confounded in his turn. But are these evidences reliable? Is it certain that the attempt at seduction ascribed to our orator, and his inclination to perjury, are not real inventions of *Æschines*? With such oratorical morals, every supposition is admissible, every affirmation is disputable. The embarrassment to which these solemn contradictions, these judicial protestations, subject the reader is precisely the object of these skillful orators. Where is the deceiver? The judge does not know. He hesitates. His conscience is troubled. He pardons, or he refuses to punish. When he has reached this point

all is consummated. Athenian eloquence is applauded for having accomplished its work.

In this case, however, Demosthenes seems to have missed his object by overreaching it. He strained the springs of his art. The instrument was broken in his hands.

“On myself, said Æschines, the effect of the accusation which I have just heard created the liveliest fear, the strongest indignation, then the greatest joy that I ever experienced. In fact, I trembled, and this thought troubles me still, that some among you may be fascinated by insidious and perfidious contrasts and may not requite me. I was excited and beside myself while Demosthenes was accusing me of outrages committed, under the influence of wine, upon a freed woman, an Olynthian; but I rejoiced when you rebuked him for this wrong. I believe that at this moment I have received the recompense of a modest and pure life.”

The adage *Se non è vero, è ben trovato* always acquits the poet. The Athenian orator often benefited by this favor before a people who were more anxious to be pleased or flattered than instructed. But it behooves all to keep within the bounds of moderation. According to Ulpian, Eubulus, at this passage of Demosthenes' oration, cried out to the Athenians: “What! will you permit him to use such language!” The judges then arose and left the orator. This last act seems very doubtful. The Athenians would have given a remarkable proof of their moral delicacy if they had actually left the scene. But the thing is not probable. Day after day they heard falsehoods equally strong, and not as well told. The accuser's recital could betray “the detestable sycophant,” according to Æschines' expression, but did not the same Æschines tremble when the vividness and agreeableness of this

picture enchanted (*ψυχαγωγῶν θεύτερος*) and delighted the hearers almost to conviction? Undoubtedly they were contented to receive it with an incredulous smile, and without being so strongly indignant. We know they were very delicate and sensitive, but not to things of pure morality.* They hissed a mistake in pronunciation. They rose up against a solecism, but in their conduct they tolerated stranger solecisms. Their moral sense emanated from their æsthetic sense. They admired, in the good, one of the manifestations of the beautiful (*καλοκαγαθία*). When they were virtuous, it was because they were preëminently artists. Demosthenes knew well his city, and what it could support. But what was tolerable to the common public ought not to have been so to Demosthenes.

An Athenian ventured an oratorical falsehood to delude the multitude, as Aristophanes risked a popular joke to amuse the multitude. But a studied calumny, circumstantiated and coldly reproduced in a written oration, after careful revisions and deliberate embellishments,—and that, too, when it had been disavowed by the incredulous attitude of the tribunal,—this contempt for truth passes all license. Demosthenes had some scruples. He suppressed one detail that was too revolting,—*dragged by her hair*. He no longer put the whip in Æschines' hands, but in the hands of the slave; but he preserved and envenomed the rest. He should have known that his fable would have no more effect upon his reader than it made on his hearers, and yet he made a fair copy of it. He persisted in his fiction, without any denial, through exclusive love for the art. This boldness approaches candor. Demosthenes

* Graïs ingenium, Graïs dedit ore rotundo

Musa loqui (*Ad Pisones*);

A eulogy very true in itself and in the restrictive sense.

effaced from his harangues certain metaphors of fine taste upon which we, less Attic than Æschines, would perhaps have passed condemnation, and he polished and repolished calumnies which dishonor their author.

IV. In Fénelon's thirty-third *Dialogue des morts* Demosthenes makes an apology, in company with Cicero :

"Eloquence is very good in itself. It is only its use that can be turned to evil, such as flattering the passions of the people and gratifying our own. And what else do we do in our bitter declamations against our enemies, — I against Midias or Æschines, you against Piso, Vatinius or Antonius? How often have our passions and our interests made us offend truth and justice! The true use of eloquence is to place truth in its proper light, and to persuade others in what is truly useful to them; that is to say, justice and the other virtues. This is the use which Plato made of it, but we have imitated neither the one nor the other."

Plato crowned Homer with flowers, and excluded him from his republic. He was more rigorous toward orators. He expelled them without crowns. Their art was so debased at Athens that he refused to grant it even the name of art. In his eyes it was a skillfulness, the fruit of practice and experience (*ἐμπειρίαι*). Eloquence ought to be allied to dialectics, and teach truths. It pursues the probable. Its task ought to be to correct minds, to fortify them by legislation and justice. Instead of offering to them "gymnastics" and salutary "medicines," it corrupts them by the "toilet" of sophism, skillfully disguised; by the "kitchen"* of flattery (*Gorgias*).

This deceiving and poisonous eloquence deserves the

* *Agoracritus* : "I can speak and cook, *ζαροχοποιεῖν*" (*Knights*).

contemptuous censure of the philosopher, and the insulting ridicule of the comic poets. Does not the art of the sophists, thus understood, actually seem to provide criminals for the tribunals rather than to honor them? Fortunate would it be for sophism if it contented itself to measure how many times a flea leaps the width of its foot, and to investigate the little insect.* It has higher aims; it purposes to confound the good and the bad, *mine* and *thine*. It teaches us not to pay our debts and to pilfer the goods of another. Therefore the poet of the *Clouds*, and the orators themselves, good judges in their own cause, treated it with no more respect. They were the first to defame one another by inserting in their speeches mutual maledictions; they whispered to the client, whose anonymous advocates they were, the blemishes of their art and the revelation of their dishonest practices. The spectacle of the abuses

* Sophism bears the same relation to learning that a pedagogue does to a scholar. The former is narrow in every sense of the word, and is absorbed in trifles; his incapacious mind must grapple with small subjects, and from his inability to comprehend or appreciate great themes he becomes an egotistical literary manikin. The sophism which measures the leap of the flea recalls an illiterate country pedagogue, whose learning was confined to the rules of arithmetic, reading and writing, and to the absurd "methods" of his imagination, which was otherwise remarkably barren. Uncouth as he was unscrupulous, ungentlemanly as he was uncultured, ungrateful as he was ungodly, he habitually delivered himself of "lectures," to the mortification of his suffering constituents, on the great questions of long and short division, and on the "methods" which he applied in educating (!) the unfortunate urchins who frequented his barbarian castle of ignorance. Owing to his minute knowledge of the rules for forming the letters of the alphabet, which he made one of the profound studies of his life, and his ignorance of everything that was ennobling, he measured all things, human and divine, by the slopes and slants of the letter A. But as civilization advances, this kind of sophism recedes. Fortunately the world to-day is not afflicted with many such relics of the Dark Ages.

of the art which Isocrates himself taught is perhaps not foreign to his logic: "We owe our safety to the Thebans as they owe theirs to us. * * * If we understand our interests, we will pay each other reciprocally for holding assemblies, because that people which holds an assembly the oftenest works the most for the advantages of the other." Isocrates is wrong in rendering the institution of popular assemblies responsible for the misdeeds of speech. It is not the reunion of the nation in council that compromises her safety, but the disloyalty of the orators who, appointed to instruct her, deceive her. Eloquence ennobles or degrades the orator; it strengthens or weakens the state according to its application. Every defensive arm can be turned into a deadly instrument in unfaithful hands.

Æschines stigmatized Timarchus with an authoritative emphasis which is not a skillful counterfeiting. In this cause he certainly had an advantage over his rival: he accused an infamous man whom circumstances forced Demosthenes to defend. The selection of Timarchus as a future accuser of Æschines was imprudent. Æschines wisely profited by this mistake when he stated the prejudicial question of the unworthiness of the man. The friendships of orators during the Macedonian epoch were often more politic than sincere.* The author of the *Great Moral* (ii, 13) thought of this union of interests when he permitted the honorable man to be the friend of the base man. "The base man, if agreeable, is a friend so far as he is agreeable: if he is useful, he is equally a friend so far as he is useful." In

* "Hate as if you were some time to love; love as if you could hate." (*Against Aristocrates.*) Hyperides loved in this manner. Demosthenes detected him, long before their rupture, preparing memoirs against the friend whom he was afterward destined to accuse in the case of Harpalus.

spite of these distinctions, there are classes whom it is best to love under no condition. Demosthenes ought to have been more circumspect and should not have committed himself with Timarchus. In still another respect he erred. Athenian orators too often deserved the suspicion of statements similar to that of Celsus: "The advocate's reward is not a good conscience, but victory." * These failings, common to orators contemporary with Demosthenes, are especially lamentable and conspicuous in him. Genius rules. In Demosthenes the man and the polemic are therefore much inferior to the orator of the *Philippics* and to the citizen. If he dared to compromise himself in this respect, without considering that the future would not have the complaisant indulgence of Athens, what liberties ought the generality of harangues to take? Demosthenes was the most honorable orator of his time except Phocion. According to this, what are we to think of the others?

Quintilian (xii, 1), defending Cato's maxim, "the orator is an honest man, skillful in speech," wishes to answer this "unanimous objection of the public":

"What then? Was not Demosthenes an orator? And yet he is reputed to have been a dishonest man. I feel that my answer will create an outcry, and demands oratorical precautions. I will therefore say at first that Demosthenes does not appear to me so reprehensible in his behavior that it is necessary to believe all that his enemies have accumulated against him, especially if I consider his noble political conduct and his memorable end."

Justice here commands us to separate the private from the public man and to imitate the state, which considers services not virtues.

* "Non bona conscientia, sed victoria litigantis est præmium." (Quintilian.)

"As to an examination of his dignity, I will add without hesitation: a state and a private individual ought not to judge alike, for the points of view are different. As a private individual, each of us considers what man is worthy of his alliance and of his relations. Certain laws and opinions determine this. But a city and a people reward whoever serves and protects them. They decide upon this not by birth and reputation, but by facts. What! In distress we will allow ourselves to be benefited by whoever offers himself, and when the service is received we will question our benefactor as to his standing. Such an inquiry would not be just." *

Honest Plutarch remarks that if the people had killed Miltiades when he was tyrannizing over Chersonesus, summoned Cimon to justice for incest, banished Themistocles from Athens on account of his licentious life, they would have thereby lost the victors of Marathon, of Eurymedon, and of Artemisium, where the Athenians laid the foundation of Hellenic independence. Plutarch here wishes to establish that God and men are praiseworthy for deferring the punishment of the guilty. The *political* philosophers of the lyceum would have drawn another conclusion from these lines. Bad acts are absolutely blamable, but the good which a citizen does his state ought to eclipse the moral evil which the unvirtuous man does against himself. "In the perfect republic," says Aristotle, "civic virtue ought to appertain to all, since it is the indispensable condition of the perfection of the

* *Against Leptines*. (Cf. Thucydides, ii, 42.) "If any among you at any time deserves reproach, it is just above all things to place his bravery on the battle-field and his service to the state in clear light. The good in him has effaced the evil, and his public virtue has served Athens more than his individual weaknesses have injured her." (*Funeral Oration*.)

state. But it is not possible that all in the state possess the virtue of a private man." The unity of virtue is as impossible as the unity of employment in choruses, where it is very necessary that there should be figurants, and not exclusively coryphei. When civic and private virtue can be found united in the same person, we have a magistrate both able and virtuous. But if they are not united, it is fitting to esteem that one which is more advantageous to state interests; for the qualities and experience of a commander are preferable to probity, because probity is more easily found than military talent. It would be fitting to choose otherwise if the object were to select a guardian of the public treasury. "The most important object is (we have frequently repeated it) to support those citizens who wish to preserve the government against those who wish its downfall." "The state can and ought to employ, and even esteem, a bad man if he is useful." A good knife is one that cuts well.

Demosthenes was less honorable than Phocion: who
* will dare to say Phocion was a better citizen than Demosthenes? Demosthenes served Athens and the sacred cause of national dignity better than he.* Affected by the contagion of his time, he bears its lamentable traces. But before the foreigner he is always mindful of himself. He is ever high and pure in the accomplishment of civic duty, and in the sacred struggle against the invader. Upon the whole, this Demosthenes is the true Demosthenes whom posterity

* A success of the Athenian army was announced to Phocion: "When then will we cease to conquer?" His maxim was, "Be the strongest or the friend of the strongest." Phocion could not fight at Chæronea. He was at that time commanding the fleet at the Hellespont,—a lamentable mishap.

especially knows and justly admires. Preëminent virtue and justice consist in accomplishing good for our fellow-men:

“Many classes can be virtuous in that which regards themselves individually, who are incapable of virtue in that which concerns others. * * * The man nearest perfection is not that man who uses his virtue for himself, but that one who uses it for another, which is always a difficult task.” *

Much will be pardoned in Demosthenes because he passionately loved his country.† Before the triumph of Antony and Octavius caused Brutus, another martyr of liberty, to doubt virtue, he had placed the bust of Demosthenes among the statues of his ancestors.‡

* *Nicomachean Ethics*, v, 1, § 15.

† Virtue, in a republic, is a very simple thing: it is love for the republic. * * * This virtue can be defined: love for the laws and for the country. This love, demanding a continual preference of public to private interest, gives all the individual virtues; they constitute this preference. This love is singularly affected in democracies. * * * I have not said this to diminish in the least degree the infinite distance which there is between vices and virtues; God forbid it. I have only wished to have it understood that all political vices are not moral vices, and all moral vices are not political vices (*Esprit des Lois*, v, 2; iv, 5; xix, 11).

‡ Cicero, *De Claris Oratoribus*, 31.

CHAPTER X.

I. DEMOSTHENES AS A MORALIST. II. RELATIONS OF JUSTICE AND POLITICS. III. RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT IN DEMOSTHENES.

I. DEMOSTHENES AS A MORALIST.

“Φανήσεται πάντα οὕτως οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς νομίμοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἀπὸ τῆς τοῖς ἀγράφοις νόμοις καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις ἤθεσι διώριξε: These maxims are not only in laws; they are in the number of unwritten laws which nature has engraved upon the heart of man.” (*Oration on the Crown.*)

SEVERAL ancient testimonies, of very questionable validity make Demosthenes a disciple of Plato. This tradition of the Platonic education of our orator appears to have been born in the schools of philosophy which were desirous of claiming such a disciple. Nine cities contended for Homer's birth: it is not astonishing to find philosophy and rhetoric contending for the glory of having inspired the author of the apostrophe to the heroes of Marathon. According to Cicero, Demosthenes was an “assiduous hearer” of the chief of the Academy.* Cicero believed that he had found the proof of this in his letters. It is true, the letters attributed to Demosthenes, and supposed to have been written (except the fifth) during his exile, express noble and generous thoughts; as a whole, they do not appear unworthy of a pupil of Plato. But any one of these pages contains passages

* *Brutus*, 31; *Orator*, 4; *Dialogue of the Orators*, 32; *Plutarch, Life of Demosthenes*, 5.

which, in the mouth of Demosthenes, would furnish his own condemnation. The author exhorts, in one of his letters, Heracleodorus to lend his aid to the accused Epitimus, instead of prosecuting him with animosity:

"I know that you have been trained in a school which is decidedly foreign to cupidity, and to the dishonest practices of evil passions, and producing all for the common good and for supreme justice. * * * A student of Plato, I call the gods to witness, who would dare to lie and prove himself dishonorable toward a single man, would be very culpable."

The philosopher of the *Gorgias* would not have disowned the orator of the *Philippics* or even the orator of the oration *On the Crown*; but he would undoubtedly have sent back to the laboratories of the sophists the polemic and logographer. If Demosthenes was the disciple of Plato, it was only under certain circumstances, as Voltaire was the student of the Jesuit fathers.

If Demosthenes did not follow the lessons of the Academy, he profited by the reading of Plato's dialogues. This is evident (we quote from Cicero) in the majesty of his style (*granditate verborum*). Quintilian (xii, 10), refuting indiscreet orators, in whose eyes coldness and dryness are claims to the reputation of Attic, asserts, with good reason, that neither Lysias nor Andocides instructed Demosthenes in the pathetic sublimity of his harangues. Demosthenes, the disciple of Isæus, surpasses his master, and draws his inspirations from a warmer and deeper source. Pericles received his best-tempered arms from the hands of philosophy. In like manner Demosthenes is indebted to the study of Plato's works for a general culture which has left its manifest imprint on the dutiful orator. In this

measure we can imagine him a disciple of Plato. To go beyond this would be an exaggeration, which would very soon be refuted by several of his orations.* The *political* philosophers of the new Academy and of the Lyceum,—these, in general, were his masters, and he heard them most often.† Cicero ascribes the credit of much of his eloquence to philosophy, but to what philosophy? To the sceptical Academy, the volatile mistress‡ of contradictory controversies. Is this what makes a true philosopher? Demosthenes gave no more attention to philosophy than did Cicero, but, like Cicero, he gained much from his perusal of philosophical writings.

The assiduous study of Thucydides, the traditional customs of Greek eloquence, the gravity of the circumstances, and that of Demosthenes' character, contributed, as much as the lessons of philosophy, to imprint a moral gravity of powerful effect on his eloquence.

“Why, Leptines, do you not think of the future? It is,

* “There was need of a Plato to mould Demosthenes, in order that the greatest of orators might do homage with *all* his reputation to the greatest of philosophers.” (Daguesseau.) This judgment is a shocking exaggeration. (*Histoire de Démosthène*, par M. A. Boullée.)

† “If you desire to follow the traces of ancient Pericles or of Demosthenes, * * * if your heart is stirred at the sight of this splendid model, of this sublime image of the orator, you must embrace, in all its extensiveness, the doctrine of Carneades and of Aristotle. * * * If a man is found who can, according to the method of Aristotle sustain the pros and cons on all kinds of subjects; if he is able, after the manner of Arcesilaus and of Carneades, to combat all kinds of propositions; and if to this method he joins the knowledge of oratorical art, the customs and exercise of language, there then is a true, a perfect, a finished orator.” (*De Oratore*, iii, 18, 19, 21.)

‡ *Orator*, 3; *Ad Atticum*, iii, 25: “O Academician volaticam * * * modo huc, modo illuc.” All philosophical schools are not equally adapted to form an orator: *Orator*, xix, 4; *De Oratore*, iii, 17; *Ad Atticum*, ii, 16; *De Finibus*, iv, 3.

by Jupiter, because we are far from the prevision of such sad conjunctures! Would that we could always be far from them, Athenians! Still, we are men; let us beware of words and laws which might awaken Nemesis. Let us hope for happiness. Let us demand it of the immortal Gods; but let us also reflect on the common law of humanity. Lacedæmon never expected to see herself in her present condition (her defeat at Leuctra laid her at the feet of Thebes); and Syracuse, that ancient democracy which submitted Carthage to tribute, which ruled over all the neighboring people, which vanquished the fleets of Athens,—she did not foresee that a single scribe,—a valet, it is said,—would impose a yoke of tyranny (Dionysius the elder) upon her. Did the Dionysius of our day imagine that with one bark and a handful of soldiers Dion would rout the master of so many triremes, so many foreigners and cities? Yes, truly the future is screened from all men; little causes effect great revolutions. We must, therefore, govern ourselves in prosperity, and provide against the future.”

The result was to confirm the moral affections of the young orator, and even far surpass them. Could he, in 355, foresee that a man from Pella would destroy Hellenic independence, that a Macedonian youth, in less than eight years, would subjugate the entire Orient?

Later, when Demosthenes witnessed the reverses which gradually prepared the ruin of the city of Minerva, he armed himself against the public decay by means of the very disasters which caused it. He exhorted Athens to derive her safety from her adversary.

“You have received a faithful report, Athenians, but you ought not to be thrown into consternation by the misfortune. Consider that discouragement is neither advantageous to the present crisis nor worthy of you; but it is worthy of your glory to consider that your duty is to repair the evil. If the noble conception which you have of Athens is not a delusion,

you ought to show yourselves superior to other men in the midst of reverses. My sincerest wish would have been that this fate would not have befallen our city, and that fortune would have spared it all disgrace. But if this crisis was to be,—if destiny had resolved upon it,—I esteem it advantageous that things have been accomplished as they are. Indeed, Fortune has sudden changes. It easily passes from one field to another. Defeats, the result of cowardice, are only constant in their stability. Believe me, even your conquerors are not ignorant that, if it is your wish,—if this check arouses you,—it is not yet possible to decide whether the present event is fortunate or unfortunate for them. If they are elated over their success, their victory can very soon be turned to your advantage; for the more confident their contempt, the more rapid their fall. * * * Perhaps none of you, Athenians, have inquired why adversity is a better counsellor than prosperity. The sole reason is that the fortunate man fears nothing. He does not believe that he is threatened by those evils which are reported to him. On the contrary, misfortune places before our eyes the faults of which it is the fruit, and makes us wise and circumspect for the future.”*

In the trial of the *Crown* Æschines shortens the debate; Demosthenes constantly enlarges it. He does not speak under the inspiration of disavowed personal passions, but in the name of moral dignity. The stoic Panætius congratulated him because he established the greater part of his harangues on this principle, that “the beautiful alone is eligible” and preferable in itself. In fact, Demosthenes always dared to present the image of an austere and laborious virtue to the Athenians. He exacted of them that they should prefer *the honorable*, although difficult and even unsuc-

* *Exordia*, 39 and 43; Didot, pp. 762, 764. This thought is developed by Bossuet: *Oraison funèbre de la Reine d'Angleterre*.

cessful, to *the useful*, although agreeable, but dishonorable. A good cause should be supported, though it be condemned to perish. The most imperious necessity is that of honor.

“Suppose some god would be your surety,—for certainly no mortal could guarantee such an event,—that, notwithstanding you kept quiet and abandoned everything, Philip would not attack you at last; yet, by Jupiter and all the gods, it were disagreeable and unworthy of yourselves, of the character of Athens and the deeds of your ancestors, for the sake of selfish ease, to abandon the rest of Greece to servitude. For my own part, I would rather die than have given such counsel; though, if another man advises it and you are satisfied, well and good. Make no resistance; abandon all. If, however, no man hold this opinion; if, on the contrary, we all foresee that the more we let Philip conquer, the more ruthless and powerful an enemy we shall find him, what subterfuge remains? what excuse for delay? Or when, O Athenians, shall we be willing to perform our duty? Peradventure when there is some necessity. But what may be called the necessity of freemen is not only come, but past long ago, and surely you must deprecate that of slaves. What is the difference? To a freeman, the greatest necessity is shame for his proceedings. I know not what greater you can suggest. To a slave, stripes and bodily chastisement. Abominable things! Too shocking to mention!”*

“Raise your hearts!” was the cry of the patriot and the motto of the orator.

Like Aristotle, Demosthenes knew the weaknesses of the Athenian multitude; but, while the philosopher condemned them without appeal, the orator labored and contended with them.

“As the mob lives solely on passions, it pursues only pleasures which are agreeable to it, and the means to procure

* *On the Chersonesus*, § 49; cf. § 10.

them. It is anxious to shun all pains and displeasures. But of the beautiful, of true pleasure, it forms not even an idea, because it has never tasted them. What orations, I ask, what reasoning, could correct these gross natures? It is not possible, *or at least it is not easy*, to change by the sole power of speech those habits which have so long been sanctioned by the passions.”*

Toward the end of his career Demosthenes is said to have experienced the discouragement which the rigorous sentence of the moralist was calculated to inspire. But this discouragement his entire political life had previously disavowed. The difficult work of which Aristotle speaks Demosthenes accomplished. By constantly speaking to the degenerate Athenians of their honor, he made them regain it. By pushing his fellow-citizens into the rough paths of duty, he sowed briars along his own pathway, and approached an almost certain precipice. The man affronting public affairs, in the hope of correcting his fellow-men, throws himself as food to “wild beasts.” “He will perish before doing any service for the commonwealth, useless to others and to himself.”† Demosthenes braved Plato’s prophecy, and almost belied it. If he perished at the task, Athens owed to him the safety of her honor. This devotion was the constant inspiration of his whole life. In this respect he never flinched nor varied. On other points his sentiments did not always have the same firmness. In him the politician was sometimes substituted for the moralist and effaced it.

* *Nicomachean Ethics*, x, 10, § 4.

† Plato, *Republic*, vi.

II.—RELATIONS OF JUSTICE AND POLITICS.

“Ἡ δικαιοσύνη * * * οὐθ’ ἑσπερος οὐθ’ ἑως οὕτω θαυματούς:
Justice * * * neither the evening star nor the morning star is so
admirable.” (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, v, i.)

“Ἔστι δὲ πολιτικὸν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δίκαιον, τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ κοινὸν
συμφέρον: The good in politics is justice, and justice is general util-
ity.”

One of the arguments which Demosthenes developed with the greatest force against Philip was the instability of all power founded on injustice. An interpreter of human conscience, the orator of the *Second Olynthiac*, by declaring the edifice of iniquitous power ruinous, affirms what ought to be as a consolation for what is. After the consecration of the honorable, the only basis of lasting success, he demanded the union of the honorable and the useful. The Socratic doctrine, so pure of intention, in this case inclines to a dangerous exaggeration. In Socrates’ eyes, a thing is not good when it is good for nothing. *Aristippus*: “Is a basket for rubbish, then, a beautiful object?” *Socrates*: “Yes, by Jupiter! and a golden shield is ugly, if the one is conveniently adapted to its use and the other is not.”* This sentiment has at least the merit of purity and frankness, a quality which is wanting in the following Stoic paradox, *The honorable is always useful, and alone useful*, a theory founded on an equivocation in which moral utility and practical utility are confounded. Both parties are somewhat mistaken. Socrates, in the Portico, exaggerated the truth. Demosthenes adopts a just medium when he

* See above, p. 32, the text and the note. The utilitarian æsthetics of Socrates leads to the utilitarian morality of the Epicureans and of the Sceptics.

says : “ We must always aim at justice, and practice it, but in the meantime we must seek measures to identify it with our interests.”* The politician guards against ideal speculations, and considers only the reality of things. He pursues the honorable and the useful at the same time. What more can we ask of him ?

The political motto of Hobbes was the saying of Plantus: “ Man to man is a wolf ”;† the state of nature is brigandage. Since men are inclined by instinct to destroy one another, they need a powerful despot capable of establishing order in society. Aristotle did not view human nature in the same light. Man, said he, is a social being (*πολιτικὸν ζῷον*); justice is “ that which is useful to the greatest number,” and when thus understood it constitutes the best politics. The thought of Demosthenes is not less generous than that of the Stagirite. Justice, in his eyes, is the defense of the oppressed. Such has always been, and such ought to ever be, the policy of Athens. The Megalopolitans (Arcadia) besought Athens for aid against Lacedæmon, then her ally. Sparta claimed this alliance in order to dissuade her rival from assisting the attacked city.

“ I wonder, also, to hear it argued that, if we espouse the Arcadian alliance and adopt these measures, our state will be chargeable with inconsistency and bad faith. It seems to me, O Athenians, the reverse. Why? Because no man, I apprehend, will deny that in defending the Lacedæmonians, and the Thebans before them, and lastly the Eubœans, and making them afterward her allies, our republic has always had one

* *For the Megalopolitans*, § 10.

† “ Homo homini lupus, quem non gnoveris.” In suppressing this restriction, the Christian philosopher aggravates the offensiveness of the Latin poet’s sentence.

and the same object. What is that? To protect the injured. If this be so, the inconsistency will not be ours, but theirs who refuse to adhere to justice; and it will appear that while circumstances change, through people continually encroaching, Athens changes not." *

The protection of the weak was so strict an obligation in Demosthenes' mind, that he made it the sovereign criterion of justice between Athens and other states. To him it was the source of honor and the foundation of equity

"Men dispose of their actions easily, but no one is powerful enough to govern the opinion which judges those acts. The people publish over the author of an act whatever appreciation the act deserves. Let us therefore act so that our politics will conform to justice; let us establish them on this principle: let us do unto the oppressed what we would wish that others would do unto us in adversity (but may this never await us!)" (*Twenty-second Exordium.*)

In the oration *For the Liberty of the Rhodians*, Demosthenes makes a distinction between social and international justice; but this time he does not impose upon the latter the obligation of moral beauty.

"I believe it a just measure to establish the Rhodian democracy; yet, granting it were not just, when I look at the conduct of these people, I conceive it right to advise the measure. And why? Because, O Athenians, if all men were inclined to observe justice, it would be disgraceful for us alone to refuse; but when all the rest are seeking the power to do wrong, for us to profess high principles and undertake no enterprise, would, in my opinion, be not justice but cowardice. I see that men have their rights allowed them in proportion to their power. * * * For, although private political rights are granted by the laws impartially to all, the

* Cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, v, 7.

same for the weak as for the strong, the rule of Hellenic right is prescribed by the greater powers to the less."

A short time previous the orator, sympathizing with the Megalapolitans, placed Hellenic right, which Athens identified with protection of the weak,* below strict right. He subordinated absolute justice to international justice, as a modern politician would sacrifice exact equity to European equilibrium. The protector of Rhodian liberty went farther and farther. He recognized a social morality arising from equity, and a Hellenic morality subject to the law of force. What was his aim? He wished that all people should see in the Athenians the defenders of common independence. Let us sound the depths of his thought: the supremacy of Athens, the champion of Hellenic liberty, would realize for him the reign of justice in Greece.

Thucydides likewise (vi, 89) reminded Athens that it was her political and moral obligation to raise herself to the protectorship of the free states: this was the most ingenious and certain method for her to encounter the preponderance of Lacedæmonian oligarchy. This policy conciliated the useful and the honorable. Demosthenes, in his turn, celebrated its advantages and magnanimity; but, inconstant to himself, after having established the law of honor, he stranded upon the apology of force: this fall was not expected, and what excuse did he give for it? The spectacle of universal injustice. * * * Too often, indeed, the example of successful iniquity is alluring; the dog of Fontaine (viii, 7) did not resist it. He was carrying his master's dinner home for him; a mastiff attacks him: a great struggle. Other aggressors come

* ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ προέσθαι μηδὲνα τῶν ἐλαττόνων τῶ μὲν ζῶντι.

upon him. The faithful guardian foresees his defeat; he decides to make the best of it.

Notre chien, se voyant trop faible contre eux tous,
Et que la chair courait un danger manifeste,
Volut avoir sa part; et, lui sage, il leur dit:
Point de courroux, messieurs; mon lopin me suffit;

Faites votre profit du reste.

A ces mots, le premier il vous happe un morceau;
Et chacun de tirer, le matin, la canaille,
A qui mieux mieux: ils firent tous ripaille;

Chacun d'eux eut part au gâteau.*

Thus certain congresses, in the name of justice (distributive), cut up a victim in the interests of general peace. The Athenian maxim is then justified: each has his rights allowed him in proportion to his strength; for none of those interested would believe it his advantage to be just while the others were unjust.

Demosthenes made a distinction between social and international justice. In what measure is this distinction legitimate, and, if it is admitted, what consequences can be drawn from it? In principle, justice does not change its nature when it changes its theater: let it be applied to individuals or to groups of individuals, to citizens of a single state or to several states, it remains the same in its essence. Good, according to Kant, is that which can be universalized with impunity. Justice being one and absolute in

* Our dog, seeing that he was too weak against them all, and that the meat was running a manifest danger, desired to have his share; and he wisely said to them: Do not be angry, gentlemen, my portion will satisfy me; you are at liberty to profit by the rest. At these words he first snapped a mouthful, and each dog tore off all he could of the meat. They all feasted,—each of them had a share of the cake.

itself, the principles of social justice should be capable of being extended to international justice, and the right of individuals generalized, ought to become the right of nations. In the actual state of Europe these two kinds of justice are very unequally observed. Social justice is differently respected in each state. In no case is the citizen authorized to violate it, even after another has violated it to his detriment. Indeed, if the principle of reprisals were admitted, it would destroy social order, whose maintenance is a better safeguard of all particular interests than the prosecution of crime or individual repression. The state is efficiently armed, for the defense of its members, with laws which protect them against every aggressor. Thus a social contract, which is fortified by sufficient sanctions, renders each people respectful to itself. On the contrary, we have not yet been able to establish a similar international code for Europe. She has treaties and temporary conventions, very similar to a simple truce. She has no penalty sufficient to prevent misdemeanors or to suppress and chastise violence. If an European state violates justice in order to injure us, have we also a right to violate it in order to secure our defense? This violation is lamentable; for evil always remains evil and nothing modifies or transforms it absolutely. But is not Europe excusable? The temporary and precarious compact which bound the states together by the supposition that it existed, has been broken; anarchy succeeds consented order; the law of Nature, the law of diplomacy. To demand of injustice a recourse against injustice is abnormal and immoral, viewed in the light of principle; but practically allowable, since necessity exacts it. Civil law forbids us to injure another, but permits

the killing of a murderer. When a nation's life or honor, which is one of its vital forces, is threatened, it no longer recognizes any other law than that of preservation, and it no longer discusses the means of securing it.* If it does not defend itself, what foreign force will have the authority and power to defend it? Perhaps Europe will some day recognize a sovereign arbitration, a justice of universal peace, sufficiently strong and respected to decide quarrels and to give decisions. With such an arbitration the Hellenic world was unacquainted in Philip's time; it has been wanting among modern nations even to our day. The boldest princes have sometimes been constrained to respect the law, the common protectress of their subjects: the destruction of social peace and the loss of their crown, would perhaps have punished them for their iniquities. Against a neighboring state if it is weak, violence offers less risks. Frederick the Great respected the heritage of the miller of Sans-Souci (this was social right), and violated Silesia (this was the way he understood international law). There were judges at Berlin for a mill; where could judges be found for provinces?

* Balzac (*Le Prince*, ch. viii) deplotes the discredit of the old theology, less accommodating, but more virtuous than the new: "It plainly says that a little evil is forbidden, when great good is to result from it; that if the world can be saved only by a trespass, it is of the opinion that it should be let go to ruin * * *; that God has placed in our hands his commandments and not the government of the universe." In ch. xxx the thesis is very different: "A drowning person indifferently catches at everything he meets * * *; necessity excuses and justifies all he does. The law of God has not repealed the law of Nature. * * * To defend oneself with the left hand is not trespassing." The latter is far from the principle of the old theology. These two chapters are to be read; in them will be found the change of front of the political moralist.

The struggle for life is a natural and a generally legitimate law, but the infringement of justice for self-defense is not the employment of force to destroy justice, nor is it the adoption of the maxim, *Might makes right*. Demosthenes witnessed the triumph of this detestable principle, and wished to draw from it encouragement for its application. In this he failed. He was better inspired when he recommended to the judges of Leptines' law that they should not permit as citizens what they would reprove as men. Now, if in social relations it is necessary that right should prevail over passion, why should it not be so among cities? States represent so many individuals, and ought to tend, out of respect to the right, to the establishment of an association similar to that which binds the members of each state. Admitting the legitimacy of might is encouraging individuals, who compose the human family, to the regime of savage life.

The idea of right was generally weak among the Greeks. The resources of Athens are exhausted; she throws herself upon an allied town in Bœotia, Oropus, and pillages it from top to bottom. "This was not through malignity, but through necessity." Such is the moral conclusion which Pausanias (vii, 11) draws from this robbery. A teacher of morality who made pretensions to gravity, Isocrates, gave an eloquent exposition on the inseparable union of the useful and the honorable. Then when he had to express himself on the violences of Athens, he acquitted her with this excuse:

"The Athenians thought that between two grievous evils they must choose the maltreatment of others rather than the maltreatment of themselves, and the unjust rule over other people rather than the unjust enslavement of themselves by Lacedæmon; and all well-informed people would think the

same. Some moralists, however, affecting wisdom, would speak and think otherwise."

Melos and Scion made no better impression on his coldness:

"We have been accused of enslaving the inhabitants of Melos and destroying those of Scion. According to my opinion, it is not in the least a proof of our tyranny, that people who have made war on us should be severely punished (σφόδρα ζολασθέντες); but it is a strong proof that we govern our people well, that none of the subjugated cities have suffered a similar punishment." *

Isocrates gave the matter little consideration, and disposed of it lightly.

The stability of thought, especially the perfect harmony of theory and practice, will, on certain subjects, always be rare among men. Generally, disavowals given to speculation are detrimental to morality. We think well and act ill. Sometimes deeds are better than words. The writings of Helvetius are like those of an Epicurean. His life was that of a sage. Such theories have undergone contradictions which are profitable to truth and good. The speculative scepticism of Kant, not daring to maintain its pretensions before morality, abdicates in its favor. Leibnitz has also fallen into a fortunate inconsistency. The author of the *Essais de Théodicée* praises God for tolerating particular evils which are the origin of general good. For evil is often the condition of good. "The grain which we sow is subject to a kind of corruption in order to germinate." We see, then, that the Creator authorizes us to use the maxim, The end justifies the

* *Panegyric*, §§ 63, 100; *On the Peace*, § 28; *Panathenaicus*, § 117; *Antidosis*.

means, and to enjoy the benefit of state rights. Should we accord the same privilege to man? God forbid it!

"The rule *Non esse facienda mala ut eveniant bona* is confirmed. The act of a queen will not be approved if she aims to save the state by committing, or permitting, a crime. The crime is certain, and the evil to the state is doubtful. * * * But in regard to God, nothing is doubtful, and nothing could be opposed to the rule of the best, which does not suffer some exception or dispensation."

Therefore God will always have the right to pursue the best, even with the aid of evil, because he knows with certainty the result. Man will not. The evil which he hopes to correct, and the good which he imagines he can effect, are equally uncertain. If, however, certainty on these two points were established, would not the evil destined to produce an indisputable good be permitted, and even be praiseworthy? Logically, Leibnitz could not deny the affirmative. But logic is not always the ruling quality of metaphysicians. Leibnitz, therefore, contradicts himself by refusing to subject man and God to the same moral principle, and the defense which the theorist of *optimism* makes of his endeavor to imitate God proves that the system attributed to God, and that of the author, are both very questionable.

Philosophers who are well informed on politics, or politicians who aspire to philosophy, are seldom consistent with themselves.* In this there is nothing astonishing. Even professional philosophers are not

* Frederick II was a philosopher in his correspondence with Voltaire, and in the *Anti-Machiavel*. However, he displayed little philosophy on the throne and in his foreign relations. "Who talks politics talks all but knavery." The king of Prussia spoke of politics as Rochefoucault spoke of disinterested virtue: "Qui a la jaunisse voit tout en jaune."

always consistent. Plato placed justice in the number of noblest ideas which constitute the retinue and radiance of the perfections of divinity. Nevertheless, in his *Republic* he disregarded justice and liberty to such an extent as to proscribe the elementary rights of the individual, the instinct of propriety, and the natural affections of the family. They are drowned by him in the state "as a few drops of honey in a great quantity of water."^{*} The most powerful genius of antiquity did not always escape, if not formal contradictions, at least the divergence of various views acceptable, each in itself, by virtue of their happy media, but not easy to reconcile.

Aristotle's method differs from Plato's. Plato generally devotes himself to pure speculation. He lays down, or rather seeks, principles whose formula is the object of his *Dialogues*; therefore he pursues the definition of the good, of the beautiful, and of the holy. In the *Gorgias* he examines like a philosopher the relations between justice and eloquence, and as dialectics appear to him alone capable of realizing truth and good, he sacrifices to it rhetoric, which merely aims at probabilities and the appearance of the useful. Aristotle proceeds differently. At first he establishes principles; then, after making these reservations, he gives rules adapted to the ordinary course of things. He affirms what ought to be, then he explains what is.

Thus in his *Rhetoric* he first regrets, in the name of truth and justice, that human infirmity has created an art condemnable in itself. If men were wise, eloquence would be no more necessary to the orator than to the mathematician and the geometrician. But

* *Politics*, Aristotle, ii, 1.

hearers have a perverted taste (*μολθῆραίαν*). They are not satisfied with convincing demonstration. We will therefore speak of elocution and the means of rendering it seductive. Action deserves the disdain of sensible minds, but the mob exact it of their orators as of their comedians. Things are not what they should be, but necessity knows no law.* We must respect the law. Nevertheless, here are some artifices of reasoning to weaken them if they condemn you, and to strengthen them if they justify you. According as the case may be, make a breach in the written law in the name of natural law, or in the natural law in the name of the written law. Apply the same practice to contracts and treaties. The city reposes on the equality and application of a law common to all. Ought great men also to be subject to it? No!

"It would be injurious to them to reduce them to a common equality, when their merit and their political importance place them entirely beyond comparison. Such persons, it may be said, are gods among men,—a new proof that legislation can concern only individuals who are equal by birth and faculties. But the law is not made for these superior beings. They themselves are the law. It would be ridiculous to attempt to submit them to the constitution, for they would follow Antisthenes, and would answer as did the lions to the decree rendered by the assembly of hares on the general equality of animals."†

Morality, considered in itself, has unchangeable principles. In detailed applications it is as individual and opportune as medicine.‡ It is not an iron rule,

* *Rhetoric*, iii, 1. *Ὅτις ὁρθῶς ἐχροντος ἀλλ' ὥς ἀναγκαίου*. (Cf. i, 13, 15.)

† *Politics*, iii, 8. These lions recall those of the *Gorgias*.

‡ *Nicomachean Ethics*, ii, 2.

rigid and inflexible. It is the lead rule of Lesbos which bends to the accidents of the stone and follows its contours.

Does the philosopher contradict himself in these various assertions? We prefer to say that he divides the subject into two branches. He sees things from a theoretical, and then from a practical, point of view under their double aspect. The political orator did not thus present the two faces of Janus. He confined himself to that face which suited his purpose. He omitted theoretical restrictions, and went straight to the reality of things. Now, reality and political necessity frequently do violence to speculative truth. Plato and Aristotle, by accepting slavery, submitted to this yoke. Since ancient society rested on this iniquity, it was impossible for them to think of shaking it from its foundations. The political and social organization of the state prevented the ancients from seeing truth in this light, or, if they did see it, from mentioning it and from pleading for a cause whose triumph, then impossible, was to be realized many centuries after the advent of Christianity; and so, in the best philosophers, principles and the application of principles, absolute morality and political interest, have little harmony. The people, we are told, will be happy when kings are philosophers, or philosophers kings. According to this they are destined never to be happy. A king may be a philosopher in his spiritual tribunal. He is chief of state in his council. When perchance philosophy reigns, it does not govern. A theoretical moralist celebrates with delight ideal justice, contemplated in its essence and in the perfection of its absolute beauty. "Neither the rising nor the setting of the sun is as worthy of ad-

miration!" * * * Ecstasy is forbidden to the politician. He does not contemplate the intellectual world. He endeavors to see distinctly the real world and to diminish the infinite distance which separates them. Since it is generally refused him to realize absolute good,* he confines his ambition to the task of doing the most possible good and the least possible harm; for he must not become a slave to ideas, but must be classed with men.

Let us note the difference between the ancients and the moderns in regard to diverse forms of moral obligation. The ancients were, first of all, citizens; they subordinated morality to politics,† and all duties to civic duty. Hence the appropriate character of Cicero's *De Officiis*, a work so perfect according to the judgment of Saint-Cyran, that he was astonished that it could have been inspired by a purely human genius before the time of Christianity. Now, this work is essentially a treatise on social morality. In it Cicero places duty to the gods in the first rank, and scarcely mentions this duty in the rest of the work. This is because the pagans had no need of a special religious morality or precepts exclusively relative to obligations to the Divinity. They served their divinity by serving their country.

The God of the christians is the God of humanity. The pagan divinities were wanting in this character of universality. Zeus, it is true, extended his empire over the entire civilized world, without devoting himself to any particular nation or country. But, under him, the immortals willingly adopted certain countries. They

* The nature of things is such that the good and the bad are everywhere found in company. (Plato, *Lysis*.)

† Politics, iii, 7; *To Nicomachus*, i, 1. *Esprit des Lois*, xxiii, 17.

had on earth a legal domicile and sometimes even temporal lodgings. They formed an integral part of the city where they were strongly established. * To defend the state was to defend them; the defeat of the state involved their defeat and condemned them to the loss of their consecrated residence and to exile. Æneas carried with him his vanquished gods and sought a new country for them. And so, while among modern nations religious faith cannot always be in perfect harmony with patriotic feeling, among the ancients religious duty and civic duty, far from counteracting each other, fortified each other to the benefit of the state.

Montesquieu recalls the trait of Persian Cambyses who placed certain animals sacred to the Egyptians before his soldiers. The Egyptians were so stupid that they did not dare to kill them, and the besieged city was captured. "Who does not see that a natural defense is superior to all precepts?" † So the ancients judged. They esteemed devotion to the state much higher than the realization of such a particular moral good. Public good was preëminently the good; who virtuously served his country had no need of other virtues. Sometimes the political moralist, in recalling the principles of philosophy, modified by a restriction the imperious order of sacrificing all to state interests. "There are hideous and infamous things which the wise man will not do, even to save the state." ‡ But

* When the Spartan kings departed for war, they carried the two Tyndarides with them; these were their companion gods. Cicero conjured the Romans to avenge the national gods (*deos patrios*) of Sicily as if they were their own. (*Against Verres*, ii, livre 4, ch. 43, 51.) See M. Tustel de Coulanges, *La Cité Antique*, iii, 6.

† *Esprit des Lois*, xxvi, 7.

‡ *De officiis*, i, 45. This exception to the sovereign rule does not trouble Cicero much; fortunately a thought puts him at his ease (*hoc*

this is merely a concession made, for form's sake, to the idea of absolute good and to the Stoic maxim that the honorable alone is truly useful. Cicero well knew that the wisdom of the politician was not that of Zeno; he even reproached Cato for constantly stating his opinions as in the ideal city of Plato and injuring the republic by his narrow inflexibility.* Let the safety of the people be the supreme law. Such was, upon the whole, the fundamental maxim of ancient politics and morality.

Christian spiritualism inspired modern nations with a more delicate morality, and, in a measure, more personal than civic. A christian prince can place the interest of his soul and the interest of state on the same level, sometimes even sacrifice the interest of state to conscientious scruples. In 1259, by the treaty of Abbeville, Louis IX restored Limousin, Périgord, Quercy and Agénois to Henry III of England against their will. "His conscience troubled him"† on account of the conquests made in France by his ancestors over the future adversaries of the Hundred Years' War. When once engaged in this pursuit, why did not the saintly king continue to the end? Was a partial restitution a "good returning"? To reduce the kingdom to the domain of Hugh Capet would have been logical.‡ In the eyes of the christian moralist piety is the whole of man,

commodius se res habet),—that the republic will never exact such a sacrifice of the sage.

* *Ad Atticum*, ii, 1. A passage commented upon by Camille Desmoulins. (*Les Vieux Cordelier*, No^e 7, 1 fin., 3 fin.)

† Guizot, *Histoire de la Civilisation en France*, 14^e leçon.

‡ Carneades said to the Romans: "Every people who have possessed empire, and the Romans themselves, masters of the world, if they wished to be just,—that is, to restore the goods of others,—would return to their huts and become resigned to the miseries of poverty."

even on the throne ; and it is not confounded, like ancient piety, with love of country. The christian turns all to the safety of his soul; the Greek or Roman, of perfect virtue, turned all to the safety of the state.

Antiquity was less interested in man, considered in himself, than in the citizen, and especially studied his rôle in the state.

Political science was to the ancients the fundamental and *architectonic* science. Consequently political justice (distinguished from domestic and civil justice) gives to good its most excellent form. This reminds us of the peripatetic definition of justice,—that which is useful to the greatest number. Plato's definition in his *Republic* is equally stamped with an eminently social character, and has nothing common with the definition: To each his own. It consists in a decorous subordination of three elements which constitute the state,—the philosophers who govern it, the warriors who defend it, and the artisans whose labor nourishes it. This justice has, therefore, nothing to do with equality of rights, nor with individual liberty, both of which Plato sacrifices to the desire of unity; it results from a certain harmony, from a certain order, according to the philosopher, necessary to a good constitution of the state.*

The social prejudices familiar to the ancients further explain the disproportion which they sometimes permitted between misdemeanors or crimes and punishments; they did not specially consider the degree of

* Likewise justice, for the individual, springs from a fitting relation established between intelligence (*νοῦς*), courage (*θουράς*, centre of generous passions), and concupiscence (*ἐπιθυμία*, brutal desires). This justice is written in large capital letters in a well-organized state, and in small capitals in a well-regulated mind; but the basis of the two inscriptions is identical.

immorality in the fault, but the amount of damage done to the state. Plato condemned to death the advocate who received money for his services or supported a bad cause. Whence sprung such excessive severity—from a desire to correct, at all hazards, one of the worst plagues of the Athenian city. The principle upon which our military justice, in time of war, rests, is the *consequence* of the misdemeanor or crime committed before the enemy. It condemns the freebooter to death, and the sentinel found asleep to several years' imprisonment. Outside of these particular circumstances modern law fixes a penalty, not on possible consequences, but on the intention. Thus it does not punish as a murderer the author of a murder committed in a state of drunkenness. The ancients were disposed to punish not so much the guilt as the injury caused. Hence suits were entered even against inanimate objects. A stone fell and killed a man; it was formally judged, condemned, and thrown out of Attica. Pittacus* was the author of a law which prescribed double penalty for crimes committed during drunkenness. As crimes were more frequent in this state than in the state of soberness, the legislator consulted the general utility of suppressing a preference for indulgence, which was due to an unconscious appetite. Thus public interest appears to have been the inspiration and the guide of political and private morality among the ancients.

Morality in itself is one and identical. Its unchangeable essence is the order and necessity to which the citizen and the private man ought to make his acts conform. But this unique morality contains many duties of unequal dignity. The determination of this hierarchy may vary according to the media. The mind,

* *Politics*, Aristotle, ii, 9, fin.

which changes and is unequal in the manifestations of its faculties in the child, the mature man and the old man, is, however, always the same in substance. Thus the honorable is the sovereign rule, the mind of all human actions. Nevertheless the honorable is not imposed on all with similar obligations. The politician, whose mission is to protect social order within and the security of the state without, ought not to be submitted to the same duties as the individual, who has only his own welfare and moral dignity to defend. Politics and morality, therefore, are not contradictory; but when both are submitted to the common principle of good they realize it by different methods, a legitimate diversity which is enforced by different circumstances and objects.

In governments, the less the political power is concentrated in the hands of a few, the more politics and justice are susceptible of harmony. A shepherd watching his flock is, according to La Bruyère, the "naïve" picture of the prince, "if he is a good prince." If he is not, he practices the maxim of Fra Paolo: "The first duty of a prince is to maintain himself prince." Herein lies the danger of monarchical power. In democracies, where sovereign authority has passed from a single person to all, the pole of politics is also displaced. Interest and duty then unite and engage the attorneys of the sovereign to attend to the welfare of the people, on whom they depend, and whose interests are united with their own. In these conditions modern political justice approaches that of the ancient free cities, where it was identified with the advantage of the greatest number. Now, when the governing and governed are thus united by common interests, and the direction of the people is intrusted to the

people, who does not see that political crimes and public disasters, which emanate from them, must necessarily be more rare? Then no dynastic manœuvres compromise national prosperity; no underhand diplomacy; none of those intrigues so mysterious that the ministers' secret is not always the *Secret of the King*. The policy of parliaments is still discreet; but it cannot and will not be concealed. The light of liberty purifies.

In the heat of the contest Demosthenes for a moment lost sight of moral law. What the philosophers frequently did to humor their systems, or to yield to the emergencies of the times, the politician did in a burst of indignation at the sight of universal iniquity.* He dreamed that his country would enjoy the perpetuity of honored power and independence. In consequence of this, he seems to have held strict equity at a low price. To pursue this course is dangerous. The authors of coups d'état never fail to allege the august authority of their desired object. They abandon legality to pursue right. They cannot confess that they violate the law to escape its threats. God forbids us to ever excuse the transgression of the law; but a criterion is here infallible to determine the amount of esteem due the author of the attempt. It is the judicial formula: Who profited by it? (*Qui bono fuerit?*) If the transgressor of the law alleged public welfare in the hope of securing his own welfare, let us declare him a criminal. If the state alone is to gather the

* Thucydides, iii, 82. "In times of peace, and in the heart of prosperity, states and individuals have a better spirit, because they are not thrown against their will into trying necessities; but war * * * teaches violence, and assimilates the passions of the multitude to the severity of the times."

fruit of the crimeful act, philosophers, be indulgent to the politician. The good God who, in creating the world, wished to make it as good as possible, has, however, left it far from his own perfection.

III. RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT IN DEMOSTHENES.

“Οἱ μὲν κάλλιστοι καὶ ἁγιώτατοι βωμοὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις τῇ ψυχῇ:
The most beautiful and sacred altar is the heart of an honorable man.” (*Against Aristogiton.*)

“Φέρειν ὅτι ἂν ὁ θεὸς διδῶ γυνναίῳς: Endure with courage whatever the god ordains.” (*Oration on the Crown.*)

In times of violent crises, when evil triumphs among men, it is not rare to see great minds, troubled by the moral disorders which they witness, anxiously questioning one another about Providence. The Epicurean Lucretius witnessed the unpunished crimes of the triumvirate, and then disavowed the gods, substituting blind hazard for them. The Stoic Tacitus, a contemporary of Domitian, sometimes doubted the goodness of the best and greatest Jupiter, and supported the belief in fatality. In the midst of the evils of the Macedonian invasion, what were the feelings of Demosthenes in this respect? The orator of the *Philippics* always speaks with admiration of the power of fortune: “Fortune is master of all things; it is the whole (τὸ ὅλον) of human things.” But a good fortune can be the reward of good actions. In the age of Aristides and Miltiades, the Athenians, faithful observers of justice in their relations between themselves and with the Greek cities, deserved to reach the zenith of prosperity. The Gods protected them in their struggle against Philip. What could be a more striking proof of their benevolence than the propitious opportunity offered by the siege of Olyn-

thus? A friendly god inspired the Macedonian with an insatiable desire destined to ruin him by finally arousing the city. Without Athens having done anything to call them forth, various favorable circumstances presented themselves voluntarily (*αὐτόματα*). To Divine Providence Demosthenes owed the sagacity which urged him to denounce the enemy's designs. Heaven's protection, with the orator's devotion, was the source of the benefit of the Theban alliance. "I will read to you an oracle of the gods, who always protect the commonwealth far better than her statesmen."

Elsewhere he tells the Athenians to confide in the future: "We have always been more just and pious than Philip." Why, then, has he thus far succeeded better than we? This objection, which the Athenians made to the orator and moralist, recalls that of Louis XIV to M. de Meaux. The young king, conqueror of Flanders, invader of Holland, saw his least equitable designs crowned with success; and victory abandoned him in the war of Spanish succession, when he fought for justice and his right. Providence, replied Bossuet, wished to punish him for his excessive love of worldly glory, and to exercise his piety. If unjust Philip has succeeded better than you, replied Demosthenes to his contradictors, it is because he manages his affairs with more energy than you do. "I see that you have many more claims than he to the support of the immortal gods. But we must confess that we are immovable and inactive. Now, whoever does not act himself, has no right to entreat his friends, still less the gods, to aid him."

The Athenians were slow to reflect on the principle of harmony between merit and good fortune. Ad-

versity soon compelled them to implore the justice of Providence; before suffering, they had little care for it. "Justice is that which is pleasing and useful to the strong" (*Gorgias*). Athens had formerly professed this doctrine publicly. At the opening of the Peloponnesian war, when the Corinthians reproached them for their selfish ambition, their orators responded:

"We have done nothing at which you ought to be astonished, nothing contrary to human nature by accepting an empire which was offered to us. * * * We are not the first to act thus; but there is an established law at all times that the strongest shall rule the weakest.* * * Considerations of your own interests have made you allege maxims of justice which never prevented any person from enlarging his domain when opportunity was presented to acquire anything by force."

This principle was even more openly pleaded in the conference which the Athenian deputies held with the magistrates of Melos (417), in order to draw that isle from the Lacedæmonian alliance. The Athenians said to them:

"We must rely upon the pursuit of what is possible, and abandon a principle on which we agree, and have nothing to teach each other mutually; this is because, in human affairs, we submit to the rules of justice, when we are constrained to it by mutual necessity. But for the strong, power is the only rule; for the weak, submission."

The Melians: "We sincerely hope that, with the protection of the gods, we will not be inferior to you in defending our sacred rights against injustice." The reply of the Athenians is curious. Force is of divine right.

“We also believe that divine favor will not be wanting to us, for we demand nothing, we do nothing, contrary to that which men attribute to the Divinity and claim for themselves. In fact, we think that, by virtue of a natural necessity, the gods, according to tradition* and men, manifestly employ all the means in their power to rule when they are the strongest. We did not enact this law; we are not the first to apply it; we found it established, and we will transmit it after us, because it is eternal. We profit by it, being thoroughly convinced that no one, not even yourselves, if placed in the same condition of power, would act differently.”†

Power becoming equity is one of the forms of fatality. We must submit to it as to all necessary things. “Mortals and immortals, all are subject to the empire of law, which establishes and legitimatizes the most extreme violence with its sovereign hand.”‡ To support this article of religious and moral faith Pindar cites the example of Hercules stealing the oxen of Geryon. Thus a *legal* crime is no longer a crime, or it is an acknowledged law of heaven and earth that power justifies iniquity. By virtue of this eternal law, hereditary in Greece, Melos, guilty of fidelity to Lacedæmon, was captured after heroic resistance. Forced to surrender at discretion, she saw her women and children reduced to slavery, and all the Melians competent to bear arms put to death; an atrocious vengeance, which even at Athens found compassionate censors.§ “Everybody knows that all mén, even those who have little regard for justice, experience a certain shame for not practicing it; but they boldly

* Jupiter, stronger than Saturn, dethroned him and sent him to Italy to create the golden age. (See *Prometheus* of Æschylus.)

† Thucydides, v, 89, 104, 105; i, 76.

‡ Pindar, *Fragments*.

§ Isocrates, § 100; Thucydides, v, 96.

rise up against injustice, especially if they are personally struck."* This shame was wanting to the Athenians in the Peloponnesian war. They audaciously displayed iniquities which Roman hypocrisy always carefully concealed. In their struggles with Philip they remembered justice and the gods when it was rather late.†

Demosthenes' mind generally seemed wavering in regard to questions of religious morality. It is very difficult for a pagan to make his morality and his opinions on the gods harmonize, and to conciliate the logic of his sentiments with the respect of whimsical and illogical dogmas. During the contest, Demosthenes was inclined to diminish the power of destiny. He found it necessary to react against the dispositions of the Athenians, who imputed all to it and even cravenly abandoned themselves to it. When the disaster was consummated, he threw the responsibility of it upon destiny alone, and no longer upon the negligence of the city. Demosthenes could reasonably hesitate between blind fortune and the gods, for the will of the gods is obscure, capricious and contradictory. Before Salamis the priestess Aristonice announced terrible misfortunes to the Athenians; a short time after she gave them a favorable response. Did the god, moved by their despair, change his advice in a few days? Hegesippus went to consult the oracle of Jupiter at Olympia, then the oracle of Apollo at

* Demosthenes.

† "When men desire to avenge themselves on others, they delight in abolishing at first the rules of common right which are applicable to the circumstances, and which always leave some hope of safety to the unfortunate. They thus deprive themselves of a guarantee which they will some day need themselves in the hour of danger." (Thucydides, iii, 84.)

Delphi. He desired to know whether Phœbus would give the same advice as his father.* “One god” (τὸς θεῶν) could procure an advantage for the Athenians, another injure them according to his particular affections. In fact, the orator declared that he had “often” experienced the fear which a malevolent genius worked for their ruin. To the war waged under the walls of Troy corresponded in Homer a war among the immortal gods. Perhaps the gods were thus divided in the two camps, and some favored Greece, others Philip. The inhabitants of Olympus did not practice the gratuity of grace. They seldom gave before receiving; nevertheless, they willingly followed the maxim of their own pleasure: “Nothing forces them to interest themselves in those for whom they care not.”† (Cyropædia.)

The uncertainty which men felt as to the nature and affections of the gods toward them, and the inconstant fortunes which they believed resulted from these dispositions, insensibly led them to accept the predominance of fortune. Who could decide on the victory or defeat of the god supposed to protect Athens? The cause was unknown to Athens and the city was excusable in attributing it to hazard; at least it was all the same to her. Demosthenes, a sad witness of Philip’s victories, could sometimes hesitate between blind fatality and Providence; but, except a few moments of painful uncertainty, it seems to us impossible that he whose death was characterized by so profound a religious feeling, did not believe in divine justice and the reward of virtue, as he believed in its efficacy to secure success.

* Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, i, 15; ii, 23.

† Impious Alcibiades lived happily; Nicias, a model of civic virtue and piety, perished miserably. (Thucydides, vii, 77, 86.)

If Demosthenes and Cicero were great orators, it is, according to Châteaubriand's opinion, because they were extremely religious. "They constantly had the name of the gods in their mouths." We would not dare assert that Cicero always had them in his heart, even when he invoked them in his most pathetic appeals. Demosthenes, a graver orator and politician than the jocund contradictor of Cato (*Pro Murena*), was subject, by his character and circumstances, to strong religious impressions. He was religious without pretense or grimaces; his piety was exempt from prejudices and hypocrisy. A priestess, Theoris, was instructing slaves how to deceive their masters, and used enchantments to dupe them. Demosthenes had her condemned to death. His hardy hand, when necessary, could ransack the sanctuary and seize the criminals who took refuge there. He was not less courageous in refuting the sophisms borrowed from sacred things through bad faith. Leptines contends against immunities by saying that the people cannot, with justice to the gods, excuse any person from duties possessing sacred obligations, a very perfidious (*ζαχαυργότατος*) argument. Demosthenes refuted him. To deprive citizens of the immunities which they enjoy would be an injustice which no religious pretext could palliate. It is the height of impiety (*ἀσεβέστατον*) to legitimatize an iniquity in the name of heaven. What the human conscience declares bad cannot be good in the eyes of God.*

Did Demosthenes believe in oracles and auguries? The Athenian masters of rhetoric gave instruction how to use favorable auguries, by virtue of the adage: *Seek*

* A sentence true, generous and worthy of a Christian. What evils would be spared the world if men always protected themselves from these false pretexts of religion! (A. Wolf.)

the advantageous,* and how to reverse contrary auguries. Demosthenes respected oracles from which he could draw arguments in his favor; he omitted, or even ridiculed them, when they could be turned against him.† Occasionally he essayed to turn the religious opinions of his fellow-citizens to the welfare of the state. Whoever would act powerfully on men must be their superior, and at the same time must speak their language; he must fascinate the minds of his hearers in order to penetrate them. A special messenger announced the death of Philip to Demosthenes before the news spread through the city. He mounted the rostrum and declared that he had just had a dream, a certain presage of approaching prosperity. Presently the official message of the predicted event arrived. The Athenians for a moment took courage and placed confidence in the gods. This innocent artifice, which Æschines keenly ridiculed, recalls that of Pericles. A very skillful artist who was working on the Propylæa of the Acropolis, fell from the top of the edifice; the physicians despaired of his life. Minerva appeared to Pericles in a dream, and prescribed a remedy which would promptly cure the wounded man, a striking proof of the sympathetic interest which the goddess mani-

* *Τὸ συμφέρον ὁρᾷν*: Each pursues his own interest; unity of measures does not exist; they are smaller in countries where the produce is sold, and larger in those where it is purchased. (*Nicomachean Ethics*, v, 7.)

† Four oracles are invoked in the *In Midiam*, one in the *Embassy*. In the oration *On the Navy Boards* he disdainfully places the makers of oracles on the same level as foolish orators. Oracles were the political and spiritual directors of antiquity. Strong minds were not their dupes. In Samothrace, the minister of the god, having initiated Lysander, ordered him to declare the most crimeful act of his life. "Who exacts this confession?—you or the gods? The gods. Well, then, you retire: I will answer them."

fested in Pericles' constructions. These fictions have nothing in common with those impositions whose ambition and selfish passion became a weapon, for example with the religious stratagem which Megacles and Pisistratus^{*} contrived in order to restore the tyrant to his former power.*

Socrates firmly believed in divination. Aristotle seems to have admitted its principle, but was unwilling to accept all its applications. The famous Epimenides of Crete (a suspicious origin for a diviner) did not predict, properly speaking, the future;† he had presentiments of it by the aid of inductions founded on events which really happened, but which were unknown to others. This particular observation was

* Herodotus, i, 60: "Megacles, weary of seditions, negotiated with Pisistratus, offering him his daughter in marriage and the despotism. These conditions were accepted. They came to an agreement, and, to execute their plans, they had recourse to the grossest of stratagems, in my opinion; because in all antiquity the Greek nation has been distinguished from the barbarians by its genius, which forms a striking contrast to their gross stupidity; and now this ruse has been employed among the Athenians, who are considered the most sensible among the Greeks. In the town of Pæania lived a woman named Phya. She was nearly six feet in height and of remarkable beauty. They placed her in full armor upon a chariot, and made proclamation to the citizens that they should welcome Pisistratus, whom Athena herself was bringing to her own Acropolis. They announced this proclamation in all quarters, and the news was spread among the people that Minerva was bringing back Pisistratus. The whole city believed that this woman was the goddess; the inhabitants adored a mortal being, and received Pisistratus. After having recovered his power in the manner just described, Pisistratus espoused the daughter of Megacles according to their agreement." This family compact did not elsewhere produce good fruit. (Ibidem, 61.)

† *Rhetoric* iii, 17. Cf. *To Eudemus*, ii, 8, where the philosopher admits the sincerity of prophetic enthusiasm. The polished society of the 17th century believed in soothsayers. (La Bruyère, *De quelques usages*.)

strengthened in the philosopher by the maxim that diviners establish what they say upon the past. Undoubtedly Demosthenes received auguries in the same manner. He respected divination, but not all who professed it. A pupil of Thucydides,* his mind was as free and manly as his teacher's, and he did not believe all that a vain people believed. He did not belong to the family of Euthyphron, but to that of Pericles.†

Religious feeling, the strongest and most elevated of all sentiments, often inspired the soul with its heroism, and the genius with his masterpieces. Ancient and modern art are indebted to it for some of their finest productions,—the Jupiter and Minerva of Phidias, the Moses of Michael Angelo, the Virgins of Raphael. It was paramount in all the important acts of the public life of the ancients. Thus it is found faithfully reproduced where we least expect it in the midst of Aristophanes' comedies. In the trial scene of the dog Labes, scarcely is the religious rite announced, in the opening of the judicial ceremony, when the poet becomes serious, Bdelycleon invokes Agyieus Apollo and willing Pæan with a respectful and touching gravity. His words are characterized by a tenderness of filial piety and sympathy for the unfortunate. Religious faith also mingled in the acts of private life. The old Romans literally could not take a step without the company of a god. The gods assisted man even before his birth, and through friend-

* Thucydides, ii, 54, 17; v, 103.

† Plutarch, *Life of Pericles*, ch. vi, 35. The eclipse of the sun and the cloak of Pericles; the ram with only one horn, a marvel differently interpreted by Lampo the diviner and by Anaxagoras the philosopher. Cf. the prodigy of the prætor with horns, in Valerius Maximus, v, 6.

ship for man they aided inanimate beings in the different phases of their existence.

Religious feeling necessarily followed the ancients to the tribune. The Roman historians and orators testify that it was one of the greatest sources of their eloquence.* It was the same in Greece. Stobæus has preserved from Euripides a fragment of remarkable impiety:

“Do you believe that iniquities have wings with which they fly to the Gods, that they are inscribed upon Jupiter’s registers, and that he consults them in order to judge men? But he would not be able himself to inscribe all or judge all. Justice is even here on our side for whoever may see it.”

Never would the Attic orators have dared to offer such insults to public conscience. They reminded their hearers of the fear of divine justice: “It is useless for your suffrages to be secret, they will never escape the gods” (Demosthenes, *On the Embassy*). The orator generally invoked them at the opening of his harangue, a tradition which the Peasant of the Danube† never failed to respect. The oration sometimes closed as it began, with an appeal both religious and patriotic. The religion of patriotism and religion itself (we have noticed it above) were confounded in the hearts of the ancients. This joint responsibility was conspicuous in Demosthenes; in his eyes Philip was the enemy of Athens,—of its soil and of its gods: would that the gods would annihilate him!

Divinity is and always will be present in the human heart; in prosperity because of happiness and thankfulness, but still more in reverses, because of a feeling

* Titus Livius, v, 51; Cicero, *In Catilinam*, i, 13; ii, 13; *De Suppliciis*, ch. lxxii.

† Demosthenes, *Exordia*, 25, 50, 54. Ἄφ’ Ἑστίας ἄρχου (*Wasps*).

of human weakness and the salutary effect of suffering. It is difficult to govern a people, especially an unfortunate people, without preaching a belief in divinity. Is it, then, surprising that religious feeling should have animated the harangues of an orator whose life was a struggle against public misfortune, in the midst of those extraordinary events which were destined to astonish the future? Demosthenes had more respect for the pagan gods than they deserved; because, if these fallible gods are doubtful, divinity is not. Forced to contend against the Athenian belief in fatality, and to escape the contradictions imposed upon the moralist by the opposition of pagan theology, Demosthenes was less credulous and more sincerely religious than the majority of his contemporaries. He had neither the pretension nor the power to sound impenetrable mysteries; but he wished to conciliate as far as possible belief in fortune, with faith in a just providence. He has assigned to destiny its proper place by vindicating the efficiency of human counsels and the obligation of duty.

“For all men, Athenians, there are two essential advantages. The first and greatest of all is to be fortunate (*εὐτυχία*); the second, less important than the first, but greater than all others, is wise counsel (*καλῶς Βουλευέσθαι*).

* * * Bad laws undermine those very republics which believe themselves most impregnable. In fact, the fortune of nations would not experience vicissitudes if, in distress, a good policy, good laws, the coöperation of honorable men, and a strict examination of all things, conducted them to a better state, and if, on the other hand, neglect of all these resources did not insensibly sap the life of prosperity which was apparently most stable. Prudence in counsel, and that vigilance which neglects nothing, very often raises men to a

brilliant fortune; but it is difficult for them to pursue the same path in order to maintain themselves there. * * *

Man is therefore, as a whole, the architect of his own fortune ; but if he is subservient to the power of destiny, it is a duty to himself that he should not decline. “The brave man should always follow where honor leads, covering himself with hope as with a shield, and nobly supporting the lot which Divinity has assigned him.” Man of Athens, if fatality constrains you, if duty compels you, resign without faltering.

CHAPTER XI.

THE TRIAL ON THE CROWN.

“Ὁ Αἰσχίνης ἔστιν οὗ τόνον οὐδένα ἔχει διὰ τὸ μὴ πεποιθότως μηδὲ ἀληθινῶς προφέρεισθαι τὸν λόγον: Sometimes Æschines fails in moving power, because his words are neither convincing nor sincere.” (Hermogenes.)

I. — DEMOSTHENES' ACCUSER.

POLITICAL activity, which was the principal element of Athenian life, was not entirely extinguished at Chæronea. Banished thereafter from the Pnyx, it took refuge in the minds of those who remained free. The great political crises kept all eyes fixed upon state affairs, and heightened political passions. The very children at Athens participated in this intellectual agitation.* They repeated in the schools the names of the hired orators of Macedonia or the ordinary guests of the enemy's emissaries. They also learned, without doubt, how to pronounce with respect the names of those servants of the commonwealth who remained faithful to its hopes and regrets: hence we can judge what interest the long expected trial *On the Crown* created.

Æschines took care to emphasize the importance which public opinion attached to it. He undertook to overwhelm Demosthenes “in the face of all the citizens who surrounded the inclosure of the tribunal, of all the Hellenes whose curiosity this judgment ex-

* Καὶ τὰ παιδία τὰ ἐκ τῶν διδασκαλείων. (Hyperides, *Against Polyeuctes*.)

cited,—the most numerous multitude that, in the memory of man, ever gathered to hear a public trial.” Indeed, the spectacle was unique and the conjuncture solemn. The two greatest orators* in the greatest trial were to unfold the resources of their genius and the intensity of their enmities. In the course of this contest the two adversaries were to discuss the politics of Athens with their own acts, and to agitate questions which had convulsed Greece for more than twenty years. In the words of Æschines, they were to be praised or hissed (*συρίττεσθαι*) by the Hellenes in the presence of the Athenians; they were to be acquitted of all complicity with an impious violator of the general peace, or enveloped in his infamy, and that, too, on the eve of the Pythian games before the assembly of all Greece.

The defense of Demosthenes is his masterpiece, and at the same time the masterpiece of the tribune and the bar. Æschines, a worthy rival of Demosthenes, has given proof of a marvelous talent; but his art lacks “that sound of a great soul” which consecrates and carries the admiration of men to its height.

Ctesiphon’s accuser was condemned from the first to the reproach of treacherous malignity.

“A citizen of word and honor should not call upon judges impaneled in the public service to gratify his anger or hatred or anything of that kind, nor should he come before you upon such grounds. The best thing is not to have these feelings, but if it cannot be helped, they should be mitigated and restrained. On what occasions ought an orator and statesman to be vehement? Where any of the commonwealth’s main interests are in jeopardy, and he is opposed

* *Gladiatorum par nobilissimum.* (Cicero, *De Optimo Genere Dicendi*, ch. vi, vii.)

to the adversaries of the people. These are occasions for a generous and brave citizen; but for a person who never sought to punish me for any offense, either public or private, on the state's behalf or on his own, to have got up an accusation because I am crowned and honored, and to have expended such a multitude of words,—this is a proof of personal enmity and spite and meanness, not of anything good; and then his leaving the controversy with me and attacking the defendant comprises everything that is base.”

The very time which Æschines chose to attack his enemy is a proof of the perfidy of his hatred. Even after the exemplary punishment of Thebes, Demosthenes, and perhaps some citizens as tenacious as he to the love of liberty, were able to entertain some hope. And yet each year was signalized by new victories of Alexander. Victorious at the Granicus (334), at Issus (333), he became master of Asia Minor, of the coast of the Mediterranean, of Tyre and of Egypt. Sparta had braved this ever increasing power: a magnanimous but sterile effort. Agis had been beaten and killed at Megalopolis (330). At Naxos and Thasos all citizens who were hostile to the Macedonian hegemony were persecuted. No longer was a return of fortune in favor of Greece to be feared. Æschines then bursts forth against Demosthenes, and proceeds formally to bring an action against him which he had allowed to sleep for eight years.* The con-

* “It was usual with the Athenians, and indeed with all the Greeks, when they would express their sense of extraordinary merit, to crown the person so distinguished with a chaplet of olive interwoven with gold. The ceremony was performed in some populous assembly, convened either for business or entertainment; and proclamation was made in due form of the honor thus conferred, and the services for which it was bestowed.

“To procure such an honor for Demosthenes at this particular juncture was thought the most effectual means to confound the

demnation of the accused seemed assured by the indisputable supremacy of Alexander. It was to be pronounced on the eve of the Pythian games: what

clamor of his enemies. He had lately been intrusted with the repair of the fortifications of Athens, in which he expended a considerable sum of his own, over and above the public appointment, and thus enlarged the work beyond the letter of his instructions. It was therefore agreed that Ctesiphon, one of his zealous friends, should take this occasion of moving the senate to prepare a decree (to be ratified by the popular assembly) reciting this particular service of Demosthenes, representing him as a citizen of distinguished merit, and ordaining that a 'golden crown' (as it was called) should be conferred upon him. To give this transaction the greater solemnity, it was moved that the ceremony should be performed in the theater of Bacchus, during the festival held in honor of that god, when not only the Athenians, but other Greeks, from all parts of the nation, were assembled to see the tragedies exhibited in that festival.

"The senate agreed to the resolution. But, before it could be referred to the popular assembly for their confirmation, Æschines, who had examined the whole transaction with all the severity that hatred and jealousy could inspire, pronounced it irregular and illegal, both in form and matter, and without delay assumed the common privilege of an Athenian citizen to commence a suit against Ctesiphon as the first mover of a decree repugnant to the laws, a crime of a very heinous nature in the Athenian polity.

"The articles on which he founds his accusation are reduced to these three.

"I. Whereas every citizen who has borne any magistracy is obliged by law to lay a full account of his administration before the proper officers, and that it is expressly enacted that no man shall be capable of receiving any public honors till this his account hath been duly examined and approved; Ctesiphon hath yet moved that Demosthenes should receive a crown, previously to the examination of his conduct in the office conferred upon him, and before the passing of his accounts.

"II. Whereas it is ordained that all crowns conferred by the community of citizens shall be presented and proclaimed in their assembly, and in no other place whatsoever; Ctesiphon hath yet proposed that the crown should be presented and proclaimed in the theater.

"III. Whereas the laws pronounce it highly penal for any man to insert a falsehood in any motion or decree; Ctesiphon hath yet ex-

éclat seemed to be assured for the triumph of Æschines in the humiliation of his rival!

Æschines brought a claim of fifty talents (over \$51,000) against Ctesiphon. If the hatred of Æschines were measured by this sum it would be found rather strong. It animated the accuser to ruin Ctesiphon in his fortune and Demosthenes in his honor.

"If one of those poets whose tragedies are played after the proclamation of public rewards presented in his play *Thersites* crowned by the Greeks, none of you would endure the spectacle. For Homer paints this ridiculous personage as a coward and calumniator. And do you, if you crown modern *Thersites*, do you not expect to be ridiculed by Greece?"

He flatters himself that he will be allowed to promenade with his crown, upon an illustrious theater before foreigners and Hellenes, in the midst of the applause of Bacchic feasts. * * * Answer this indecent pretension by dishonoring him! The harangue of Æschines bears marks of that smallness of soul (*μικροψυχίας*) which Demosthenes reveals in it. Demosthenes delighted to remind the Athenians that in the Median wars their country, especially desirous of glory, had spent more men and money than all the rest of Greece. Æschines estimates what the contest against the Macedonians has cost. He accuses Demosthenes of having intentionally, and by venality, burdened Athens with the expenses of the war, rather than Thebes, her ally. Demosthenes alone is the author of your evils, and of the disasters of your country. Sacrifice him, and you will be justified! The baseness of Æschines' real sentiments refutes the nobility of his oratorical sentiments:

pressly declared, as the foundation of this his decree, that the conduct of Demosthenes hath been ever excellent, honorable, and highly serviceable to the state; a point directly opposite to the truth." (*Leland.*)

inviolable respect for the law, devotion to public affairs, necessity of offering a striking lesson of morality to the youth, love of harmony, homage to this word, the noblest ever taught, — forgiveness;* veneration for the ancient heroes, whose glorification by Demosthenes would exasperate their manes. Æschines omits generous thought or pathetic feeling within an orator's power. But such is the irremediable vice of bad faith, that it emerges and betrays the most skillful.†

Æschines' malice pierces at every opportunity. The alliance with Thebes and Eubœa was the double triumph of Demosthenes' policy. Æschines considered them grave wounds, inflicted upon the Athenians "without their knowledge." The alliance with Eubœa, purchased by Callias of the avaricious Demosthenes, lost to the commonwealth the tribute from that island. Demosthenes thereby gained three talents. That alliance with Thebes, so much boasted of, was also the fruit of his avidity. The Thebans thought of treating with Philip separately. Demosthenes opposes it. He cannot see them alone accept the Macedonian's gold. Therefore the jealousy which suggested

* *Τὸ ἀλλήλοιστον ἐκ παιδείας ῥῆμα, μὴ μνησικαχεῖν* (forget evil).

† The oration *Against Ctesiphon* contains proofs of charges against Æschines that are honorable to Demosthenes. The enemies of the public peace, said Æschines, called Demosthenes to the tribune by proclaiming him the "only incorruptible man" in the city. No one ever thought of conferring this eulogy on Æschines, even in sarcasm. Alexander is surrounded in Cilicia, threatened with ruin by the Persian cavalry. Æschines aptly describes Demosthenes' joy: Demosthenes holds in his hand, and everywhere shows the letter, a pleasing message. He notes the down-hearted, terrified look of Æschines. He calls him "the victim with adorned horns, already crowned to fall at the first reverse of Alexander." This is because the friend of the Macedonians feared reverses which would be the signal of his ruin.

to him the thought of a lucrative reconciliation of the Bœotians with Philip leads him to urge them into the war; and their ruin is prepared with ours. The malignity of Æschines is turned against himself when he suggests improbable and contradictory imputations. Demosthenes, at first an accomplice of Philocrates, subsequently becomes his denunciator. He was jealous (ζηλοτυπίας) of seeing Philocrates better paid than himself. This ally of Philocrates had, however, according to Æschines, a spy, Charidemus, with Philip. The same Demosthenes is guilty of blind hatred toward the Macedonians, and has secret intelligence from them. He rejoices at Alexander's dangers, and does not profit by them. He is reproached for *Bœotianizing*, and is charged with the sack of Thebes. These premeditated calumnies bring their author into disrepute. All injustice and base slander is rotten by its nature (σαθρόν φύσει), and reveals its corruption somewhere. (*Pro Corona*.)

A man came to Demosthenes to solicit his aid. He said that he had been insulted and struck. "My friend, it is not true that you have been struck." The complainant, raising his voice: "What, Demosthenes! I have not been struck!" "Oh! now I recognize the voice of a man who has actually been maltreated." Æschines * had not this accent of sincerity. He studies

* Hermogenes (*Περὶ ἰδιῶν*, ii, 11) has well characterized Æschines: He has "eloquence due to the use of artificial proceedings (δεινότης ἢ κατὰ μέθοδον), but he is "sophistical"; he aims at bombast and effect (γαῶρος). "Of oratorical skill he has a moderation, but he has not the *character of sincerity* to an equal degree. Therefore, notwithstanding all the vehemence and severity which he employs, he sometimes completely fails in moving power (τόνον οὐδένα ἔχει * * * ἐπὶ λόγον), because his words are neither convincing

to delude; his rhetorical pathos recalls his school and does not move his hearers. Conviction and truth in emotion exclude declamatory bombast. "O Earth! O Heaven! O Virtue! and you, Intelligence and Knowledge, by whom we discern the good from the bad, I have aided my country; I have spoken." High-sounding words, vainly cried out in a tragic tone. Equally cold is the passage in which measured antitheses fail to arouse indignation against Demosthenes for rejoicing over Philip's death, seven days after the death of his own daughter. This passage is admired by one of the interlocutors of the *Tusculanæ Disputationes*,* and judiciously criticized by Plutarch. "You have not been able to see with your eyes the ruin of the unfortunate Thebans; see it in your mind. Imagine a city taken by assault, * * * etc." These lamentable appeals are like melodramatic scenes. Æschines neither spares inflections of the voice nor sobs, and yet he leaves us cold. Although so clever a comedian * * * at the tribune, he has played his rôle poorly.

"What strikes me most in the course of his imputations and falsehoods, is, that in speaking of the misfortunes of the city, he has not shed a tear; he has not in the least felt in his heart that grief natural to a devoted and virtuous citizen. But he raised his voice with a satisfied air; he cried out with all his might (*λαρυγγίζων*); he evidently believed that he was accusing me, and he gave proofs, against himself, that our calamities inspired him with feelings very different from yours."

(*πεπαιθότως*) nor sincere (*μηδὲ ἀληθινῶς*)." Sincerity (*ἀληθεία*) is, on the contrary, one of Demosthenes' strongest qualities.

* Æschines in Demosthenem invehitur * * * et quam rhetoricè! (*Tusculanæ Disputationes*, iii, 26.) This indiscreet eulogy of Cicero might serve as an epigram to the oration *Against Ctesiphon*.

Æschines triumphed in these disasters; they were so many arguments against Demosthenes, and justifications of the wise policy of the ally of the Macedonians. Æschines' eloquence flows from a happy and fertile imagination; it has the cleverness and impetuosity of hatred. Demosthenes draws his from the bottom of his heart; he does not move the imagination, he moves the feelings. We feel in his defense the accent of an honorable man outraged. Thanks to the political rôle which honored him, Demosthenes was destined to be, even as an orator, superior to his adversary.

One subject aids eloquence and creates it, another renders it singularly meritorious. An implicated client is always difficult to defend. Now, no one was ever more implicated than was Æschines in his relations with Macedonia, hence his inability to establish the justification which Demosthenes demanded of him.*

* In a brilliant résumé of Athenian history since the Median wars,—a picture of the alternatives of belligerent passion and of political wisdom in the city,—Æschines renders homage to the memory of Cimon, Andocides and Nicias, peaceful benefactors of the democracy. He eulogizes Thrasybulus and amnesty, which he himself might greatly need. He flatters his audience, he insults his accuser. All these tricks betray the agony of the accused, without dispelling the imputations which press upon him. "The people were encouraged and recovered their strength (after the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants), and observe how men were fraudulently enrolled upon the records of the citizens, a class that always attract to themselves the worst part of the state, because they have no other policy than war. During peace they are prophets of evil. With their words they incite minds that are eager for glory and too ambitious. During hostilities they are military inspectors and admirals, although they have never touched a sword. Fathers of bastards born of courtesans, sycophants buried in infamy, they precipitate the state into the greatest dangers. With their adulations they caress the name of democracy, and with their conduct they outrage it. Infringers of the peace, which is the support of popular government, eager for war, which is the scourge of the state, they all unite and now attack me.

At first the declared enemy of Philip, he suddenly became milder. He saw the prince, and the hostile ambassador was immediately disarmed. Æschines thus explains his metamorphosis:

“You censure my embassy in Arcadia and my oration to the Ten Thousand. You accuse me of fickleness,—you, a fugitive slave whom the hot iron should have branded. Yes, during the war I animated the Arcadians and the rest of the Hellenes against Philip, so far as it was in my power. Seeing that no people aided the commonwealth, that some awaited the issue of the contest with indifference, that others were marching with the Macedonians against us, that the orators in Athens took advantage of the war in order to support their daily luxury, I advised the Athenians, I confess, to unite with Philip and to make a peace which you to-day believe shameful, you who never touched a sword.” *

In other words, Æschines followed the torrent. He did not wish to be right against the world. The honor of Demosthenes is that he did not yield to universal enthusiasm:

S'il en demeure dix, je serai le dixième.

Et s'il n'en reste qu'un, je serai celui-là.

Demosthenes, in order to justify his own political conduct, had to celebrate that of his ancestors, whom he justly represented. What could the partisan of the Macedonian alliance, that is to say, of the abdication of Hellenic liberty, oppose to this advantage? If he

Philip has, they say, purchased peace; he has profited by negotiations in order to ruin us all. This peace, made to his advantage, is beneficial to him who has violated it; and they accuse me, not as a deputy, but as a guarantee of Philip and of the peace! I merely used words, and they demand of me actions to satisfy their expectations! The same orator, as I have shown, is my panegyrist in his decrees and my accuser before the court. We were ten ambassadors, and I alone am prosecuted for not giving in accounts!”

* *Embassy*, § 79.

exalts the virtues of his ancestors it is to contrast them with the insinuated crimes of Demosthenes, a parallel in which the bad faith of the orator betrays itself. Ordinarily he will have to conceal a glorious past which speaks against him, or ridicule its praise as commonplace and impotent.

"Of the united orators who arose, not one essayed to save the city, but each called our attention to the Propylæa of the Acropolis, our memories to the battle fought at Salamis against the Persians, to the pictures and trophies of our ancestors." *

Demosthenes, in the apology of his ministry, which is that of the heroes of Marathon, is naturally magnanimous and eloquent. On the contrary, most of the beauties of Æschines' oration will necessarily be artistic beauties. Moral beauty will not easily find place in it; and also the spirit of that political party of which he is chief, and the character of the thesis which he defends, will appear artistic.

Æschines, as an orator, was better endowed by nature than Demosthenes. It only remained for him to become the first orator of Greece; he preferred to enjoy the advantages accruing from the friendship of the Macedonians. Demosthenes snatched the palm from him, in spite of a natural inferiority, because he knew how to hold his mind high, and to draw the powers of his eloquence, which has elevated him above the past and perhaps the future, from the generosity of the heart. The oration *On the Crown* is the last

* *Embassy*, § 74; cf. Demosthenes, § 16. "You must," said Æschines, "not remember your ancestors, nor listen to those who recall their naval victories and their trophies. He himself will propose and draw up a law ordaining that we shall only aid the Hellenes who shall have first aided you."

effort of Attic eloquence; "it realizes the ideal conceived in our minds; we can imagine nothing superior to it" (*Orator*, 38).

II. PIETY TOWARD THE GODS AND TOWARD HIS COUNTRY.

"*Ἀρὴ γὰρ, ὡς γούν ἐμοὶ δοξεῖ, ὅσα τις πράττει τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπιφημίζων, οἰαυῖτα φαίνεσθαι, οἷα μηδ' αὖ, ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου παρὰ θέντα, πονηρὰ φανείη*: A bad act committed in the name of the gods is no more excusable than if it rested on purely human motives." (Demosthenes, *Against Leptines*.)

Æschines felt the inferiority of his cause, and essayed to remedy it. It was difficult for him to derive advantage against Demosthenes from his piety toward his country; he wished to supply this deficiency by piety toward the gods. He hoped to reduce his adversary to human aid, and then pierce him with a divine arm. The tactics were skillful: the moral state of Greece at that epoch seemed to promise him victory. When the ground trembles, man instinctively raises his eyes toward heaven. The remark of Titus Livius (v, 51) will be true in all time: "Adversity recalled the Romans to religious practices." Brennus and Hannibal, in their turn, revived the feeling of divine power in a people who were indebted to piety for their empire; vanquishers of the ancient Roman gods, they forced her to have recourse to new divinities, even though they should be a black stone. It is characteristic of great disasters to unsettle the imagination of the people. Scarcely had France recovered from the evils of the German invasion, when in 1870 she gave proof of it, as did Greece formerly when she became a prey to the Peloponnesian war. In the midst of the public trials,

only a few select minds resisted the torrent of violent commotions and preserved the judicious firmness of a serene mind. The mass of the nation was profoundly agitated.

This physiological phenomenon was reproduced during the Macedonian epoch. Greece became subservient to a man of Pella, the Orient was conquered by a Macedonian of thirty years; a sudden rearrangement of the surface of the earth; was it possible that such astonishing revolutions should not have turned the minds of men, more strongly than ever, toward divinity? What other hand than a divine hand could have led a few cohorts to such incredible success? These religious prejudices are found in a curious oration of Hyperides in favor of Euxenippus. The Athenians divided the territory of Oropus among the ten tribes of the city. After the distribution, it was discovered that the lot assigned to two tribes had been consecrated to Amphiarus. Piety forbade to dispose of it without the consent of the god. Euxenippus, a citizen of venerable probity and age, received the mission to go, with two companions, and sleep one night in the temple of Amphiarus. Euxenippus obeyed, and the next day he announced to the people that the lord of the temple signified in a dream that he desired to remain in possession of his territory. A citizen, who was not convinced of the sincerity of the dream, prosecuted him on a criminal charge accusing him of having invented the dream. Lycurgus spoke against the friend of Amphiarus; Hyperides defended him. Here, then, is a criminal action established on a dream, and seriously discussed.

Similar inclinations of the mind explain the pages in

which Diodorus describes the effects of celestial vengeance, not only on the desecrators of Cyrrha, but even on those who seconded them or approached them. Philomelus precipitates himself from a rock; his brother Onomarchus is crucified. Phaillus dies of a slow and painful consumption. (He converted a portion of the sacred treasures into money.) Phalœcus perished consumed in a fire which was kindled from heaven. His mercenaries were killed or taken prisoners; two thousand of the latter were sold, and two thousand more were slaughtered as accomplices of an impious man. The wife of a Phocian chief had worn the necklace of Helen,—she was punished by an uncontrollable lust. Another wife adorned herself with the necklace of Eriphyle,—bereft of reason, she perished in the flames of her own house which her own son fired. Chæronea was destined, at a later day, to chastise the Athenians, and Alexander to sack Thebes. “Thus all the desecrators were struck with divine vengeance.” As to Philip, “he returned to Macedonia, leaving the Greeks a high idea of his piety and of his military science. * * * Philip, who, by the aid derived from the oracle of Delphi, and by his piety toward the gods, saw his influence increase from day to day, was finally proclaimed chief of all Greece, and thus realized the grandest empire in Europe.” Diodorus, however, made this honest remark on Philip: “Being thus provided with traitors in all cities, and giving the title of lord or friend to whosoever received his gold, he corrupted the morals of the human family by his perverse principles.” Justin, not dissimulating Philip’s political perfidy, thus renders homage to his piety: “He alone chastised a sacrilege which the entire world ought to have pun-

ished. Therefore, the avenger of the majesty of the gods almost deserved to be their equal.”*

The Athenians were formerly consulted by Iphierates upon the disposal of the offerings which Dionysius of Syracuse had sent to Delphi and Olympia, and they answered: “It is better to give attention to the support of the soldiers than to the affairs of the gods.” The time was past when the Athenians showed themselves “impious on land and sea.” Adversity inspired them with the pious probity which had formerly honored Nicias, but they believed that they satisfied divinity by enslaving themselves to superstitions as whimsical, and sometimes as cruel, as those of the contemporaries of the Sicilian expedition.

Philip, a prudent politician, early saw the advantage which he could derive from the religious prejudices of the Greeks. We have elsewhere spoken of the dexterity with which he interfered in the first sacred war of Phocis (the pillage of Delphi by Philomelus), and in the second crusade against Amphissa. Even Æschines himself, who was an associate of Philip, could not refrain from invoking the heavens against the adversaries of the Macedonian party; popular prejudice and youthful remembrances urged him to it. Born of poor parents, he saw his own mother follow the profession of initiations (τελεστροια) among the mob. These religious practices were a private counterfeiting of the official Eleusinian mysteries, and bordered upon jugglery. Æschines played his part in them. He was handsome and well formed; he had a fine voice; this was sufficient to contribute to the success of the maternal ceremonies, and to make tarts and cakes pour into

* *Justin*, viii, 2. These two authors are evidently the echoes of the historians of the Macedonian epoch.

the mystic basket. "The amphora long preserves the odor with which the first days impregnated it." The political orator Æschines preserved the impressions of his youth. A servant in the initiation, afterward an actor, he was prepared by this double education for the rôle which he played in the trial *On the Crown*, and which has won for him, from the lips of Demosthenes, this homage, that he was an excellent comedian (*ὑποκριτὴς ἄριστος*).

Aristotle recommends this artifice to the despot who is desirous of strengthening his power:

"The tyrant ought to make a show of an exemplary piety. Men fear less the injustice of a man whom they believe devoted to the service of the gods (*θεοσιδαιμόνα*), and they dare less to conspire against him, because they suppose the very heaven is his ally. The tyrant, however, ought to beware of continuing these appearances down to a ridiculous superstition."

These maxims are perhaps an allusion to the Macedonian king; at all events they apply to him in every respect. By taking in hand the cause of the gods, Philip gained his own. Æschines certainly aided him. When he announced in the popular assembly the condemnation which the Amphictyonic council had, at his instigation, pronounced against the Locrians of Amphissa, Demosthenes cried out: "Æschines, you are carrying the war into the heart of Attica,—a sacred war!" After the enslavement of Greece, Æschines was not anxious to claim such a work; it was more convenient for him to attribute the disastrous intervention of Philip and the public ruin to his rival's impiety: At your advice, Demosthenes, Athens refused to accept the "hegemony of piety," the protectorship of religion. The defense of the gods, which

you rejected, fell to the Macedonian king; you alone are, therefore, responsible for his successes and our misfortunes.

Æschines, considered in his private life, was an epicurean gallant. He revealed the innocence of his manners, and did not seem to use the permitted licenses of his time to their fullest extent. And yet he was not a stranger to them. A defender of Timarchus reproached him for his severity toward this person: Was not Æschines himself, a constant attendant of the gymnasium, in some respects reproachable? It may be judged from Æschines' own confessions. He neither disowns the amatory verses, with which his adversary endeavors to delight the audience, nor the injuries and blows which his gallantry often won for him: "I have loved, I confess, and I still love; I have had quarrels, and I have fought, I do not deny it. But to love a beautiful and modest object is the mark of a tender and well-disposed heart (*φιλανθρωπῶτον*)."^{*} Æschines believed that he could cultivate this form of philanthropy and preserve the dignity necessary to become a serious instructor of the youth. An easy life did not exclude piety among the ancients.*

In other respects, the devout Æschines sometimes profited by his epicurean maxims. He wrote these lines, which Cicero imitated three times, and which are indeed worthy of a philosopher above all prejudices:

"Do not believe, Athenians, that great catastrophes have their origin in the wrath of the gods, and not in the per-

* The courtesan Rhodope wished to leave at the temple of Delphi a memento of her piety: an offering of iron spits to roast beef, and representing one-tenth of her property. (Herodotus, ii, 134, 135.)

versity of men; nor that the crimeful are pursued and chased by Furies, armed with burning torches, as we see them in tragedies: the unbridled love of pleasure, insatiable lust, these are the Furies of criminals. No regard for their honor, no fear of punishment moves them; but the hope of success, the appetite for enjoyments, fascinate and allure them." *

Æschines here speaks like Lucretius, and even touches upon horrors which the poet detested. Does he actually believe in the pious motives with which he arms himself against Demosthenes? The bad faith, abundant proofs of which are in his oration, invites our doubts; but a perfidious consideration encourages him.

The accusation of impiety was one which the frivolous Athenians always took seriously. We know how they amused themselves with their gods at the theater. Modern men would prefer to deny the Divinity rather than suppose it vicious. The Athenians permitted the most ridiculous defamation to enter Olympus. Mock and traduce the gods at your ease, but do not deny them. Do not give them new colleagues without the consent of the state. Protagoras saw his books burned and himself banished by the Areopagus; Diagoras of Melos was declared an outlaw; Anaxagoras was thrown into prison; Prodicus of Ceos was condemned to drink the hemlock, like Socrates the *Melian* (according to the perfidiously spiritual allusion of Aristophanes.) Even the women were not spared. Pericles had to move the people by his tears in order to save Aspasia. Euthias, a lover of Phryne, either through cupidity or spite, accused this courtesan of introducing "a new god." The clientess of Hyperides owed her safety solely to a pious scruple of the judges; when they

* *Against Timarchus*, § 190.

recognized her beauty, they feared to offend the gods by condemning a priestess of Venus.

The religious susceptibilities of Athens offered formidable arguments, and Æschines, who wished to induce the people to condemn Demosthenes, made himself represent the people and cried out against impiety. Demosthenes' whole life is impious. Under the pretext of repairing the walls of Athens he has destroyed the public tombs. He dares accuse the ambassador with whom he partook of the repast at the Prytaneum. "This barbarian * * * sacrifices, libations, fraternity around the table,—nothing checks him." He delivered to punishment his guest, the Oritanian Anaxinus, an honest merchant who was innocently trading in Greece for Olympias. "To the salt of the hospitable table I prefer the salt of our native land." Demosthenes takes pride in this shameless confession. He insults Pythia, he derides the oracles, he ridicules Alexander for venerating sacred things.* He advised Chæroneia, "notwithstanding contrary presages." He esteemed more than all other auguries that which Hector preferred: "The best augury is to fight for our country."† We embrace the cause of Priam's son, condemned by heaven to succumb under the divine arms of Achilles. Æschines rallies to the cause of the gods, whom Demosthenes has outraged.

The pages in which this engine of war is put into play constitute the finest passages of his oration. The aggressor is there intrenched as in an impregnable fort.

* Æschines ascribes these words to him: "This Margites will not stir from Macedonia. He prefers to promenade at Pella, and there to consult the entrails of victims." (*Against Ctesiphon*, § 160.) Alexander was indeed superstitious, according to Plutarch. (*Life of Alexander*, 73-75.)

† *Iliad*, xii, 243.

Let us follow him there. Cyrrha, on the gulf of Crissa in Phocis, was early the seaport of Delphi. Enriched by the numerous pilgrimages made to the temple of Apollo, the Cyrrhæans had excited the jealousy of the neighboring cities. They were accused of avidity and extortions from strangers, who were the pious visitors of the god. In the first Sacred War (590) Cyrrha was destroyed and its territory consecrated to Apollo; however, as a harbor was necessary to shelter the visitors of the sanctuary, the Locrians of Amphissa, neighbors of Cyrrha, had it rebuilt and repeopled. The liberality of the faithful was not long in enriching the city, which was unduly raised on its ruins; and boldness increased with its prosperity to such an extent that its new inhabitants tilled a part of the fields which the Amphictyonic council had condemned to sterility. Such was the beginning of the second Sacred War and of the disastrous intervention of Philip. We give the words of his voluntary or imprudent auxiliary, Æschines.

“There is a plain, Athenians, well known by the name of Cyrrha, and a port now called the devoted and accursed. This tract the Cyrrhæans and Acragallidæ inhabited, a lawless people, whose sacrilegious violence profaned the shrine of Delphi and the offerings there deposited, and who presumed to rebel against the Amphictyonic council. The Amphictyons in general, and your ancestors in particular (as tradition hath informed us), conceived the justest resentment and addressed themselves to the oracle, in order to be informed by what punishment they might suppress these outrages. The priestess pronounced her answer, that they were to wage perpetual war against the Cyrrhæans and Acragallidæ without the least intermission, either by day or night; that they were to lay waste their lands, and to reduce

their persons to slavery; that their possessions were to be set apart from all worldly purposes, and dedicated to the Pythian Apollo, to Diana, to Latona, and to Minerva; and that they were not to cultivate their lands nor to suffer them to be cultivated. In consequence of this oracle the Amphictyons decreed, and Solon the Athenian was the first mover of this decree (the man so eminent for making laws, and so conversant with the arts of poesy and philosophy), that they should take up arms against these impious men, in obedience to the divine commands of the oracle. A sufficient force being accordingly raised by the Amphictyons, they reduced these men to slavery, demolished their harbor, razed their city, and consecrated their district, as the oracle directed. And to confirm these proceedings, they bound themselves by an oath that they would never cultivate this consecrated land nor suffer others to cultivate it; but that they would support the rights of the god and defend this district thus consecrated with their persons and all their power. Nor were they contented to bind themselves by an oath conceived in the usual form; they enforced it by the addition of a most tremendous imprecation. Thus it was expressed: 'If any shall violate this engagement, whether city or private person or community, may such violators be devoted to the vengeance of Apollo, of Diana, of Latona, and of Minerva; may their lands never yield their fruits; may their women never bring forth children of the human form, but hideous monsters; may their herds be accursed with unnatural barrenness; may all their attempts in war, all their transactions in peace, be ever unsuccessful! may total ruin forever pursue them, their families, and their descendants! and may they never [these are the very terms] appease the offended deities, either Apollo or Diana or Latona or Minerva, but may all their sacrifices be forever rejected!' To confirm the truth of this let the oracle be read. Listen to the imprecations and call to mind the oath by which your ancestors were engaged in conjunction with the other Amphictyons.

THE ORACLE.

Still shall these tow'rs their ancient pride maintain,
 Nor force nor valor e'er their rampart gain,
 Till Amphitritè, queen of azure waves,
 The hallow'd lands of sov'reign Phœbus laves;
 Till round his seat her threat'ning surges roar,
 And burst tumult'ous on the sacred shore.

THE OATH. — THE IMPRECATION.

“ Yet, notwithstanding these imprecations, notwithstanding the solemn oath and the oracle, which to this day remain upon record, did the Locrians and the Amphissæans, or, to speak more properly, their magistrates, lawless and abandoned men, once more cultivate this district, restore the devoted and accursed harbor, erect buildings there, exact taxes from all ships that put into this harbor, and by their bribes corrupt some of the pylagoræ* who had been sent to Delphi, of which number Demosthenes was one; for, being chosen into this office, he received a thousand drachmas from the Amphissæans to take no notice of their transactions in the Amphictyonic council. And it was stipulated still further, that for the time to come they should pay him at Athens an annual sum of twenty minæ out of their accursed and devoted revenues, for which he was to use his utmost efforts, on every occasion, to support the interest of the Amphissæans in this city, a transaction which served but to give still further evidence to this melancholy truth, that, whenever he hath formed connections with any people, any private persons, any sovereign magistrates, or any free communities, he

* The Amphictyonic council was composed of three kinds of deputies: first, the *Pylagoræ*, or orators of the assembly of Pylæ (the Amphictyons met 'at Thermopylæ in autumn and at Delphi in the spring); second, the *hieromnemes*, or guardians of the sacred archives. The council was presided over by an *hieromnemon*. Each Amphictyonic people sending an hieromnemon to the diet had, in its turn, the honor of presiding. Third, the *theori*. The *theori* were deputies at Delphi to consult the oracle.

hath never failed to involve them in calamities the most deplorable. For, now, behold how Heaven and fortune asserted their superior power against this impiety of the Amphissæans!

“In the archonship of Theophrastus, when Diognetus was iëromnemon, you chose for pylagoræ Midias* (that man who on many accounts I wish were still alive) and Thrasycles, and with these was I joined in commission. On our arrival at Delphi it happened that the iëromnemon Diognetus was instantly seized with a fever, and that Midias also shared the same misfortune. The other Amphictyons assembled, when some persons, who wished to approve themselves the zealous friends of this state, informed us that the Amphissæans, now exposed to the power of the Thebans, and studious to pay them the most servile adulation, had introduced a decree against this city, by which a fine of fifty talents was to be imposed on the community of Athens, because we had deposited some golden shields in the new temple, before it had been completely finished, which bore the following, and a very just inscription:

“‘By the Athenians: taken from the Medes and Thebans when they fought against the Greeks.’

“The iëromnemon sent for me and desired that I should repair to the Amphictyons and speak in defense of the city, which I had myself determined to do. But scarcely had I begun to speak on my first appearance in the assembly (where I rose with some warmth, as the absence of the other deputies increased my solicitude), when I was interrupted by the clamors of an Amphissæan, a man of outrageous insolence, who seemed a total stranger to politeness, and was, perhaps, driven to this extravagance by some evil genius. He began thus: ‘Ye Greeks, were ye possessed with the least degree of wisdom, ye would not suffer the name of the Athenians to

* This Midias was the man who struck Demostheres; hence the deep regrets of Æschines.

be mentioned at this time; ye would drive them from the temple as the objects of divine wrath.' He then proceeded to take notice of our alliance with the Phocians,* which the decree of Crobylus had formed, and loaded the state with many other odious imputations, which I then could not hear with temper, and which I cannot now recollect but with pain. His speech inflamed me to a degree of passion greater than I had ever felt through my whole life. Among other particulars, on which I shall not now enlarge, it occurred to me† to take notice of the impiety of the Amphissæans with respect to the consecrated land, which I pointed out to the Amphictyons from the place where I then stood, as the temple rose above the Cyrrhæan plain and commanded the whole prospect of that district. 'You see,' said I, 'ye Amphictyons, how this tract hath been occupied by the people of Amphissa. You see the houses and factories they have there erected. Your own eyes are witnesses that this accursed and devoted harbor is completely furnished with buildings. You yourselves know, and need not any testimony, that they have exacted duties and raised large sums of wealth from this harbor.' I then produced the oracle, the oath of our ancestors, and the imprecation by which it was confirmed, and made a solemn declaration that, 'for the people of Athens, for myself, for my children, and for my family, I would support the rights of the God and maintain the consecrated land with all my might and power, and thus rescue my country from the guilt of sacrilege. Do you, ye Greeks,' thus did I proceed, 'determine for yourselves as ye judge proper. Your sacred rites are now prepared, your victims stand before the altars; you are ready to offer up your solemn prayers

* This alliance was culpable in the eyes of the Amphissæan, because the Phocians had formerly pillaged the treasury of Delphi.

† Æschines did not dare say that a god inspired him with this thought, as the gods undoubtedly suggested to the Amphissæan his injurious sally. He left his hearers to suppose it. Was not the thought rather a souvenir of his engagements with Philip?

for blessings on yourselves and on your countries; but O! consider, with what voice, with what front, with what confidence, can you breathe out your petitions if ye suffer these sacrilegious men, thus devoted and accursed, to escape with impunity! The imprecation is not conceived in dark or doubtful terms. No; the curse extends not only to these impious profaners, but to all those who suffer their profanation to pass unrevenge'd. These are the very words with which the awful and affecting form is closed: 'May they who permit them to escape unpunished never offer up an acceptable sacrifice to Apollo, or to Diana, or to Latona, or to Minerva; but may all their devotions be rejected and abhorred!'

"When I had urged these, and many other particulars, I retired from the assembly, when a considerable clamor and tumult arose among the Amphictyons; and the debate was now no longer about the shields which we had dedicated, but about the punishment due to the Amphissæans. Thus was a considerable part of that day wasted, when at length a herald arose and made proclamation that all the inhabitants of Delphi above the age of sixteen, both slaves and freemen, should, the next morning by sunrise, assemble in the adjoining plain, called the 'plain of victims,' with spades and mattocks; and by another proclamation it was ordained that the representatives of the several states should repair to the same place to support the rights of the god and the consecrated land; and that, if any representatives should disobey this summons, their state was to be excluded from the temple, as sharing in the sacrilege and involved in the imprecation. The next day we accordingly repaired to the place appointed, from whence we went down to the Cyrrhæan plain; and having there demolished the harbor, and set fire to the buildings, we retired. During these transactions the Locrians of Amphissa, who are settled at the distance of sixty stadia from Delphi, assembled in arms, and fell upon us with their whole force; and, had we not with difficulty gained the town by a

precipitate flight, we must have been in danger of total destruction."

It would be inaccurate to say that antiquity never experienced religious wars.* Never did the most ardent leaguers feel or express religious fanaticism more strongly. Certain traits of this passage recall the severity of the prophets of ancient law against the enemies of Jehovah. "Take the little children of the Philistines and dash their heads against the stones." The author of the *Soirées de Saint Petersburgh* was not moved by piety in the face of these inhuman aberrations. Æschines undoubtedly despised them in his heart, but he wished to take vengeance on Demosthenes, and he made the most of them.

* Rome did not experience them, but she had not the perfect tolerance that Voltaire has attributed to her by sometimes forcing the texts. (Cf. *Philosophie de l'Histoire et Essai sur les Mœurs*.) It is proper to distinguish their beliefs and their worship. The Romans disregarded the religious doctrines of foreigners. They themselves had none at all. For the absent dogma they substituted formulas, a ritual, and ceremonies very definite in the minutest details. The fragments of Fabius Pictor's work on the rites of Rome are very expressive in this respect. The flamen of Jupiter was forbidden to ever touch or name a dog, a she-goat, ivy, beans or raw flesh, or to remain out of his house three consecutive nights. A certain ceremonial accompanied the cutting of his hair and nails. The legs of his bed were smeared with fine clay. He was forbidden to be in open air without his bonnet, etc. * * * The heretics of Rome were the impious who violated these prescriptions, or others of like import. The Romans, indifferent about doctrine, made an attempt at the liberty of conscience as soon as they departed from the formalism of the religion of the state. This religion, it is true, was hospitable, and welcomed all the gods to which the senate had accorded the investiture. The other gods and their followers were severely proscribed. The republic and the empire pursued all foreign unrecognized gods officially, before declaring a war of extermination on the god of the christians. They were never as tolerant as the authors wish to convey in such works as Cicero's *De Divinatione*.

“On the succeeding day Cattyphus, who acted as president of the council, summoned a ‘convention’ of the Amphictyons; so they call an assembly, formed not only of the representatives, but of all who came to offer sacrifice, or consult the oracle. In this convention many accusations were urged against the Amphissæans, and much applause bestowed on our state. The whole debate was closed with a resolution, by which the iëromnemons were directed to repair to Thermopylæ, at a time appointed previously to the next ordinary assembly, with a decree prepared for inflicting the due punishment on the Amphissæans, for their sacrilegious offenses against the god and the consecrated land, and for their outrage on the Amphictyons. To prove the truth of this, I produce the resolution itself.”

Athens was disposed to associate herself with the pious reparation voted by the Amphictyonic diet. Demosthenes, faithful to his bargain with the Amphissæans, opposed it. “This was commanding you to forget the oaths which your ancestors swore, to forget the anathema and the divine oracle.” All other cities send delegates to Thermopylæ, “except one single city, whose name I will pass over in silence (Thebes, recently destroyed by Alexander), and may its disaster never be renewed among any people of Greece!” Hostilities were opened against the Amphissæans. Athens remained a stranger to them, while the gods offered to her in this sacred expedition a leadership which Demosthenes had sold. The orator here with majestic eloquence unrolls the picture of the strange catastrophes which were the consequence of the sacrilege committed by Demosthenes, in spite of the advice of the gods.

“And did not the gods warn us of our danger? Did they not urge the necessity of vigilance, in a language scarcely

less explicit than that of man? Surely never was a state more evidently protected by the gods, and more notoriously ruined by its popular leaders. Were we not sufficiently alarmed by that portentous incident in the mysteries, the sudden death of the initiated? Did not Amyniades still further warn us of our danger, and urge us to send deputies to Delphi to consult the god? And did not Demosthenes oppose this design? Did he not say the Pythian priestess was inspired* by Philip, rude and brutal as he is, insolently presuming on that full power to which your favor raised him? And did he not at last, without one propitious sacrifice, one favorable omen to assure us of success, send out our armies to manifest and inevitable danger? Yet, he lately presumed to say that Philip did not venture to march into our territories for this very reason, because his sacrifices had not been very propitious. What punishment, therefore, is due to thy offenses, thou pest of Greece? If the conqueror was prevented from invading the territories of the vanquished by unpropitious sacrifices, shouldst thou, who, without the least attention to futurity, without one favorable omen, hast sent our armies to the field, shouldst thou be honored with a crown for those calamities, in which thou hast involved the state, or driven from our borders with ignominy?

“And what can be conceived, surprising or extraordinary, that we have not experienced? Our lives have not passed in the usual and natural course of human affairs; no, we were born to be an object of astonishment to posterity. Do we not see the king of Persia, he who opened a passage for his navy through mount Athos, who stretched his bridge across the Hellespont, who demanded earth and water from the Greeks; he who, in his letters, presumed to style himself sovereign of mankind, from the rising to the setting sun;

* Demosthenes expressed this by an artificial phrase (the priestess Philippized), on which the adversary founds his charge of rudeness and brutality.

now no longer contending to be lord over others, but to secure his personal safety? Do not we see those crowned with honor and ennobled with the command of the war against Persia, who rescued the Delphian temple from sacrilegious hands? Hath not Thebes, our neighboring state, been in one day torn from the midst of Greece? And, although this calamity may justly be imputed to her own pernicious counsels, yet we are not to ascribe such infatuation to any natural causes, but to the fatal influence of some evil genius.* Are not the Lacedæmonians, those wretched men, who had but once slightly interfered in the sacrilegious outrage on the temple; who, in their day of power, aspired to the sovereignty of Greece; now reduced to display their wretchedness to the world by sending hostages to Alexander, ready to submit to that fate which he shall pronounce upon themselves and on their country; to those terms which a conqueror, and an incensed conqueror, shall vouchsafe to grant? And, is not this our state, the common refuge of the Greeks, once the great resort of all the ambassadors from the several cities, sent to implore our protection as their sure resource; now obliged to contend, not for sovereign authority, but for our native land? And, to these circumstances have we been gradually reduced from that time when Demosthenes first assumed the administration. Well doth the poet Hesiod pronounce on such men, in one part of his works, where he points out the duty of citizens, and warns all societies to guard effectually against evil ministers. I shall repeat his words; for I presume we treasured up the sayings of poets in our memory when young, that in our riper years we might apply them to advantage.

* *Θεοβλάβειαν* * * * *ἀφροσύνην*, madness attributed to divine wrath: *Quos perdere vult Jupiter dementat.*

Daigne, daigne, mon Dieu, sur Mathan et sur elle
 Répandre cet esprit d'imprudence et d'erreur
 De la chute des rois funeste avant-coureur! (*Athalie*, i, 2)

When one man's crimes the wrath of Heav'n provoke,
Oft hath a nation felt the fatal stroke.
Contagion's blast destroys, at Jove's command,
And wasteful famine desolates the land.
Or, in the field of war, her boasted pow'rs
Are lost; and earth receives her prostrate tow'rs,
In vain in gorgeous state her navies ride;
Dash'd, wreck'd, and buried in the boist'rous tide.

Take away the measure of these verses, consider only the sentiment, and you will fancy that you hear, not some part of Hesiod, but a prophecy of the administration of Demosthenes; for true it is, that both fleets and armies, and whole cities, have been completely destroyed by his administration. (Leland.)

In all this quotation from *Æschines'* oration, the tone is elevated and the thoughts are as grand as the images, but in the midst of his solemn appeals ostentation is more apparent than true emotion. In vain he exhausts all the resources of his art; his oration always exhibits the baseness of his heart. Now this baseness stamps upon the eloquence of *Æschines* a stain which his sentimental and religious disguises are unable to dissimulate. The mask is well adjusted, painted with appropriate colors, and yet through this mask the hypocrite is clearly discovered. Was it not sufficient for *Æschines* to have been the auxiliary of Philip, and was it necessary that he should complete his impersonation in all points by becoming the auxiliary of Divinity?

The gods are useful allies, and their intervention is always advantageous. Demosthenes knew how to consider their auguries; he sought his allies elsewhere,—in his conscience as a good citizen, in his hatred toward the invader and toward his accomplices. This answer of Pythia was delivered to the assembled

people: "All the Athenians, except one, advise the same." Philip's partisans had dictated this answer to Pythia in order to render Demosthenes odious. Æschines rendered himself odious by making himself the interpreter of sacred impostures. Philocrates compares him to a prophet delivering oracles. The oracle and the orator seem to us to offer another analogy besides that of diction. Pythia often obeyed other inspirations than those of heaven, and did not yield less to Pluto than to Apollo.

Before the destruction of Phocis, Æschines feigned sickness (sickness has at all times been a diplomatic instrument), that he might not go on an embassy to Macedonia. When the extermination was consummated, Æschines recovered and flew to the king. Philip celebrated the ruin of Phocis with rejoicings: Æschines assisted at the festive banquet of the invader, an indecency which he was destined to again renew after Chæronea.

"What he did after he had reached the king is far more shocking. For when all of you here, and the Athenians in general, considered the poor Phocians so shamefully and cruelly treated, that you would not send either members of the council or the judges to represent you at the Pythian games, but abstained from your customary deputation to the festival, Æschines went to the sacrifice which Philip and the Thebans offered in honor of their success and conquest; and was feasted, and joined in the libations and prayers which Philip offered up in thanksgiving for the lost fortresses, and territory and troops of your allies, and donned the garland and sang the pæan in company with Philip, and pledged to him the cup of friendship. Nor is it possible that I should state the matter thus, and the defendant otherwise. * * * With respect to his doings yonder,

there will be evidence against him by his colleagues and persons present, who told the particulars to me; for I did not go with them on the embassy, but excused myself. * * * What prayer do you suppose Philip offered to the gods when he poured his libation? What do you suppose the Thebans? Did they not pray for might and victory in battle for them and their allies; the contrary for the allies of the Phocians? Well, then; Æschines joined in that prayer, and invoked a curse upon his country, which you ought now to make recoil upon himself." *

Let us see how Æschines tries to justify himself.

"The accuser says, I sung the pæan with Philip, after the destruction of the cities of Phocis. What proof could manifestly establish it? Like my colleagues I have been invited to a customary banquet which, with the deputies of Greece, guests like us, counted not less than two hundred table companions. In this crowd, no doubt, I have been clearly remarked; I did not keep silent; I sung, if we shall believe Demosthenes, who was not there, and did not produce any testimony of any present person. And how had my voice been distinguished unless I intoned first, as in the chorus? If then I was silent, Demosthenes, your accusation is lying. But if, when my fatherland was flourishing and my fellow-citizens were not afflicted by any disgrace, I sung with my colleagues a hymn by which the Divinity was honored without outraging Athens in anything, I did a pious, innocent action, and I deserve to be absolved. But no, I am not therefore worthy of any pity; it is you who are a pious man,—you, the accuser of them whose libations you have been a partaker of." †

Æschines is logical. He declares Philip's expedition against Phocis pious; there can be no impiety in celebrating its success.‡ Either Æschines is sincere

* *On the Embassy*, § 128.

† *On the Embassy*, § 162.

‡ According to Demosthenes, Æschines' intrigues resulted in excluding Phocis from the treaty which Philip consented to. Æs-

in the expression of his religious belief, and then, it must be confessed, his piety chokes his patriotic feeling and his moral sense; or he affects sentiments which he has not. In both cases he is to be pitied; for his deceitful devotion is insulting to the Divinity, or his piety is very similar to that of a Frenchman whom conscientious scruples would have induced in 1859 to desire the ruin of the French army in Italy.

Demosthenes formally accuses Æschines of having deliberately served Philip's designs in provoking the sacred war against the Amphissæans:

"When clothed with the dignity of the state he arrived among the Amphictyons, dismissing and disregarding all besides, he hastened to execute what he was hired for. He makes up a pretty speech and strong, showing how the Cyrhræan plain came to be consecrated. Reciting this to the presbyters, men unused to speeches and unsuspecting of any consequences, he procures a vote from them to walk around the district, which the Amphissæans maintained they had a right to cultivate, but which he charged to be parcel of the sacred plain. * * * When the Amphictyons, at the instance of this man, walked over the plain, the Locrians fell upon them and well-nigh speared them all; some of the presbyters they carried off captive. Complaints having followed, and war being stirred up against the Amphissæans, at first Cottyphus led an army composed entirely of Amphictyons; but as some never came, and those that came did nothing, measures were taken against the ensuing congress by an instructed gang, the old traitors of Thessaly and other states, to get the command for Philip. And they have found a fair pretext: for it was necessary, they said, either to subsidize themselves

chines then labored to deliver Phocis to the prince, "bound hand and foot (*μόνον οὐκ ἐπίστω τὸ χεῖρ ἐδύσαντες*)."*(On the Embassy.)* This accusation is not surprising when we see Æschines on many an occasion detesting the "impious" Phocians.

and maintain a mercenary force and fine all recusants, or to elect him. What need of many words? He was thereupon chosen general; and immediately afterward collecting an army, and marching professedly against Cyrrha, he bids a long farewell to the Cyrrhæans and Locrians, and seizes Elatea. Had not the Thebans, upon seeing this, immediately changed their minds and sided with us, the whole thing would have fallen like a torrent upon our country. As it was, they for the instant stopped him; chiefly, O Athenians, by the kindness of some divinity to Athens, but secondly, as far as it could depend on a single man, through me.”*

The recital which Æschines himself has given of the memorable sitting of the council in which he was the hero, if closely examined, confirms the probability of Demosthenes’ imputations. Many of the traits arouse suspicions. Scarcely had they arrived at Delphi, when the hieromnemon and one of the pylagoræ were taken with a fever. Was this an unfortunate accident or a premeditated evasion? Did they wish by absenting themselves to give room to Æschines, who had his own plan, and to avoid associating themselves with a dangerous responsibility? Amphictyons, who are friends of Athens, inform Æschines that the Amphiissæans, through complaisance for the Thebans, who were hostile to Athens, are about to decree a fine of fifty talents against the republic, because of a consecration injurious to Thebes. Æschines runs to the assembly to defend his country. Now, according to Demosthenes, Amphissa never thought of raising any complaint of this nature against Athens. It is a “false pretext” which the knave alleges to justify his tirade against the Locrians, whose ruin he plotted. Whilst Æschines justifies Athens, an Amphiissæan, “perhaps urged to

* *Pro Corona*, § 149.

this error by a god," insults the Athenians and demands that they be driven from the temple as accomplices of the sacrilegious Phocians. Is this fact probable? Did not the Amphissæans, according to Æschines' confession, take part against the Amphictyonic troops, in favor of the inhabitants of Cyrrha, a people of Phocis? The outrages of this person kindled the wrath of Æschines. He replies by giving a pathetic picture of the sacrilege of Amphissa. It is no longer a question of votive shields, but of the chastisement which must be inflicted upon the Locrians. Thus the eloquent apostrophe which was called forth by the insults of the Amphissæan, was an unpremeditated diversion, instantaneously inspired in the Athenian pylagoræ by a patriotic indignation, a digression profitable to Athens and for which the republic ought to feel thankful to him. Æschines, on hearing the city thus stigmatized, could not control himself; never, in his whole life, had he experienced such anger. A skillful orator exaggerated his wrath in order to explain an untimely explosion of religious zeal, whose consequences were disastrous to Athens. Later, Æschines, as if under the impression of the divine maledictions which he has described, personally made his peace with the gods. He advised the Amphictyons to follow this prudent example, and to swear a war of extermination against the impious. He aroused their fanaticism; he placed the sacred sword in their hands. This was a consecration of slaughter.

In these conjunctures the religious zeal of Æschines is equivalent to a crime of high treason. For the Athenians had not authorized their pylagora to arouse the Amphictyonic council against Amphissa, and to incite a sacred war which was eagerly desired by their enemy. Æschines, the deputy of Athens at Delphi, did not

look to the affairs of Athens but to those of Philip. His piety, even if sincere, could not therefore exculpate him from a public crime, the origin of the capture of Elatea and the ruin of his country. It would be useless to "torture" the truth; he could never free himself from a treason which crowned his iniquities. Thus spoke Demosthenes, and at the same time cursed his "impure head." In the oration *On the Embassy* Æschines is indignant at the thought that the Athenians should have left Demosthenes unpunished, when they had "executed Socrates the sophist." This badly-drawn comparison is expressive. Æschines' hatred of Demosthenes is veiled, like that of Meletus and of Anytus, under religious pretext. Personal resentments are the secret of his piety and the stimulus of the fanaticism which he inspires in the Athenian people without even having the sad excuse of sharing it.

Æschines has sown with dangers the path on which Demosthenes had to pass in order to defend himself. He hoped to see him strike against engines of war, the indiscreet touch of which provoked mortal explosions. Such was Demosthenes' necessity to justify Chæroneia and to speak freely of the all-powerful Alexander. The orator set this difficulty at naught; he dared to maintain that the defeat, even though foreseen, had to be met in the name of duty; he was not afraid to conclude an oration which teemed with regrets at the downfall of Athens, with execrations against its conquerors. Æschines had laid another snare for him, which was even more perfidious. This Demosthenes could not brave.

It is always difficult to undertake the justification of acts or of words declared impious. If we reply that the accuser is a knave who lies knowingly, we are always

apt to wound the feelings of the people, and of hearers who are perhaps sincerely imbued with opinions affected by the informer. If we allege patriotic probity and disinterested devotion to the state, this apology is foreign to the question and does not refute the accusation of disrespect toward the gods. How are we to prove, in the present cause, that political passions and human covetousness mingled with the anathema against the Phocians, the plunderers of Delphi, or against the Amphissæans, the desecrators of the sacred field? Here Demosthenes cannot meet Æschines with equal arms. The lieutenants of the Phocian Phalæcos commenced digging around the hearth and tripod of Delphi on the belief in a Homeric verse, which mentions "the treasures concealed in the stony soil of Phœbus' temple in rocky Pytho."* Violent earthquakes, manifest signs of divine wrath, checked the desecrators. Demosthenes himself had to fear the commotions of the sacred ground on which his enemy forced him to defend himself; at every imprudent word he was threatened with the fire of heaven. Hence his reticence and his shifts,—he walked upon burning coals.

If the question turns upon the first sacred war of Phocis (355), he denies that he was implicated in it as a responsible counsellor. He was not then connected with public affairs. Besides, even if he had been animated with an indulgence toward the Phocians, these feelings could have found their excuse in the feelings of the Athenians. Athens indeed recognized "their wrongs," but she hated their enemies, the Thebans, even more than she reproved a sacrilege to which despair had driven a ruined people,—a people despoiled of all, of their land, their wives, their children. Their

* *Iliad*, ix, 404.

Apollo seemed powerless to protect them. They demanded provisions and arms of his treasure of Delphi. The impiety of the Phocians, who attacked the divinity itself in their distress, had, according to Justin (viii, 1), rendered the Thebans even more odious because they reduced them to this extremity. Sparta sent aid to them; Athens accorded her alliance to them. Demosthenes was excusable for not having fought those impressions in the hearts of his fellow citizens which circumstances rendered legitimate.

Æschines accuses him of having devoted Athens to the wrath of the gods, by dissuading her from joining the Amphictyonic league. To this charge the orator could not answer without the evasion that it was better to aid his country than the gods. A direct justification upon the basis of the imputation being forbidden him, he used palliatives and devious methods. He did not deny the impiety of the desecrators of a consecrated district; he raised doubts of the consecration itself. For want of a forcible apology, he proved that the adversary could not present his own. The accused became the accuser; he called on the gods to witness the justness of his intentions and the purity of his acts. He invoked Pythian Apollo in particular, whom Æschines especially wished to arouse against him; he called him to witness the truth of his words when he accused Æschines of having been the voluntary auxiliary of Philip, under pretext of defending the gods. Even without urging the sacred war, he (Demosthenes) was more worthy of the protection of the Delphic god than the religious Æschines: such was the impression which Demosthenes wished to leave upon his hearers; and to this effect he demonstrated the criminal in-

telligence between Æschines and the Macedonians, in their plot against Greece. Demosthenes deserted the cause of the gods! Æschines deserted the cause of his country! Æschines was really impious, he was the scourge of all the Hellenes.

III. DEMOSTHENES A BAD COUNSELLOR.

*“Τὸς παράγοντας ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν τι τῆς αὐτοῦ τύχης ἀνέπλησεν * * * Ἐδοθίζω Δημοσθένους ἑφ’ ἑλκος εἶναι ὁὔτος ἀπώλετο: With his ill fortune Demosthenes has ruined those who labored in your behalf. * * * He says that he was the friend of Euthydicus; Euthydicus has perished”* (Dinarchus).

Æschines did not dare say openly to the Athenians: “You have failed in defending your liberty against Philip.” He attributed their defeat to the fatal influence of a bad counsellor. From the day on which Demosthenes concluded a venal compact with sacrilegious Amphissa, all who approached him were plunged more than ever into incurable evils. The malediction connected with his person triumphed over the good fortune of Athens. Thebes, Lacedæmon, the Great King, all the enemies of Macedonia have succumbed; a political and sacrilegious orator sympathized with them in their struggle against the people who avenged the Divinity. Æschines unscrupulously took advantage of the prejudice which had made an unlucky man of Demosthenes. Six years later, Dinarchus, in the trial of Harpalus, exposed the disastrous effects of this fatal politician.

Belief in a good or bad destiny was a conviction deeply rooted in the minds of the Greeks. Herodotus is thoroughly imbued with it, and owes to it one of his most touching recitals,—that of Adrastus the

Accursed (i, 34). This predestined good fortune is considered by Aristotle* among the number of convincing arguments in orations. Æschines insists on it the more voluntarily because he knows his adversary is unable to refute it successfully. What could he allege to prove logically that he was not infested with a fatal ill-fortune? Appearances were against him: the cities which he had joined to Athens had all fallen like herself; the Macedonians, the enemies of his whole life, were everywhere triumphant. The desecrators, aided in vain by his political manage-

* *Rhetoric* i, 5. The fortunate man has ugly brothers, and he alone is handsome. (Cf. *Eudemian Ethics*, vii, 14.) "It cannot be denied that there are classes who really have good luck. They have fine opportunities to act foolishly, everything succeeds for them. * * * Nature establishes between men from the moment of their birth profound differences, giving to some *blue eyes*, to others *black eyes*. * * * In like manner Nature makes some fortunate, others unfortunate: * * * In navigation it is not the most skillful who are fortunate; but sometimes it is as a game of dice, in which one draws nothing, whilst another draws a number that proves that he is naturally fortunate, or that he is loved by the gods, as they say. * * * If this fool succeeds, it is because *destiny, which is an excellent pilot, is in his favor*. I confess that we are justly astonished (*ἄσπορον*) that God or destiny loves a man of this kind, rather than the most honest or prudent man."

The partisans of Philip purposely exalted his good fortune. Demosthenes recognized it, with a feeling of bitter irony, in a particular passage: "Numerous are the motives, Athenians, for congratulating Philip on his good luck; but he can be especially congratulated on one advantage of which I have not found another example (I call the gods to witness) among the great fortunes of our century. To have taken great cities, to have joined vast countries to his empire, all successes of this kind are brilliant and worthy of envy; who doubts it? Nevertheless, we could cite many others who have enjoyed them. But good luck was his; he shared it with no one. What is it? his policy needed perverse men, and the perversity of those whom he found, surpassed his desires." (*On the Embassy*, § 67.)

ment, edified the world by the exemplary chastisements which they suffered. To refute such overwhelming testimony, strengthened by the superstitious feelings of a people who were astonished at the sight of revolutions which had shaken the whole world, was indeed a heavy task; Demosthenes sustained its weight as well as he could.

“From many things one may see his unfeelingness and malignity, but especially from his discourse about fortune. For my part, I regard any one who reproaches his fellow-man with fortune, as devoid of sense. He that is best satisfied with his condition, he that deems his fortune excellent, can not be sure that it will remain so until the evening. How, then, can it be right to bring it forward, or upbraid another man with it? As Æschines, however, has on this subject (besides many others) expressed himself with insolence, look, men of Athens, and observe how much more truth and humanity there shall be in my discourse upon fortune than in his. I hold the fortune of our commonwealth to be good, and so I find the oracles of Dodonæan Jupiter and Pythian Apollo declaring to us. The fortune of all mankind which now prevails, I consider cruel and dreadful.

“For what Greek, what barbarian, has not in these times experienced a multitude of evils? That Athens chose the noblest policy; that she fares better than those very Greeks who thought if they abandoned us they should abide in prosperity, I reckon as part of her good fortune. * * * If you can mention, Æschines, a single man under the sun, whether Greek or barbarian, who has not suffered by Philip’s power formerly, and Alexander’s now, well and good; I concede to you that my fortune, or misfortune (if you please), has been the cause of everything. But if many that never saw me or heard my voice have been grievously afflicted,—not individuals only, but whole cities and nations,—how much juster and fairer is it to consider that to the common fortune apparently

of all men, to a tide of events overwhelming and lamentable, these disasters are to be attributed? * * * If we suffered reverses, if all happened not to us as we desired, I conceive she has had that share of the general fortune which fell to our lot. As to my fortune (personally speaking), or that of any individual among us, it should, as I conceive, be judged of in connection with personal matters. Such is my opinion upon the subject of fortune,—a right and just one, as it appears to me, and I think you will agree with it. *Æschines* says that my individual fortune is paramount to that of the commonwealth, the small and mean to the great and good. How can this possibly be?"

Demosthenes was not unfortunate, because he was not conquered: "I have conquered Philip, because his gold has not been able to corrupt me. * * * I never was beaten by Philip in estimates or preparations; far from it; but the generals and forces of the allies were overcome by his fortune." Nobody has a right to charge him with the reverses of Athens; he neglected nothing that could insure success. But the struggle was too unequal: to the arms of the Macedonians he only opposed speeches, and the traitors paralyzed all his efforts. Greece has suffered, not through the fault of Demosthenes, but for not having followed his advice. One Demosthenes in every city would have been enough for the common salvation, but all the cities were full of *Æschineses*. "Then go not about saying, O Athenians, that one man has inflicted these calamities on Greece. Heaven and earth! it was not a single man, but a number of miscreants in every state." *Thucydides* (ii, 37) praises the Athenians for respecting, beyond all the others, the laws protecting the sanction of public opinion. In Demosthenes' eyes one of them is not to reproach an unfortunate man for misfortunes

which he cannot prevent. Æschines makes the lost cause a weapon against his enemy; he violates that law of moral delicacy which forbids the abuse of an innocent man on account of unfortunate circumstances. Demosthenes was unfortunate in having stranded; he did not strand because he was unfortunate. Instead of exciting public hatred against him, Æschines ought to have respected his affliction, and, if he was able, to have shared it.

Notwithstanding the force of his reasoning and the eloquence of his complaints, Demosthenes undoubtedly did not succeed in overcoming the prejudice of an ill-luck which was connected with his person. After Chæronea, the Athenians continued to be inspired by his counsels. Nevertheless, out of deference for a prejudice at variance with the bold confidence of his fellow-citizens, the orator for some time abstained from signing his own name to decrees which he had adopted. He subscribed the name of a friend, Nausicles. He wished to remove every pretext for a distrust in the future, and to preserve the city from even the appearance of a fatal influence, a touching proof of his piety toward his country.

Without accepting the prejudice of the Athenians on the fatality attached to Demosthenes, even we are struck by the character of a life which an evil destiny seems to have constantly pursued. This tragic color appears manifest to whosoever considers the rough career which the orator experienced; and, at first, what a contrast his career forms with that of Æschines! The friend of the Macedonians sung the pæan at Philip's table after the ruin of Phocis; he celebrated Chæronea with the conqueror; and his life passed calmly and pleasantly between the fruitful sympathy of the Mace-

donians and the artistic admiration or moral indifference of his fellow-citizens. He lived happily, honored by the greatest number. One disgrace befell him,—he provoked Demosthenes to a single combat, in which his hatred was baffled and his vanity humiliated. He resolved upon voluntary exile, and then spent his leisure hours between the culture of eloquence and friendly relations with Alexander, until he died peaceably at Rhodes or Samos.

With this picture let us compare that of Demosthenes' life and death. Early deprived of his paternal inheritance, Demosthenes, at the age of twenty, was obliged to contend with his avaricious guardians for his property. His persevering efforts deprived them of a small share of it. After a laborious youth, obstinate in struggling against natural imperfections, he enters the tribune. He is there mocked. Far from losing his courage, he redoubles his energy, finally triumphs over his defects, and carries the suffrages of the Athenians. What fruit will he reap from it? He chooses an honorable part,—the defense of Hellenic rights. Philip's talents, the vices of Athens, the weakness of all Greece, throw obstacles in his way, which, though constantly surmounted, constantly rise up again before him. Always in the breach, he struggles alone for the national honor. He is always right, and he is always vanquished. He passed his life rolling the rock of Sisyphus. After Charonea, he saw himself dishonored as a public scourge, detested as sacrilegious, and accursed.

Is not he who sows good and reaps evil, who approaches without ever reaching his object, indeed condemned by the gods? The Theban alliance for a moment made the scales balance in favor of Athens; but

the superior force of destiny very soon disturbed her equilibrium. Fatality seems to have played with Demosthenes. At the death of Philip (336) and of Alexander (323) it brightened his life with rays of hope, and each time plunged him again into dark uncertainty. The Athenians restored his courage by rendering due homage to his patriotic policy (330). A few years afterward (324) the Areopagus condemned him on a charge of corruption. An exile awaited him more humiliating than that of Æschines, if he was guilty; much more grievous if he was innocent. His return was a triumph (323) which recalls that of Alcibiades.* Scarcely had a year passed when the defeat of Cranon again ruined his hopes. He was incessantly baffled by deception and bitterness.

Less upright than Nicias, but more illustrious and more useful to his country as a citizen, he was the victim of a longer and more painful misfortune. Fond of pleasures, and of the money which procured them, very sensitive to the wounds of self-love, given to lamentable failings through timidity, his weaknesses subjected him to the slanders and calumnies of his enemies, and conspired with his civic virtues to make him suffer. Virtue ought to be always gratuitous; why is it not always unpunished? Chæroneia, the grandest political title of Demosthenes in our estimation, won for him the reproachful term, parricide. At the time of his greatest credit he was obliged to sup-

* A galley was sent to bring him from Ægina; and when he came up from the Piræus to Athens the whole body of citizens went to meet and to congratulate him on his return, insomuch that there was neither a magistrate nor a priest left in the town. The people made him a present of fifty talents, which was intended to compensate the fine that was imposed upon him by the Areopagus. (Plutarch, *Life of Demosthenes*, 27.)

port the overwhelming weight of a state which was rebellious to generous counsels, because it was inactive.* Broken by a final disaster, he terminated his days as a fugitive, surrounded by the enemies of his country, in the face of indifferent or impotent gods. "The life of the statesman is as ruffled as that of the warrior."† During thirty years Demosthenes maintained the contest against Athens and against Macedonia. He conquered his country, but the victory was too late. He could not find in her sufficient support to accomplish his work by rejecting the Macedonian yoke. This unfortunate destiny, and the firmness of a mind unswayed by misfortune, give a tragic expression to Demosthenes' figure. It is surprising that an Alfieri, for example, has not profited by such a drama. The inflexible obstinacy of Demosthenes recalls Prometheus,‡ Philoctetes and Electra. He hated the invader as the son of Pæan hated the Atrides. Like him, he preferred pain to the shame of a compromise. He did not recognize the right of pardoning. Clytemnestra killed her husband. "Strike again!" cried Electra to Orestes. The Macedonians killed Hellenic liberty. To his last breath Demosthenes cried, "Revolt and take vengeance on the murderers!"

Pain is a blessing, said Antisthanes. "True happiness is obedience to the voice of duty" (Hyperides).

* Demetrius reports this saying of Demades: "Athens is no longer the warrior city of our ancestors. She is an old woman who drags her sandals, and lives on tisane."

† Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, x, 7.

‡ Æschylus, *Prometheus*: "I have foreseen all. I have wished, yes, I have wished, to act thus. I will not deny it, in order to aid mortals I have incurred sufferings" (v, 270). "For thy servility, know you well I would not exchange my misery" (v, 956). Demosthenes used the same language to Æschines.

In this respect only was Demosthenes happy during his whole life. Considering things with the elevated sentiments of which he himself gave a striking example, he was also happy in his death. He deserved above all others the hatred of his country's enemies. Was not this a more enviable death than that of Æschines, who died faithful to the Macedonians and forgetful of Athens? Or of Philip, the politician of skillful intrigues, who was assassinated in a court intrigue? Or of Alexander, the young Bacchus, the conqueror of India, who was carried away by an orgy? Or of Dinarchus, who was paid for his services by the executioner of Polysperchon? Or of Demades, expiating his duplicities by the murder of his own son, whom Cassander killed in his arms, and then killed the father? The great soul of Demosthenes in the midst of trials found in itself the consolation of manly courage: the consciousness of his fidelity to duty. It foresaw another consolation, posthumous but sovereign: the certainty of an honored immortality.

The testimonies of esteem which his fellow-citizens conferred upon him gave him a presentiment of his future renown. In the trial *On the Crown*, Athens, feeling that the cause of Demosthenes was her own, wished to sanction the glory of her orator by sharing it. The Republic, said Æschines, would appear such as the one whom she would crown. Athens preferred rather to resemble Demosthenes than his accuser, and she proudly crowned the irreconcilable adversary of her conquerors. The firmness of his attitude after Chæronea was a plain proof of his determination. The constancy of Rome after Cannæ has been praised. Frivolous Athens was no less

vigorous, although in a situation still more desperate. Owing to energetic measures, the city was put in a state of defense; the slaves enfranchised; the oppressed restored to their rights. The sepulchres furnished stones for the fortifications, and the trophies of the temples gave up their arms. Demosthenes was the soul of the resistance; he went to arouse the allied cities, whilst the people, not having political rights to spare their Varro, punished Lysicles* and inflicted capital punishment on the emigrants. Philip, in the face of this unexpected resolution, used generosity and prudence.†

IV. — GRECIAN ELOQUENCE EXTINGUISHED WITH DEMOSTHENES.

Ἡμισυ γάρ τ' ἀρετῆς ἀποαίνονται ἐθόρυπα Ζεὺς
Ἀνέρος, ἐδ' ἄν μιν χατὰ δοῦλιον ἥμαρ ἔλῃσιν:

"Jove fix'd it certain, that whatever day
Makes man a slave, takes half his worth away."

After peace was concluded Athens, notwithstanding the division of parties, did not cease to contend secretly in proportion to her resources. Her courage did not fail her. She was subjugated by force. At every propitious opportunity she attempted to raise

* *Attic Orators*: "You commanded the army, Lysicles; a thousand citizens have perished and two thousand have been made prisoners, and a trophy has been raised against the republic, and all Greece is enslaved! All these misfortunes have befallen us while you were guiding and commanding our soldiers; and you dare to live and to enjoy the light of the sun, and to present yourself on the public square; you, a monument of shame and opprobrium to your country!" (*Lycurgus*.)

† Cf. *The Funeral Oration* attributed to Demosthenes.

her head. She pursued the agents of Olympius; she gave all liberty to orators who were hostile to her conquerors. "Before the smoking ruins of Thebes" she dared (a firmness admired by Livy, ix, 18) protest against her masters and even ridicule them. Alexander wished to be a god and the recognized god of the Athenians. People ought to deliberate upon the demanded apotheosis: "What kind," said Lycurgus, "will that god be whom we cannot worship except on condition that we purify ourselves when leaving him?" On the proposition of Demosthenes, the city declared that it would confine itself to the gods which its ancestors worshiped. This proud liberty won the esteem of Alexander. He expressed the desire that at his death command in Greece should be reserved to the Athenians. Their eulogies, he declared, were the recompense whose hope stimulated his exploits.

Forty-two years after Demosthenes' death (280), Athens wished to consecrate the respect due to his memory by a public act. Demochares, a nephew of the orator, proposed and carried a decree in which we read these words:

"Demosthenes served the Athenian people by his benefits and his counsels. * * * He gave to the state three triremes and thirteen talents. * * * He contributed his own property in order to provide arms for poor citizens and to purchase grain during the famine. * * * He ransomed several citizens who had been made prisoners by Philip at Pydna, at Methone, and at Olynthus. * * * At his expense he repaired the walls of the Piræus. * * * By his eloquence and devotion he brought into the Athenian alliance the Thebans, Eubœa, Corinth, Megara, Achaia, Locris, Byzantium, and Messenia. Sent on an embassy among our allies, he persuaded them to furnish more than five hundred talents for

war expenses. A deputy to the people of the Peloponnesus, he distributed money among them in order to prevent them from sending reinforcements to Philip against Thebes. To the Athenians he gave the wisest counsels, and supported the national independence and democracy better than any of his contemporary orators. Banished by the supporters of the oligarchy when the people had lost their sovereignty, he died in the isle of Calauria, a victim of his own patriotism. * * * Pursued by the soldiers of Antipater, he remained to the last faithful to the democracy, and at the approach of death he did nothing which was unworthy of Athens. * * * The oldest of his family will hereafter be supported at the Prytaneum, and in the games he will be assigned to places of honor. A bronze statue will be erected on the public square to Demosthenes."

The statue received this inscription:

"Divine in speech, in judgment too divine;
Had valor's wreath, Demosthenes, been thine,
Fair Greece had still her freedom's ensign borne,
And held the scourge of Macedon in scorn!"

Athens owed even more to her orator than she acknowledged. As long as he lived he supported the soul of his country. The proud sentiments which he inspired in her might have left Athens some oblivion of her sad condition. When Demosthenes was lost to her, not having in herself the power to raise her head under the yoke, she bowed humbly and submitted entirely to the degrading influence of servitude. From that day she was actually enslaved, and her feelings made it quite evident.

Seven or eight years after the adoption of the decree in honor of Demosthenes, the same Athens voted a similar decree in favor of his nephew, Demochares. This person received the same homage as his uncle for having proved his devotion to the public welfare, but

the conditions and circumstances under which the two men labored were very different. In the number of Demochares' eminent services were his successful embassies to kings; he obtained money from Lysimachus, from Ptolemæus and from Antipater. He was a good administrator, a faithful democrat and a successful beggar. In 305, Athens had reached the depth of her moral degradation. She celebrated the entry of Demetrius Poliorcetes within her walls with this sacred hymn:

"Yes, the greatest and most beloved of the gods are present in our city. See how the propitious occasion introduces Demeter and Demetrius together. She comes to celebrate the mysteries of her daughter (Proserpine); he, as joyful as becomes a god, appears handsome and smiling. The majestic spectacle of his presence! All his friends in a circle around him like the stars; he in the midst of them like the sun. O thou son of all-powerful Neptune and of Aphrodite, hail! for the other gods are either too far away, or they have no ears, or they do not exist, or they have no care for us. But thou, we behold thee present, not in wood or in stone, but in reality.—to thee we address our prayers. * * * etc."

"Such," adds Athenæus, "was the song which the warriors of Marathon sung, not only in public, but even around their firesides; they who had punished with death the adorers of the Persian king, and who had slain myriads of barbarians." This servile cantata was the worthy accompaniment of the adulations with which Demetrius was overwhelmed even to disgust. Athenæus has transmitted to us the proofs of all this: altars to the intimate acquaintances of the new god, temples to his two mistresses.* Thus the city pros-

* One of them, Lamia, was a flute-player at Athens. Plutarch (*Life of Demetrius*) gives curious details on these unheard of adula-

tituted itself to a foreign master; the city in which the popular song of Harmodius and Aristogiton had been chanted for years; the city which had been formerly honored with the meritorious names of the Prytaneum, of the hearth, of the rampart and of the school of Greece.*

By losing his liberty, says Homer, man loses half his virtue. When Greece was deprived of her independence, she was at the same blow bereft of her genius. Macedonian rule did not pacify her eloquence; it annihilated it. Demosthenes had no heir; he did not even leave a legacy to any one. The Hellenic language, so fertile in masterpieces for almost two centuries, was suppressed immediately and forever. Only rhetoric survived, babbling and varnished, in its schools; bombastic and ingenious, an adulatress to the powerful. But one name rises above this level mediocrity, that of Demetrius Phalerens. Could it be otherwise? Banished from the political domain, where it once enjoyed its liberty, eloquence could find no other soil to cultivate than the petty debates of civil life and flattery. The pride of the city became the humble auxiliary of the domestic hearth, the captive servant of foreign masters. Robbed, without any compensation, of her Attic eloquence, which was supplanted by Asiatic loquacity, Greece deserved, in this respect, to be com-

tions. "These mockeries completed the corruption of a prince whose mind was not altogether sane." One of the most grievous fantasies of the new god to the Athenians was the immediate payment of the tribute of two hundred and fifty talents. The sum was sent without delay to Demetrius, who delivered it to his courtesans "to purchase toilet powder." This was a strange way to recompense the Athenians for their devotion for which they paid so dearly.

* *πρυτανείων* (Theopompus), *ἑστίας* (the oracle itself), *ἔρζεισμα* (Pindar), *παύδευσιν* (Thucydides).

pared "to one of those houses delivered up to libertinism and evil genius; the free and wise woman languished in disdain, whilst the mad courtesan, summoned to destroy everything, governs like a mistress and overwhelms the legitimate wife with insults and humiliations."*

Demosthenes is to be honored for having devoted his life to the ambition of preventing the ruin of the Athenian mind and genius with her enslavement. He only succeeded in retarding it. But the transformation of Greece, which was immediately disfigured, further justified the orator of the *Philippics*. He had a presentiment of the void which the disappearance of Athens would leave in the world, and the check to civilization which her defeat caused. In fact neither moral and national dignity, nor eloquence nor poetry, nor even any high inspiration in the arts, survived the fall of the Attic city. The day on which she fell with Demosthenes, the shining light of the Occident was extinguished; long years were to roll by before Alexandria was to see the Aurora of a new dawn.

* Dionysius of Halicarnassus. (*Memoirs*, Introduction, i.)

CHAPTER XII.

CONCLUSION.

“Περιγεγράφθω μὲν τὰγαθὸν τὰύτη· δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἰθ’ ὕστερον ἀναγράφαι. * * * Ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων ἐδρεπής· ὁθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γέγονασιν αἱ ἐπιδόσεις: Let us content ourselves with this imperfect sketch of the good. It is, perhaps, necessary at first to draw from it an incomplete image, whose features will be perfected subsequently. * * * Time reveals these progresses; it is the source of the protection of the arts.” (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, i, 5).

ANTIQUITY, “the youth of the world,” will always seem young in certain respects; its prejudices and its customs are past, but the humanity which it portrayed still lives. The universal man of whom Pascal speaks, is modified in his growth; but in his essence he remains perpetually the same. Also the strange moral necessity constantly revives among men the same phenomena, different in their forms, but substantially identical.*

* This periodical return of the same currents in human life is sometimes aided by the immutable stability of the physical nature in the midst of which man acts; to moral necessity is allied a kind of geographical fatality. In our days, as in the times of Philip, Byzantium is the key of universal rule. It is to-day defended in the name of European independence against the presumptive heirs of Peter the Great. Twenty centuries ago Athens and Demosthenes defended it against a prince of the north, who longed for the conquest of the southern states, and perhaps that of Asia, which was reserved for his son. Who knows whether Greece, the historical and natural bulwark of the Bosphorus, will not some day receive the custody of the Oriental Porte? Byzantium, the beautiful and envied sultana, has up to this period been trusted without danger to an

Thus the commotions of those states which struggle to preserve or gain their liberty, will always have the same consequences in the manifestations of human passion. The Macedonian period and the French Revolution were destined to be for Greece a triumph, for France a cradle of political eloquence. The two nations, in a national storm resulting differently for each, were stirred in their patriotic, moral and religious fibers.

Demosthenes protested against the iniquities of the invader and the felony of his Greek allies. The legislative assembly rose up against the manifesto of Brunswick and the emigrants. The political orator of the *Philippics* advised the Athenians to sacrifice strict right to the superior cause of Hellenic rights; the Committee of Public Safety gained authority by the example of nature, which is interested in classes, not in individuals. An unexpected ally, Joseph de Maistre, came to justify these theories. The revolutionary power, "a monster of power," said he, "is at the same time a dreadful chastisement for the French, and the only means of saving France." Some questioned themselves about Providence, some found it convenient to abandon themselves to destiny and to submit to the good fortune of Philip; others, the better classes, held up with Demosthenes the claims of the city to the benevolence of the gods, and wished to aid them by a manly use of liberty. Thus the action of Providence was even apparent to the enemies of

effeminate guardian. The Turk, unable himself to guard her, can no longer protect her from the covetousness of a manly neighbor. The European states would be satisfied if the Greeks were strong enough to become the protectors and masters of Constantinople, and wise enough never to abuse her.

the French revolution. With logical fanaticism the author of *Considerations sur la France* declared that it was "decreed." In it he beheld an "overwhelming force which surmounted all obstacles. Its whirlwind carried away all that human power could oppose to it like light chaff. No one crossed its path with impunity." What are we to say of the commotions of the imagination at the sight of a young conqueror who, full of faith in his own star, renewed the prodigies of Alexander? Destiny conducted the one from Pella to the Indus and to Babylon, the other from Brienne to the pyramids and to Moscow. Both overran the world with resistless power; as formerly Hellenism, so '89 was diffused through the universe.

Hume, before the most brilliant period of the British parliament, marked the absence of political eloquence in his own country: "Great interests are wanting to us." They were not long wanting to England, and especially to France. The political movements which supported the eloquence of Rome and Athens seem moderate compared with the prodigious renovation of which France in 1789 gave the signal to Europe. Philosophical meditation had enriched the soil by thoroughly ploughing it. To the sowing of ideas succeeded a harvest of disputed reforms, which were propagated by eloquence. Contending parties always held speech in dread, and armed themselves with it as with an irresistible power. Oratorical duels were fought over the body of royalty, then in the heart of the republic, between the moderate party and the violent party. Mirabeau and Barnave, Vergneaux and Danton, gave to the tribune a resonance and an outburst of eloquence in which genius and passion were more conspicuous than perfect wisdom or virtue. The

gravity of the interests discussed and the solemnity of the circumstances gave a grandeur to these oratorical contests which was unknown to the most imposing debates of the Pnyx and the forum. Hence the character of an eloquence whose vehemence was more than Roman, and whose transports were sometimes emphatic, was very far from Athenian sobriety. Things, men, orations, everything at that period, affected gigantic proportions. Memories of Greece haunted the imagination. Sparta, an exemplary city, with its rigid virtues, was erected into a model of patriotism. She was envied her Lycurgus. Herault de Séchelles seriously proposed to inspire himself with the laws of Minos, as did Sparta. Democratic Athens exercised less prestige on the mind. However, they thought of her in order to threaten the dictators with the dagger of Harmodius. They purloined from the Hellenes an emblem, the Greek bonnet; but how faithfully revive their eloquence? In the Convention tempests burst forth which overran the hall in the name of the sovereign people. Eloquence is a flame which, according to Tacitus, needs the nourishment of civil agitations; but if the little flame be transformed into a volcano, what does it become? Too often at that epoch it gave place to popular roaring or to the impassible reading of sinister reports in the midst of the silence of fear. Thus the civic exaltation and the effective atrocity of generous aspirations hurried France to an inauspicious crisis. * * * But let us not touch the ax.

Athenian eloquence, as we have seen, often bore the characteristics of the pamphlet.* The same was true

* "Political eloquence is censured for being quarrelsome and hateful (*φιλαπνευσθής*)." (Isocrates, *Antidosis*. See ch. viii.)

at certain epochs of the political eloquence of the moderns. The great Irish agitator, O'Connell, sometimes seasoned his harangues with that wrath and violence familiar to the ancient tribune. The orators of the revolution could scarcely refrain from these impetuosities. Those, however, who truly deserve the name of orator rarely gave to their orations the insulting violence familiar to the Agora. This relative moderation is due to the literary customs of the two countries. The pamphlet and the oration were confounded at Athens; at Paris they were cultivated separately. What the mouth would not have dared to hazard in an assembly, however bold, the paper, which never blushes, published throughout all France. Friends and enemies of the new constitution had their publishers,—champions with cruel teeth. The *Revolutions of France and of Brabant* repaid the Acts of the Apostles for their outrages and bites. Calumnies in verse and in prose, ridiculing or lacerating parodies, bloody sarcasms which were to be avenged in blood, malice and venom, nothing was wanting to these libels that could exhale shameless hatred.

The chair of the new apostles was a tumbrel less Attic than that from which Æschines insulted Demosthenes. The spoken pamphlet of Athens outraged truth and decorum, but not modesty. The written pamphlet of the innovators and of their adversaries despised all law. That wrath should be thus manifested in ignominious language is too much; but what would this have been if the pamphlet had not favored what Aristotle calls the *purgation* of the passions and preserved eloquence?

The liberties of the Athenian pamphlet were a feeble echo of the audacities of the comic stage. The “di-

vine " muse of Aristophanes spat upon his enemies with a "vast spittle." The muse of André Chénier could not refuse the temptation of "spitting upon their names" and "chanting their punishment." Nevertheless, Greek comedy, even with its transports, was never murderous. Camille Desmoulins remarked with his accustomed spirit :

"The Athenians were more indulgent, and they wrote fewer songs, than the French. Far from sending to St. Pelagie, and still less to the Place de Revolution, the author who, from the beginning to the close of the play, discharged the most bloody arrows against Pericles, Cleon, Lamor, * * * Alcibiades, against the committees and presidents of sections, and against the sections in mass, the *Sans-Culottes* applauded with enthusiasm, and no one suffered death except those spectators who burst by dint of laughing." *

* The *Vieux Cordelier*, No. 7; the *Pour et le Contre*, bearing on the liberty of the press: "How can one be mistaken in this respect? As for me, I do not see how a republic can be recognized where the liberty of the press does not exist. The Athenians were true republicans by principle and by instinct. Not only did the Athenian people permit speaking and writing, but I see, from that which remains to us of their theatre, that they enjoyed no greater pleasure than to see represented upon the stage their generals, their ministers, their philosophers and their committees, and, what is stranger, the representation of themselves. Read Aristophanes, * * * and you will be astonished at the strange resemblance between Athens and democratic France. You there find a Père Duchêne as at Paris, the red bonnets, the orators, the magistrates, the motions and the sittings, absolutely as ours. You will there find the principal characters of the day: in a word, an antiquity of two thousand years with which we are contemporary. The only resemblance which is wanting is that when her poets represented Athens with a long beard, * * * under the costume of an old man, who was called People, the Athenian people, far from being angry, proclaimed Aristophanes the victor of the games, and encouraged him to create laughter at their own expense. * * * Remember that these comedies were so caustic against the ultra revolutionists, and the occupants of the tribune at that time, that there

The *Clouds* amused Socrates, it did not kill him. The pamphlet and the eloquence of the French Revolution are as sharp as a sword. * * * "Yes, monsters, I will accuse you before nations with my steel pen, glittering with the sacred fire of liberty which you do not know; I will pierce and burn your entrails." Sometimes there was death without phrases, and again there were phrases that were truly mortal, such as those of St. Just. The same St. Just, in 1789, published a poem (*Organt*) in which the author displayed a vein of hilarity, and essayed here and there the picture of guileless love. Robespierre composed verses which Dorat would not have disowned. These literary distractions were not long to amuse the rivals of the Septembrists. The Greeks were too exclusively artists to have threats of death anywhere than on their lips; generally outside of art they took few things seriously. The men of the Revolution were, above all, citizens inflamed with their convictions, and were easily carried from a sublime enthusiasm to fury.

The revolutionary furnace was the crucible where

is one of them which was played under the archon Stratocles, 430 B.C., and that if it were translated to-day, Hébert could assert to the Cordeliers that the piece could only be of yesterday, and of the invention of Fabre d'Églantine, against him and Ronsin, and that this is the translator who caused the dearth of subsistence. * * * Charming democracy, that of Athens!"

The interlocutor of Camille Desmoulins makes this judicious restriction to the claim of the unlimited liberty of the press: "The French people, as a mass, do not sufficiently read the journals, and are not sufficiently instructed and informed by the primary schools, to discern clearly at the first glance the difference between Brissot and Robespierre. Consequently, I do not know whether human nature is capable of that perfection that would warrant the unlimited liberty of speaking and writing."

very different materials were moulded, and from that material came the pure metal in which to-day, blended with that of France, shines forth the statue of our French Republic, crowned with its triple device as with an aureola. Our fathers in '89 had the fanaticism of liberty and of their country; the contemporaries of Demosthenes were unacquainted with this sacred ardor. Sometimes they scarred themselves in order to derive a little money from the enemy; the majority escaped the more serious scars of the Macedonian sword. They celebrated their independence without sacrificing themselves for it; they applauded the country of their ancestors, but lost their own. Our fathers, regardless of life, met their punishment with the enthusiasm of martyrs. Nothing great is accomplished without faith. The men of the French Revolution had faith: their heroic abnegation saved us. The Athenians were sceptics in taste and in thought; they had not, like our ancestors, souls of granite to check the sterile torrent of the invasion which was to submerge them.

II. Revolutions which provoke the greatest shocks among men are social revolutions. That which in England in 1650, and in France in 1789, was exceptional and scandalous, was the rule and the normal state in Athens. The social strata were there mixed and were leveled since the time of Solon and Pericles. The city was, therefore, saved from those dangerous eddies of a state where the bottom aspires to take its place on the surface. Social peace was not of an irreproachable clearness, for absolute equality of rights will never suppress the inequality of conditions and fortunes.

Well settled in her basis and nearly satisfied with her condition, Athens might have derived from the hatred of the foreigner an ardor similar to that of her social struggles. She might and should have employed against her invaders the energy she had manifested in the Peloponnesian war. She was formerly impetuous against rival cities, but she was mild in the face of Philip; less devoted to liberty than to repose, she only demanded the continuance of her self-enjoyment without labor or sacrifice. The Greeks hated the Greeks more than they detested the Macedonian. Municipal passions had been violent in Greece, and would reappear upon every occasion; but there was no longer a passion for the country of the Hellenes. France, on the contrary, in '92, felt both social and patriotic passions. She had to defend herself against the allied royalists and against the sovereigns; it was a gigantic struggle. Athens did not experience any of these powerful incentives; in vain did Demosthenes attempt to arouse her with his patriotism. Whatever might befall her, she was assured that she would not be deprived of the advantages of her social organization; she therefore resigned herself to the loss of an independence whose preservation seemed to her too expensive.

Man's moral nature has something of the invariability of the laws of physical nature; but humanity has the privilege of reconciling this constancy with the law of progress: a progress which is necessarily limited as to the perfection of the human soul, but unlimited in the domain of the mind and of social amelioration. The ancient republics were often oppressive aristocracies (thus Rome) or tyrannical governments ruled by demagogues. The abuses of liberty

inspired high-minded men with a false idea of the true republican constitution. The Socratics whose ideal was Sparta, demanded the rule of the best (*ἀριστοκρατία*). Now, it is known how this fortunate predominance of aristocracy usually terminated.* Aristotle excluded artisans from the state;† in his eyes the only legitimate citizen was he who enjoyed ease and leisure. The real democracy of Athens was not much better than the one which the philosopher fashioned after his own idea. Perfect equality was unknown. In oligarchical states, the great eat the small. In the country of Hyperbolos and Cleonymes, the small aimed to live on the substance of the great. They had the right to be poor and mediocre, but not the right to be superior by wealth or merit. What would the equality have become, if some citizens were permitted to rise above the common level by their virtue?

This distrust in eminent merit seemed so naturally inherent in Athenian democracy, that Aristotle praised ostracism as a law of humanity.‡ In fact, this process of elimination was better than the leveling by decapitation which Tarquin enjoyed; but it was too much that the proscription of excellent capacities should seem necessary. A very eminent citizen, not having

* "If you desire a good constitution, you will first see that the wise enact the laws; then that the good repress the bad and deliberate upon state affairs, without permitting the stupid to offer their advice, to harangue or appear in the assembly. But the immediate result of these excellent measures will be that the people will fall into bondage (*δουλείαν*)." Xenophon, *Government of the Athenians*.

† *Politics*, iii, 3. Antiquity experienced more revolting maxims than the exclusion of artisans from the state: the exclusion of weak children from life.

‡ *Politics*, iii, 8.

any position clearly defined in the state by the Athenian law, invaded and usurped them all. A very eminent citizen, in a modern republic, concentrates his powerful activity in his functions; he does not encroach on the authority of another. He has his sphere determined; that of a great man at Athens was not determined. When the united merits of all the citizens could not equal the merit of one, it was necessary to repudiate this superior being, or to submit to him. Athens remained forty years submissive to Pericles; but ostracism generally saved her from the danger of extraordinary talents. The ship *Argo*, on the principle of equality, refused to receive Hercules because he was much heavier than his companions. The modern ship of state is so strongly constructed that it can sustain the most powerful characters. To-day preëminent merit has its place in our democracy. Far from excluding it from the state, it is desired. Themistocles, Cimon and Aristides were banished from the city of Minerva to preserve the public safety. To-day they would be unanimously sent to Parliament, if they were not already there.

Athenian democracy saw a menace and a social danger in the riches of individuals.* The political philosophers labored to regulate and restrain it. Sycophants toiled, after their fashion, to solve the problem

* Formerly, says the author of the *Antidosis*, people acquired wealth in order to be considered. "Now they must refrain from wealth as from a crime; if they do not justify themselves thereupon, they are lost. * * * I could count more wealthy men deprived of their fortunes than guilty men punished for their misdemeanors." He bitterly complains that he himself is taxed above his resources. He would have himself considered less wealthy than was Gorgias, whose fortune did not exceed \$3,096. However, he never had a wife or children, and lived exempt from this tax (*λειτουργίας*), the longest continued and most expensive of all.

by making a breach in opulence for their own profit. Not content with extorting money from the allied cities desirous of purchasing the protection of orators who were heeded by the multitude, their envy and cupidity made them covetous of the goods of their fellow-citizens. It is easily seen from the Greek orators how the flatterers of the rabble made war on the owners of the silver mines of Attica, and farmed them by *extortion*.* One of the most delicate questions of modern society is the relations of labor and capital. This difficult problem was ignored by the ancient republics, in which labor was almost the exclusive lot of the slave. Athens, nevertheless, had her artisans. Rome, the proud aristocrat, despised them; Plato, the disdainful dreamer, regulated them in the last rank of the social scale. He admitted them only as workmen to serve him. Socrates, a true sage, reinstated them by eulogizing manual laborers. Athens, not being able to live like Rome on the spoils of the world, was obliged to work, however little. The social question at Athens, therefore, offered a particular difficulty. We have seen how Demosthenes essayed to hold the balance equal between the opposed pretensions of the rich and the poor, and for want of a just conciliation, pursued the good of the state.†

* These abuses and disorders led Xenophon to propose the working of the mines by the state, with the consent and to the profit of the people. * * * "Thus all the Athenians will be able to derive their subsistence from the public revenues. * * * I declare that thereby our commonwealth will become not only wealthy, but more mild, more friendly to order, and better prepared for war." "It is just that the poor and the people at Athens should have the advantage over the nobles and the wealthy; for it is the people who, with their oars, propel the vessels and who constitute the power of the commonwealth." Although somewhat ironical, this reflection is just.

† See ch. iv.

The public welfare also inspired Hyperides with wise words. The informers, by imposing upon the owners of mines, forced them to abandon their working, to the detriment of the public treasury. Was it serving the state to molest individuals in this manner? "The best citizen is not the man who, in return for a little money (proceeds of fines and of confiscations), causes a detriment to the general interests of the city,* nor the man who furnishes temporary resources and deprives Athens of her legitimate revenues. It is the man who has a regard for the future interest of his country, for the concord of the citizens, and for your glory. There are people whom all this does not trouble. They deprive the industrious of the fruit of their labor, and pretend to enrich the city while they are preparing indigence for it; *for if property and the accumulation due to economy become a cause of alarm, who will expose himself to danger?*" The Athenian people, jealous of the revenues of miners, attempted to deprive them of their income for the benefit of the treasury, from which they themselves derived in part their subsistence and the gratuity of their pleasures. This was a strife organized between capital and idleness. The question of the respective rights of capital and labor is not settled in our day, but it will undoubtedly have its solution also, which will be another proof of the superiority of modern democracy.

And, now, what advantages has modern democracy over Athenian democracy? Justice is not at the mercy of skillful speech, as it was before the heliasts. Politics is in the hands not of frivolous and suspected

* The treasury deducted one twenty-fourth of the revenues of the mines.

orators, but of experienced politicians. The man and the citizen are distinct; private enmities do not trouble the state within or compromise its security abroad. The nation rises above the greatest individual intellects. The government of Athens was a great convention formed of all the citizens and without control,—a dangerous balance, whose jerks in times of trying crises could overthrow the state. Modern republics are balanced; a prudent equilibrium unites stability and animation in them. Their course, regulated by harmony, follows the course of time. The Athenian people repudiated their demagogues, who were often unworthy favorites and extemporary representatives of the city, without proper authority or regular mandates. To-day the governess of the city is public opinion, and this queen governs, provided with the most excellent political organ,—universal suffrage,—an instrument decisive and pacifying.

III. The progress of moral sense is not less apparent than political and social progress; a manifest proof of this is found in the different judgments which the Athenians and we pass on Demosthenes as a man and an orator. In order to properly judge an ancient man, we must first replace him in his own sphere; we must go to him, instead of bringing him to us, and see him as his contemporaries saw him. Therefore we have often used the testimony of Aristotle, a powerful genius, in whom converged, as in a concentric focus, all the ideas of his century, illuminated by the light of the past.* His work, a genuine encyclopædia, is the *Sum* of Greek

* For his *Politics* alone, he made a collection of the constitutions of 158, or, according to some, of 250 democratic, oligarchical, aristocratic and tyrannic states.

philosophy. Now, ancient philosophy was universal science. We cannot, then, cite a more reliable witness of the feelings and ideas of the atmosphere in which Demosthenes lived. But while criticism remains faithful to the principle of consulting the past, it does not abdicate its right of personal appreciation. Demosthenes, then, remains amenable to the moral sense and taste of modern critics.

The Athenians were little affected by certain weaknesses of Demosthenes,—they found the same in themselves. Benign moralists, far from exacting that he should be better than his time, were disposed, by a feeling of their own infirmities, to plead extenuating circumstances in his favor. The author of the *Philippics* fled at Chæronea. Nature and destiny shared this fault with him. We are born courageous or timid, as we are born dark or fair. He could not resist the temptation to acquire money,—never did Philip's gold soil his hands. He loved pleasures,—well! who does not? The virtue of the citizen is of more importance than that of the private man. As a political orator, he did not recoil before a falsehood,—the object of eloquence is victory. He forgot himself to such a degree that he followed Æschines' example, and lavished insults upon him. Invective was an integral part of democratic liberty; it was not so essential to enlighten the judges as to prejudice them.

On these general points the moderns judge Demosthenes with less indulgence than his fellow-citizens did. They are severer in regard to moral weakness, and have the greatest respect for propriety and truth. Modern political eloquence attacks opinions, not persons. Mindful of dignity, which is a part of parliamentary dignity, it commands respect by respecting itself. A political

orator who is to-day convicted of public falsehood, loses his honor and credit. The Athenians were little moved by the impostures of their orators, and saw in these a means of delusion which custom justified. "The aim of the architect is to give to his work that harmony which satisfies the perceptions of the senses, and as far as possible, to invent methods which will deceive the sight by aiming at symmetry and everything that is not real but apparent." The theory of delusion was not confined, in Greece, to architecture; to-day deceptions are banished from eloquence.

The Athenians did not admire Demosthenes more than we do to-day; we perhaps appreciate him more by admiring him in a different manner. Ancient criticism was confined to a narrow channel, that of style,—the choice of words, the arrangement of sentences, harmony: such were its preferable objects. It compared as "engravers and sculptors"* the most dissimilar authors, such as Isocrates, Plato and Demosthenes. It gave special attention to the beauties of diction. Lucullus excused himself to Atticus for the faults found in his history written in Greece. He said that he had sown barbarisms and solecisms in it to show clearly that it was the work of a Roman. A Greek would never have dreamed of carrying the love of local color-

* Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On the Excellence of Demosthenes' Eloquence*, ch. 51. Cicero himself did not escape this fault. He separated the history of eloquence from political history, and saw only differences of style in orators who were separated by an interval of one hundred and twenty years, Appius Cæcus and Servius Galba (*De Claris Oratoribus*, 14 and 23). He commences the paragraph on Cato the orator by saying: "I leave aside the citizen, the senator and the general." What remains? Style (*Ibidem*, 17). Plutarch, who gave less attention than Cicero to elocution, gave a juster account of Cato's eloquence. (*Life of Cato*, 10.)

ing so far. The worship of form was the brilliant idolatry of the Hellenes.

The reputation of Isocrates,* and the sovereign authority which he enjoyed, astonish us to-day. Imagine a modern publicist profiting by his great fame in order to address one of the three emperors with a great written political oration, containing parentheses of this nature: "I pray your majesty will pardon me for using metaphors and metonymies so imperfectly. My years are the cause of it. I no longer have the vigor or talent of youth." This, however, was the condition of Isocrates, the great master of the art of diction. He wrote a long programme, in the form of a letter, to the Macedonian king, in which he pledged himself to give a direct contradiction to the "impertinent dreamers" who accused the king of meditating the enslavement of Greece, and to turn his forces and those of the Hellenes against the Persians:

"We have not given to this oration the dress of harmonious cadences, nor that of varied figures. I employed them in my youth, and instructed others in the ornaments which render eloquence agreeable and persuasive. To-day I cannot use them. My age prevents me."†

And who asked these ornaments of you, candid old man?

Modern readers do not clearly comprehend the thousand niceties and delicacies of ancient diction. Those minute precepts, that curious refinement of number, of assonances, of alliterations, and so many other arts which were taught and carefully practiced, and which

* "I have seen among my pupils orators, generals, princes and kings." (Isocrates, *Antidosis*.) They came from Sicily, and even from the Pontus, to be instructed in his school.

† *Oration to Philip.*

the ancients made state affairs, are now disdained even in our academies.* The Greeks and Romans were charmed with them, and applauded them in their gravest political speakers. When C. Gracchus spoke in public he had a musician concealed behind him, who quickly gave him a note on an ivory flute, in order to raise his voice if it fell too low, or to moderate it in the course of stormy debates.† In place of this musician, the regulator of the orator's intonations, modern assemblies employ a president, who represses the flights of speech, not those of the voice, and prevents the storms which the tribune's flute did not avert.

Modern eloquence has no ostentation. It has more regard for things than for their envelope. Like Chatham, Fox and Pitt, the orators of the French revolution generally improvised and disdained all revisions for the sake of impression. Even now, when the political fever is slumbering, eloquence owes little to art. The time is no more when the author of the *Panegyric* on Athens spent ten years in writing a

* Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, iii, 9, fin. The Latins followed, and on some points, perhaps, surpassed the Greeks. Quintilian, in a chapter *On Action*, teaches his orator the language of the fingers, not forgetting the thumb, which is also capable of certain effects: "To draw the index near the thumb, and to press its extremity upon the right side of the thumb-nail, relaxing the other fingers, is a gesture expressive of approbation, etc. etc. * * * " (The lesson *On Philosophy* given to M. Jourdain is here surpassed.) Such a disposition of the fingers expresses aversion; such, modesty. The author takes the trouble to inform us that Demosthenes undoubtedly pronounced the humble exordium of the oration *On the Crown* "with the first four fingers slightly closed at the extremity, his hand not far from his mouth," etc. He also states in what measure it is proper to strike one's sides and to stamp one's feet, "movements which are suited to indignation and awaken the judges. (*Institution Oratoire*, xi, 3.)

† *De Oratore*, iii, 60.

work of fifteen pages. To-day we would scarcely devote ten hours to the preparation of an oration. Atticism was simple and natural. It shunned large, sonorous words, and resplendent outbursts of eloquence. Its familiarity was always allied, in the shades and in the contexture of the whole, to an exquisite art. It might sometimes be pronounced *abandonné*, and *négligé*. It was the *négligé* of a woman naturally beautiful, but perfect in the art of pleasing. Modern simplicity is naïve and unpremeditated. Thought and sentiment alone attract.

P. L. Courier said of American journalism that it made use of the same style, whether the question was a reform in the state, a coalition of European powers against liberty, or "the best soil for sowing turnips." Our modern political orators do not speak entirely in the same tone in a debate on the constitution, or on the appointment of a door-keeper. Nevertheless, their eloquence always has a frankness that is foreign to the artistic cases of the ancients. The orator of to-day does not lecture; still less does he harangue. He exposes, he explains, he opens his thought, he opens his heart. His is an attentive, convincing conversation. He cannot and does not wish to use it otherwise. Time flies, affairs are pressing upon him. His speeches ought to be his acts. He addresses himself not to his hearers, but to his citizens. Like them, he owes his entire attention to the administration and to the government of his country. Is this not a commendable progress?

The artistic orator is sometimes tempted to make lamentable sacrifices to his art, and he gives to his audience æsthetic impressions, which indiscreetly draw them from the public interest under discussion. An-

cient eloquence avoided dry discussions, technical details and figures. It submitted to the same yoke as did history according to the conception of Herodotus, Livy and Tacitus. Modern history is no longer a branch of eloquence grafted with poetry. It is the mirror of the entire organization of the state, the exact and expressive relief of the different elements of the material, political, intellectual, and moral life of a people. Speech has shared with history the benefit of this transformation. Rhetoric is no more; eloquence is living, nourished more than ever in France and America by the excellent practice of affairs in liberty. Who has not during the past years been moved by the reading of orations which political wisdom and patriotism inspired in the orators of our parliament? Some of these harangues (a man familiar with Greek eloquence will be pardoned for the rashness of this judgment) approach, in certain respects, the masterpieces of Demosthenes. Maturity and fertility of thought, force of truth and captivating rapture, are equal. Why are they not equally admired and considered as fine as the ancient efforts? Because they are written in English or French, and are not two thousand years old.

The purely Attic beauties of Demosthenes are almost lost to us.* They often possess imperceptible shades; but there are imperishable beauties which will continue to resist the modifications of taste and the translators. His good sense, his logical force, his generous passion, will render Demosthenes famous

* Isocrates (*Antidosis*) cites a fragment of an oration of his youth. "This passage," says he, "is of an elocution more ornate than that which you have just heard." This difference certainly did not escape the Greeks. Even forewarned, the modern reader can scarcely comprehend it.

forever. Time has shaken off the delicate charms of his diction like so many flowers; the oak remains firm, supported by its powerful roots, adorned with its vigorous branches and the majesty of its crown. It is like the Parthenon robbed of the fragile ornaments of its polychromy, an inevitable obliteration, which does not in the least deprive the marble of its perfect beauty.

The orator and the politician are inseparable in Demosthenes.* They are both conspicuous in his acts and in his orations. In both two qualities are pre-

* Demosthenes at times had concentrated in his hands all the public powers, except that of strategus. After Charonea he could exculpate himself from the disaster by throwing it upon the generals. I was right in advising war. If you have been conquered it is because others have not done their duty. In preceding ages this excuse would have been impossible. When Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles, Alcibiades, or Nicias, proposed a military expedition, it was always understood that they did not refuse to take charge of it. They assumed the double responsibility of the counsel and of the execution. Thucydides (iv, 28) has shown how the currier Cleon, taken at his word by the people, was decreed strategus and victorious strategus in spite of himself. In Demosthenes' time the Athenians did not exact of their political orators that they should be both counsellors and men of action; therefore they never imposed the military command on Æschines, although in his youth he had borne arms successfully. Demosthenes, not being a military man, had his general, Diopithes. This distinction between the thought which inspires and the hand which executes is, in certain respects, a good one. Sometimes the people accuse of versatile inconsistency the men of opposition who have become men of government,—a reproach ill founded. The one sees above all things the absolute good, the other is placed in contact with practical difficulties. The opposition unrestrained in its ideal conceptions, and the government which has its hands bound by real necessities, represent the perpetual dualism of ideas and facts of the desirable and the possible. Each is legitimate; their antagonism conspires to the welfare of the state by preventing the exclusive and equally dangerous triumph of chimerical theory or of a narrow positivism. The true politician finds that medium which, in correcting the two systems, the one by the other, reconciles them.

dominant: warmth of passion and wisdom. True to the principle of the inviolability of national dignity, manifesting an invariable perseverance in his desired aim, he was judicious and versatile in the employment of means. His heart was proud and impetuous, his mind was serene and penetrating. He did not rush into war like a *mad blind man*; he well knew when to advise peace. He hated Philip instinctively and heartily. While his soul was enraged against him his mind meditated. He saw where the crafty policy of the Macedonian would insensibly drag Greece. He marvelously comprehended the carefully dissembled obstinacy of the cunning and insinuating invader of the Attic city. He had a presentiment of the incurable wound which the surrender of Athens would inflict upon the Hellenic world, then the grandest expression of humanity.

Equally inclined to a belief in fortune and providence, his religious sincerity incapable of prejudices and selfish considerations, united two pieties which insincerity alone could separate,—the religion of the gods and the religion of his country. Free to choose between the advantages of submission and the bitterness of the struggle, he struggled during thirty years against enemies of his country devoid of mercy and exhaustless, always conquered and yet worthy of conquering. His gravity contended against the levity of the Athenians; his vigor against their feebleness; his patriotic anxieties against their indifference. He consumed his forces in enlightening them and inspiring them with the spirit of their ancestors, which seemed to be centered in his breast; the energies and sufferings of his country sought refuge in his heart. On the point of falling into the hands of the Macedonians, he did

not invoke the men who abandoned him, but the gods whom he honored by loving his country. His destiny was stamped with an unfortunate fatality; his heroic character was more than tragic. When he was vanquished at Chæronea, the Athenians continued to see in him their benefactor, and it was just. If they had not faced this disaster "in emulation of a triumph," they would have fallen to the level of the Messenians and the Thessalians, instead of holding in Greece and in history that rank of supremacy in which their forefathers had placed them, and in which the esteem of posterity conferred upon them in their turn the reward which they had reserved for patriotism. At the call of Demosthenes they marched forth to contend for the crown, and they gained it.

If the moral weaknesses and the political passions of Athens are not entirely unknown to us, our state is better constituted than she was; our men and citizens are better. It was due to the soul and genius of the orator of the *Philippics*, that Athens, in her struggle with Macedonia, did not fail; but her own infirmity forced her to succumb; her past mistakes* and her present weakness weighed equally on her. In order to conquer or to survive her defeat, she must have changed; one man alone, however devoted and powerful, could not bring about in her this metamorphosis. France, in her struggle with a modern Macedonia, has survived unparalleled reverses because the causes of the disasters were not inherent in her. To recover, she had only to shake off the yoke. Despotism cut down the tree in order to gather the fruit; by virtue of its living roots and a wise cultivation, in a few years the tree sprouted again, and to-day it bears better fruit. De-

* The expedition to Sicily and Ægos Potamos nearly ruined Athens.

mosthenes at least saved the honor of his country. In 1870 France held her honor safe, and to-day we see it increasing in respect. When Demosthenes attempted to arouse the courage of his fellow-citizens by urging the efficient energy of human counsels against fortune, they reminded him of Philip's invincible destiny. Modern nations know how to have faith in Providence and liberty. God and France protect France.

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